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ABSTRACT
The Concept of Mind and Political Theory
May,

1980

Mark R. Weaver, B.A., Ohio University
M.

A-,

University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

Professor William E. Connolly

This study examines the connections between mind and politics or,

more specifically, between basic assumptions and assertions concerning
knowledge and mind on the one hand and the analysis of political
behavior and political phenomena on the other.
a general

Although it begins with

survey of the explicit, systematic treatment of the connect-

ions between theories of mind and theories of politics in traditional

political philosophy, the principal focus of this dissertation is on
the implicit,

fragmented views of knowledge and mind which are embedded

in contemporary explanatory frameworks and accounts of human behavior.

Drawing on recent work in linguistic philosophy of mind and and philosophy of action, the contestable philosophical assumptions underpinnning

classical liberal political theory as well as contemporary approaches
to the study of political behavior and political psychology are anal-

yzed.

The major part of the dissertation concentrates on exploring and

assessing the work of Stuart Hampshire,

a

contemporary linguistic

philosopher, as it relates to the conceptual issues and problems

V

concerning the description and explanation of political behavior.

Hampshire's comprehensive critique of the empiricist conceptual frame-

work and his attempt to formulate an alternative account of thought and
action are examined in detail.

This analysis of the conceptual issues

which are necessarily linked to any attempt to provide an adequate
account of human behavior includes such topics as the adequacy of a

dispositional treatment of mental concepts, the relationship between
beliefs and emotions, the role of intention in human behavior, the
unique problems of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, and the

connections between knowledge and action.
The final section focuses on the implications of Hampshire's anal-

ysis of the conceptual issues concerning thought and action for

political theory and political inquiry.

Among the major topics con-

sidered are the explication of the concepts of freedom, autonomy and

responsibility, the nature of description and its relation to evaluation, and the structure of explanation and the role of theory in

political inquiry.

In particular, Hampshire's conception of the

reflexive relation between theory and fact in the social and behavioral
sciences is developed and analyzed.

In this context,

this position is

assessed in relation to current debates concerning the notion of
science of politics modeled after the natural sciences.

a

It is argued

that although this view of explanation and theory in political inquiry

requires further development, it takes the first essential steps toward

resolving the serious conceptual and philosophical issues which now
confront the political theorist and researcher.
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CHAPTER

I

MIND AND POLITICS

Philosophy of Mind and Political Theory

All of the major thinkers in the Western tradition of political

philosophy recognized the importance of the connections between mind
and politics or, more specifically, between philosophical issues

concerning knowledge, mind and action on the one hand and the analysis
and evaluation of political behavior and political institutions on the

other.

Plato's Republic

,

which attempts to link

a

theory of social

structure with a particular conception of human nature, offers one of
the most powerful and influential of the treatments of mind and poli-

tics in Western political philosophy.

Moreover, it sets out the basic

conceptual framework which, with certain modifications, dominated
ancient Greek and medieval philosophy and political thought.

The Re-

public is therefore a useful starting point in an analysis of the

contributions and achievements as well as the deficiencies and failings
of the traditional treatment of mind and politics.
St<indard interpretations of the Republic have focused on Plato's

attempt to construct a vision of what the political system ought to be
like

— an

endeavor which he certainly considered to be one of the cen-

tral tasks of pnilosophy.

quite clear.

The basic features of this ideal state are

Building on the notion of the division of labor, he

constructs the picture of an ideal state in which the citizens are
divided into three classes.

In this ideal state, each class is charged
1

2

with a different economic and social function.

The guardians, who are

denied private property and family life, are responsible for the orga-

nization and supervision of the state.

The auxiliaries serve as the

soldiers, police and civil servants who defend the state and execute
the orders of the guardians.

The third class, which is made up of the

laborers and artisans, produces the material goods necessary for social
survival.

Social justice results from the harmonious cooperation of

these three separate parts of the state under the rule of the

guardians .

^

The centrality of the connections between mind and politics in

Plato's political theory becomes evident upon closer examination of
this account of the just state.

In the first place, it must be noted

that Plato, in his account of the ideal state, moves from arguing that

class divisions are necessitated by the division of labor to contending
that human beings are by nature divided into classes because each

person is suited to perform only one of the three functions.

The

foundation for this move is found in his account of human nature or the
human soul.

Plato's description of the individual soul mirrors his portrayal
of the ideal state.
parts:

The soul, like the state, is made up of three

reason, spirit and appetite.

The healthy personality or just

soul is, again like the ideal state, an organic whole in which the

three parts operate under the dominance of their proper master, in this
case reason.

In both the soul and state, justice is the harmonious

3

coordination of separate parts of

a

single whole which are charged with

different functions.
Moreover, according to Plato's analysis, it is the dominance of
one of these parts of the soul that explains the obvious differences in

personality types and that ultimately determines the particular class
into which each person will fall.

Although he recognizes the impor-

tance of education, training and other environmental factors, Plato

holds that people are born with the personality traits which make them
rulers, auxiliaries or laborers.

Justice and harmony result when the

citizens in the various classes know their proper place in the social
order and concentrate on the performance of their given class
function.

2

The connections between mind and politics are also especially

evident in books eight and nine of the Republic where Plato examines
the various types of unhealthy personalities which correspond to the

different types of unjust states:

the blind pursuit of honor which

dominates in the timocratic state; the love of wealth which characterizes the oligarchic state; the impetuous pursuit of all desires,
impulses and appetites which typifies the democratic state; and the
total domination of the baser appetites in the tyrannical state.

His

analysis of these stages of inevitable degeneration from the just state
and the just soul illustrates his conception of the reciprocal inter-

dependence of social order and human character.

According to the

and
Platonic conception of mind and politics, corruption of the soul

process.
corruption of the state are integral dimensions of the same

4

Plato clearly maintains that the founding of a just and harmo-

niously ordered state requires fundamental change in social structure
as well as in individual psychology.

He suggests that there cannot be

a just state unless it is made up of just individuals, and that just

individuals are, for the most part, the products of a just state.

In

short, Plato, utilizing a particular theory of human nature, attempts
to analyze the limits of what is possible given the type of personality

that dominates in a particular state or society, the likely develop-

ments within a given state or society, and the limits of what is

possible if fundamental alterations in the political system are made.

Although the above is only a brief and cursory summary of certain
of the arguments and themes in the Republic

.

it does illustrate the

importance of the connections between mind and politics in Plato's
work.

The Republic is not simply an abstract exercise in utopia-

building, but rather examines and criticizes the existing social order
and analyzes and explicates basic social, political and ethical con-

cepts which had become sources of confusion and disagreement.

Plato's

analysis of the problems of justice and social order is expressly

connected to an account of fundamental human characteristics, powers
and activities that emerges from an examination of problems which cut

across the modern boundaries separating epistemology

,

philosophy of

mind, ethics, psychology and political science.
Of course,

from the perspective of the mainstream political

scientist, the possible contribution of such a treatment of mind and

politics to our understanding of social structure, human nature, or the

5

relationship between the two seems minimal at best.

In the first

place, it appears that Plato's conception of the connections
between

human nature and social structure is simply an elaborate
analogy between a tripartite picture of the just state and a tripartite
account
of the just soul.

Alan

R.

White, for example, characterizes Plato's

portrayal of the soul as a "political theory of mind" in which "the
human mind is regarded as a microcosm of human politics."^

Thus, even

if it were granted that some background understanding of human nature
is essential

to the analysis of political behavior and political in-

stitutions, the path to such understanding is not philosophical specu-

lation and the construction of simplistic analogies.
Yet while it is certainly true that an elaborate analogy between
the just state and the just soul does lie at the core of Plato's at-

tempt to link his theory of social structure with an account of human

nature, his analyses of mind, human nature and the connections between

mind and politics extend far beyond this metaphor.

Despite the use of

analogies, the main arguments which Plato provides to support his

account of the soul or mind are largely independent of those used to
defend his conception of the ideal state.

The more substantial foun-

dation of Plato's political theory is a conception of human nature

which is based upon analyses of such topics as the mind- body problem,
the relationship between reason and desire, and the connections between

knowledge and action.

Moreover, the most serious objections to the

groundwork of Plato's political theory raised by later theorists center
not in his analogy drawing illegitimate connections between theory of

6

mind and political theory, but rather in unresolved problems in
the

philosophy of mind, philosophy of knowledge and metaphysics which were
to serve a secure foundation for this theory of the state.

The conceptual framework through which Plato identifies, clas-

sifies and characterizes human motivation and behavior is definitely
not as simplistic as White and other modern philosophers and social

scientists have often asserted.

First, Plato bases his claim that the

soul is divided into different parts on the fact that there are inner

conflicts within the soul:

a man who is thirsty and desires a drink

but who knows that the water is bad and desires not to drink, or a man
who feels a desire to look at corpses but is disgusted and angered by

such feelings and desires not to look.

Moreover, although he inter-

prets such cases as supporting a tripartite conception of personality,
the fundamental division in his account of soul is a sharp distinction

between the rational and irrational parts of the soul.

Plato portrays

the personality or soul in terms of constant conflict between reason on
the one hand, and the various appetites, impulses, desires and emotions

on the other.

Reason, according to this influential conception of human nature,

must correct or restrain these nonrational forces if the soul is to be
just and happy.

Individuals whose souls are not ruled by reason are

doomed to perpetual discontent because they must forever pursue bodily

appetites and pleasures which are without limit and therefore insatiable.

Only those souls in which reason has established an ordering

of desires can find true happiness.

Also,

for Plato, the question of

°

7

whether or not

a

person is truly happy cannot be answered by a simple

introspection of his or her feelings at

a

particular moment, but rather

requires examination of the entire order or structuring of one's soul.
Thus, his theory of mind suggests an account of consciousness which

allows for extensive self-deception or "false consciousness" as in the
case of the despot or tyrant who deludes himself about his own inevi-

tably unhappy condition.

5

In addition, like other Greek thinkers, most notably Socrates,

Plato is very much interested in the relationship between knowledge and
the well-being of the human soul as well as the central role of in-

dividual self-knowledge in our moral, social and political life.

This

concern is most evident in the early sections of the Republic which are

written in the form of Socratic dialogues, exchanges of questions and
answers which are designed to elicit, clarify and analyze the participant's opinions and convictions.

The point or purpose of the

Socratic dialogue is to generate self-knowledge by forcing the participants to first confront their own confusion and ignorance.

The

knowledge generated is of a special kind in that it cannot simply be
transmitted in the form of laws or theorems but rather emerges from a
questioning process that reaches into one's own soul.

Thus, the

Socratic dialogue rates the conviction of the participants in their
beliefs and the genuine give and take of intellectual endeavor as more

important than the attempt to arrive at certain truths through systematic adherence to given standards of proof and argument.

8

Philosophers and political theorists have commented extensively on
Plato's abandonment of the Socratic dialogue, execpt as a rhetorical
device, in the course of the Republic

.

Although Plato recognizes that

the Socratic method is often useful in clearing away false beliefs, he

seems to conclude that a positive method is necessary in order to

obtain true knowledge.

He converts Socrates'

argument that in order to

define a moral virtue such as justice, we must identify the essence of
the concept rather than simply giving examples of just behavior into a

position which holds that there must be a transcendental essence common
to all things of a particular kind.

In addition, he abandons the

Socratic approach which emphasizes the moral reform of individual souls
through rational persuasion and attempts to legislate a new social
order in which the wise shall rule.
c

Yet, despite these much discussed differences between the posi-

tions staked out by Socrates and Plato, Plato remains preoccupied with
the problems confronting the Socratic conception of the relationship

between knowledge and virtue.

As a result, the conceptual framework

through which he confronts philosophical and political problems is
radically different from that which has dominated the liberal political
tradition.

For example, like Socrates, Plato makes no distinction

between the knowledge of effective or efficient means for arriving at a
given end and the knowledge of the particular end at which one is
aiming.

In much the same way that one cannot administer medicine

without having an adequate conception of health, one cannot act correctly in politics and morals without understanding the purpose of

9

moral and political discourse and activity.

Plato follows Socrates in

holding that an individual must possess a certain kind of knowledge and
a proper psychic

structure in order to live a just and good life.

This

conception of an intimate relationship between self-knowledge on the
one hand and moral and political action on the other constitutes, as we

shall see, one of the most significant differences between classical
and liberal treatments of mind and politics.

7

The accounts of the internal conflict between the rational and

nonrational parts of the soul and of the connections between self-

knowledge and human action are but two features of the conceptions of
self, mind and knowledge which underpin the theory of the state pre-

sented in the Re public

.

As Plato's successors in the Western political

tradition recognized, effective criticism of these theories of mind and

knowledge undercuts the political theory which they support.
this reason that much of the critical analysis of Plato'

s

It is for

political

theory has focused on his philosophy of mind and his epistenology as
well as the more specific connections which Plato himself makes between

mind and knowledge on the one hand and the theory of the just state on
the other.

Plato's portrayal of mind in terms of a fundamental division
between rational and irrational elements has been very influential in

various attempts to construct a theory of human nature throughout the

history of Western thought.

However, there are serious conceptual

problems with this model of mind and significant weaknesses in the
arguments which Plato uses to support this model.

Aristotle, for

10

example, challenges the notion that all desires are essentially ir-

rational products of the appetitive part of the soul which necessarily

conflict with the rational part of the soul.

While Aristotle does not

deny that there are conflicts within the soul, he seems to contrast

rational and irrational desires rather than assume a fixed opposition

between reason and appetite.

Q

He thus challenges the Platonic con-

ception of personality by showing that Plato's analysis of inner conflicts does not provide adequate support for positing a sharp dichotomy

between rational and irrational parts of the soul.
In addition, certain of Plato's successors have challenged his

assigning reason and mind a special status in his portrayal of human
nature.

Reason is here pictured as the one quality which sets human

beings apart from other animals and which constitutes their essential
nature.

The powers of the human mind, as expressed in thought and

knowledge, are considered vastly superior to sensory experiences and

bodily pleasures, giving his account of mind

a

transcendental and

Puritanical flavor.
One of the principal supports for this conception which elevates
those rational faculties associated with the soul over those irrational

characteristics associated with the body is a mind-body dualism which
Q

Plato inherited from earlier Greek thought.

The rational soul, the

true center of the self, is an independent entity or agency which

occupies the body for a relatively brief period of time.
dwelling in the world of sense experience, is but

a

The body,

temporary dwelling

place from which the immortal soul will eventually depart.

The ex-

11

posure of problems with this particular account of the relationship

between mind and body, like criticism of the account of internal conflicts within the soul, undercuts the Platonic conception of the di-

vision between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul, where
reason is supposed to restrain or correct man's nonrational impulses
and inclinations.

Of course, these points merely touch upon the complex set of

problems and topics that must be addressed in order to assess the

conception of soul or mind which provides the central core of Plato's
account of human nature.

Yet, this brief discussion of Plato's con-

ception of mind and criticisms of it does provide an example of one of
the central dimensions of the connections between mind and politics as

these as presented and understood by the classical political theorists.
One of the most significant questions that can be raised in connection
to any theory of politics or society concerns the adequacy of the

conception of mind, the conceptual framework for classifying and characterizing the fundamental facts about human thought and behavior,
which is used in describing, analyzing and evaluating political
behavior and institutions.
In addition, again as the Republic and later critiques of it

clearly illustrate, the connections between mind and politics extend
beyond the confines of philosophy of mind as narrowly construed.

Although the arguments in six of the ten books of the Republic are not

expressly linked to the Theory of the Forms, Plato's metaphysical and
epistemological views are, like his account of mind, central under-

.
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pinnings of his political theory.

Plato makes a fundamental distinc-

tion between belief, which is based upon uncertain and transitory sense

experiences, and knowledge, which is of unchanging objects apprehended

directly through reason.

The world

vre

experience through the senses is

only a shadow, reflection or copy of the real world or ideas of Forms.
The Forms are immutable, transcendental, timeless, and independently

existing concept-objects which are the sources or causes of things in
this world and which can be known only through advanced philosophical

understanding
According to this doctrine, a person can know what a tree, individual, state, justice and goodness are only if he becomes, through
the use of speculative reason, acquainted with the relevant Forms.

The

Forms provide an understanding of the relationship between universals
and particulars, a solid ground of certainty for claims to knowledge,

and absolute standards of moral and political conduct.

As a meta-

physical doctrine regarding the nature of persons, objects and values,
and as an epistemological theory concerning knowledge of persons,

objects, and values, the Theory of the Forms permeates Plato's

political and ethical theories.
The most widely recognized and criticized direct connection be-

tween Plato's epistemological and metaphysical views on the one hand
and his political theory on the other is found in that section of the

Republic where he makes explicit use of the Theory of the Forms to
support his portrayal of the ideal state.

Plato here argues that

personalities
only those who are born to be guardians (those having

13

which are subject to the rule of reason) are fit to receive the
education which will enable them to know the Forms.

All the other

citizens will be told a myth about the mixture of base and precious

metals in the soul to explain their place in the social and natural
order.

Justice in the individual soul and in the state can be esta-

blished only where political power is wielded by those few guardians or

philosopher kings who can know the Forms.
Plato thus portrays the knowledge which is required to participate
in political decision-making as a matter of expertise, much like the

knowledge which is necessary in order to practice medicine.

The Theory

of the Forms is openly used to justify the division between the few who
can recognize what is good, just and proper, and the many who must

accept the fact that their rulers know better than themselves what is
for their own good or in their own best interest.

Of course, there have been numerous objections to this elitist

doctrine and the idealist-intuitionist philosophical position which
supports it.

For example, among many points which Aristotle makes

against this doctrine is his distinction between the kind of knowledge

which is characteristic of practical reasoning as oppposed to that
which typifies speculative or theoretical reasoning.

Aristotle clas-

sifies speculative reasoning, which is the product of intellectual
training, as the process which governs philosophy, physics, mathe-

matics, and other subjects where knowledge is pursued for its own sake.
habit and
In contrast, practical reasoning, which is the product of
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experience, concerns the kind of knowledge pursued for the sake of

action as in ethics and politics.
This distinction between practical and theoretical reason and

knowledge as well as other elements in Aristotle's epistemological and
metaphysical doctrines provide

a

potential base for challenging the

elitist position linked to the Theory of the Forms.

The connections

between knowledge and politics are quite evident here in that criticism
of the epistemological, metaphysical and metaethical positions which
are associated with the Theory of the Forms has extensively undercut
the theory of social structure advanced in the Republic

.

At the same time, the most powerful and deepest connections be-

tween a certain political theory on the one hand and metaphysical and

epistemological theories on the other are much more subtle and indirect
than has so far been suggested.

Basic metaphysical and epistemological

assumptions or positions, like assumptions or assertions concerning
mind and action, constitute the deepest levels of the conceptual frame-

work which is the basis of any attempted description, analysis and/or
evaluation of political phenomena.

This framework includes fundamental

metaphysical stands on the nature of the world around us, the relationships between the self and objects in this world, and the relationships

between the self and other persons.

It also incorporates a set of

epistemological views concerning knowledge of the external world, other
persons and ourselves as well as views regarding the connections be-

tween such knowledge and human action.

These metaphysical and epis-

temological assumptions and assertions are intimately linked to those

15

stated positions and implicit assumptions concerning the mind-body

relation, the relationship between reason and the appetites or passions, and other topics in philosophy of mind which form the core of a

conception of human nature, self or personality.
In short, there are a number of different ways in which a certain

political theory is connected to basic philosophical positions regarding the nature of mind, knowledge and reality.

The single most im-

portant of these connections is found in the conception of human nature
which, incorporating and reflecting these philosophical positions, is
an essential and ineliminable part of the conceptual framework through

which the political theorist perceives and interprets political
reality.

One of the strongest attributes of classical political phi-

losophy is that the classical theorists recognized the importance of
this connection and typically attempted to set out, systematically and

clearly, the views of self, mind, knowledge and so on which underpinned

their theories of politics and society.
Of course, this does not mean that either the classical accounts
of self, knowledge and mind or the manner in_ which the classical theo-

rists treated the connections between mind and politics are free of
problems.

Indeed, one of the basic reasons for the modern skeptical

attitude toward the traditional analyses of mind and politics is that
there are serious objections to not only the answers which the clasalso the
sical philosophers provided to the questions they raised but

questions.
manner in which they raised and attempted to answer these

16

More specifically, there are powerful challenges to the basic conceptual framework, including the views of human knowledge, reality and

philosophy itself, which formed the common background of the ancient
and medieval treatments of mind and politics.

The essential features of this framework which dominated the

classical approach to mind and politics are set out by Plato.

Plato

presents an idealist metaphysics and epistemology which portrays the
physical world as an illusion and our everyday understanding of this
world as worthless.

He argues that the only way to obtain certain

knowledge of the real world, the world of universal, ideal and timeless
Forms, is through

matics.

a

kind of speculative reasoning modeled on mathe-

According to this position, human beings can discover their

predetermined place in the natural order, as defined by the Forms,
through the use of their intellect.
This is the basic framework from which the classical and medieval

discussions of mind and politics never escaped.
of mind and politics rest upon this conception of

Traditional theories
a

universal cosmic

order, an order of Forms or ideas, in which human beings have
and established place.

a

given

To attain knowledge of the universal Forms or

ideas is considered the only path through which human beings can put

themselves in touch with the meaning and purpose incorporated
cosmic order.

in

the

According to the classical view, it is the task of

philosophy to discover man's real nature and his place

in

the natural

order, to uncover the basic nature of human experience and existence.
It

is assumed that philosophers can,

through the use of pure and

.
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abstract reason, determine the origin, basic components, and structure
of the universe.

The traditional philosophers attempt, through de-

ductive metaphysics or system-building, to arrive at an understanding
of the ultimate nature of reality and knowledge,

a

seemingly solid

enough foundation for the analysis of mind and politics.

^"^

Certainly, there are significant differences which separate the

specific conceptions of self, knowledge and mind as well as the

theories of society and politics advanced by various philosophers in
the ancient and medieval periods.

The philosophical, political and

social doctrines set out by Plato and Aristotle, for example, exhibit

some rather obvious differences.

In particular,

Aristotle is highly

critical of the Theory of the Forms and specifically rejects the
idealist position which holds that objects in this world are only
shadows, reflections or copies of unchanging Forms.

Aristotle contends

that the basic particulars in the realm of sense experience and or-

dinary discourse, individual objects such as man or house, are real.
His major metaphysical concern is not with the question of whether or
not these things exist, but rather with understanding what they are, or

those identifying features of an object which make it the kind of thing
it is

Aristotle's analysis of the identification and classification of
objects proceeds in his terminology of form and matter, essence and
substance.

He concludes that there

is a universal

and unchanging

element within each object which makes it what it is and which dis-

tinguishes it from other kinds of objects.

Thus, the world around us

.
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is not a mere copy of a transcendental world of ideas, but rather in-

corporates the universal and ideal.

Although these universals or ideas

must be embodied in the world of particulars, they have

jective existence.

a

real, ob-

Aristotle suggests that we attain knowledge of

these universals by examination of the physical world for hints of the

order of ideas, the reality lying behind sensible particulars, rather
than by turning completely away from our experience of the physical

world

Centering around his rejection of the Theory of the Forms,
Aristotle offers comprehensive and detailed analyses of problems
cutting across metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind which
call for drastic revisions in the Platonic views of self, knowledge and

mind.

Yet, despite these significant differences between the

Aristotelian and Platonic theories of mind and politics, Aristotle
continues to work within the basic framework which portrays the
universe as

a

natural order of ideas.

If the Aristotelian view of the universe, each thing,

man and the polls, has

a

including

distinct and unique place in the cosmic order

which is defined and determined by the order of ideas.

At the top of

this universal order is the immaterial and unchanging Unmoved Mover

which is the source of all motion and change.

Every other thing in the

natural order is seen as striving to realize its own appropriate form,
to fulfill

its own nature or to achieve its own proper end.

key Aristotelian concepts are teleological

,

All the

for knowledge of the things
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in nature is necessarily knowledge of the final causes,

ends or pur-

poses of things.

Like Socrates and Plato before him, Aristotle holds that human

beings can obtain knowledge of the essential and unchanging features of
a

thing which lie behind its incidental and varying features.

Thus,

the study of nature and things in nature is ultimately the study of the

order of universal ideas.

Aristotle's notion of unchanging and time-

less ideas, universals or essences which are embodied in the physical

world is directly inherited from Plato.
that these ideas or universals have

a

Like,

Plato, Aristotle holds

real, objective existence, al-

though he tends to portray them as organizational principles which are
embodied in the world of particulars rather than as transcendent Forms.

According to the Aristotelian conception, the aim of the sciences is to
arrive at definitions which state the essence or essential properties

of things.

In a very real

sense, this doctrine of intelligible

essences and the Aristotelian conception of

present

a

a

unified universal order

revised version of the Platonic theory of ideas.
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This doctrine of intelligible essences and the realted notion of
the universe as an order of ideas dominates classical and medieval

discussions of mind and politics.

According to this classical view,

the study of morals and politics, is, like the study of nature, a

search for definitions which capture the essence or essential pro-

perties of those things being studied.

It

follows that the primary

concern of the study of morals and politics is the definition of man
realization of
who, as a part of the natural order, moves toward the

a

6

.
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predetermined end or purpose which marks his particular place

in this

order
The attempt to define man becomes a search for the essence of

man

— that

which is unique about him and which sets him apart from other

things in the universe.

Cur understanding of morals and politics is,

according to this conception, dependent upon discovering those powers,

characteristics or activities which constitute his end or purpose and
which make him what he is.

Knowledge of human nature, and in turn of

moral and political behavior, is knowledge of essences.

1

From his analysis of the functions of the soul, Aristotle con-

cludes that although man shares certain capacities with other forms of
life,
is

intelligence belongs to man alone.

Like Plato, he argues that it

ultimately the power to reason which is exclusively human and which

constitutes the essence of human nature.

Moreover, despite his re-

cognition of the importance of practical reasoning, he follows Plato in

characterizing speculative reasoning as the highest and most pleasant
form of human activity.

Against the background of his notion of self-

sufficiency, Aristotle constructs an almost Platonic portrayal of the

ultimate end or purpose of human life in terms of philosophical con-

templation of timeless and unchanging ideas.
In

short, although many of his arguments suggest an emphasis on

practical rationality, the importance of our sense experience of the
world around us, or developmental treatments of men and society,

Aristotle ultimately returns to
Plato's Theory of the Forms.

a

position which is very close to

Aristotle's view of rationality as
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marking the essence of human nature is tied to his conception of an
order of universals or ideas which establishes the pattern of all

processes of realization and development, which is on

a

separate and

higher metaphysical plane than the world we know through sense experience, and which can be apprehended by human beings only through the
use of speculative reason.
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This general framework, particularly in the form of the scholastic

synthesis of Greek philosophy and Christian theology best respresented
by Aquinas, prevailed until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
This scholastic vision mirrored the Aristotelian portrayal of the

universe as
a

a

hierarchical and purposeful order in which each thing has

proper and distinct place.

Each thing is seen as having not only an

assigned meaning and purpose as part of God's creation but also as

having

a

purposes.

natural motion or inherent activity in the service of God's
In this

medieval framework, the earth remains the center of

the universe and man, at least in his ultimate heavenly state, remains
the highest purpose of God's creation.

Any discussion of mind and pol-

itics necessarily begins with an account of man's established place in
the natural order, which can only be determined in relation to God's

overall plan.
The fact that this construct of

a

universal order of ideas or

Forms and the doctrine of essences were so closely associated with the

classical treatments of mind and politics is one of the principal

obstacles to recognizing the very real contributions of these analyses
of mind and politics.

After all, the classical approach to mind and
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politics is directly tied to an outdated and discredited conception of
the scope and function of philosophy:
a

the conception of philosophy as

deductive or transcendental metaphysics which aims at discovering the

ultimate nature of reality.

This conception of philosophy as

a

kind of

super-science which, through the use of "pure reason," deduces the
ultimate structure of reality, whether physical or social, is now

completely rejected.

To the extent that the enterprise of mind and

politics is linked to this kind of deductive or transcendental .metaphysics, it is perceived as

a

pre-scientif ic

,

speculative approach to

questions which can be properly answered only through rigorous application of the scientific method.
Moreover, as we have seen, the classical approach to mind and

politics typically fits the following pattern:

starting with

a

set of

epistemological and metaphysical doctrines, the theorist constructs
conception of human nature from which
can be derived or deduced.

a

a

theory of politics or society

This type of approach remains dominant even

among those theorists writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-

turies who expressly reject the claims of transcendental metaphysics
and attempt to apply the emerging scientific methodology to the study

of mind and politics.

During this period, theories of knowledge and

mind and the accounts of human nature they support are used to set the
limits of prudential rationality that would provide the foundation of

a

stable civil order, to sketch the "natural" or "real" man as opposed to
his "social" and "artificial" counterpart, to outline the inherent

limitations of human character which require restraint or mobilization

.
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for social purposes, and to portray the extensive inherent
potential
for development which requires certain social conditions to be re-

leased.

These various accounts of knowledge, mind and human nature

serve as the foundations for competing traditions and perspectives

within Western ethical and political thought.
The organization of Hobbes' Leviathan

,

which expressly rejects the

scholastic framework, provides one of the clearest and most systematic
examples of this approach to mind and politics.

establish

a

Hobbes' attempt to

scientific approach to the study of politics begins with an

analysis of the basic building blocks of cognition and proceeds to
outline the mechanical apparatus involved in the basic "motions" of the
individual human being, including sense, imagination, speech, reason
and the passions.
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Working outward from this mechanistic account of

individual belief, thought, motivation and behavior, he then formulates
a

theory of human behavior in society which, focusing on man's inces-

sant desire for power, sets out the basic laws of human interaction and

prudential reason.

This detailed account of human nature constructed

in the first part of Leviathan is clearly intended to put his

theory of the commonwealth on

a

solid, scientific foundation.

following
Thus,

Hobbes' political theory, including his analyses of sovereignty, the

basic determinants of conflict and stability, law and punishment and so
on,

is supposed to be derived or deduced

from his account of human

nature
Certainly, not all of the traditional theorists are this systematic or rely so extensively on the deductive method in tracing the
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connections between mind and politics.

The traditional treatments of

mind and politics differ extensively in the degree of their detail and
thoroughness, in their major point of concern or emphasis, in their

methods of analysis, and in their background assumptions or the starting points of their analyses.

presents

a

Yet traditional political philosophy

general, inclusive picture of society, government and

politics which is linked to some view of human nature.

Moreover, all

of the major classical theorists place a common emphasis on formulating
a

coherent theory of human nature as an essential part of their

attempts to classify, explain and evaluate political institutions,

political behavior and political life.
One of the most important dimensions of traditional political

philosophy, particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
is the criticism and construction of the theories of knowledge, mind

and action which underpin or support alternative political theories.
For example,

an essential component of Rousseau's attempt to refute

Hobbes' political theory is his critique of the Hobbesian accounts of

motives, will and agency, reflection and consciousness, the relationship between reason and the passions, the connections between language
and thought, the "natural"-"social" distinction, and other issues which

reach into philosophy of mind and epistemology

20
.

Moreover, Rousseau's

alternative accounts of these topics form the core of the different

conception of human nature which serves as the grounding for his own

characterization of the causes of political conflict and stability,

25

sovereignty, slavery, inequality and the other central ingredients of
his own political theory.
Thus, even those traditional political philosophers who reject the

construct of

a

transcendental order of ideas and the notion of phi-

losophy as deductive metaphysics follow Plato and Aristotle in addressing the critical task of analyzing the philosophical premises of

competing theories of politics or social structure as well as the

constructive task of attempting to formulate
philosophical foundation for

a

a

coherent and consistent

theory of politics or society.

From the

perspective of the mainstream political scientist, this treatment of
mind and politics still relies too extensively on

a

philosophical or

speculative approach which contributes very little to the principal
task of political science:

phenomena.

In particular,

the explanation and analysis of political
the entire enterprise of mind and politics,

as well as the general, grand-scale theories of human nature, politics

and society which were the products of this enterprise, are associated

with two major characteristics of classical political philosophy which
are thought to set it fundamentally apart from political science.

In

brief, as one recent text in research methodology states, "The study of

politics practiced during the classical period tended to be normative
in concern and deductive in method."

Thus,

losophy,

it
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according to this portrayal of traditional political phiis

essentially normative in character and purpose and is

principally concerned with prescribing the ideal political system or

recommending particular political goals and values.

This same text
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acknowledges Machiavelli as one of the few in "the classical period"
who attempted to explain the actual workings of government and political institutions, but characterizes him as an exception to the rule:

... by and large students of politics in this period
turned their attention to Utopian states, to the justification of institutionalized value preferences, and,
rarely if ever, to the real-world operation of existing
governmental institutions.
In
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short, this perceived difference between traditional political

philosophy and political science rests upon the distinction between
facts and values, or between "is" and "ought."

The classical theorists

wrote primarily to influence political beliefs, values and behavior, an

essentially normative activity, and were for the most part unconcerned
with making empirical statements or generalizations about actual political behavior and institutions.
In other words,
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the conceptions of mind and knowledge and human

nature were formulated by the traditional theorists to support certain
sets of normative conclusions or particular political or social move-

ments.

Tne theories of human nature presented by the traditional

political philosophers were designed for such purposes as to justify
the state by setting out the grounds of political obligation, to

rationalize and justify existing economic, social or political arrangements and institutions, or to support and justify particular social and

political policies or more general policy orientations.
the examination of the normative implications of

a

Thus, while

particular concep-

political
tion of human nature is a legitimate task, the traditional
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philosophers either lacked completely any sense of the distinction
between facts and values or failed to set normative questions about
what human beings or society should be apart from empirical questions
about what human nature and society actually are.
In addition,

as the text cited

above also notes, the traditional

political philosophers lacked the sophisticated scientific techniques
and scientific methodology which have served as the foundation for the

most significant advances in political science.

One of the principal

problems with traditional political philosophy is that the conception
of human nature which underpins a particular historical theory is

typically an

b

priori philosophical psychology or

phical anthropology.

ai

priori philoso-

More generally, the grand-scale theories of

politics, society and human nature advanced by the classical theorists
not only lack adequate empirical support but also are so sweeping and

general that they are immune to refutation or objection on the basis of

empirical evidence.

Moreover, any attempt to deduce or derive

of politics or society from

a

conception of human nature or

a

theory

a

parti-

cular metaphysics, no matter how systematic, is clearly at odds with
the methodological requirements of contemporary social science.
In

short, the classical notion of essential and ineliminable

connections between mind and politics or between philosophy and
political inquiry is identified with the discredited attempt to derive
or deduce a normative political theory from an

a

priori conception of

human nature or an even more general metaphysical or epistemological
theory.

According to the dominant conception of

a

science of politics.
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political science has, by adopting the scientific method, freed itself
from the philosophical dimension which was so central to traditional

political philosophy.

It

is still widely assumed that we have pro-

gressed (or are now progressing) from the kind of pre-scientif ic traditional political theory which necessarily rests on

a

priori philoso-

phical accounts of human nature, mind, action and so on, to

a

purely

empirical science of politics in which we can construct theories
exactly as in the physical sciences.
This dominant model of

a

science of politics or society, which is

frequently labeled the "positivist" model because it has been prin-

cipally influenced by the logical positivist account of the methodology
of the natural sciences, maintains that political inquiry, or, more

generally, the social and behavioral sciences, must be structured

according to the same methodological principles identified with the
natural sciences.

According to this positivist conception of scien-

tific explanation, singular events or facts are explained in reference
to empirical generalizations or laws, and these laws are in turn ex-

plained in reference to

a

theory.

Also, the prevailing account of

a

genuine scientific theory, the so-called "orthodox view" of theories,
is that of a hypothetico-deductive system in which the laws or gen-

eralizations subsumed under the theory can be deduced from the basic
principles of the theory.
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However, this pervasive conception of

a

science of politics which

which is
is completely distinct and autonomous from philosophy and

.
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structured according to the positivist formulation of the methodological principles of the physical sciences is open to challenge either as
an account of the present state of the discipline or as a statement of

the ultimate goal and future direction of political inquiry.

In the

first place, recent work in philosophy of science has raised serious

questions concerning the adequacy of the positivist model of the
structure of scientific explanation and scientific theory.

Such works

as Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Stephen

Toulmin's Foresight and Understanding have challenged major features of
this positivist model by focusing attention on the conceptual framework
or scheme which is required to identify, classify and explain

phenomena

According to Kuhn and Toulmin, particular scientific theories as
well as the general framework common to

a

particular mode of inquiry

embody certain conceptual presuppositions about what is normal, to be
expected and requires no further explanation and what is abnormal,

unexpected and does require some explanation.

Since the conceptual

presuppositions structure the basic processes of identification and

observation of phenomena as well as the processes of classification and
explanation, some of the basic tenets of the positivist conception of
the structure of scientific explanation and scientific theory are

brought into question.

Kuhn,

Toulmin and others have contested such

major features of the positivist model as the standard account of the

relationship between theory and fact which underpins the predominant
treatment of issues concerning the testing and validation of theories

.
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as well as the distinction between the "theoretical" and "observa-

tional" languages of

view of theories

a

theory which has been central to the orthodox

25

In addition to this work focusing on the adequacy of the posi-

tivist conception of the methodological principles of the natural

sciences, there is an additional challenge to the positivist model of

a

science of politics or society which concentrates on the problems

confronting those who attempt to apply the scientific methodology
developed in the natural sciences to the study of human society and
behavior.

For example, some recent work concerning the methodology of

political science in particular and of the social and behavioral

sciences in general suggests that this problem of conceptual presup-

positions is even more acute when the phenomena to be explained are
In an article titled

human behavior and activity.

"Neutrality in

Political Science," Charles Taylor maintains that one of the essential

conceptual presuppositions of the explanatory frameworks used in
political inquiry is what he calls

a

"schedule of human needs, wants
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and purposes."

According to Taylor, such

a

schedule of human needs, wants and

purposes is one of the minimal requirements of

a

conceptual framework

which is adequate for explaining political behavior and processes as
opposed to offering simply
nomena.
in

Of course,

a

descriptive account of political phe-

if a particular schedule of human needs is mistaken

some fundamental way,

the explanatory framework which incorporates

explanation
or presupposes it cannot provide an adequate and accurate
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of political behavior and other political phenomena.

Taylor's thesis suggests that

a

In short,

careful reconsideration of at least

part of the traditional account of the connections between mind and

politics is mandated.

As he states,

A conception of human needs thus enters into a given
political theory, and cannot be considered something
extraneous which we later add to the framework to yield
27
a set of value judgements.

Similar conclusions are reached in

J.

Donald Moon's analysis of

the structure of social scientific explanation and theory, "The Logic

of Political Inqiury:

A Synthesis of Opposed

Perspectives."

Moon

demonstrates how Half Dahrendorf's and Chalmers Johnson's theories of
social change implicitly incorporate and depend upon "certain funda-

mental conceptions about human needs and purposes

..." 28

More gen-

erally, one of the essential characteristics of all explanatory theories generated in the social sciences

".

.

.

is that they make implicit

assumptions regarding human motivation, sociality and rationality."
In short,
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the explanatory theories utilized in contemporary political

science, like the theoretical frameworks sketched by the traditional

political philosophers, "presuppose

a

particular 'model of man'."

As both Taylor and Moon recognize, the explanatory power of the

theories developed in the social and behavioral sciences rests, at
least in part, on the conception of human nature which is incorporated,

whether unref lectively and fragmentarily or reflectively and systematically, into

a

particular theoretical framework.

Clearly, further
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analysis of this problem of conceptual presuppostions

,

particularly

those concerning human motivation and behavior, and of what this

problem means in terms of the structure and function of explanation and
theory in the social sciences is necessary.'^''

Yet it is clear that the

political scientist cannot afford to simply assume that an approach to
the study of politics, society and human behavior based upon scientific

techniques and methods is automatically and completely presuppositionless.

The task of examining the possible connections between these

conceptual presuppositions, which center in

nature or

a

a

conception of human

model of man, and the explanation and analysis of political

phenomena marks one of the fundamental links between traditional political philosophy and modern empirical theory.
Of course, this does not mean that the political theorist and

researcher can return to the program of deductive metaphysics or the

construction of the kind of

a

priori conceptions of man and mind which

typified the traditional treatment of mind and politics.

It is clear

that any conception of human nature which is fabricated in isolation

from empirical research on human motivation and behavior or which is

immune to objection or refutation on the basis of such research is

unacceptable.

At a minimum,

an adequate conception of human nature

must necessarily incorporate the work which has been done in the social
and behavioral sciences on the following topics:

the analysis of the

basic appetites, drives or instincts within the personality or psyche
and the psychic processes through which these forces are shaped, chan-

nelled or controlled; analysis of the alteration of these basic psychic
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forces through environmental, social or cultural arrangements and

processes; and analysis of those environmental factors and conditions

which are conducive to human satisfaction, happiness, fulfillment or
development as opposed to those social processes, arrangements and
structures which block such end states and cause insecurity, anxiety
and frustration.
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Yet while the discoveries and findings emerging from research on

these topics hopefully will displace the

a

priori models of man which

continue to infect explanatory frameworks and theories, it cannot
simply be assumed that all philosophical questions raised by the

traditional theorists in their discussions of mind and politics will

automatically disappear with the advance of the social and behavioral
sciences.

Many of the most significant disagreements separating the

traditional accounts of human nature concern such issues as the free

will-determinist debate, the materialist-dualist debate, and the
controversy concerning the nature of moral values and their relationship to statements of fact.

The questions raised in these debates are

partially if not principally philosophical or conceptual questions as
opposed to empirical questions.

This certainly does not mean that "the

facts" are irrelevant to attempts to answer these questions, but it

does mean that such questions and controversies cannot be resolved

solely on the basis of scientific discovery and observation.
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In

other words, many of the most important of the persistent controversies
about human nature are not simply disagreements "about the facts," but

rather are more fundamental disagreements concerning the conceptual
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framework through which we identify and classify the facts about human
thought, motivation and behavior.

Certainly, many of these questions and controversies have been

reformulated, and the prevailing conception of the philosopher's

approach to these questions has changed since the traditional theorists
addressed the connections between mind and politics.

But the essential

nature and relevance of these problems has not changed, and contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of action still focus on many
of the same issues and problems addressed by the traditional philosophers.

For example, various problems and controversies arise in

relation to the cognitive concepts, including perception, knowledge,
belief, memory, understanding, thinking and imagination; the will

concepts such as intention, choice, decision, wish and will; and the
emotion, feeling or sensation concepts including anger, fear, pleasure,
pain and desire.

Also, there are fundamental disagreements concerning

the division of mind into separate departments, capacities or parts,
the relationships among these various parts, and the implications of

these competing conceptual divisions or departmentalizations of the
mind.

Moreover, the unconscious, dreams and conscience bear directly

on these debates concerning the classification of mental capacities,

powers or features.
In addition,
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philosophy of mind remains at the heart of any theory

of human nature not only because of the problems and controversies

centering in particular "mental concepts" but also because of more
general and broader philosophical issues which clearly have not been
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resolved by empirical studies of man and mind.

There are general level

questions about the nature of mind or mental phenomena, including those
regarding whether there is such

a

"thing" as mind and whether human

thought and action, particularly the "higher" forms of thought and

intentional action, can be explained by the application of genuine laws
or law-like generalizations.

Also, philosophers still confront

troublesome questions about the relationships between mind and body,
between our own minds and the minds of others, and between the mind and
the "external" world.

While analysis of these concepts and problems in philosophy of

mind certainly does not constitute the whole of the attempt to construct a coherent and adequate theory of human nature, these conceptual
and philosophical issues remain an essential component of any theory of

human nature.

Thus, the accounts of mind and personality, which are an

inherent part of every conceptual framework that is used in the ex-

planation as well as the evaluation of political behavior and institutions, provide the clearest and most direct example of the continued

importance of the connections between mind and politics.

In addition,

as the traditional political philosophers again recognized,

the con-

ceptual framework through which one classifies and explains human

behavior as well as political phenomena also rests on more general

philosophical positions and assumptions.

For example,

a

particular

account of the structure and limits of human knowledge is closely tied
to the model of mind and man,

the conception of the nature and scope of

political inquiry, and other central components of

a

given conceptual

.
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framework utilized in analyzing political phenomena.

The most impor-

tant conceptual problems and controversies concerning thought and

action reach into epistemology

,

metaphysics, philosophy of meaning,

ethics and metaethics
The most important insight offered by the traditional analyses of

mind and politics is that it is impossible to explain or evaluate human
action, including the various kinds of activity of interest to the

political scientist, without

a

background framework which includes

a

complex set of positions or assumptions on self, mind and knowledge.
The issues surrounding thought and action have been

a

central battle-

ground in political theory not simply because the traditional theorists

mistakenly incorporated

a

philosophical, pre-scientif ic

dimension in their attempts to sketch
Rather,

a

,

normative

theory of human nature.

implicit or explicit stands on the fundamental conceptual and

philosophical issues concerning mind, knowledge and self constitute the
ineradicable core of any theory of human nature and in turn of any

explanatory framework used in political inquiry.

Thus, the underlying

classif icatory system used to identify and distinguish basic human
powers, characteristics and activities is an essential part of the

foundation for our attempt to explain and evaluate the political world.

Two Recent Analyses of Mind and Politics

Two of the most comprehensive recent attempts to examine the

connections between mind and politics in relation to contemporary
political inquiry and political theory are Ellen Meiksins Wood's

_
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and Politics and Roberto Mangaberia Unger's Knowledge and Politics

.

Both Wood and Linger view the connections between certain conceptions
of

knowledge, mind and self on the one hand and particular political and
ethical theories on the other as central and universal features present
in all political theories.

They regard the modern tendency to treat

philosophy and political inquiry as separate and unrelated disciplines
as a denial of one of the most important themes developed in tradi-

tional political philosophy.
Unger, for example, writes:

until the present time, few ideas were so widely shared
among thinkers of the most diverse persuasions as the
belief that the decisive question for political thought
is 'What can we know?'
This belief was accompanied by
the doctrine that the manner in which we solve the
problems of the theory of knowledge in turn depends on
the way we answer questions in political thought.
In his view,

this traditional conception of knowledge and politics

makes little sense to contemporary political scientists and political

theorists only because Anglo-American analytic philosophy, remains

preoccupied with "technical riddles" and narrow problems rather than
the more significant and broader range philosophical questions ad-

dressed by the traditional theorists.

He

suggests that contemporary

philosophers and political scientists must abandon this "false and
nefarious" modern view, which creates artificial barriers between the

philosophy of knowledge and the study of politics, and return to the
"true and beneficial" ancient view, which explicitly acknowledges the

.
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reciprocal interdependence of theories of knowledge and theories of
politics
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This traditional conception of knowledge and politics is portrayed
as correctly focusing on the connections among four interrelated levels

of inquiry and activity:

the attempt to answer fundamental philoso-

phical and religious questions about the nature of the world, man's

place in and knowledge of the world, and the existence of God; the

construction of psychological theories of human nature, personality or
self; the systematic study of society, politics and ethics; and thought
and action in the realm of practical politics and morals.

Unger's

thesis is that any comprehensive and systematic political theory is

a

theory of knowledge and politics because it necessarily incorporates,
implies or rests upon

a

related set of explicit positions or implicit

assumptions at each of these levels.

Although political theorists, particularly modern ones, often fail
to state or even recognize these positions and assumptions, it is still

possible to identify the fundamental "principles, premises or postulates" which are operative on each of the different levels and which

serve to unify a particular theory of knowledge and politics.

The

identification and examination of the principles and premises which
underpin competing conceptions of knowledge and politics remain among
the most significant tasks facing the political theorist.

Unger's thesis does not entail the view that the form and content
of theories of politics simply follow from or are completely determined

by underlying philosophical or religious frameworks.

The argument is
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that there is

a

complex series of connections among basic philosophical

and religious issues and the attempts to construct an adequate theory

of human nature and
are,

a

systematic theory of politics.

These connections

Unger argues, particularly evident in the conceptions of indi-

viduality and sociality, which are two of the central features of any
political or social theory.

The notions of individuality and sociality

are interdependent because it is impossible to provide

a

conception of

what a person is without including an account of the relationships

among persons or to advance

a

notion of society independently of some

interpretation of the nature of individuals.

Moreover, both concep-

tions have common origins in that one's views of personality and

society are necessarily rooted in

a

more fundamental conception of
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human nature or self.
There is virtually no discussion of any recent empirical research
on personality in Knowledge and Politics

,

and Unger focuses exclusively

on the philosophical or conceptual issues involved in the attempt to

lay out a theory of human nature.

The three elements which form this

philosophical core of any conception of human nature, whether or not
they are specifically acknowledged or addressed, are:

the relationship

between self and nature, the relationship between self and other in-

dividuals, and the relationship between the abstract and the concrete

self.^^

Unger holds that any account of these relationships is closely

tied not only to various issues concerning the nature of human know-

ledge and the human mind but also to fundamental metaphysical problems
wholes
concerning universals and particulars and the relationship of
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and parts.

This is the grounding for his claim that themes in meta-

physics, epistemology and philosophy of mind do form the basis of much

of our thinking about human nature, politics and ethics.

It is also

the principal support for his assertion that the basic problems con-

fronting philosophy, particularly metaphysics, and the social sciences

must be resolved simultaneously if they are ever to be resolved.
There are

a

number of striking similarities between Unger's

analysis of the connections between knowledge and politics and Wood's

examination of the connections between mind and politics.

Wood does

not like Linger expressly contrast traditional and modern views of mind
and politics, but she does offer a parallel treatment of the "affini-

ties" among certain theories of cognition, individuality and politics
as universal features of political theory which traditional theorists

often addressed and modern theorists tend to neglect.

Although she

acknowledges that discussions of will, desires and the passions seem
more visibly connected to political and moral theory than questions

concerning cognition, she writes:
Nevertheless, it is the fundamental premise of this
study that moral and even political implications can be
drawn from epistemological theories and their underlying
conceptions of mind; that sometimes, in fact, the ultimate meaning of a theory of mind may be seen as a moral
or political one; and that sometimes epistemology may,
so to speak,

be read as political theory.
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Wood supports Unger in arguing that the notion of

a

connection

between mind and politics does not simply mean that conceptions of

knowledge and mind serve as the foundation for moral and political
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theories.

She suggests that theories of knowledge and mind can also be

"derived" from political or moral doctrines.

However, she makes no

attempt to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of
such connections, and simply claims to investigate the affinities

between mind and politics, whatever the order of the relationship might
prove to be in particular cases.
The similarity between Wood's and Unger's essays is not confined
to a common emphasis on the importance of the connections between mind

and politics but also extends to their characterizations of and pro-

posals for investigating these connections.

Wood suggests that fun-

damental philosophical problems, basic issues in political and moral
theory, and questions surrounding the attempt to construct

politics are tied together because they share
mode of thought and logic.
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a

a

science of

particular pattern or

The proper focus for the political

theorist attempting to examine such

a

pattern or mode is the notion of

individualism and the problem of the relationship between man's in-

dividuality and his sociality.
According to Wood, mind and politics are directly connected in
that any conception of individualism is rooted in

a

conception of

individuality which in turn is connected to philosophical accounts of
the self, of the relationship between the self and the external world,
and of the relationship between the self and other persons.

Thus, the

various debates concerning individualism and individuality, which bear

directly on our attempts to understand human nature and social life,
cannot proceed in isolation from

a

series of philosophical issues

—
42

including the "subject-object relation," the nature of reason and
thought, and the nature of consciousness.

These philosophical issues concerning self and mind, which are

ineradicable elements in any attempt to sketch

a

coherent account of

individuality or human nature, are linked to the most problematic and
most important concepts used in political discourse and political
Wood points to disagreements concerning the nature of human

inquiry.

freedom and the nature of social bonds as the two most significant

examples of this connection.
In short, two of the most fundamental political
concepts liberty and community can be regarded as two
In other
aspects of the self's relation to other.
words, a conception of the self (and, hence ultimately,
a theory of mind) is an implicit unifying factor in
uniting two of its most essential
•political theory
questions and liberty and community are two sides of
I would argue, then, that certain
the same coin.
theories of mind and the conceptions of the self they
imply tend to encourage or support certain social and

—

—

;

political ideas.
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In short, both Wood and Linger identify the principal connections

between mind and politics as centering in the theories of self, human
nature or individuality incorporated in competing theoretical frameworks.

They contend that at the core of any comprehensive attempt to

construct

a

theory of politics is

a

set of assumptions or positions

concerning mind, knowledge, reality and related topics.

They further

suggest that these general level philosophical issues must be conproblems
fronted before we can even begin to discuss the more technical

relating to the scientific study of human behavior and politics.

.
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The Wood-Unger thesis that there are such fundamental and per-

vasive connections between mind and politics clearly challenges the

dominant tendency to assume that modern political inquiry has, by
adopting the scientific method, freed itself from the philosophical

difficulties discussed by traditional political theorists.
plausability of

a

Since the

particular theory of politics rests, at least in

part, on the adequacy of underlying assumptions regarding mind, knowledge and the world, philosophy of mind, epistemology and metaphysics

remain important background elements in any attempt to describe or

explain political phenomena.
Moreover, Unger and Wood contend not only that contemporary Anglo-

American social science and social theory continue to rest on such

a

set of assumptions, but also that these background assumptions are

fundamentally mistaken.

Both theorists argue that the major philos-

ophical underpinnings of the dominant conception of

a

science of

politics, especially as revealed in its treatment of the notions of

individualism and community, are found in the metaphysics, epistemology
and philosophy of mind articulated by the early British empiricist

philosophers
Wood approaches the investigation of the linkages between modern

political science and classical liberal philosophy from an avowedly

Marxist perspective.

She states.

sense, the prevailing trends in
modern especially American social science, particularly
in the last two or three decades, has (sic) represented
a return to early pre-Marxist materialism-empiricism;
In a very important

M4

and to the extent that it adheres to the premises of
these earlier doctrines, it tends to secrete similar

social and political values.

Although her critique of these premises is not well organized, the
three major targets of her attack are clearly the prevailing conceptions of

a

science of politics, of society, and of human nature, which

Wood believes are the direct inheritance of classical liberalism.

She

attempts to build on the Marxist critique of classical liberal theory,
arguing that these conceptions carry "implicit ideological assumptions"
about the relationship between the study of politics and political

activity, the ideal society, and the nature of human activity and

rationality.
Mind and Politics links "a strong faith in an exact social
science" with the advocacy of liberal doctrines and portrays the modern

"inclination toward

a

Newtonian science of society and politics" as

bias inherited from the eighteenth century liberal theorists.

'

a

Al-

though Wood fails to discuss the major philosophical issues connected
with the positivist model of scientific explanation and to confront the

contemporary debate regarding the use of models borrowed from the
physical sciences for studying human behavior and social life, she does
suggest that

a

blind "faith in precise prediction, quantification and

measurement" has prevented political scientists working within the
liberal tradition from perceiving the basic traditional insights into

.46

both the subject matter and the enterprise of political inquiry.
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However, her claims that contemporary political science entails

a

reduction of human action to animal behavior and that it treats social
forces as if they were natural forces rest not on detailed analyses of
action, causation and related concepts but rather on

a

sketchy contrast

between the modern emphasis on observable behavior, social roles and

functions on the one hand and Greek and Marxist notions of purposeful
action and human ends on the other.

Wood believes that the major

failing of the dominant models and approaches used in American political science is their implicit denial of the human capacity to act so
as to alter social reality, giving them a pervasive status quo orien-

tation.

This is a central support for her argument that the "empi-

rical" definitions offered by the "new" political science, far from

being value-free or value-neutral, incorporate the basic values of

liberal-capitalist society.
This assault on the "new" science of politics rests on the

argument that the liberal adoption of

a

mechanistic approach for the

study of social forces and personality destroys the important contri-

butions to our understanding of society and human nature offered by
traditional political theory.

Modern political science is charac-

terized as an "atomistic pluralism" which accepts as given the

classical liberal view of society as simply

individuals or

a

collection of autonomous

a

web of conflicting interests.

As numerous critics of

liberalism have noted, given this view of society, the public interest
the sum of
or common good tends to be treated as nothing more than

individual interests or individual desires.

Wood emphasizes the extent

.
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to which this conception obliterates classical and Marxist notions of

shared social purposes and common values which could become the basis

of political activity aimed at social change.

Within the liberal

framework, society is pictured as an artificial mechanism designed to

maximize the opportunities for individual want-satisfaction and
politics is reduced to "a regulatory 'homeostatic' mechanism subor-

dinate to the existing social order."
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According to Wood, this mechanistic view of society both supports
and is supported by

a

mechanistic conception of individuality.

Both

the early and modern liberal treatments of thought and action are

portrayed as breaking with the traditional conceptions of man which

recognize "his 'subjectivity,' his creative self-activity, his role as
a

conscious, purposeful actor."
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The traditional identification of

the essence of human nature with the capacity to act in pursuit of

conscious, rational purposes is contrasted with the liberal treatment
of human purposes and rationality in terms of the maximization of

utilities
Game theory and voting behavior studies are cited as illustrations
of the continued reliance of

a

liberal view of human nature which

equates rational behavior with the most predictable behavior and thereby reduces human rationality to the "functionality of

a

machine."

Thus, the basic line of continuity between the "new" political science
on
and classical liberal theory is found in their common dependence

formulated
"the simplistic psychology of empiricism-liberalism" first
by Hobbes and advanced most uncompromisingly by Bentham.

In short,

the

1
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modern notions of the empirical study of politics, society and human
behavior are underpinned by the same theory of human nature which Marx
exposed as:
not only scientifically inaccurate in that it
tended to oversimplify the nature of man, but morally
wrong, insofar as it encouraged the treatment of men as
.

.

.

things

.''^
.

.

Mind and Politics is an attempt to trace the central weaknesses of
this view of human nature in particular, and of liberal political

theory and the "new" science of politics in general, to the underlying
empiricist philosophical assumptions regarding self, mind and knowledge.

Wood focuses in the work of the classical liberals, particu-

larly Locke, Hume and

S.

J.

Mill, who provide the most systematic and

conscious efforts to link liberal political doctrines with an empiricist metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind.

According to

her sketch of the general features of this empiricist framework, its

central feature is that the mind plays an essentially passive role in
"the constitution of experience" or "the creation of the basic con-

stituents of knowledge."

5

The empiricist conceptions of mind and

knowledge therefore rest on the metaphysical notion of "an independently existing given standing over and against the subject."

view of the mind as only
to provide

a

a
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„

.

This

passive recipient of given experience fails

base for developing an adequate theory of consciousness

because it "equates consciousness with sensation and feeling and the
"^^
kind of awareness they imply.

Moreover, the resulting view of the
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self as nothing but

a

bundle of perceptions denies not only "any dis-

tinctive consciousness of self" but also all social and historical
factors in the development of self and consciousness.
self or ego is taken as

a

Thus, since the

universal, ahistorical and presocial "fact of

human existence," the identification of self or ego with egoism and

possessiveness becomes

a

matter of definition.

Wood's sketchy summaries of the specific theories advanced by the
various liberal philosophers and of the common features of the classical liberal framework are inadequate.

In addition,

her critique of

the empiricist account of mind focuses not on objections based on

philosophical analysis or empirical research, but rather on exposing
the "tensions" between the empiricist view of mind and the moral and

political doctrines advanced by the classical liberals.

For example,

she argues that the highest and most noble liberal ideals, represented

by Hume's notions of 'community,' and 'sympathy' as well as Locke's

conception of 'liberty' and moral premises, cannot be supported by

a

theory of mind which denies any distinctive consciousness of self and
portrays individuals as being naturally isolated and egotistical.
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Certainly, such an analysis of the internal consistency of the

liberal treatment of mind and politics is important.

Moreover, Wood's

essay does offer some useful insights into certain of the most sig-

nificant conceptual problems inherent in the early liberal framework.
For example, she suggests that Hume's account of sympathy, which

requires

a

translation of one's beliefs about the feelings of others

into feelings of one's

owi:,

is

impossible given his own treatment of
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reason as totally separated from the emotions.

providing

a

However, instead of

sustained analysis of the conceptual problems and debates

concerning such topics in philosophy of mind, she concentrates on
sketching

a

moral and political critique of particular components of

the classical liberal account of mind and politics.
The most solid and convincing parts of this critique of the

liberal theory of mind and politics are those which follow Macpherson's

analysis of possessive individualism, the definition of self through
the acquisition and possession of property.
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The argument is that the

modern liberal moral and political framework, as revealed by the
notions of liberty and society, remains bound by the conceptual li-

mitations imposed by the version of individualism which emerges from
the classical empiricist account of mind.

She writes,

The model of liberalism is characterized by a conception
of liberty in which human freedom is not incompatible
with subjection even to objective forces external to the
individual; and a conception of community as externalized, perhaps enforced coexistence, assuming atomistic
relationships among individuals and, insofar as individuality tends to be equated with atomism and priva-

tization, an essential antagonism between individuality
and sociality.

Wood thus links the passive empiricist theory of mind to both

a

kind of society in which individuals are treated as role-occupants or

objects and
society.

a

kind of social theory which functions to justify such

Her main indictment of the empiricist account is that it

supports the reduction, externalization and ob jectif ication of human
life and activity which is characteristic of liberal society and

a
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liberal political theory.

The only foundation for

a

new society and

a

new form of social theory is an alternative account of mind which can

eliminate the basic tensions, particularly that between individuality
and society,

pervasive throughout the liberal framework.

Knowledge and Politics is

a

similar attempt to trace the under-

pinnings of the modern science of politics or society to the classical
liberal philosophical framework, but Unger's analysis of these con-

nections is more comprehensive and more complex than Wood's.

Unger

acknowledges that the contemporary social sciences have moved beyond
the classical liberal conceptions of human nature and society where

these conceptions represented an obvious barrier to the empirical study
of the subject matter of a particular discipline.
that each discipline has attained at best only

a

However, he contends

"partial criticism" of

the entire liberal framework:

Each science refuses to accept the premises of liberal
theory that bear most directly on its chosen subject
matter, while continuing to rely, unavowedly and
unknowingly, on principles drawn from other branches of
the system of liberalism.

59

For example, while political scientists studying political sociali-

zation have abandoned the classical liberal portrayal of the individual
as a pre-social,

autonomous, rational being, they may continue to

incorporate other basic features of liberal psychology which are less

directly connected to their own concerns.
we must
In order to focus on the liberal framework as a whole,

begin to view liberalism not simply as

a

set of political doctrines
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concerning the distribution of power and wealth but as "a metaphysical

conception of the mind and society" as well.^^

Modern political

scientists fail to see the liberal framework in this way because they,
unlike the classical liberals, do not recognize the central connections

between theories of mind and theories of politics.

Since contemporary

philosophers and social scientists working in the liberal tradition
remain unaware of these connections, the first problem is one of

attempting to expose the "unref lective view of mind," and of personality and society, which constitute "the premises on which much of our

contemporary philosophy and social science is built. "^^

It is

Unger's

contention that these unreflective views of mind and personality are
simply unsystematic and watered-down derivatives of the classical
liberal formulation.
This unreflective view of mind and the liberal theory of person-

ality are analyzed in terms of three "unifying principles" which

characterize empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind.

The first

principle, "the principle of reason and desire," portrays the self as
being composed of two totally separate parts, reason and desire, with

desire considered the sole source of activity and motivation in the

personality.

Secondly, according to "the principle of arbitrary

desire," desires are not subject to rational criticism or correction
and there is no basis for judging any desire superior to another.
is
Thirdly, "the principle of analysis," states that human knowledge

of
constructed from and can be reduced to the basic building blocks

elementary sensations or ideas.
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Unger contends that these three empiricist premises regarding mind
and knowledge give rise to contradictions or antinomies which make it

impossible to formulate an adequate theory of personality within the
liberal framework.

His critique of these basic features of the em-

piricist account of mind is more comprehensive than Wood's, but it does
not adequately investigate the many problems and topics which it

raises.

For example, he attempts to demonstrate that the liberal model

of mind and man cannot satisfy the minimal requirements of any coherent
Co

theory of personality.

However, here, as elsewhere, Unger raises

important questions concerning central tenets of the liberal framework,
but he fails to address these questions in the context of a sustained

analysis of the relevant problems and issues in philosophy of mind and

philosophy of action.
The critique of liberal political theory advanced in Knowledge and

Politics focuses on the unreflective view of society which is submerged
in the conceptual

social science.

framework of contemporary political philosophy and
As before,

this unreflective view is presented in

terms of three underlying principles:

1)

"the principle of values and

rules" portrays mutual hostility and antagonism as the basic fact of
social existence and champions law, punishment and fear as the only

guarantees of order and liberty; 2) "the principle of subjective value"
treats all values as individual and subjective; and 3) "the principle
of individualism" views

individuals."^^

a

group or community as "simply

a

collection of

.
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Just as the premises of the liberal view of mind will not support
an adequate theory of knowledge or personality,

the premises of the

liberal view of society preclude the possibility of arriving at

coherent, adequate theories of legislation and adjudication.

Unger

raises a number of objections to these premises or principles which

parallel comments made by other critics of liberal political theory,
but his major emphasis is again on the contradictions or antinomies,

particularly that between values and rules, generated by the liberal
premises
Unger perceives

a

direct connection between mind and politics in

contemporary liberal thought in that the principles of the unreflective
views of mind and society, as well as the resulting antinomies between

reason and desire and between values and rules, are reciprocally inter-

dependent.

The major defect of liberal psychology, namely its ren-

dering the moral life as "opaque to the mind," is the "reverse side" of
the central weakness of liberal political theory,

its view of society

as being held together by rules and threats rather than shared values

s.^^
and common belief

Moreover, the analytical conception of knowledge and the indi-

vidualist conception of society are "twins" to the extent that they
.

both reflect an aggregative view of wholes as the sum of their parts.
Thus,

according to Unger

's

analysis, one cannot fully comprehend the

reciprocal interdependence of liberal theories of mind and politics
without examining the metaphysical views which underpin the entire
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liberal framework.

The antinomies between reason and desire and be-

tween values and rules can be traced to the more basic antinomy of

theory and fact.

In other words,

the modern views of mind and society

are grounded in conceptions of nature and science which incorporate the

contradictory positions that all facts are mediated through theory and
that it is possible to independently compare theory with fact.

Finally, all three of these major contradictions within liberal

thought as well as the problem concerning the relationship between
parts and wholes are rooted in the rejection of the traditional

doctrine of intelligible essences and are therefore "expressions of the
en

more fundamental problem of the universal and the particular."

These

contradictions, which are evidence of the inadequacy of the modern
liberal conceptions of mind, personality, society, and nature, cannot
be resolved or reconciled within the liberal conceptual framework.

Such

a

reconciliation requires

a

radical reconstruction of the basic

premises or our thinking about mind, knowledge, self, society and
nature, beginning with an alternative notion of the relationship

between universals and particulars.
Of course, such an examination of the internal constitution of

liberalism as

a

system of ideas is considered only

a

first step toward

the necessary analysis of liberalism as a mode of social conciousness
and a type of social organization.

conciousness in terms of

a

Unger characterizes the liberal

manipulative and instrumental view of man's

relationship to nature, an individualist conception of interpersonal
relationships, and an ambivalent attitude toward

a

person's work and
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place in the social order.

This conciousness represents

a

seculari-

zation of the idea of transcendence, where the distinction between soul
and body becomes an opposition between reason and desire.

This interpretation of the liberal consciousness is accompanied by
an equally harsh indictment of the liberal social order and the "master

institution" of the liberal state, bureaucracy.

Liberal society is

unstable because of the tensions it generates, particularly those
between the principles of class and role and between the experience of

domination and "the ideal of organization by impersonal rules." 70

More

significantly, liberal society provides no natural basis for the

definition of individuality or community because individuals are isolated and reduced to mere role-occupants.
Unger like Wood perceives moral and political connec-

In short,

tions between the liberal-empiricist view of mind on the one hand and

society which reduces persons to objects and

a

a

type of social science

that serves to justify this society on the other.

Both critics agree

that the basic tensions, antinomies or contradictions pervasive in

liberalism as

a

theoretical framework and as

a

form of social life can

be overcome only with the construction of an alternative society,

an

alternative social science and alternative conceptions of mind and
personality.
Wood and Unger regard their critiques of the philosophical frame-

work of liberalism as merely the first step in an attempt to put the

study of mind and politics on

a

more secure foundation.

Both theorists

offer alternative conceptions of knowledge, mind and self which are

1
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designed to correct the major deficiencies of the liberal-empiricist

framework and to eliminate the tensions or contradictions pervasive

throughout liberal thought and society.
Wood advocates

a

"Kantian" theory of mind which portrays mind as

being self-active and autonomous by acknowledging the mind's "original
role in the creation of the basic constituents of knowledge."

7

In

contrast to the empiricist account of mind and knowledge which rests on
a

dualism of independently existing objects and passively experiencing

subjects, "Kantian" epistemology is characterized as

a

dialectical

effort to unite subject and object by demonstrating that

object

— the

"...

objectivity of perception, which is experience

by the subject and not simply given."

— is

the

created
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Wood utilizes examples taken from the work of

a

number of dif-

ferent philosophers and social theorists who are classified as

"Kantians" in her attempt to demonstrate the superiority of the conceptions of mind and self which follow from this epistemological framework.

She argues that Kant's distinction between perception and

experience lays the goundwork for an adequate theory of consciousness
by destroying the empiricist identification of consciousness with

sensual awareness and by acknowledging man's experience of himself "as

intelligence, as

a

free and spontaneous being

..."

Rousseau's

conception of compassion and Piaget's notion of the process of rejection are cited as "Kantian"-based challenges to the Humean dualism of
intellect
reason and passion which reestablished the interdependence of
and the emotions.

Finally,

Piaget's account of ego-development is used

.
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to

illustrate the manner in which the "Kantian" conception of mind

underpins

a

theory that treats the ego as

infantile egocentrism with

a

a

social product and connects

lack of ego-consciousness.'''^

The presentation of this "Kantian" theory of mind is much more

disjointed and far less systematic than the characterization of the

liberal-empiricist theory.

Wood suggests that the "Kantian" model

cannot be analyzed using the same methods applied to the liberal model
because it is not

a

closed system fully articulated in the work of

few theorists, but rather

a

a

"revolutionary process" which begins with

Kant's epistemology and is still being elaborated by developments

within socialism.
The central figure in this process is Marx who transforms the

"Kantian" conception of mind, with its emphasis on "subjectivity," its

reunification of subject and object, and its epistemological theory of
the active subject,

well as

a

into a new theory of society and social action as

Whereas the empi-

new vision of human nature and community.

ricist account of mind supports an essentially negative view of human

freedom, an atomistic conception of community, and

a

perpetual antag-

onism between individuality and sociality,
The contrasting "Kantian" model is characterized by a
conception of freedom as self-activity, autonomy, and
transcendence of objective determination; and a
conception of community as an integral part of the human
psyche, united in consciousness with individuality so
that society and individuality which here does not
simply mean atomism or privatization, but the impulse
toward self-activity, creativity, and selfdevelopment are not antagonistic but mutually

—

—

^.

supportive
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Thus the controversy between the empiricist and "Kantian" models is not

merely an "epistemological quibble," but rather an argument about the
nature of personality, community and the proper approach to the study
of human behavior and society.
In sum,

the basis of:

Marx's elaboration of the "Kantian" conception of mind is
1)

a

transformation of liberal or metaphysical indi-

vidualism into Marxist or dialectical individualism which defines both
human nature and freedom in terms of "self-activity, self-creation and

self-realization;"

2)

a

transformation of civil society into human

society where the dualism between public and private is overthrown and

where people interact as persons rather than role occupants;

3)

a

transformation of the tension between individuality and sociality into
a

dialectical interaction in which individual self-consciousness and

sense of community interact and develop in

a

dynamic process; and

transformation of social theory and social science from

justification of the existing social order into

a

a

a
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a

static

dynamic union of

theory and practice which acknowledges revolutionary practice as
form of social consciousness.

U)

a

a

new

Wood interprets Marxist theory as both

sketch of the political and moral implications of the "Kantian"

theory of mind and an analysis of the requisite social conditions for
implementing these moral and political directives.
Although Unger characterizes Marxism as among the most compre-

hensive and most influential of the "partial critiques" of liberal
thought, he holds that it cannot provide an adequate foundation for

radically different theory of mind and politics.

His own "positive

a

59

program," which is designed to present such an alternative theory,

consists of three parts:

the theory of the welfare-corporate state, a

theory of the self or human nature, and the theory of organic groups.
The theory of the welfare-corporate state is an attempt to examine

the basic historical trends or tendencies affecting the liberal

consciousness and the liberal social order.

A growing concern for

preservation rather than exploitation of the natural order,

a

devel-

oping interest in "the idea of communities of shared purpose," and

a

tendency toward "the acceptance of the sanctity of one's station and
its duties" are cited as evidence of an emerging rejection of the

dominant transcendent consciousness.
order is portrayed as moving toward
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a

In addition,

the liberal social

radically new form in that the

principle of role or merit is triumphing over class domination and is
in turn being challenged by the claims of community and democracy.

Although these fundamental changes universally call for

a

drastic

reformation of liberal philosophical premises and provide the social
conditions to make such

reformation possible, the ultimate forms that

a

this new conciousness and new social order will take are not completely

determined by historical factors.
signs of becoming either

a

The emerging conciousness shows

secular version of the doctrine of immanence

or a synthesis of transcendence and immanence.

Similarly, the emerging

social order reveals competing inclinations toward either increasingly

hierarchial or increasingly egalitarian forms of social life.
Unger concludes that analysis of the contemporary historical and

social situation can only identify the possibilities for future
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development presented by this situation.

Since such investigations

cannot provide the guidance necessary if we are to take full advantage
of the choices inherent in our changing modes of life, we must confront
the basic issues of mind and politics:

nature of the self?

What is human nature or the

What is the nature of the good?

What form of

community is conducive to the development of human nature and the good
life?
The remaining part of Unger's "positive program," which revolves

around his theory of self, is an attempt to provide

coherent set of answers to these questions.

a

systematic,

He characterizes his

conception of the self as the "classic" theory of human nature to which
"all the great thinkers of Europe have contributed," citing "special

guidance" from Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel and
Marx.
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This theory is comprised of three basic elements:

l)the ideal

of harmony which states that the self must be both separate from nature
and at one with it; 2) the ideal of sympathy which means that the self

must be independent of others yet reconciled with them: and

3)

the

ideal of concrete universality which establishes an inner connection

between species and the individual.
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These three different aspects of the basic problem of the rela-

tionship between self and the world are presented both as "facts" in
that they "describe striving simplied in the very nature of person-

ality," and as "ideals," in that they are the sole basis for making

political and moral judgements in the absence of divine revelation or
the discovery of "objective" values.

In

its general form, this
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theory of the self simply states that the self must be both separate
from the world and at the same time reconciled with it.

Knowledge and Politics posits
tive and the evaluative because

a

direct link between the descrip-

a

particular theory of good emerges

from this account of human nature or self:

become even more perfectly what, as

a

"to achieve the good is to

human being, one is."
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Unger

contends that his theory of human nature and account of the good
incorporate the best of both the liberal and classical theories.

Although the libe^-al approach to the study of human nature properly
focuses on the connections between what we call 'good' on the one hand
and human desires and well-being on the other, it reduces the good to

what people desire, divorces the empirical study of human nature from

ethical discussion of the good life, and ignores the union of self and
world inherent in the ideal of self.
that the term 'good'

The classical approach recognizes

is more than a label applied to things which

people find desirable, emphasizes the union of self and world, and

attempts to ground moral and political doctrines in

universal human nature.

a

conception of

However, it ignores the social and historical

factors that shape human desires and human values and thus sanctifies
as universal a partial and limited moral vision.

Unger 's "synthesis" of these two views identifies the good with
the development and realization of human nature, characterizing human

nature as being whatever does not arise from domination.

It

focuses

or
not on the wants and values of people in particular social settings

historical periods but rather on examining the circumstances under

,

62

which such wants and values become truly representative of "what is

distinctive to each of them and to mankind as

a

whole,"

There is

a

"unitary human nature" but it is revealed anad developed in history
through

a

spiral of diminishing domination and increasing community.

Although Unger's view is, like the classical conception, teleological
he insists that it is presumptous to attempt to sketch the final out-

come of this spiral.

Both our knowledge of human nature and human

nature itself "evolve in accordance with the dialectic of theory and

politics ."^^
The final part of Unger's "positive program" is an account of the

ideal community which is implied by his theories of self and the good.
The theory of organic groups is designed to state the political im-

plications of this view of the good and to suggest how the ideal self
can be realized in society.

Unger argues that we can move toward the

development and realization of human nature only in
characterized in terms of the following ideas:

1)

a

universal society

"the community of

life," focusing on the importance of face to face relationships and

diverse, multi-purpose groups; 2) "the democracy of ends," requiring
the transformation of bureaucracies into communities through

a

demo-

cratic rather than meritocratic distribution of power; and 3) "the

division of labor," calling for limited specialization and emphasizing
individual opportunity to experiment with different forms of life.

Although Unger contends that such

a
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vision is not Utopian or irrelevant

to contemporary politics and that philosophy and politics must "join

hands" to develop this theory as

a

real alternative, he acknowledges
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that the human capacity to achieve the good in history is subject to

fixed limits.
Indeed, the imperfection of human knowledge, human nature and

human society is

a

central theme in Knowledge and Politics

Since

.

neither the ideal self nor the ideal community can ever be fully
realized, they must be regarded as "regulative ideals" rather than as

descriptions of future persons and societies.

For example, the problem

of conflict between the individual and the social aspects of person-

ality can never be resolved in
is, by its very nature,

a

social form of life because community

always on the verge of becoming oppression.

Moreover, given that the various notions used to characterize the
ideal self and the ideal society not only conflict but also reflect the

ever-present conflict between universalism and particularism, the
imperfection of knowledge, self and society cannot be finally and
forever resolved on

a

philosophical plane.

For Unger the problem of

universals and particulars is simply the metaphysical aspect of the

problem of the self, and it is the attempt to reconcile the doctrines
of immanence and transcendence, the religious aspect of the same basic
In this analysis the

problem, which is the more fundamental issue.

question of human imperfection is ultimately

a

religious question, and

Knowledge and Politics ends with the appeal, "Speak, God."
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T he Need for an Alternative Approach to Mind and Politics

The preceeding section summarizes Wood's and Unger 's analyses of

liberal
the connections between mind and politics, their critiques of

64

assumptions concerning mind and politics and their attempts to develop
alternative, superior accounts of mind and politics.

Their views are

set out in such detail because these two works represent the most

comprehensive and powerful treatments of these issues in relation to

contemporary political inquiry and political theory.
raise

a

They clearly

number of important questions and pose serious challenges to

the prevailing set of philosophical and methodological assumptions in

the social and behavioral sciences.

Yet, there are serious defici-

encies in their analyses of mind and politics, and an examination of

these deficiencies provides an agenda of topics and problems which must
be addressed in future discussion of the connections between mind and

politics, or between philosophy and political inquiry.
It

is, of course, difficult to assess the kind of fundamental and

comprehensive critique of mainstream political science and political
theory which both Wood and Unger advance.

They are, as we have seen,

challenging not only the dominant portrayals of mind and human nature
in the liberal political tradition but also the basic assumptions,

standards, methods and arguments which constitute Anglo-American

analytic philosophy and social science.
Unger,

for example,

expressly abandons "the heavy-handed though

frivolous sobriety" characteristic of analytic philosophy and insists
that the basic questions confronting philosophy and social theory can
be answered only by adopting a radically different conceptual framework

and a radically different conception of philosophy.

attack the dominant conception of

a

Both critics

social science, contending that it
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is

far from value-free because it incorporates liberal-capitalist

ideology, and that it has, by utilizing models borrowed from the

natural sciences, misconstrued the basic relationship between philos-

ophy and the social sciences.

Moreover, Wood and Unger maintain that

the study of mind and politics is not an isolated, academic enterprise

but rather an integral part of the project of transforming human

relations, changing social consciousness and reorienting politics.
Their essays call for

a

drastic redrawing of the boundaries between

theory and practice, and among philosophy, the study of politics,
political action and, in Unger's argument, religion as well.
This kind of confrontation between competing conceptual frame-

works, paradigms or modes of thought raises unique problems and makes
the task of analysis and assessment especially difficult.
best way of getting

a

Perhaps the

handle on the basic issues raised here is to

start by focusing on the alternative theories of mind and politics

advanced by Wood and Unger.

After all, both authors utilize their

alternative accounts of mind and politics to provide the ultimate
support and foundation for virtually every other element in their

analyses.

Yet, despite the fact that each position is made dependent

upon this claim to have layed out

superior theory of mind and poli-

a

tics, neither Wood nor Unger presents the kind of evidence and analysis

which is necessary to support such

a

claim.

Since Wood characterizes her alternative as

science constructed on

a

a

"Marxist" social

"Kantian" theory of mind, it would seem that

her "superior" theory of mind and politics is solidly grounded in
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powerful philosophical traditions which do offer coherent alternative

conceptions of knowledge, mind and self.

However, instead of carefully

examining and building on Kant's critique of classical empiricist

epistemology and philosophy of mind, she constructs

a

simplistic

dichotomy which identifies as "Kantian" any theory acknowledging the
active role of mind and which labels as "empiricist" all theories

portraying the mind as passive.

According to this categorization,

American pragmatism is "Kantian" in the sense that it recognizes that
mental activity introduces order into the world of conscious experience.
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This is but one example of how Wood, by focusing exclusively

on this active-passive dichotomy, neglects other crucial dividing lines
in philosophy of mind as well as a number of serious problems,

such as

those confronting the so-called doctrine of the transcendent will,

which must be addressed in any adequate attempt to support

a

Kantian

account of mind.
In addition,

although Wood also claims to base her alternative

theory of mind and politics on Marxist theory, she simply fails to even

discuss the Marxist or Hegelian analyses of the complex historical,
political and economic factors affecting human knowledge and consciousness.

may be true, as Wood suggests, that the Marxist tradition

It

corrects

a

serious liberal deficiency by focusing on the functions of

consciousness and self consciousness, as revealed by the theory of
ideology, in human self-interpretation and action.

But Mind and Pol-

or the
itics contains no real examination of the theory of ideology

Marxist conceptions of consciousness and self consciousness.
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Moreover, there is no analysis of the most significant debates

within contemporary Marxist discussion of issues in epistemology

,

meta-

physics and ethics, and no attempt to support or justify Wood's own

interpretation of Marxism as an anti-materialist, moral indictment of
the liberal-capitalist system.
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Finally, since there is no coherent

explanation of how Marx's conception of human nature or individuality
is related to his political

and social theory, the connection between

mind and politics in Wood's own "superior" theory of mind and politics
remains fuzzy and ambiguous.

In

short, her presentation of the philo-

sophical foundation of this "Kantian-Marxist" alternative is strong in

advocacy but extremely weak in analysis.
Wood draws very little support for her theory of mind and politics
from the philosophical underpinnings of Kantian and Marxist theory, but
she relies even less on analysis of central topics in

a

mainstream,

Marxist or any other approach to contemporary social science.

There is

no attempt to demonstrate the superiority or even the adequacy of the

"Kantian-Marxist" approach to mind and politics given our current

understanding of human motivation and behavior and of society and
politics.

She fails to consider evidence which might be drawn from the

fields of political science, economics or sociology to support her case
for a "Marxist" social science.
It

is clear that Wood chsllenges

the standards of objectivity and

empirical verif lability which characterize the dominant conception of
science of politics, but she nowhere discusses the structure of ex-

planation or the methods and approaches to be utilized in her Marxist

a
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alternative.
ical,

Although she discusses the epistemological

,

psycholog-

anthropological and political dimensions of the debate over mind

and human nature, she treats this debate principally in terms of

historical political theory, contrasting the classical empiricists
(including Hobbes

,

Locke, Hume and Mill) with the "Kantians" (including

Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Piaget)

.

There is virtually no dis-

cussion of most of the major issues dominating contemporary epistemology, psychology, anthropology and political science which might have
a

direct bearing on her attempt to construct

a

superior theory of mind

and politics.
In her concluding chapter. Wood states that the controversy over

mind has been "transferred" from philosophy to social science in that
the "passive empiricism" which remains dominant in contemporary social

science is now challenged by
vanced by Chomsky and Piaget.

a

"theory of the creative mind" as adBut instead of analyzing Chomsky's and

Piaget's theories or examining the evidence in support of them, she

focuses exclusively on the moral and political significance of the

controversy, which represents "a choice between different designs for

man's life in society."
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Wood apparently thinks that such an approach

is appropriate because "ultimately no theory of human nature is empiri-

cally verifiable" and because we must consider the ethical and political consequences of accepting a particular conception of man and mind

"after exhausting all

time."^^

However,

'scientific' evidence available to us at

a

given

in Mind and Politics she proceeds as if we should

life
start with our moral and political conclusions about what human

.

.

69

and society should be like and, working from this ideal, construct a

theory of mind or human nature which is compatible with these

conclusions
The fact that

a

particular theory of mind or human nature does

have ethical or political implications does not automatically eliminate
the possiblity that we may discover scientific evidence which supports
or undercuts that theory.

Certainly, competing conceptions of mind or

human nature have proved to be not fully testable, but they do fre-

quently incorporate or entail claims which must be

assessed in light

of available evidence concerning human motivation and behavior.
Of course, one of the major contributions of Wood's work is its

focus on the conceptual and philosophical questions which must also be

addressed when one is examining and appraising alternative conceptions
of mind and man.

But her analysis of the conceptual framework sup-

porting the "Kantian" account of mind and the "Marxian" theory of human
nature is fragmentary and incomplete.

The reader does not even get a

clear sense of the conceptual choices involved here, and there is

certainly an inadequate presentation of the case for opting for the
"Kantian-Marxian" model rather than the empiricist conception of
mind
In

addition, although Wood maintains that normative considerations

are relevant when making

a

choice between competing theories of mind

is
and human nature, she does not indicate how this normative dimension

and
related to the empirical and conceptual questions concerning mind

action.

nature
She does acknowledge that conceptions of mind and human
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must be supported by both sufficient "objective" evidence as well as an

adequate conceptual or philosophical foundation.
that one cannot select

a

Thus,

it seems clear

theory of mind or human nature solely on the

basis of its moral and political implications.

However, the central

weakness of Mind and Politics is that it sets out her alternative

conception of mind in isolation from such empirical and conceptual
support, focusing almost exclusively on discussion of its moral and

political implications.

Wood's inability to provide

a

systematic and coherent philoso-

phical foundation for her alternative theory of mind and politics and
her presentation of this alternative in isolation from evidence con-

cerning human mind and behavior have the same root cause.

represents

a

Her analysis

return to traditional political theory not only because

she accepts the notion of a direct connection between mind and politics

but also because she reverts to the standards, approach and mode of

argument used by the classical theorists in attempting to answer the
basic questions concerning mind and politics.
One of the clearest indicators of this return to the traditional

approach to mind and politics is found in Wood's rejection of the
dominant (liberal) conceptions of personality and community, which is

ultimately based upon the claim that:
In the final analysis, whether we approach the problem
(of a conception of human nature) from the point of view
of scientific psychology or philosophical anthropology,
we are left with our own perceptions, or own intro-

spection, our own experience of ourselves through which
Any theory of human nature
we must interpret our data.

.
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must in the end be broken down to an irreducible and

unverifiable element of self-experience.^^
As she makes clear, this "evidence" of self-experience constitutes a

fundamental challenge to behavioral psychology in particular and

empiricist social science in general not because it makes some kind of
conceptual point, such as concerning the role of self-interpretation in
human behavior and human life, but rather because it affirms "a belief
in man's fundamental creativity."
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Wood follows the lead of Wolin, Strauss and other critics of the
"new" political science who anchor their critiques in various inter-

pretations of traditional political theory.

She objects to the

interest orientation of liberal political theory and contemporary

political science, arguing that the liberal substitution of the notion

of 'interest' for the traditional concern with 'conscience' and 'soul'
has contributed to the conception of human beings as "externalized

creatures" or objects.

The "empiricist" conception of human nature is

attacked as misreading the "evidence" of self-experience, as redefining

man's essence as

a

"receptacle for interests" and as neglecting man's

true essential nature or "inner being."

Her alternative conception is

championed as recognizing sociality, self-realization and spontaneity
as principles which arise from the "inner needs" of "man's creative

nature" and which are known directly and intuitively through self-

experience
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This slippage into the terminology associated with the classical

doctrine of essences is neither accidental nor incidental, for Wood

.
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defends her alternative theory of mind and politics as if she were
writing in the classical period.

Instead of examining empirical

evidence and philosophical issues connected to the notions of selfexperience, consciousness, desire, reason, interest and other related

concepts. Wood returns to the kind of

a

priori philosophical

anthropology which typified traditional political theory.
Unger's discussion of the criteria to be used in choosing

a

theory

of the self or theory of human nature represents a similar return to

the traditional treatment of mind and politics.

Of course, he does

acknowledge that an adequate theory of human nature must be compatible
with an accurate historical analysis of the levels of social con-

sciousness and form of social order found in the liberal, welfare-

corporate and socialist states.

Tnis historical analysis is advanced

as a framework for reexamination of theoretical issues which rests upon
a

set of empirical claims about the characteristics of and tendencies

within these modes of life.

In addition to this "appeal to history,"

Unger like Wood argues that in choosing among competing conceptions of

mind and human nature one must look into oneself and rely on one's own

experience
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Yet, Unger stresses that such historical evidence, even in com-

bination with "the evidence of critical self-understanding," does not

provide

a

conclusive and definitive account of human nature.

This is

open-ended,
so principally because human nature itself is basically

meaning that there is extensive potential for development toward

different ends inherent in human nature as it now exists.

Given this
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open-ended feature of man and mind, the proper focus of any adequate
account of mind and human nature must be upon "our moral interest" as
the central factor in determining which human powers, characteristics
and activities are so essential to human life that they must be further

developed and realized.

In other words,

the theory of human nature must build on a moral
vision that partly precedes it but that is constantly
refined, transformed, and vindicated through the
.

.

.

development of the theory.
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The theories of the self, of the good and of organic groups which

are presented in Knowledge and Politics are expressly designed to fill
in the content of this guiding moral vision.

statement of this task, it represents

a

According to Unger's own

full scale return to the

central core of the traditional treatment of mind and politics.

He

specifically aligns himself with the mainstream of classical political
theory which views the formulation of an ideal of self and an ideal of

community as theory's "highest calling."
Unger contends that his theory of mind and politics,

Moreover,

unified by the theory of good, is not simply an

psychology or

a

a

priori philosophical anthropology.

priori philosophical
His claim is that

it represents a significant advance over the political theories

advanced in the liberal tradition or generated by positivist social

science which always begin with or assume

a

static, ahistorical,

abstract conception of human nature.
He contrasts his view of mind and politics with these other

conceptions in the following way:
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Instead, it starts out from the idea that the
distinctive experience of personality is that of
confronting a certain set of intelligible, interrelated
problems that arise from one's dealings with nature,

with others, and with oneself."
It

would seem, then, that the investigation of these philosophical and

conceptual problems concerning knowledge, mind and self provides the
foundation for developing an adequate theory of mind and politics.
However, Unger's approach to the connections between mind and politics makes only

problems.

a

minimal contribution to the analyses of these

Indeed, he cuts his own essay almost completely apart from

all modern attempts to clarify and resolve these issues as well as all

empirical evidence which might be relevant to these topics.

He not

only dismisses all of Anglo-American analytic philosophy and the

contemporary social and behavioral sciences as embodying the liberal
account of mind and politics but also rejects Marxian theory, Freudian
psychology, the sociological contributions of Durkheim and Weber and

structuralism as merely "partial criticisms" of the liberal framework.^^

As a result, the positive program set out in the final chapter

is inconsistent with his own statement of the proper starting point for

developing an adequate theory of mind and politics as well as the major
contributions of his earlier chapters.

It

substitutes

a

search for

a

metaphysical-religious reconciliation or synthesis of opposing doctrines, which are themselves products of his own thought,

for careful

analysis of philosophical issues concerning knowledge and mind.
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Of course, this is not to say that Unger's call for a "total

criticism" and radical restructuring of the conceptual framework which

continues to underpin liberal political theory and contemporary
political science can be dismissed out of hand.

He has identified

certain problematic and contestable assumptions concerning knowledge
and mind in the basic framework used to explain and evaluate political

behavior, processes and institutions.

Yet, his own program for in-

vestigating the problems and articulating

a

superior framework is

itself problematic and contestable.
Unger makes

a

valid point when he maintains that philosophical

analysis is not the whole of philosophy and that

a

more speculative

approach which focuses on the connections between mind and politics is
necessary.

However, if the type of detailed and technical analysis of

particular problems and concepts which Unger ridicules is not the only

philosophical task, it does seem to be the necessary starting point in
any examination of the connections between issues in philosophy of mind
and epistemology and the study of politics.

Without such analysis,

Unger cannot demonstrate the need for an alternative conceptual framework.

Moreover, he cannot advance alternative conceptions of self,

knowledge and mind which can be shown to be superior to existing
concepts unless he somehow makes his alternative scheme intelligible by
relating it to certain of the concepts we already have.
Unger's essay provides such

a
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powerful critique of the conceptual

scheme through which the liberal theorists and contemporary social
scientists classify and characterize human thought and action precisely
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because it does partially undertake such an analysis of those conceptual and philosophical issues.

But this dimension of his work does not

receive sufficient attention and is ultimately incompatible with his
own vision of the philosopher's task and of the place of metaphysics in

philosophy and political theory.
In place of the

"false and nefarious" modern view which severs the

connections between mind and politics

linger

seeks to construct an

alternative theory of mind and politics that:
bridges the distance from the study of knowledge
to the understanding of individual conduct, from the
understanding of individual conduct to the science of
society, and from the science of society to the exercise
98
.

.

.

of political choice

.

.

.

This alternative theory of mind and politics is not systematically

founded on careful examination of issues concerning knowledge, human

motivation and behavior, the structure of scientific explanation, and
of political choice and activity.

Rather, it is founded on the kind of

transcendental metaphysics and system-building which characterized the
classical treatment of mind and politics.
Certainly, Unger himself seems to reject the notion of

a

complete

and perfect picture of ultimate reality sought by transcendental meta-

physics as antithetical to the inherent limitations of human knowledge
and understanding.

At the same time,

it is this model of transcen-

dental knowledge which is reflected in his own attempt to formulate

comprehensive theory of mind and politics by reconciling or synthesizing competing philosophical and religious views.

His approach to

a
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the issues of mind and politics turns away from any extensive analysis

of the structure and possible limits of human knowledge and the

implications of this analysis for political theory and political
science, and returns to the classical vision of

a

theory of politics

based upon that perfect knowledge which can be found only in the

transcendental realm of ideas.
Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics are certainly

significant works because they focus attention on the frequently
ignored connections between theories of knowledge and mind on the one
hand and social, political and ethical theories on the other.

As both

authors argue, the traditional political philosophers did recognize the

significance of these connections, especially as embodied in the

conceptions of human nature or individuality which were explicitly or
implicitly incorporated in ethical and political theories.

Since

conceptions of human nature or personality remain an essential part of
any conceptual framework used to explain and evaluate political

behavior, the traditional discussions of the conceptual and philosophical issues concerning self, knowledge and mind are still relevant
to political theory and political science.

Moreover, Wood and Unger's indictment of the neglect of these

connections in Anglo-American philosophy and social science stands on
strong ground.

Reflecting

a

powerful positivist influence, analytic

philosophers and contemporary social scientists have standardly
or
asserted or assumed that there is no connection, either logical
the
practical, between doing epistemology or philosophy of mind and
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study of politics or ethics.

Since this exclusion of moral and

political "recommendation" or "attitudes" from philosophy and social

science has been regarded as

a

major advance over traditional political

philosophy, analytic philosophy and mainstream social science have

typically rejected central elements of the traditional treatment of
mind and politics as completely mistaken. 99
Clearly, Wood and Unger challenge certain of the most fundamental

categories and classifications which have been central to analytic

philosophy and the positivist model of

a

science of politics or

They contend that the imposition of these categories and

society.

classifications upon traditional political philosophy has typically
resulted in gross distortion and misrepresentation of traditional

treatments of mind and politics.

The embarrasingly crude caricature of

Hegel which has dominated Anglo-American philosophy and political

theory until very recently can be cited as

a

particularly strong

indicator of such blatant misrepresentation.
However, Wood and Unger seem to suggest that the entire attempt to

develop

scientific theory of human nature or politics as well as the

a

whole set of distinctions and classifications which mark the "modern"
or "scientific" perspective are simply part of an arbitrary framework

blocking
itics.

a

proper appreciation of traditional theories of mind and pol-

Unger,

for example,

points to Plato's conception of "a science

of ideals" as overcoming the liberal principle of reason and desire by
.

denying that what ought to be and what is are not wholly different.

Although he does not advocate returning to this conception, he does

100
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hold that Plato's failure to differentiate between description and

evaluation in his theory of human nature is

a

valid approach with equal

standing to those theories of politics which do incorporate this
distinction.

He presents a theory of self which is supposed to unite

the best of this Platonic or traditional conception with its "ob-

jective" view of the good and the liberal or modern conception which is
based on

a

"subjective" view of the good.

This is

a

fundamentally misconceived notion of how to make use of

what is offered by Plato and other classical theorists' treatments of

mind and politics.

The need is not for a synthesis which somehow both

transcends and preserves Plato's views but rather for careful investigation of what his analysis of the connections between mind and politics can contribute to our understanding of the logic of moral discourse, the structure of explanation used in political inquiry, and the

relationship between the two.

The basic problem with analytic inter-

pretations of traditional theories of human nature and politics is not
that the liberal conception of human nature rests on

a

partial truth

which must be reconciled with another partial turth represented by
classical philosophy and political theory, but rather that analytic

theorists have tended to treat the fact-value distinction as

a

dichotomy into which all statements about human nature can be neatly
classified.

""^^

Plato and other traditional political theorists make

substantial contributions to our understanding of human nature, ethics
that
and politics not because their accounts lack such distinctions as
and
between facts and values which are recognized in modern philosophy
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social science, but despite their failure to make these significant

distinctions and the crudeness of their accounts of mind and
psychological theories.
In short, one of the major failings of the Wood-Unger approach to

mind and politics is that they do not address the difficult questions

which arise when we attempt to assess traditional or contemporary
theories of mind, human nature and politics.

For example, there is no

real effort to differentiate those essential and ineliminable connec-

tions between mind and politics which are present in any conceptual

framework used to explain and evaluate political behavior from those
illegitimate and improper connections between mind and politics which
were drawn by political philosophers attempting to deduce or derive

theory of society or politics from

a

theory of self or mind.

In

a

other

words, these authors do not confront in sufficient detail the problems
and topics centering around the concepts of knowledge, mind and action

which, according to their own analyses of mind and politics, must be
faced by the political theorist and the political scientist.
The inadequacy of their analyses of the basic issues surrounding

mind and knowledge is evident in their most extensive and most effective discussion of these issues, which are found in their critiques of
the liberal-empiricist framework.

Since both Unger and Wood believe

that the conceptions of knowledge, mind and self formulated by the

early British empiricists continue to have

a

pervasive influence in

liberal political theory and mainstream social science, they regard the
essential
critical reexamination of these philosophical doctrines as an
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part of the attempt to set out
action.

a

more adequate account of thought and

Here they clearly identify some of the more problematic

features of this empiricist account of knowledge and mind, most notably
the notion of man as simply a passive observer rather than an agent in
the world and the notion of reason as the servant of the passions.

However, their analyses of the basic themes which unified the early

empiricist conceptions of knowledge and mind are not systematic and
comprehensive, as illustrated by their inadequate treatment of such
central components of the empiricist framework as its conception of

self-knowledge.

Moreover, despite some promising suggestions, both

authors fail to demonstrate the full force of the connections between
the empiricist accounts of knowledge and mind and classical liberal

political theory.
In addition, both Unger and Wood frequently proceed as if any and

all criticism of the early liberal-empiricist account of mind and poli-

tics applies, totally and without qualification, to contemporary Anglo-

American philosophy, political theory and political science.

They

ignore the most important developments in recent linguistic philosophy
as well as the genuine contributions to our understanding of human

motivation and behavior and of social structure and political institutions which have emerged from the social and behavioral sciences.
course, as they argue, it is still possible that the unreflective

assumptions incorporated in the conceptual framework utilized by con-

temporary philosophers and social scientists, while not identical to
rest on
the classical liberal view of mind and politics, continue to

Of
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the basic premises and the fundamental core of that liberal view.

such

a

claim certainly requires the support of

a

But

more extensive

examination of these unreflective assumptions present in contemporary
political theory and political science than is provided by either of
these authors.
The inadequacy of V/ood's and Unger's investigation of the most

crucial issues centering in philosophy of mind is even more prominent
in

their presentations of their alternative theories of mind and poli-

tics.

Certainly, the attempt to replace the set of unreflective,

liberal assumptions with more coherent, more adequate accounts of

knowledge, mind and action must proceed on the basis of analysis of
issues which cut across metaphysics, epistemology
and philosophy of action.

,

philosophy of mind

But Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Pol-

itics ignore or treat cavalierly such topics as the problems concerning
the limitations and possible distortions inherent in the perceiver's or

knower's point of view, the important problems concerning the identification and classification of mental as opposed to physical phenomena,
and the role of language or

a

particular scheme of classification in

channeling or limiting human thought or action.
Moreover, the authors neglect or only cursorily address those
problems and topics which lie at the heart of any account of mind or
human nature, including the mind-body problem or the relationship

between thought and action, the special characteristics of self-

knowledge and the role of such knowledge in human behavior, and the
relationship between self-knowledge and empirical knowledge.

There is
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also no analysis of the full range of mental concepts from the sen-

sations to the "higher" mental terms such as beliefs and intentions, of
the relationship between reason and the passions, emotions and desires,
of the role of choice and deliberation in human behavior, or of the

basic elements of consciousness and self-consciousness.

Finally and perhaps most crucially since these authors are at-

tempting to generate coherent theories of mind and politics, there is
no careful consideration of the implications of basic changes in our

conceptions of mind and knowledge for political theory and political
science.

Most surprisingly, these works fail to make any contribution

to clarifying or resolving those traditional philosophical contro-

versies, as,

for example,

the free-will determinist debate, which have

been high on the agenda of the historical political theorists.

In

addition, there is little real analysis of those concepts such as

freedom and responsibility which are both central to the explanation of
political behavior and the same time linked to the concepts of mind,

knowledge and so on.
More generally. Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics
present a confusing and fragmentary account of the

relationship

between descriptive concepts or statements on the one hand and normative concepts or statements on the other.

They make no substantial

contribution to analysis of the relationship between theory and fact in
the social and behavioral sciences,

ignoring even the partial and

limited treatment of this relationship present in current discussion of
the problem of the self-fulfilling prophecy or the self-fulfilling
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prediction.

Even such general concerns which seem most directly

relevant to their own focus on philosophical issues, such as the epis-

temological situation of the political scientist and how it compares
with the epistemological situation of the political agent, are ne-

glected.

In short,

these two works make only

a

minimal contribution to

any adequate discussion of the proper model of political inquiry and of

the structure of explanation and theory in political inquiry.

Unger and Wood may be correct in calling for

a

radical reformu-

lation of the entire philosophical framework which underpins the

contemporary approach to the study of human action, society and
politics.

Moreover, despite the deficiencies of their analyses, they

have demonstrated the need for

a

reexamination of the basic philoso-

phical and methodological assumptions which underpin the positivist

model of political science.

However, the only viable path toward this

systematic reexamination or revolutionary formulation of the conceptual
framework used in the explanation and evaluation of political behavior,

processes and institutions is

a

detailed investigation of those

conceptual and philosophical issues which reach across metaphysics,
epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy
of social science.

anthropology or

a

The return to the kind of a priori philosophical

priori philosophical psychology utilized by the

traditional political philosophers or to

a

type of deductive meta-

physics aimed at reconciling or synthesizing polar opposites is an
untenable alternative.

Systematic and detailed investigation of the

philosophical assumptions of liberal political theory and positivist

. .
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social science is being undertaken from

a

variety of different phi-

losophical perspectives, including Marxism, phenomenology and exis-

tentialism.
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The tragedy of the Wood-Unger approach to mind and pol-

itics is that these authors cut themselves off from all of these more

methodical and extensive examinations of the crucial issues of mind and
politics
One of the most rigorous and thorough reevaluations of empiricist

assumptions has been initiated by

a

number of philosophers and social

theorists working within the analytic tradition.

Discussion of issues

in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action remains at the forefront

of contemporary linguistic philosophy, and from this work have emerged
forceful challenges to basic components of the classical empiricist

account of thought and action.

Moreover, there are

a

number of lin-

guistic philosophers or theorists influenced by linguistic philosophy,
most notably Stuart Hampshire, Charles Taylor and Alasdair Maclntyre,
who are exploring the connections between these philosophical issues
and current problems and concerns in political theory and political

science
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The focus of the remainder of this essay is on the work of these

linguistic theorists which bears most directly upon analysis of the

connections between mind and politics.

The second and third chapters

focus on setting out the essential components of the classical liberal

conception of mind and politics and the basic philosophical and
conceptual assumptions which underpin the treatment of thought and
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action in contemporary political science as these have been charac-

terized and analyzed in recent linguistic philosophy.

This approach is

taken because this work, which is completely ignored by Wood and

summarily dismissed by Unger, provides the kinds of systematic and

comprehensive presentation and analysis of both the classical liberal
framework and the contemporary, unreflective view of thought and action
that are lacking in Unger 's and Wood's presentation.
The final three chapters focus even more narrowly on the efforts

of one contemporary linguistic philosopher, Stuart Hampshire, to
formulate an alternative conception of thought and action and to

explore the implications of this revised conception of thought and
action for political theory and political science.

From the beginning,

it must be made clear that this concentration on Hampshire's inves-

tigation of these topics does not rest upon any claim, explicit or
implicit, that he provides or even proposes

a

definitive and complete
Indeed,

resolution of the problems surrounding thought and action.

Hampshire himself argues that there are reasons for treating any

philosophy of mind, no matter how systematic and well supported, as

essentially contestable and open to challenge.
At the same time,

104

his work does exhibit several characteristics

which make it quite valuable to the political theorist or political
scientist who wishes to explore further the connections between mind
and politics.

In

the first place, Hampshire's approach is

a

broad-

ranging analysis which focuses on the connections among several issues
and problems concerning knowledge, mind and self, but which is not
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detached from the more detailed and comprehensive treatments of
separate philosophical and conceptual problems or from recent empirical

research in the social and behavioral sciences.
attempt to set out

a

thoroughly grounded

Moreover, his own

more adequate account of thought and action is
in

a

comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of the

central deficiencies of the classical empiricist framework and of the
most important topics in contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy
of action.

Finally, in contrast to Wood and Unger, Hampshire's work

offers more sophisticated and more viable accounts of what answers

philosophical analysis can and cannot be expected to supply and of what

standards and criteria must be used in deciding between competing
conceptions of mind and personality.
In addition,

Hampshire certainly does not attempt to construct

a

unified theory of mind and politics, and he nowhere provides the kind
of systematic statement concerning these connections as is attempted in
Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics

.

However,

a

basic concern

with the connections between philosophical and conceptual issues

regarding knowledge, mind and self on the one hand and the most important issues in social, ethical and political theory on the other is

pervasive throughout his various books and articles.

Also,

although

Hampshire is interested in and has been influenced by the work of the
traditional philosophers, particularly Aristotle and Spinoza, he is not
solely or even principally interested in examining the theories of mind
and politics advanced by the traditional theorists.
is with

His major concern

the issues surrounding thought and action as they relate to
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contemporary ethical theory and social inquiry, and he focuses on the
connections between conceptual and philosophical issues and major

questions concerning the structure of explanation and theory in

contemporary social inquiry.

In short,

his analyses of such topics as

the relationship between explanation and evaluation or the relation

between theory and fact in social inquiry set the examination of the

connections between mind and politics on

a

much more substantial

foundation than is provided by Wood or Unger.
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section

1.

CHAPTER

II

THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL TREATMENT OF MIND AND POLITICS

The Cartesian Spectatorial Account of Knowledge

The classical liberal account of mind and politics emerged during

the heyday of mind and politics.

This account is most explicitly

formulated in the work of Locke, Hume and John Stuart Mill, who combined an interest of social, ethical and political issues (as the

founders of liberal theory) with

a

concern for resolving central philo-

sophical problems (as the founders of the empirciist tradition).
the liberal theorists, like the classical thinkers, perceived

a

Thus,

direct

relationship between fundamental problems in metaphysics, epistemology
and philosophy of mind on the one hand and the study of human nature,

morals and politics on the other.

Yet, although they acknowledged the

significance of the connections between mind and politics, they strongly objected to the specific theories of mind, human nature and politics

which had been advanced by the classical and medieval philosophers.
The British liberals attacked not only the content of traditional

views of reality, mind and knowledge but also the manner in which
earlier philosophers had posed and attempted to resolve basic problems
in metaphysics,

philosophy of mind and epistemology.

Like the rationa-

list philosophers of the seventeenth century, the liberal-empiricist

philosophers rejected the traditional conceptions of philosophy and
science as incompatible with the new understanding of man and the
universe emerging from the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and
97

98

seventeenth centuries.

The classical liberal accounts of self, know-

ledge and mind represented

a

systematic challenge to the entire philos-

ophical framework within which classical discussion of mind and politics had proceeded since Plato.
It was, of course,

the Copernican revolution that marked the

fundamental break with the classical and medieval conceptual framework

which identified the real world with certain ideas or powers lying
beyond the physical world.

The work, which was begun by Copernicus,

continued by Galileo and Kepler, and culminated in Newton destroyed
this view of the universe and of man's place in and knowledge of it.
The real world was increasingly viewed not as

hierarchical order of

a

meanings, essences or purposes which could be known through deductive

metaphysics or religious insight but rather as

a

series of contingent

correlations linking different observable phenomena.

1

The Aristotelian view of explanation in terms of final causes or

purposes and as exposing the essential nature of
by

a

a

thing was replaced

model of explanation which applied mathematics and precise methods

of measurement in attempting to account for the efficient causes of

particular events.

The new scientific or experimental method champion-

ed the notion that theories must be testable, excluding the traditional

attempts to explain why things must be as they are on the basis of

unknowable final causes.

According to this alternative model of ex-

planation, to explain is to reduce

a

complex whole into its basic parts

function
and then examine how the various parts are combined to form or
as a whole.

2

99

This combination of

a

new method of explanation and the atomistic

metaphysics associated with the scientific revolution undercut the
classical and medieval notions of the special status of man in
the

universe and the special nature of the study of human nature, morals
and politics.

Man lost his unique standing as

a

creature close to the

top of the hierarchical natural order and became simply one creature

among many.

Human nature was increasingly viewed not as the product of

an overall design or as the fulfillment of ideal ends or purposes but

rather as

a

more or less coincidental and mechanistic arrangement of

certain parts and functions.
Accordingly,

a

proper understanding of the nature of man could

only be the product of

behavior, not

a

a

scientific study of human motivation and

search for essential qualities or powers.

Moreover,

the scientific or experimental method increasingly came to be seen as
the single valid method of acquiring knowledge.

Especially after

Newton, the attempt to construct an adequate account of human nature

became identified with the attempt to provide mechanistic explanations
of observable processes and behaviors.
Of course,

have

a

it was

generally acknowledged that man continued to

somewhat special status because he could gain direct access to

the workings of his own mind through introspection or reflection.

However, these "internal" contents of consciousness were typically

viewed as

a

given set of "ideas" or phenomena which could be studied in

the same way that we examine objects in the "external" world.

More-

over, although Newton and most of the other early proponents of these
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mechanistic and atomistic views of man and mind actually held some
variant of dualism which left room for the "spiritual" aspects of human
nature emphasized in Christian thought, the new method of inquiry they

championed tended to ignore or make this "spiritual" half of hunan nature superfluous.

One of the leading advocates of this new scientific approach to

human nature was Hume who sought to apply Newtonian methods to the

investigation of human knowledge and the human mind.
develop

a

His goal was to

Newtonian theory of mind based upon the universal, scientific

principles which govern the workings of the mind.

According to this

conception, which was widely shared by the liberal theorists, philos-

ophy became

a

kind of general science of the mind.

The attempt to go

further by entering speculative philosophy and making deductions con-

cerning the ultimate nature of reality was rejected as
Newtonian methodology.

Thus,

a

violation of

Hume's philosophy aimed at becoming

truly experimental science of human nature.

a

He held that only such a

science of human nature could provide the foundation necessary for

testing the speculative conceptions of mind and man advanced by the
classical, medieval and rationalist philosophers.
Hume perceived the attempt to arrive at

a

true understanding of

human nature or mind not as an isolated, autonomous discipline but

rather as providing the basis for resolving the central problems of
ethical and political theory.

The application of the methods of the

natural sciences to the study of mind and human nature was to have

direct and immediate impact upon morals and politics.

a

Hume believed
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that an understanding of the passions which move men
to act and of the

conflicting impulses and instincts inherent in human nature
would
provide

a

groundwork for the construction of political arrangements

providing stability, order and peace.

This conception was represen-

tative of the general liberal view of the connections between mind and
politics.

Although the speculative philosophers were not mistaken in

attempting to draw such connections, their pre-scientif ic

a

,

priori

accounts contributed little to our understanding of mind and politics.
The classical liberal theorists held that we must utilize

a

scientific

approach to the study of human nature if we are to answer the fundamental questions concerning mind and knowledge and provide workable

solutions to ethical and political problems.
The liberal-treatment of mind and politics cannot be understood

apart from this transition from the classical-medieval to the modern

views of reality, nature and man.

At the same time, the dominant

portrayal of this transition as merely

a

by-product of the emergence of

the empirical sciences from speculative philosophy or as simply a

progression from the darkness of metaphysical-religious illusion to the
light of established scientific fact is fundamentally mistaken and

misleading.

The acceptance of the scientific method and of certain

conclusions reached through its application does not mark the final end
of the age of philosophy and the beginning of an age of science wherein
all philosophical problems disappear automatically.

Although it is true that the scientific revolution represented

devastating challenge to the classical portrayal of the scope and

a
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methods cf philosophy, it is also true that it raised

a

series of

complex problems spanning metaphysics, epistemology and
philosophy of
mind.

The seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers
were pri-

marily concerned with epistemological questions about the existence
of
other minds, the reality of the external world, the possibility of
Pi^iori

a

knowledge, the nature of sensation, the role of introspection

and related issues which were directly related to the attempted appli-

cation of the scientific method to the study of knowledge, mind and

human nature.
The transition from the classical to the modern framework for

viewing knowledge, mind, self and man's place in the universe is tied
not only to the scientific revolution but also to

epistemological and conceptual revolution.

As

a

closely-related

Charles Taylor notes,

one way of looking at this transformation in the basic conceptual

framework is to interpret it as "an epistemological revolution with

anthropological consequences."^

The liberal attempt to put the study

of man, mind, morals and politics on
does entail

a

a

solid, scientific foundation

drastic redefinition of human nature or self.

redefinition of human nature, which is

a

This

central feature of liberal

political and ethical thought, is underpinned by

a

conceptual and epis-

temological revolution as well as the scientific revolution.
In

the classical and medieval framework,

considered

a

the soul or mind was

reflection of the cosmic order, human knowledge resulted

from rational contemplation of the order of ideas, and man was defined
in

terms of his assigned station in the natural order.

In the emerging
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framework, the human mind was increasingly viewed in
terms of experience and consciousness which are private and unique to
each individual,

human knowledge was obtained through an individual effort
to work

"outward" from the given contents of one's own consciousness,
and man,
who was considered an individual first and foremost, was
self-defining
in that there was no pre-established place for him in the natural

order.

The classical philosophers simply did not share these views of

private experience, consciousness, individuality and self which have
been central parts of the conceptual framework common to Western phi-

losophers and political theorists since the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries.

Tne theories of knowledge and mind advanced by the early

British empiricists were essential features of the redefinition of

human nature which stood at the very center of liberal political and
ethical theory.
As we have seen, Wood,

Unger and other traditional critics of this

liberal framework suggest that the basic problem here is the liberal

adoption of

a

scientific methodology which neglects or negates the

spiritual or essential characteristics of human beings recognized and

emphasized by the classical theorists.

This is a misleading and mis-

directed objection to the liberal framework which does not come to
terms with the central issues involved in this liberal reorientation of

philosophy and political theory or the crucial questions regarding the
connections between mind and politics.
The real source of potential problems in this liberal approach to

mind and politics is not simply that it attempts to be scientific, but
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rather that it ultimately rests on the same kind of
contestable phil-

osophical positions and assumptions as do the classical theories
of
mind and politics.

The proper question is whether this approach, which

attempts to utilize the scientific method but which still relies on

fundamental conceptual choices and philosophical doctrines, is adequate
to the task of identifying, classifying and explaining the central

components of human motivation and behavior.

This question cannot be

answered without critical analysis and assessment of the empiricist

conceptions of knowledge, mind and self which underpin the liberal
explanation and evaluation of politics.
The early liberal conceptions of knowledge, mind and politics

cannot be understood apart from the fundamental epistemological refor-

mulation initiated by Descartes.

Descartes can be considered the first

"modern" philosopher in that he offered one of the earliest, most

comprehensive and most influential attempts to resolve the epistemological and metaphysical questions tied to the advances in the sciences
and mathematics.

Although he did want to reconcile the new framework

which was emerging from work in mathematics and the sciences with

Christian theology, Descartes was not concerned with mind and politics
in the same sense that he had no major interest in the political and

social issues of the time.

However, his proposed solution to basic

philosophical difficulties left

a

lasting imprint on all successive

theories of mind and politics.
For example, he articulated new standards of argument and proof as
he attempted to reform all traditional areas of rational inquiry,
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including philosophy, by introducing the rigor
characteristic of mathe-

matics and the sciences.

In addition,

he made epistemological ques-

tions about the basis of human knowledge rather than
metaphysical

questions about the nature of the world the starting point in
philosophy.

Finally,

Descartes firmly established the "egocentric approach"

by making the question "What do
question of philosophy.

I

know?" the basic and most fundamental

7

According to the Cartesian method of doubt, this question can only
be answered by breaking down all complex "ideas" into their component

parts and, by systematically rejecting all "ideas" against which one
can imagine the least ground of doubt, uncovering certain "clear and

distinct ideas" which provide an indubitable and certain foundation for
human knowledge.

He notes that it is possible to doubt that one's

perceptions actually correspond to the real world or that one actually
has a body.

However,

a

person cannot doubt his own existence because

he must exist in order to entertain this doubt.
In short,

cogito ergo sum is the basic indubitable proposition

which places human knowledge on

a

solid and secure footing.

The at-

tempt to prove the existence of the external world, of one's own body,
or other "ideas" which are not self-guaranteeing must proceed like a

mathematical proof beginning with the contents of one's own consciousness.
step,

Of course,

Descartes

's

argument incorporates

a

transcendental

for he uses his proof of God's existence as the ultimate guaran-

tee that we are not substantially deceived in our beliefs about the

existence of the world and our bodies.
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For the most part, the leading philosophers of the
seventeenth

century continued to work within the confines of the rationalist
frame-

work articulated by Descartes.

They followed Descartes in viewing the

basic materials of human knowledge, including knowledge of the external
world, as "ideas" originating in the understanding or intellect rather

than in sense experience.

According to the rationalist doctrine of

innate "ideas," the mind is pre-equipped with certain "ideas" such as
"God," "mind" and "matter" and does not have to derive them from expe-

rience.

In

addition, the rationalist philosophers of the seventeenth

century generally accepted the Cartesian vision of all human knowledge
as a single, unified,

deductive system, resting upon basic propositions

discoverable through reason.

They attempted to examine this hierarchi-

cal order of propositions central to metaphysics and epistemology by

utilizing the rigorous techniques of the mathematician.
The eighteenth century empiricist philosophers challenged this

rationalist framework as well as the medieval perspective it sought to
replace as fundamentally out of step with the basic insights offered by
advances in the sciences.

One of the main targets of the classical

British empiricists was the rationalist notion that there are "ideas"
with which we are born or which are presented to us by an undeceiving
God.

According to the empiricist position, illustrated by Locke, all

"ideas" were ultimately derived from sense experience.

Locke held that although there are complex "ideas" which may
involve the mind in some active sense, these complex "ideas" are ul-

timately reducible to simple "ideas" which are the products of sense

.
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experience rather than original contributions of
the mind.

In general,

the British empiricists acknowledged two kinds
of such simple "ideas."

First, they recognized "external" sensations, or what
Locke labeled

"ideas of sensation," which involve the use of sense organs,
give us

information about the external world and are fully sensuous in
nature.
In

addition, they focused on "internal" sensations, or "ideas of re-

flection" in Locke's terminology, which, while not involving sense
organs, similarly allow us to "perceive" our own internal states (feelings, pains, etc.) and our own mental operations (thinking, believing,

hoping, etc.).

9

Our knowledge of these simple "ideas" or sensations,

whether external or internal, was considered direct, immediate and
certain.

Given this view that we can know things only through our sense

impressions of them, it is clear that the empiricists could not accept
the rationalist conception of the body of human knowledge as

a

deduc-

tive system, based upon certain propositions discovered through reason.
The British empiricists regarded this rationalist account of the source
and structure of knowledge as fundamentally misconceived as the medieval view of metaphysics as

a

science of the final causes of things.

This notion that a priori reasoning cannot establish anything about the

nature of reality has been one of the central unifying themes in the

empiricist tradition

Although there were and are

a

number of significant disagreements

among empiricists concerning the details of

a

theory of knowledge, the

empiricist philosophers have generally held that all human knowledge

1
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can be constructed out of or built up from certain
basic, indubitable

elements given in our sense experience.

The simple "ideas" or sensa-

tions which can be known directly by acquaintance have
been treated as
the building blocks out of which the rest of human knowledge
can be

constructed.

Our knowledge of external objects, according to this

account, must remain indirect and derivative.

All that we can properly

claim to know is ultimately based upon or reducible to the association
of certain "ideas" with basic sensations, to experience at its most

fundamental and primitive level.

1

The empiricist rejection of the rationalist accounts of the

materials of knowledge and of the foundations of our body of knowledge
pointed Anglo-American analytic philosophy in

a

direction which is

radically different from and fundamentally opposed to developments in
continental epistemology and metaphysics.

At the same time, there are

important similarities in the epistemological frameworks utilized by
the rationalist and empiricist philosophers which are neglected if one

focuses exclusively on empiricist efforts to fill in details of the

attempted construction of all knowledge out of sense impressions.
After all, the classical empiricists followed Descartes in con-

sidering epistemology rather than metaphysics the correct starting
point in philosophy.

formulating

a

They like Descartes set themselves the task of

final answer to the challenge of skepticism by locating

a

source of knowledge which is free from the possibility of error and

certain.

Moreover, the British empiricists incorporated the egocentric

approach which is tied to the Cartesian method of doubt.

In short.

2
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although they rejected Descartes' transcendental and deductive
solution, the empiricists followed him in making the search
for certainty
an appeal to a form of direct personal verification
provided by the

data of consciousness.

1

The classical empiricists offered

a

different path to the goal of

certain knowledge, but the basic framework within which they confronted

epistemological issues remained fundamentally Cartesian.

In a sense,

both Descartes and the early empiricists worked within the confines of
a

standard account of knowledge which had been dominant since Plato and

Aristotle.

Richard Rorty,

a

contemporary analytic philosopher, labels

this account the "spectatorial" account of knowledge and characterizes
it

as maintaining:

that the acquisition of knowledge presupposes the
presentation of something "immediately given" to the
mind, where the mind is conceived of as a sort of "immaterial eye," and where "immediately" means, at a
.

.

.

minimum, "without the mediation of language."
The central common feature of the Cartesian and empiricist epistemo-

logical frameworks is the systematic and uncompromising formulation of
this spectatorial account found in the "doctrine of ideas" or "way of

ideas" advanced by Descartes and taken over by the empiricists.

14

Both the seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers portrayed

"ideas" as the objects of the mind when it thinks, where thinking

includes sense perception and sensation.
used to label

a

In

fact, the term 'ideas' was

category which includes sense perceptions, sensations,

passions, mental images, thoughts, concepts, and propositions.

This
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conception of 'ideas' contained, implied or supported
certain views of
the relationship between the self and the external world,
the relation

between the self and other persons, the relation between body and
mind,
as well as other issues central to any account of human nature.

though there was

a

Al-

significant shift in terminology as empiricist phi-

losophers adopted an increasingly sophisticated classification of
mental terms, the spectatorial account of knowledge as embodied in the
"doctrine of ideas," with its corresponding views of mind and man,
remained

a

central part of the empiricist framework.

There are as Rorty suggests, three principal elements in this

Cartesian spectatorial account, as it appears in the "doctrine of
ideas," which bear directly on philosophy of mind.

The first of these

three elements is the notion that "ideas" are objects which are im-

mediately given to the mind.

As we have seen,

Descartes' attempt to

resolve the problems concerning human knowledge proceeds from his proof
of his own existence and subsequent examination of the "ideas" which
are present in his own consciousness.

The fundamental assumption in this Cartesian approach is that the

correct starting point is the ego to which only "ideas" are present.
An "idea" is any object which can be contemplated by the Cartesian ego,

but it is an object of

a

very special kind in that it is supposed to

carry no "existential commitment" to anything besides the ego presented
with such an "idea."

Thus, "ideas" are objects which can be con-

templated without logical commitment to anything other than the con-

templating ego.

Moreover,

for Descartes, "ideas" are the paradigm case

8

Ill

of objects because they are the objects which mediate
or form the

interface between the ego and the external world

The existence of

objects or other egos in the external world can only be
established by

working "outward" from those "ideas" which are immediately given to
the
isolated Cartesian ego.
The classical empiricists followed Descartes in treating "ideas"
as the objects which are immediately given to the mind.

Locke, for

example, states:
Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath
no other immediate object but its own ideas, which
it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our

knowledge is only conversant about them.
In

17

similar fashion, Hume argues that only "perceptions or impressions

and ideas" are immediately present in the mind.

1

As we have seen,

the

British empiricists reject the notion that any of these "ideas" are
innate and contend that all complex "ideas" are formed by combining,
with the help of memory and imagination, "ideas" which we have acquired

through experience.

The focus in the empiricist tradition thus in-

creasingly shifts from "ideas" to sensations, impressions, sense experiences or what come to be called sense data.
Yet, although the terminology of "ideas" is gradually replaced by

the language of sense experience, the Cartesian notion of basic units

which are immediately given or directly present to consciousness remains.

The empiricists continue to assume that what we experience is

presented individually in the form of atomic units, whether "ideas,"
impressions or sense data.

These atomic units are supposed to carry no

9
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"existential commitment":

a

description of them is

a

description of

how things appear to the individual with no strings attached
to any

external reality.

1

Sense experience, which is taken to be private,

simple and incorrigible, becomes the interface between the Cartesian
ego and the external world.

The existence of objects and persons in

the external world can only be established by working "outward" from

the foundation of experience which is immediately given to the

Cartesian ego.
A second element in this variant of the spectatorial account of

knowledge is the view of the mind as some kind of "immaterial

of reason as some form of mental vision.

eye='

and

Descartes systematically

incorporates this notion of an inner mental vision, which is suggested
by various expressions in ordinary discourse,

knowledge.
from

a

20

into his theory of

This conception of mental vision does not follow simply

mistaken identification of "ideas" with images, although both

Descartes and the British empiricists do often treat "ideas" as if they
were images or pictures.

Rather, the central feature of this view is

the conception of "ideas" as the objects of an inner mental vision.

21

Descartes explicitly compares the processes involved in "mental intuition" to the visual process and argues that

a

person must examine

his "ideas" by "isolating them from each other and scrutinizing them

separately with steadfast mental gaze."

22

In the Cartesian spectatorial account of knowledge, vision becomes

the one model for viewing our thinking and reasoning processes.
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Thought and reason are simply efforts to "see" more clearly
and dis-

tinctly the idea-objects which are immediately given to consciousness.
In Descartes'

work this notion of intellectual vision is linked to his

treatment of perception as largely

a

rational process of seeing through

something or "the active rendering of the object transparent to the
23

mind."^

Moreover, Descartes' portrayal of this inner vision is tied to his

contention that our inner perception can take one to

a

direct,

immedi-

ate awareness and understanding of his own essential nature.

Descartes' belief that

person can have, in Norman Malcolm's words, "a

a

clear and distinct perception of himself as

a

thinking and unextended

thing,"

is an essential component of his view of the essence of human

nature as

a

thinking, noncorporeal thing or substance.

However, the

fundamental assumption underpinning this conception of an inner mental
vision is the portrayal of the attempt to understand one's own mental

processes and states as

a

process parallel to visual perception of the

external world.

Although the empiricist philosophers offer

a

radically different

account of perception and reject the Cartesian claim that man can have
a

direct and immediate awareness of his essential self as

a

thinking

being, they remain committed to this model of mental vision as appro-

priate for discussing the acquisition of knowledge about the workings
of one's own mind.

Such observation of our mental operations is,

according to the classical empiricists,
simple "ideas."

Locke,

for example,

a

fundamental source of our

argues that we obtain our "ideas"

of doubting,

imagining, remembering and other mental processes
by

observing the performance of these processes in our own minds.
This notion of an inner perception of the workings of one's
own

mind, which Locke calls "reflection" and by the late nineteenth century
was commonly termed "introspection," is a central theme in empiricist

epistemology and philosophy of mind.

The British empiricists follow

Descartes in making this notion of an inner mental vision,
optical "look" at what is happening in one's own mind,

a

of their portrayals of self-awareness and self-knowledge.

a

non-

principal part
The class-

ical empiricist epistemological framework retains as one of its most

fundamental assumptions this Cartesian view that human beings can
perceive the contents of their own minds in much the same way that they

perceive objects in the external world.
The combination of this view of "ideas" as the only immediate

objects of the mind and the notion that we become aware of our "ideas"
through

a

form of mental vision clearly has significant implications

concerning the relationship between words and ideas or between language
and thought.

Indeed, a third major element in the Cartesian specta-

torial account of knowledge is the view that we can become directly

aware of our "ideas" without the mediation of language.

Clearly the

whole point and purpose of the Cartesian method of examining our
"ideas" with "a steadfast mental gaze" is to leave behind the dis-

torting effects of words, particularly those in the Aristotelian-

medieval conceptual framework, and put ourselves directly in touch with
our own "ideas."

.
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According to this Cartesian account, it is the philosopher's task
to strip away the artificial layer of public discourse in order to

uncover the basic chain of "ideas" which is inner, mental discourse.
Thus,

the Cartesian framework advances the fundamental claim that an

individual can break out of the system of identification and class-

ification embodied in his language and find direct, intuitive knowledge
of his own "ideas."

The key assumption which underpins this claim is

the view of thought as solely a matter of internal, mental discourse,

conceptions or "ideas" which are prior to and, at their most funda-

mental level, completely autonomous from public language.

27

Whereas Descartes only lays the groundwork for or at most suggests
such

a

view of the relationship between thought and language, the

classical empiricists fully articulated the view, in Malcolm's words,
"of language standing in

a

purely external relation to the speaker."

2g

Locke, for example, seems to hold that words are simply marks or labels
for "ideas" in the speaker's mind.

He states.

Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand
for nothing but the idea in the mind of him that uses
them

Such

a

29

conception of words as labels necessarily presupposes that there

are "ideas," mental states or experiences which exist prior to and

independently of our knowledge or our labeling of them.
in general

Locke states

terms what must also apply to an individual's use of mental

terms: "In the beginning of languages, it was necessary to have the
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idea before one gave it

name."^

a

Locke thus illustrates the classi-

cal empiricist tendency to view the function of language as narrowly

restricted to the inner recording of one's own "ideas" and to the
attempt to communicate such "ideas" with others.
This classical empiricist view of the relationship between lan-

guage and thought raises

a

number of serious problems which have been

addressed repeatedly by succeeding philosophers in the empiricist
tradition.

For example,

since the matching of mental terms and "ideas"

results from each individual's reflecting on or introspecting his own
private stock of "ideas" and is purely an individual matter, the question of whether different persons are using the same words to label the
same "ideas",

a

prerequisite of communication, must be confronted.

In

short, the very possibility of communication remains problematic as
long as one remains within the confines of this spectatorial framework.
In addition, given that a person's "ideas" are,

in Locke's words,

"all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others"

31

and

that one can have direct knowledge of his own "ideas" only, the sole
basis that one could have for believing in the existence of other minds

with similar "ideas" is reasoning by analogy.

Thus, this spectatorial

framework seems to lead directly to solipsism,

a

position which holds

that one has no solid ground for supposing that there are "ideas,"

thoughts or experiences other than his own.

32

These are but two of

a

whole series of interrelated problems which flow directly out of this
out by
third component of the spectatorial account of knowledge s-t

Descartes and the early empiricists.
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Much of the criticism of the empiricist epistemological
framework,

particularly within recent linguistic philosophy, has centered
around
the conception of the relation between thought and language
presented
in the standard empiricist formulation that words signify "ideas."

Numerous objections have been raised against this account of human

knowledge which focuses exclusively on individual "ideas," sensations
or experience and which severs the connections between knowledge and a

shared public language and

a

shared public world.

Ian Hacking,

for

example, has argued that the major problem with the empiricist account
of the relationship between thought and language is not simply that the

empiricists held

crude referential theory of meaning, but rather that

a

they "had no theories of meaning of the sense now given to the
phrase.""^

Hacking's point is that theories of meaning have to do

"with the essentially public features of language," and the classical

empiricists' acceptance of

a

Cartesian conception of "ideas" as im-

mediate private objects of an inner mental vision precludes the construction of such

a

theory.

34

Like Descartes, the early empiricist philosophers set out

a

kind

of "epistemological individualism" which assumes or asserts that the

source of all knowledge lies within the individual mind and its private

mental discourse of "ideas" or the sensations which it receives.

35

^
In

this Cartesian-empiricist spectatorial account of knowledge, the in-

dividual knower is abstracted from the linguistic and social context

within which he experiences, perceives and acts in the world around
him.

This epistemological framework is linked to the approach to the
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study of politics and society utilized by the classical
liberal theorists and to liberal political theory in general in
ferent ways.

In particular,

dividual knower as

a

a

variety of dif-

the epistemological conception of the in-

passive recipient of "ideas" or experiences di-

rectly supports the conception of individualism which permeates early
liberal political theory.

Thus, the account of mind which flows out of

this epistemological individualism constitutes the most powerful and

most visible of the complex connections between the empiricist epis

temological framework and liberal political theory.

The Classical Empiricist Account of Mind

The Cartesian-empiricist spectatorial account of knowledge contains,

implies or supports

a

series of themes which are central com-

ponents of the general account of mind shared by the early British empiricists.

In particular,

there are four major themes in empiricist

philosophy of mind which flow from this epistemological individualism
and which provide central components of the view of human nature that

underpins classical liberal political theory.

The themes are:

dualistic account of the relationship between mind and body,
notion that consciousness is given and transparent,

reason as the servant of the passions, and

4)

3)

2)

1)

a

the

the view of

the portrayal of self-

knowledge as being no different in kind from knowledge of the external
world.

The tenability of the liberal account of human nature in par-

itcular and liberal theory in general is heavily dependent upon the
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coherence and adequacy of these central components of the empiricist
account of mind.
The problematic dualistic account of the mind-body relationship,

which has dominated empiricist philosophy of mind and the treatment of

thought and action in the liberal political tradition, is closely tied
to the spectatorial account of knowledge formulated by Descartes and

the early empiricists.

This is not to say that Descartes and the em-

piricists introduced dualism, for both philosophical discussion of and

ordinary discourse about knowledge and mind contained dualistic elements long before the philosophical contributions of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.
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Moreover, in modern discourse we continue

to distinguish between "physicalistic" statements describing physical

events

,

properties and processes which can be made about any physical

object including the human body and "mentalistic" statements describing
thoughts, feelings and motives which can only be made about people or
beings to whom we attribute consciousness.

37

However, the Cartesian-

empiricist epistemological framework does entail

particular version

a

of mind-body dualism which reaches far beyond any dualist conception

implicit in ordinary usuage and which has exerted

a

tremendous influ-

ence on the portrayal of human thought and action in the liberal tra-

dition

.

This Cartesian-empiricist account of the mind-body relationship

emerges directly from the spectatorial account of knowledge which
physical
portrays the construction of the existence of persons and

objects out of "ideas" or sense impressions as

a

purely intellectual
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operation.

This epistemological framework explicitly legislates

a

division between an "outer" world and an "inner" world and characterizes each in detail.

The "outer" public world consists of persons

and objects and our knowledge of these remains derivative, inferential
and uncertain.

In contrast,

the "inner," private world consists of

"ideas" and sense impressions, our knowledge of which is direct, im-

mediate and certain.
The body belongs, of course, in the former world because it is

located in space, subject to physical laws and can be perceived by

outside observers.
because it is

a

In contrast,

the mind occupies the latter world

bodiless, nonspatial "thing" which is pre-stocked with

private "ideas," experiences and impressions and ultimately independent
of the physical world.

Although this dualistic account does not auto-

matically rule out the possibility that both mind and body are united
in

the whole person or self,

essentially separable.

it consistently portrays mind and body as

In addition,

in that the spectatorial

pictures the construction of the physical world as
tual process and presents man as primarily

a

a

account

purely intellec-

passive spectator in the

world, it tends to identify mind as the central or essential component

of the self.^^
One of the primary objectives of Descartes' dualistic account is
to reconcile the apparent incompatibility of the Christian emphasis on

human spirituality and the soul with the emerging scientific framework
which seeks to provide mechanistic explanations for all phenomena.

He

argues that there are two basic kinds of things in the world, thought
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and matter, neither of which can be reduced to or explained
in terms of
the other.

Human beings are special in that they are combinations or

unions of minds which think and bodies which are subject to the universal laws of the physical sciences.

Although Descartes recognizes that mind and body interact and even
suggests that such interaction might take place in the pineal gland, he
insists that mind and body are essentially distinct and fundamentally

different substances.

He thus rejects the Aristotelian notion that it

is soul or mind which makes the body alive.

the body is

a

In the Cartesian account,

purely mechanical system, and we can explain the func-

tions and processes of living bodies on the basis of mechanical principles.
The mind,

in contrast,

is a pure thinking,

nonextended substance

which cannot be explained in terms of or reduced to mechanical prin-

ciples.

Moreover, Descartes'

"mental substance" or "pure ego" theory

of mind portrays the mind as constituting the essence of the self.
Indeed, the Cartesian account of mind is very much in line with the

classical and medieval conceptions in that it pictures the mind as

a

spiritual substance which is connected only contingently and temporarily with the body.
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Descartes, however, bases his claim that mind constitutes the

essence of self on his method of doubt rather than the citing of classical or theological sources.

He argues,

a person can doubt that his body exists,

as we have seen,

that whereas

he cannot doubt that he as

a
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thinking being exists.

Thus, in part, his defense of the identifi-

cation of self with mind is based on the conceptual possibility that
one could exist as

a

disembodied mind.

More importantly, Descartes

takes this argument to demonstrate that one can have

tinct "idea" of his essential nature or of himself as

clear and dis-

a
a

thinking being.

The classical empiricist philosophers reject this Cartesian con-

ception of mind as an immaterial substance and the notion that one can

perceive one's self as

a

thinking being as hopelessly confused.

In

general, the empiricists attempted to remove the remaining spiritua-

listic elements from the discussion of mind and to model their own theories of mind after Newtonian physics.

One of the most influential of

these early empiricist portrayals of mind is Hume's account of mind as
a

"bundle" or "theater" of passing, separate sensations or perceptions.

Hume argues that one cannot have

a

direct perception of himself as an

unex tended and thinking being because the mind itself is:

nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and
.

.

.

movement.

Although our powers of inner perception or introspection can
illuminate specific "ideas" or impressions, we cannot in this way

discover

a

unique substance which we would call "self."

What we call

"persons" or "selves" are simply bundles or collections of "ideas,"

perceptions and experiences.

Hume himself expresses reservations about

or
this conception because it cannot account for the unity of self

.
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mind, or what Hume calls "the real simplicity and identity of
mind,"

through all these changes in our perceptions and experiences.^^
Such difficulties are inherent in the empiricist account of mind
not only because it is linked to an atomistic view of experience but

also because it continues to incorporate Descartes' dualistic view of

mind and body.

Like Descartes, the classical empiricists tend to

accept the notion that mind is, in some fundamental sense, distinct
from body.

They convert the Cartesian image of

being who comes pre-stocked with "ideas" into

bodied conscious being who is merely

a

a

a

disembodied conscious

picture of

a

disem-

passive recipient of experience.

The empiricist philosophers also follow Descartes in treating this

picture of

a

passive spectator who views the world from some dimen-

sionless point as the paradigm case for examining the central questions

concerning mind, knowledge and self.

In addition,

they make the search

for the unity of mind the key to "discovering" the self or to resolving

what has come to be called the problem of personal identity.

Either

explicitly or implicitly, the empiricists equate the self or person
with

a

mind or consciousness which is conceived of as essentially

bodiless
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This vision of the mind as

a

passive recipient of given experi-

ences which does not require corporeal embodiment for its essential

functions has exerted

a

tremendous influence in discussions of human

action and of the relationship between thought and action in the liberal empiricist tradition.

A Cartesian dualism does systematically

movements
infect the standard empiricist treatment of actions as bodily

:
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which are proceeded by and caused by mental events,
characterized in
terms of wills, volitions or intentions.

As Gilbert Ryle argues, "the

official doctrine" or "the official theory" of mind in the empiricist

philosophical tradition does divide each individual's life and activity
into
two collateral histories, one consisting of what
happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what
.

.

.

happens in and to his mind.
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The interaction between mind and body, the transactions between this

"inner," private history of mind and this "outer," public history of
body, "remain mysterious."
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This dualist account of the mind-body relationship is closely tied
to the doctrine of epistemological individualism and has exerted

a

pervasive influence throughout the history of Anglo-American philosophy
and political theory.

It has been

extensively criticized from

a

va-

riety of different philosophical perspectives, particularly those which
have treated seriously Hegel's attempt to set out an alternative con-

ception of the relationship between thought and action.

Since the

publication of Ryle's The Concept of Mind as well as Wittgenstein's
later work, linguistic philosophers have joined this search for

a

more

viable account of the relationship between mind and body or between
thought and action.
Certainly, Ryle's specific diagnosis of the basic problems in-

herent in "the official doctrine" and the alternative "behavioralist"

125

account of mind which he advances remain matters of controversy.^^
More generally, no single, universally accepted account of thought
and

action has emerged from such reexaminations of the standard empiricist

portrayal of mind and body.

However, linguistic philosophers, fol-

lowing the lead of Ryle and Wittgenstein, have pushed this analysis of
the mind-body problem into a wide-ranging reassessment of the basic

features of empiricist philosophy of mind, including its views of consciousness, self-consciousness and introspection.
A second major theme in classical

empiricist discussions of mind,

the notion that consciousness is both given and transparent, also

follows directly from the Cartesian epistemological framework adopted
by the empiricists.

According to this spectatorial account of know-

ledge, knowledge of one's own "ideas" or the contents of one's own con-

sciousness is direct and certain, whereas knowledge of objects and
events in the external world is indirect and uncertain.
assigns

a

This view

definite epistemological primacy to the processes of reflec-

tion or introspection because it is assumed that the mind can, through
a

kind of non-sensuous vision, directly perceive at least some of its
Also, this epistemological framework por-

own states and operations.

trays the basic data of consciousness as private and accessible only

through this process.
What this view suggests is that we can differentiate among the

mental concepts in our language only by introspectively examining the

qualitatively distinct "ideas," experiences, states or operations for
which each mental word is

a

label.

These "ideas" and experiences are

1
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considered to be the ultimate data of consciousness in
that they simply
happen to people and cannot be further broken down or
analyzed.

per-

A

son has an epistemologically "privileged access" to
these mental

phenomena because he knows directly and immediately whether or not
they
are presently occurring in his own mind.^°

The implication of this

doctrine, which was recognized by Descartes, is that first person

reports of such mental events or "ideas" are immune from error.

Al-

though many of the empiricists refuse to accept this conclusion, they

generally adopt this Cartesian portrayal of the basic contents of our
minds as being given and transparent. 5
It

is

the concept of pain which best seems to substantiate this

empiricist notion of the transparency and giveness of consciousness.
Pain is generally considered

a

kind of bodily sensation, and it seems

clear that being in pain entails experiencing this particular kind of

sensation.

As a sensation,

pain is something which happens to

or which he simply experiences.

Moreover,

a

a

person

person knows directly,

immediately and certainly whether or not he is, at some point in time,
experiencing

a

pain sensation.

It would appear that he cannot be

mistaken about the fact (except perhaps as to the classification of

a

particular sensation as pain rather than discomfort or some other
sensation), and that he is thus the final court of appeal when asked
whether he is in pain.
as

Finally, it is in the case of such sensations

pain that it seems most reasonable to treat our mental concepts as

simply labels for independently existing experiences.
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The discussion of pain and similar bodily sensations
has been

emphasized by philosophers in the empiricist tradition precisely
because such cases provide the most secure ground for the claim that

consciousness is given and transparent.

However, even here, post-

Wittgensteinian philosophy and recent scientific research have raised
serious objections to the Cartesian-empiricist account of such sensations, our knowledge of them, and our use of sensation words.

In

any case, the Cartesian-empiricist framework is clearly mistaken in
that it tends to treat pain or sensations in general as the paradigm
case of "ideas," mental experiences and mental processes.
For example, the early empiricist philosophers typically assume

that the term 'pleasure' is like 'pain'

a

label for

a

particular kind

of feeling or sensation which lies at the opposite end of the same

scale of given and transparent experience.

Thus,

Locke classifies both

pain and pleasure as "simple ideas which we receive from both sensa-

tions and reflection;" Hume treats pain and pleasure as "impressions of

sensation;" and Mill portrays pain and pleasure as ultimate unanalyzable copies of sensation or the product of some combination of sen-

sation and "ideas."

According to the British empiricists, what makes

something pleasurable or painful is that it is accompanied by one of
the series of feelings or experiences on the pain-to-pleasure scale.

Pleasures are treated as inner, private, given and transparent experiences exactly like sensations.
The classical empiricists also follow Descartes in treating the
states
"passions of the soul" as certain kinds of conscious qualities,
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or feelings which are like sensations in that the soul
or mind pas-

sively experiences them.

Hume,

for example, classifies the passions as

"impressions of reflection," particular kinds of experience which
result from the interaction of our "ideas" and sensations.
mind is portrayed as

a

passive observer which can directly perceive the

passions which are given or presented to it.
'anger,'

Again, the

'resentment,' and 'fear,'

Emotion words, such as

are apparently,

like sensation

words, simply labels for corresponding private mental events or basic,

unanalyzable qualities of consciousness.

Moreover, it is this unique

inner experience, feeling or conscious quality which makes each emotion

what it is and which differentiates it from all other emotions.
It

follows that one can know his emotions only in the same direct

and immediate way that he can know his sensations:

by discovering and

observing through introspection the particular feelings or experiences
which are already present in his consciousness.

This 'feeling theory'

of the emotions treats the relationships between an emotion and the

beliefs connected to it, between an emotion and its object, and between
an emotion and its behavioral manifestations as all contingent.

In-

deed, Hume, who most consistently and systematically advances this

position, cannot account for the fact that the emotion of pride is

typically associated with things that belong to us or achievements in
which we have played

a

part rather than with objects, events or acti-

vities which are completely unrelated to us.
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A final example of the empiricist treatment of mental concepts as

labels for the immediate contents of our consciousness which are given
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and transparent is found in their portrayal of the concept
of desire.

William

Alston calls this account "the phenomenological view of

P.

desire" and lists the following sub-categories where desire is characterized as:
A felt urge or impulse to get X (Hume).
An uneasiness occasioned by the absence of X (Locke).
An idea of X as pleasant, or with pleasant associations,
or an expectation that X will be pleasant (Mill).

Thus, the classical empiricists tend to identify desires, as well as

pleasures and emotions, with particular feelings or sensations which
are given or presented to the mind and made transparent to the mind

through introspection.
This notion that the basic contents of consciousness are given and

transparent, which flows directly from the central assumptions of the

spectatorial account of knowledge, is, like the dualist account of mind
and body,

a

significant factor in liberal-empiricist discussions of

human action.

sciousness

It

— pains,

lends support to the view that the basic data of con-

pleasures, passions and desires

which cause us to act as we do.

— are

inner forces

the portrayal of con-

In this way,

sciousness as given and transparent underpins the empiricist effort to
explain human action by simply discovering the basic inner forces
inherent in human nature or personality.
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Moreover, this view of consciousness is

a

major obstacle to the

development of an adequate theory of consciousness throughout the

liberal-empiricist tradition.

Since our pleasures, emotions, desires
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and the other contents of consciousness are taken as
given, the empir-

icist philosophers tend to ignore the manner in which certain
historical conditions and social arrangements reinforce or alter existing
and

generate new pleasures, emotions and desires.

As Hume states.

The same motives always produce the same actions; the
same events follow the same causes.
Ambition, avarice,
self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public
spirit these passions mixed in various degrees and
distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all
the actions and enterprises which have ever been ob-

—

served among mankind.
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The liberal-empiricist conception of mind acknowledges the variety of

human passions and desires, but holds that the basic passions and

desires, the inner motivations of human behavior, are the same in all

societies and in all historical periods.
In addition,

because they take the contents of consciousness as

transparent, the empiricists tend to neglect the various ways in which
our understanding of our own states of mind may be mistaken, distorted
or simply confused.

The empiricist conception of mind is incompatible

with any sociological theory which maintains or suggests that an in-

dividual's understanding of his own desires and emotions may be inadequate because of certain false beliefs about their origin or nature.
It

is

also incompatible with

a

psychological theory of human motivation

and behavior which recognizes the possibility of unconscious desires

which are not immediately transparent to each individual.

Finally, the

standard empiricist account of mind simply neglects the common situations in everyday life where individuals are uncertain or unclear about
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what they desire or want.

For all these reasons as well as those

discussed above, the empiricist portrayal of the roles of consciousness
and self-consciousness in human activity and life, which is directly

supported by this notion of consciousness as given and transparent, is
simplistic and naive.
A third,

closely-related theme which is central to the accounts of

mind and man offered by the British empiricists is the antithesis
between reason and passion emphasized in Unger's critique.

In part,

this view is directly linked to the revised conception of reason ad-

vanced by the empiricist philosophers.

Whereas Plato and most of the

classical and medieval theorists identified reason with the entire
scope of human knowledge and inquiry, the empiricists adopted

a

much

more limited view of the domain of reason.

The empiricist tradition

stresses the contrast between reason, which

is

identified with specula-

tive thinking or abstract reasoning, and experience, which is the basis

of all human knowledge acquired through the use of the senses, inclu-

ding observational and experimental science.
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This revised conception of reason is tied to an extensive reformulation of the classical conception of the relationship between the

rational and irrational components of human nature.

The empiricist

philosophers reject this classical position represented by Plato's
account of reason and the just soul.

As we have seen,

Plato portrays

the healthy personality as one in which certain ends or goals are

apprehended through reason, and the appetites are directed or controlled in order to attain these goals or ends.

In

contrast, the unhealthy

1
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or unjust soul

is one

which is under the unbridled dominance of ir-

rational appetites and desires.

According to this Platonic view, human

action and human nature can be understood only in terms of

a

constant

conflict between reason and such irrational forces as appetites or
desires, where reason is supposed to restrain or correct man's nonrational impulses and inclinations.
The empiricist position, which is most fully and systematically

articulated by Hume, holds that this notion of reason controlling or
even coming into conflict with the appetites or passions is nonsensical.

Since Hume characterizes reason as the ability to make deduc-

tive and inductive inferences, it is clear that reason cannot provide
the goals or ends of human action as supposed by the classical the-

ories.

The role of reason is restricted to the discovery of relevant

facts concerning, and the calculation of the best means of achieving,

goals and ends which cannot themselves be derived from reason.
The ends or goals of human behavior are dictated by the passions
and desires which give rise to volitions and move people to act.
is the view behind

This

Hume's often-quoted statement that:

Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions,
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve
and obey them.

6

Reason itself can never produce

a

volition or action and cannot even

function so as to oppose the inclinations, impulses, desires or

passions which are presented to our minds.

Any inclination or impulse

.

.
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to act in a certain way can be countered only by an opposing
incli-

nation or impulse.

Thus, the only way in which we can legitimately

label any action "irrational" is if it is based on mistaken factual

data or

a

mistaken evaluation of the best means for attaining

a

given

end

This view of reason as the slave of the passions clearly has

direct and immediate implications on ethical theory.

For,

if the ends

and goals of human action are given by the passions, impulses or ap-

petites and cannot properly be characterized as rational or irrational,
it is clear that the making of moral

judgments about the goodness or

badness of human ends or actions cannot be

a

rational enterprise.

Hume

follows this line of thought to its logical conclusion. He states:
'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of

the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
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Since the whole point or purpose of moral judgments is to guide human

action, they cannot be judgments of reason if reason can never move us
to action.

Hume attempts to offer an alternative grounding of ethics

upon the passions and sentiments which are shared by all human
beings

Within the liberal tradition, discussion of this view of reason as
the servant of the passions has typically focused on Hume's account of

moral judgement and its ethical implications.

This treatment is mis-

leading in that it suggests that this view of reason and the passions
is

solely an ethical doctrine and that Hume's uncompromising statement

.
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of it is somewhat of an aberration in liberal-empiricist theory.

How-

ever, although other empiricist thinkers seem to hold both
reason and

moral judgment in higher esteem than does Hume, the empiricist attempts
to explain as well as to evaluate human action systematically incor-

porate this notion of an antithesis between reason and the passions.
All the various accounts of human nature offered by the classical

empiricists repeat, in

a

number of different forms, the basic view of

man being moved by pleasure and pain.

According to this framework

shared by the liberal theorists, those objects or states of affairs

which are found, in the course of individual experience, to be associated with pleasure become desired.

Those objects or states of affairs

which are associated with painful experiences come to be avoided.
Thus, it is the prospect of pleasure and pain, arousing the appetites,

passions and desires, which ultimately determines the goals or ends of
human action.
This general empiricist account of the relationship between

thought and action portrays the impulses, desires and other immediate

contents of the mind as causing volitions, acts of will or intentions,
which in turn cause certain behaviors or actions.

In the

various

accounts of the human mind, human nature and human behavior advanced by
the early empiricists, reason and deliberation become only secondary

intervening variables in the causal chain linking the passions and
actions
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Although these accounts of the relationships between thought and
action and between reason and the passions are defended as the result
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of an emerging scientific understanding of human
motivation and

behavior, they clearly rest on

a

regarding mind and knowledge.

These basic assumptions are not unique

set of philosophical assumptions

to Hume's specific treatment of knowledge and mind, but rather
follow

directly from the conception of the abstract, asocial spectator and the
related notion that consciousness is given and transparent.

The por-

trayal of "ideas" as objects which are immediately presented to the

mind and which can be perceived through

a

form of mental vision without

the mediation of language supports an artificial and limited view of

the reasoning process.
In particular,

these philosophical assumptions reduce reason to an

egocentric and arbitrary process, denying the essentially public character of all uses of reason.

A major part of the problem with the

empiricist portrayal of reason is certainly the notion of thought as
prior to and autonomous of language, which blocks an adequate under-

standing of the function of language as

a

vehicle for reason.

More-

over, because it pictures the mind as coming pre-stocked with "ideas"
and the basic epistemological problem as one of working outward from

these "ideas," the spectatorial framework necessarily distorts the

reasoning process by ignoring the fact that, in Richard Peters' words,
even when it takes place in the individual's head,
those of
is an internalization of public procedures
criticism, the production of counter-examples and the
.

.

.

—

it

suggestion of different points of view.
In addition,
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this view of reason as the servant of the passions is

dependent on the identification of passions with inner experiences or
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felt qualities of consciousness which are given and
transparent.

The

notion that passions as well as pleasures and desires are
experiences

which are immediately presented and openly accessable to
the mind

automatically makes them immune to rational criticism or correction.
For example, Hume's treatment of

a

passion as an event which is di-

rectly observable to the person experiencing it makes the connection

between

passion and its object into

a

a

purely contingent one.

He,

like the other empiricists, works within a framework that ignores the

links between the passions and our beliefs or between the emotions and

cognition.

Although he focuses attention on what he calls the "dis-

interested passions" which he thinks are sometimes confused with
reason, the assumption that all passions are inner experiences blinds

Hume to the manner in which these so-called "disinterested passions"
are intimately tied to the use of reason.
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Hume certainly sets out this doctrine in greater detail and explores its implications more thoroughly than do the other liberal theorists.

Yet, the essential core of this view of the relationship

between reason and the passions is not

theory but rather constitutes

a

a

unique feature of Hume's moral

central feature of the common concep-

tual framework through which the British liberals evaluate and explain

human behavior.

In

this dual role, the conception of reason as the

servant of the passions is one of the most powerful and most lasting of
the influences of empiricist philosophy of mind upon liberal political

theory.
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There is also

a

fourth theme in empiricist philosophy of mind

which is implicit in the empiricist assumptions and positions
already

discussed but which merits additional attention.

The fourth feature of

the empiricist account of mind with significant implications for pol-

itical theory is

a

severance of the connection between knowledge and

action which the classical thinkers considered central to philosophy of
mind.

Classical philosophy treats knowledge of persons, particularly

self-knowledge, and the connection between such knowledge and human

behavior as topics closely related to the study of ethics and politics.
Classical epistemological discussions focus on the manner in which

persons arrive at such knowledge and on the manner in which they hold
their beliefs rather than the truth-content of human knowledge and

beliefs.

In contrast,

the spectatorial framework advanced by Descartes

and the classical empiricists emphasizes certainty rather than con-

viction as the essential element in the quest for knowledge.
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This

spectatorial account of knowledge portrays the attempt to discover

a

solid, certain base of knowledge within the individual mind as the

primary task of philosophy.
The Cartesian-empiricist epistemological framework, with its con-

ception of "ideas" as objects, of an inner mental vision, and of
thought as independent of and prior to language, systematically abstracts human knowledge from the methods by which it is acquired and
the uses to which it is put.

It creates an artificial

and abstract

or acpicture in which knowledge has no ties with learning, skills

tions.

the mind
The image that emerges from this framework presents

a£
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a

dimensionless, passive spectator of given contents of
consciousness

and man as simply

the world.

a

passive spectator of rather than an active agent in

70

This neglect of the relationship between knowledge and action is,
of course, closely intertwined with the other themes commonly advanced
in empiricist theories of mind.

is tied to the dualist account

It

which confines the question of the unity of the self to
the unity of

a

a

discussion of

mind confronted by an endless series of separate per-

ceptions and impressions, and which treats the body and bodily movements as essentially irrelevant to our understanding of knowledge and
mind.

In addition,

this neglect of the links between knowledge and

action is closely connected to the notion that consciousness is given
and transparent.

Since a person has

a

direct and infallible access to

the contents of his own mind through reflection and introspection,

there are no special problems associated with self-knowledge that might
bear on discussions of human action and human nature.

Self-knowledge,

self-reflection, self-introspection and self-consciousness are all
reduced to an unproblematic kind of inner, non-sensuous perception.
The empiricist tendency to sever the connections between knowledge
and action is also tied to the notion of reason as the servant of the

passions.

The empiricist theorists discuss epistemic rationality in

detail, but they do not address the series of issues surrounding practical rationality.

Thus, their limited conception of reason ignores

the human capacity to guide behavior in accordance with purposes and

intentions, to make choices between alternative actions, and at least
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on some occasions,

to recognize that certain factors in their environ-

ment or in their own character are influencing their own behavior and
to attempt to free themselves of this influence.

The empiricist theories fail to recognize the full implications of

the facts that human action is goal-oriented and that human reasoning

concerns the proper ends of human action as well as the appropriate
means for attaining these ends.

To the extent that the early British

empiricists concern themselves with human action at all, they view it
as being completely determined by given passions, desires, pleasures

and pains and as essentially non-rational in nature.
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In short,

given

the assumptions in empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind, it
is

impossible to even make sense of the classical treatments of the

reciprocal relationship between knowledge and action.
Although Descartes and many of the classical empiricists were

concerned with at least some of the issues regarding the knowledge of
persons and self-knowledge in particular, the epistemological framework

they constructed portrays mathematical and scientific knowledge as the
proper models for all forms of human knowledge.

Philosophy in the em-

piricist tradition remained preoccupied with epistemological issues

concerning knowledge of the external world and remained isolated from
the efforts of Continental philosophers to resolve the issues sur-

rounding self-knowledge and self-consciousness set out by Hegel.

The

empiricist focus on the attainment of certain knowledge within the individual mind resulted in

a

general neglect of those traditional areas

certainty
of human knowledge where the prospects of achieving such
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seemed remote.

Thus, as several linguistic philosophers have sug-

gested, the neglect of problems concerning self-knowledge and self-

interpretation in the Cartesian-empiricist accounts of mind and knowledge is not unrelated to the general neglect of such subjects as

history and aesthetics in the empiricist tradition.
Of course, the preceeding sketch of certain of the general themes
in classical

empiricist philosophy of mind and the attempt to trace the

connections between this account of mind and the spectatorial framework
as embodied

in

"the doctrine of ideas" do not constitute comprehensive

and complete discussions of Cartesian or British empiricist episte-

mology and philosophy of mind.

The outline of the spectatorial frame-

work simply attempts to trace certain connections between Cartesian and

empiricist thought which have been frequently ignored by those working
within as well as those working outside of the empiricist tradition.
One could also focus on other elements in Descartes' work which have

influenced radically different interpretations of knowledge, mind and

self as, for example, the connections between Cartesian philosophy and
phenomenology.
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In addition,

the general account of empiricist views of knowledge

and mind offered here cannot capture the complex details of and sig-

nificant differences among the specific theories advanced by Locke,
Hume, Mill and other empiricist philosophers.

A full analysis of em-

piricist epistemology and philosophy of mind would require examination
of many topics ignored here and

a

more comprehensive treatment of the
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technical difficulties associated with those topics which
are addressed.

The sketch of the classical empiricist account of mind
merely

attempts to identify some of the major themes in empiricist philosophy
which have had

a

significant impact upon liberal political and ethical

theory and v^ich are now being questioned and reevaluated by many

contemporary linguistic philosophers.
My claim is that these empiricist theories of knowledge and mind

constitute an essential part of the foundation or support for the
analysis and evaluation of political behavior and political institutions presented by the British liberals.

Therefore, the political the-

orist who seeks to understand and assess the central doctrines of

classical liberal political theory cannot afford to ignore the con-

nections between mind and politics.

To the extent that the basic

assumptions and positions of the empiricist philosophical framework are
mistaken, misleading or open to challenge, the political doctrines of
classical liberalism are, at least in part, undermined.

The Redefinition of Human Nature
and the Study of Politics

It

is

certainly not true that liberal political and ethical theory

simply follow from or are merely an extension of the empiricist account

of knowledge and mind.

One cannot achieve an adequate understanding of

early liberal political and ethical theory by treating it in abstraction from such important factors as the historical and social context

within which the liberal theorists worked.

For example, not only is
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the Protestant Reformation like the Copernican revolution
an important

element in the increased focus on the individual and individual
conscience, but religious conflict and consequent civil war are
dominant

factors affecting the ethical and political thought of the period.
The early British liberals confront the problem of establishing

peace and order in the absence of religious homogeneity and what could
be presumed to be universally agreed upon natural laws.

This concern

is reflected in their preoccupation with questions regarding the basis

of the legitimate authority exercised by the state or the sovereign and
the grounds of political obligation.

The liberal theorists attempt to

show why and in what circumstances human beings should submit to government, what particular forms of government are best, and if and

under what conditions revolution against government is justified.
Moreover, especially since Marx's influential analysis of the

ideological function of theories of ethics, government and politics, it
is clear that the political theorist cannot treat political and ethical

doctrines in isolation from basic changes in the economic and social
structure and their connections to political conflicts and changes in
the distribution of political power.

Certainly, the political and

ethical stands defended by liberal thinkers often reflect direct in-

terests in or ties to positions associated with particular sides or
parties in political contests such as that between parliament and the

monarchy.

More fundamentally, liberal political theory cannot be

abstracted from the development of the capitalist mode of production
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and exchange and the emergence of a new, powerful class, the
bour-

geoisie.

As any of the standard approaches to historical political

theory acknowledges, liberalism itself is fundamentally

a

class move-

ment which was primarily concerned with abolishing medieval restrictions on commerce and industry, and liberal political theory can only
be fully understood in this context.
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What this means, of course, is that the major components of liberal political theory, such as the particular theory of human nature

advanced by the classical liberal theorists, are directly tied to the

interests of this emerging class.

Thus, to ignore how the theories of

human nature and self advanced by liberal theorists functioned as

justifications and defenses of the capitalist system, particularly the
economic activities and political needs of the bourgeoisie, would be to
neglect

a

central dimension of liberal political and ethical thought.

Finally, again as each of the established approaches to the study
of historical political theory emphasizes, no political theory, however

revolutionary and radical, is written on

a

blank slate.

Liberal pol-

itical theory in general and the liberal theory of human nature in

particular do not represent

a

complete and final break with the rest of

the Western political tradition.

Not only do elements of this liberal

individualist theory appear repeatedly in various pre-liberal accounts
of human nature, but the liberal theorists themselves remain, in certain ways, under the direct influence of the classical and medieval
tradition.'''^

144

These are legitimate reasons against treating liberal political
and ethical theory as simply a superstructure which is built upon,

completely supported by, and determined by
sisting solely of empiricist philosophy.
political theory does constitute

a

a

foundation or base con-

At the same time, liberal

radical change in the conceptual

framework through which we examine the central questions concerning

government, politics and social life.

Analysis of the connections

between mind and politics is essential in understanding and assessing
this conceptual framework and the approach to the study of politics and

government which it supports.

Indeed, analysis of the linkages between

empiricist philosophical assumptions and liberal political theory is

necessary in order to understand the resiliency and strength of standard liberal assertions regarding political behavior and political
life.
In part, the importance of these connections, at least as they are

revealed in the liberal redefinition of human nature, is widely acknowledged in the standard texts on historical political theory.

In other

words, it is commonly understood that at the core of the classical liberal theories and ethics is a fundamental redefinition of human nature
and of the individual's political, social and moral relationships with

other persons.

considered

a

Moreover, this redefinition of human nature, which is

major dividing line between classical and modern political

theory, has been generally identified with the doctrine of psychological egoism.

of
For example, George Sabine's classic text, A History
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Political Theory

,

characterizes this fundamental reformulation as

resting upon:
the assumption that human nature is essentially
selfish, and that the effective motives on which a
statesman must rely are egoistic, such as the desire for
security in the masses and the desire for power in
rulers.
Human nature, moreover, is profoundly
aggressive and acquisitive; men aim to keep what they
have and to acquire more. Neither in power nor in
possessions is there any normal limit to human desires,
while both power and possessions are always limited by
natural scarcity.
Accordingly, men are always in a
condition of strife and competition which threatens open
anarchy unless restrained by the force behind the law,
while the power of the ruler is built upon the very
imminence of anarchy and the fact that security is
.

.

.

.

.

.

7 f\

possible only when government is strong.
This notion of individualism is, according to Sabine, a major theme in

the political thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
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Sabine traces the development of this conception of egoistic in-

dividualism in classical liberal thought which culminates in the political and ethical theories of the Philosophical Radicals, most notably

Bentham, and the laissez faire doctrines of the classical British

economists, represented by Ricardo.

Thus, this view of human beings as

motivated solely by egoistic self-interest systematically infects
classical liberal social, political and ethical thought and is most

clearly and most uncompromisingly established as the principal foundation of classical liberal theory by the utilitarians and the early
British economists.

Bentham, for example, specifically ties his theory

of legislation, his approach to the study of politics in general and
his ethical theory,

all of which are united by the greatest happiness
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principle, to

a

theory of human nature that is "supposed to be appli-

cable in all times and in all places."'''^

Similarly, the classical

study of economic behavior and the market mechanism:

"...

was con-

ceived to depend upon the general laws of human nature stated by the

associational and hedonistic psychology that Bentham had
short,

used."'''^

In

Sabine like most scholars of historical political theory acknow-

ledges that this redefinition of human nature is

a

central and highly

significant component of classical liberal political, economic and
social theory.
In addition,

Sabine recognizes, at least in part, the importance

of the connections between mind and politics as these are exhibited in

this conception of human nature.

He states.

Liberalism had always claimed that it rested upon an
empirical foundation, but empiricism had been understood
to mean an individual psychology developed from the "new
way of ideas" that Locke had considered to be the original insight of his Essay

.

This clearly suggests that the classical liberal studies of politics
and society, particularly as these are directly tied to egoistic in-

dividualism, rest upon

a

number of unexamined assumptions or tacit

premises which emerge from empiricist philosophy.

Moreover, while

Sabine does not explore these connections in the systematic manner

attempted by Unger and Wood, his critique of the two major deficiencies
of classical liberal theory—a critique which he traces to

a

second

phase of liberalism beginning with John Stuart Mill—parallels the

Unger-Wood analysis of the changed conceptions of individuality and
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sociality which underpin the classical liberal theory of personality
or
human nature.
In the

first place, Sabine examines the difficulties inherent in

the classical liberal notion that one can proceed from

a

basic set of

general laws of human nature, which are universal and unchanging, to an

analysis of the political and economic behavior of human beings in

particular social settings and historical periods.

In part,

this

treatment of human motivation and behavior is problematic because it
treats the individual as completely detached from any "social milieu "
or cultural,

social and historical setting.
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As

Sabine recognizes,

this asocial, ahistorical view of the individual is most explicitly

formulated in the early liberal attempts to differentiate between
"natural man" and "social man."

According to this "state of nature"

model, human nature is that which is natural, given and unchanging as

opposed to that which is artificial, conventional and variable in human

motivation and behavior.

The conception portrays the individual as at

least logically if not historically an isolated, autonomous and self-

sufficient unit and expressly rejects the classical view of man as by
nature

a

social or political animal.

However, as Sabine suggests, this conception of the individual as

completely abstracted from society and history

is not simply associated

with the state of nature model but rather constitutes an essential

underpinning of the explanatory framework utilized by all the classical
liberal theorists.

In other words,

the notion that any form of politi-

cal and economic behavior in any social setting can be adequately
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explained in terms of pleasures and pains, and the desires and
passions
which they arouse, presupposes this picture of the abstract individual.

Sabine does not examine the connections between such

conception of

a

individualism and empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind,
but he does set out the connections between this view of individualism
and liberal views of society and the study of society.
In particular,

human nature entails

Sabine emphasizes that the liberal redefinition of
a

radically different way of conceptualizing

society and social relationships than that which dominated medieval
political thought.

In

contrast to the medieval conception of the state

or society as an organic entity,

the classical liberals hold that:

Society is merely an "artificial" body, a collective
term for the fact that human beings find it individually

advantageous to exchange goals and services.
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Classical liberal theory consistently portrays society as the creation
of an agreement or series of arrangements between autonomous, self-

sufficient individuals which is designed to serve their individualistic
and self-centered desires and interests.

Again, it is the early lib-

eral theorists who most clearly set out this notion of society and the

state as

a

contractual agreement supposed to serve

dividual interests.

a

limited set of in-

However, this same basic conception of society and

social institutions as compacts among pre-social yet rational, pur-

posive and language-using individuals remains

a

basic common denomi-

phase.
nator of classical liberal theory through its utilitarian
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Indeed, as Sabine points out, Bentham's perspective rejects as

completely fictitious the very notion of
society or the state.
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a

"corporate body" including

Society or the state becomes nothing but

a

collection of egoistic individuals whose happiness both constitutes
what is good for the individual and can be summed up to calculate the
good of all.

Thus, throughout classical liberal thought, membership in

society or social groups can be analyzed either in terms of

a

contrac-

tual relationship among self-interested, autonomous individuals or as
an instrumental and practical arrangement designed to serve given in-

dividual desires and interests.

The various social, moral and polit-

ical aspects of human life are treated as compacts or instrumental

devices which are responses to and which can be evaluated in terms of
the established needs, preferences or interests of egoistic indivi-

duals.

This conception of sociality is

a

second crucial dimension of

the theory of egoistic individualism as summarized and analyzed by

Sabine.

Sabine not only recognizes the centrality of the abstract con-

ception of the individual and this instrumental view of social institutions and relationships to the theory of egoistic individualism but
also acknowledges the connections between these reformulations of in-

dividuality and sociality and the classical liberal approach to the
study of politics, economics, society and ethics.

He again follows

Mill in citing the systematic neglect of historical change and social
thedevelopment as the second major deficiency of classical liberal
ory.

of
This classical liberal failure to realize the importance
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historical and social development is linked to an approach to social
inquiry that takes self-sufficient, self-interested individuals as the
basic units or atomic parts out of which social institutions are con-

structed and in terms of which social institutions are to be explained.
After all, it is only within the context of the standard early

liberal characterizations of all individual behavior as determined by
pains and pleasures and of all social institutions as instrumental

arrangements which must be rationally constructed for proper management
of these given motivating forces that Bentham could aspire to be the
"Newton of the moral sciences. "^^

Moreover, as Sabine emphasizes, this

aspiration and the conception of the study of society and human life
which underpins it are not unique to utilitarian ethics.

Classical

British economic theory, like classical liberal political theory in
general, is characterized in terms of this same conception of the

nature and scope of social inquiry:
institutions and their history as scientifically irrelevant,
because they are reducible to habits of thought and
action which can be fully explained by rather simple
It was a kind of Newtonianism which regarded

laws of human behavior.
In other words,

87

the basic inadequacies of classical liberal analyses of

social institutions and human behavior are not simply attributable to
the specific psychological theory they formulated but rather are in-

herent in the very conceptualizations of individuality and sociality

which permeate classical liberal political, social and ethical theory.
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Sabine thus acknowledges the important links between the indivi-

dualistic theories of politics, economics and ethics set out by the
classical liberals on the one hand and the type of "methodological in-

dividualism" which is basic to their conception of the proper approach
to the study of social institutions and human behavior on the other.

The classical liberals clearly do attempt to construct a science of

society or politics upon the supposedly solid foundation of universal
laws of human motivation and behavior which apply in all times and in
all places.

This is an extreme form of methodological individualism

which maintains that all social behavior, institutions, relationships
and so on are simply instrumental pacts or arrangements which can be

fully analyzed and explained in terms of the sensations, desires and

interests of abstract, asocial individuals.
Unfortunately, Sabine's analysis of the methodological and philosophical assumptions underpinning classical liberal theory breaks off at
this point.

As we have seen,

his analysis of classical liberal theory

does identify the conception of the abstract individual and the instru-

mental view of society and social institutions as central dimensions of
the liberal redefinition of human nature.

He also traces certain of

the connections among these conceptions of individuality and sociality,
the radical form of methodological individualism inherent in the class-

theoical liberal approach to social science, and the individualistic
ries of politics, ethics and society championed by the early liberal

thinkers.

Finally, he suggests that classical liberal theory.
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particularly its adherence to methodological individualism, is related
to empiricist positions set out in Locke's doctrine of the "way of

ideas

However, Sabine does not examine any further these connections

between empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind on the one
hand and, on the other, the classical liberal redefinition of human nature in particular and early liberal social and ethical theory in

This failure to pursue the connections between mind and pol-

general.
itics is

a

significant factor affecting his assessment of the defi-

ciences and contributions of classical liberal theory as well as his

analysis of the transition from classical to modern liberal theory.
Certainly, this in no way suggests that one must automatically
reject Sabine's argument that classical liberal theory with its emphasis on the individual does represent, despite its deficiencies, some

important advances in our understanding of the basic role, purposes and
function of government.

For example, classical liberal theory, parti-

cularly in its utilitarian phase, does acknowledge that what people
want and what gives people pleasure are relevant considerations when

discussing moral conduct and public policy.

Traditional theories of

mind and politics all too frequently portray the gratification of

pleasure or desire as necessarily wrong and consider human happiness

only in transcendental or ideal terms.

In addition,

the conception of

each individual as the best judge of his own interest counters any

elitist position which holds that

a

select few can legitimately claim

the majority of
to know what is good for or in the best interests of
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citizens.

The notion that the happiness or pleasure of each
individual

counts equally also has sweeping democratic implications.

Moreover, the liberal view of the state as

a

device designed to

serve human desires and interests rather than some kind of super-entity

with its own will and purposes has fundamentally altered our perception
of the basis of and the proper function of government.

The early lib-

eral emphasis on individual or natural rights which each person has

simply by virtue of being human and which no government can legiti-

mately violate clearly has radical implications.

Also, the conceptions

of consent as the only legitimate basis of government and of satis-

faction of human needs, desires and interests as the only legitimate

justification of government are anti-authoritarian ideals.

In addi-

tion, the notion of political representation as the representation of

individual preferences has been instrumental in the gradual extension
of the right to vote in liberal democracies.
Finally, classical liberal ethical and political theory does, in

various forms and to differing degrees, champion such basic human
ideals as individual freedom, autonomy, privacy, dignity and self-

development.
ports, as

a

Classical liberal political theory also generally sup-

means for realizing these goals, such ideas as limited

government, constitutional guarantees, freedom of expression, religious
toleration and other notions which have become inextricably tied to the
modern conceptions of democracy and democratic government.

89

Yet, despite these contributions and achievements which are gene-

rally credited to the classical liberal doctrine, succeeding liberal
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theorists found it necessary to question, challenge
and revise certain
of the essential components of classical liberal theory.

Later liberal

theorists challenged such standard notions as the completely
negative
role of the state, particularly in relation to economic activities
and
the "negative" conception of freedom as simply the absence of external

constraints.

Moreover, as Sabine points out, such reevaluations of

classical liberal views concerning the nature of the state or the
nature of liberty entailed

a

deeper reassessment of the theory of

egoistic individualism with its underlying conceptions of individuality
and sociality.

fact, the classical liberal conception of human beings as

In

motivated entirely by egoistic self-interests increasingly became the
focus of these revisions attempted within the liberal tradition.

The

conception of human nature, especially as set out by Bentham and James
Mill, was identified as
ing of moral values,

institutions.

a

major obstacle blocking adequate understand-

individual behavior, and social relationships and

Thus, beginning with John Stuart Mill, one of the prin-

cipal concerns of liberal theory was to bring this utilitarian image of
man as

a

rational pursuer of his own given desires and interests into

line with the traditional moral values and moral judgments embodied in

ordinary discourse and everyday human activity.
The dilemmas faced by those who inherited this theoretical frame-

work founded on psychological egoism are quite evident.

For example,

it is clear that if each person can act only in his own self-interest,

then traditional and everyday discussions of ethics and politics in

a
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terms of

a

vocabulary of duties, obligations, honor or chivalry—

vocabulary which seems to identify "selfless" or "altruistic" behavior
with virtuous behavior— are meaningless.

Faced with

a

host of such

difficulties, Mill and many other liberal theorists began to perceive
egoistic individualism and its underlying conceptions of individuality
and sociality as incompatible with the moral dimension of human be-

havior and the moral values of community life.
Many nineteenth and twentieth century liberal philosophers and
social theorists, either by explicitly borrowing from other philosophical traditions or in further attempts to develop

a

more adequate, more

inclusive framework for the study of human behavior and politics, have
offered numerous critiques and reformulations of psychological egoism
and the attendant conceptions of the abstract individual and of society
as merely an instrumental arrangement among such individuals.

example, T.

H.

For

Green and John Dewey, representing two different strands

of liberal thought, both attempted to rectify what they perceived as

a

fundamental deficiency in classical liberal theory by welding conceptions of individual self-realization and community to liberal individual ism.

Sabine treats such revision of the doctrine of egoistic indivi-

dualism as one of the principal dividing lines between two distinct but
related periods of liberalism:

the classical version of liberalism

which reaches its culmination in Bentham's utilitarianism and the

modern phase of liberalism which begins in

a

transitional period marked
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by John Stuart Mill.

According to Sabine's account of the develop-

ment of liberalism, the core of the classical liberal
doctrine is saved
from its own excesses, which, as we have seen, center in the
conception
of egoistic individualism, by two successive waves of revision.

The

first of these waves consists chiefly of Mill's work as modified and

reinforced by the contributions of Herbert Spencer.

The second wave is

Oxford Idealism, particularly as formulated by

Green.

Mill,

is,

in this account,

T.

H.

the central transitional figure because

he recognizes the inadequacy of and attempts to rectify the simplistic

classification of human motivation and behavior endemic to egoistic in-

dividualism as well as the classical liberal neglect of social institutions and social change which follow from the purely instrumental

view of society.

Sabine emphasizes that Mill's transitional work

repeatedly shows the strains between his formal allegiance to utilitarian premises and numerous far-reaching qualifications and revisions

which cannot ultimately be reconciled with his starting principles.
But Mill's struggle clearly points the way, and succeeding liberal the-

orists are able to wrest themselves free of the restrictive confines of

egoistic individualism.
liberal theory share

a

Of course, classical liberal theory and modern

common core in that they are both, in

mental sense, "individualist."

funda-

a

However, modern liberalism not only

stresses "individualism" in the sense that it views the individual as
the source of value but also combines this individualism with

a

genuine

conception of community, emphasizing that the relationships between

individuals are essentially moral relations.

94

.
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Indeed, these revisions have been so successful and so
complete
that the term "liberalism," at least in its "general sense," is
now

"nearly equivalent" to the term "democracy."

Modern liberalism stands

for "popular institutions of government" and champions "political

institutions that acknowledge certain broad principles of social philosophy or of political morality

of Frederick

M.

.

.

."

95

Sabine,

following the lead

Watkins, characterizes liberalism "as the culmination

of the whole 'Western political tradition' or 'the secular form of

Western civilization.'"
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Of course, our concern here is not with Sabine's general thesis

concerning the place of liberalism in the Western tradition or in the
modern world but rather, more narrowly, with his claim that the major

conceptual problems which he associates with the classical liberal

doctrine of egoistic individualism have been resolved or eliminated by
Mill and other liberal theorists.

Certainly, it would be

a

mistake to

treat all liberal political and ethical thought as identical with the
brand of utilitarianism sketched by Bentham.

From Mill onward, nu-

merous liberal theorists acknowledge that psychological egoism and its

underpinning conceptions of individuality and sociality represent an

artifically restricted conception of human nature which does not allow
for the full diversity and complexity of human motivation and social

behavior
At the same time, the basic elements of psychological

egoism—the

pleaportrayal of human beings as always acting to maximize their own
again and
sure, happiness, want-satisfaction or self-interest—reappear

.
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again throughout the liberal tradition.

This basic conceptual scheme

for classifying and characterizing human motivation and behavior
does

remain part of the background against which various liberal theorists

attempt to explain and evaluate political phenomena.

The tenacity and

durability of this conceptual scheme become clearer if we examine
carefully Mill's attempt to reformulate the liberal approach to the
study of politics and society.
As Sabine points out, Mill's work clearly shows the tensions and

inconsistencies characteristic of
thought.

a

transitional stage in political

In regard to his account of the scientific study of society

and politics, Mill does seem to follow the pattern described by Sabine:

first he sets out

a

number of principles which follow from the liberal-

utilitarian framework he inherited, and then he proceeds to make

a

series of significant revisions which are ultimately incompatible with
these stated premises.

Thus, Mill's own statement concerning method in

the social sciences adheres to the extreme methodological individualism

of the classical liberal theorists:

The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be,
nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of
human beings united together in the social state. Men,
however, in a state of society, are still men; their
actions and passions are obedient to the laws of indiviHuman beings in society have
dual human nature.
which
are derived from, and may
no properties but those
nature of individual
the
be resolved into, the laws of
.

man

.

.

97

This statement seems fully compatible with the classical liberal

conception of

a

science of society according to which one can achieve
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an understanding of society simply by piecing it
together from the

psychological make-up of the individual, the basic unit or building-

block of society.

Study of the basic psychological laws of human na-

ture, which are universal and unchanging, provides the necessary
and

sufficient basis for the study of politics in all social settings and
in all historical periods.

the Humean conception of

a

In short.

Mill's position seems to follow

science of politics or society which is

deduced from a theory of human nature where "human nature" means the

psychological characteristics of abstract individuals.
However, Mill does not consistently adhere to any such formulation

of

a

science of politics or society entirely built upon an analysis of

the psychological attributes of abstract, asocial individuals.

Again,

as Sabine emphasizes, one of Mill's principal concerns is "to modify

the empiricism in which he was bred" by rectifying the neglect of

social institutions, historical change and cultural variation which had
been characteristic of the classical liberal-utilitarian approach to

social science.
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Mill clearly attempts to incorporate the evolu-

tionary, developmental conceptions of society and social institutions

which he finds in the social philosophies of Coleridge and Comte into
more comprehensive approach to the study of politics

his vision of

a

and society.

Although Mill retains the notion that psychology is the

fundamental science of human behavior, he holds that this deductive

explanation of political behavior and events in terms of basic psychological laws must be supplemented by an indirect inductive method
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which attempts to establish general laws of historical development
and
social change.
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Mill does make a significant contribution to

a

major change in the

prevailing conception of the proper methods and procedures to be followed in

politics.

a

genuinely scientific approach to the study of society and
After Mill, the explanation of political phenomena is in-

creasingly detached from the classical liberal conception of

a

deduc-

tive science of politics and is increasingly identified with an

approach which stresses the roles of observation and induction in
social science.

Moreover, as Sabine argues, this emphasis on examining

the sociological dimension of human behavior does undercut the sim-

plistic accounts of individual motivation and behavior as well as the

instrumental conception of social institutions which dominated classical liberal theory.
At the same time, there are fundamental similarities between

Mill's revised account of explanation in the social sciences and the

classical liberal conception of

a

science of politics or society.

These connections which link Mill's work to the philosophical framework

of classical liberalism are deeper and more basic than simply his

unwillingness or inability to depart with the notion that

politics can be deduced from

a

a

science of

more general science of human nature.

For even if it were granted that Mill abandons this Humean conception

of

a

deductive science of politics, his account of the structure of

explanation clearly retains Humean conceptions of agency and causality,
or what he would call Humean conceptions of Liberty and Necessity.

It
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is upon this philosophical base that Mill,

like Hume and the other

classical liberals, portrays the study of politics and human behavior
as resting upon the same methods and techniques which are used in the

natural sciences.
As Mill explicitly states in the second chapter of Book VI of his

System of Logic

,

Correctly conceived, the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity is simply this: that, given the
motives which are present to an individual's mind, and
given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he might act might be
unerringly inferred; that if we know the person
thoroughly, and know all the inducements which are
acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as
much certainty as we can predict any physical event.

^"^^

Since human behavior is like all other physical events subject to

certain constant laws, human behavior is to be explained in the same
way that the natural scientist explains natural phenomena.

Such ex-

plantion typically provides an account of the internal causal connections between various states of mind ("laws of mind") and of those

states of mind which are "produced directly by" states of the body
(laws of physical science) which together constitute the basic causal

chain behind any particular human behavior.
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Human action is thus

determined by beliefs, desires and other mental contents in much the
same way that the collapse of

a

bridge is determined by certain phy-

sical factors.

This is, of course, the same framework for classifying and

characterizing human thought and action which was formulated by the
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classical empiricists, and it rests upon the same set of
positions and

assumptions concerning the nature of reality, knowledge and mind.
Mill's framework for viewing thought and action, his model of man or
human nature, is dependent upon

a

metaphysics which views the universe

as a set of atomic phenomena that are only connected through series of

contingent correlations, an epistemology which makes the individual
mind, already pre-stocked with "ideas," the focus of the search for

certain knowledge, and

a

philosophy of mind which offers contestable

accounts of the mind-body relation, of the nature of the passions and
other contents of consciousness, of the relationship between reason and
the passions, and of the role of self-knowledge in human action.
It

is this philosophical

framework, particularly the classical

empiricist account of mind, which is the source of the pervasive influence of the doctrine of egoistic individualism in liberal accounts

of human motivation and behavior.

The dualistic account of the mind-

body relationship divides an individual's life into two collateral

histories whose interaction can only be accounted for in causal terms.
The notion that consciousness is given and transparent portrays

desires, passions and other mental states as private mental events
which can be identified introspectively

havioral manifestations.

,

independently of their be-

Moreover, these basic contents of conscious-

ness are treated as given, the dominant motivating forces of human na-

ture in all places and all times.

Reason and deliberation are only

secondary intervening variables in the causal chain which links the
passions, desires and so on to certain behaviors or actions.

Self-
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knowledge or self-consciousness is simply

a

matter of introspective

awareness of independently existing "objects" and can affect not the
slightest change in these "objects."
This empiricist framework establishes conceptual limits concerning
the kinds of desires, pleasures and passions, and in turn, motives and

interests, which individuals can have.

According to the empiricist

account of mind, the pleasures and desires which determine an indivi-

dual's interests and his behavior are conscious events or occurrences
which are experienced privately by isolated, autonomous individuals.
An individual's interest in an external object or state of affairs is

always reducible to and can be analyzed in terms of his own pleasure

function or egoistic desires and preferences.

By treating all plea-

sures and desires as the private experiences of independent centers of

consciousness, this framework conceptually eliminates the possibility
that individuals might have or develop desires, pleasures and interests

which make, in Robert Paul Wolff's words, "essential reference to
,,102

reciprocal states of awareness among two or more persons."
In this way,

the conceptual limitations established by the empir-

icist accounts of knowledge and mind make some variant of psychological

egoism true by definition.

In

its "hard" versions, all possible social

or altruistic feelings, desires, motives,

reduced to egoistic ones.

interests or behaviors are

By definition what seems to be altruistic is

selfsimply some form of misunderstood or masked self-interest or

satisfaction.

Moreover, even in its "soft" variants which acknowledge

behavior, the
the possibility of genuinely altruistic motives and
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springboard of such altruism is identified as some kind of "natural"
feeling of sympathy or compassion or some kind of "natural" want or

desire to live in harmony with others.

This "soft" but still thor-

oughly individualistic framework takes such feelings or desires as
given and mandates

sharp dichotomy between altruistically motivated

a

actions and egoistically motivated actions by ruling out all the more
complex emotional states, feelings and desires which do involve reciprocal states of awareness among persons. 03
1

Certainly, Mill does not attempt to deduce

a

theory of politics or

society from an egoistic psychological theory which is in turn spe-

cifically linked to
mind.

a

particular theory of knowledge and theory of

However, he approaches political issues and the study of pol-

itics within the conceptual framework of egoistic individualism which
is underpinned by empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind.
In other words,

the conceptual framework into which the empirical facts

about politics, society and human motivation and behavior are fitted

retains at its very core major components of the classical empiricist

portrayal of thought and action.
An adequate assessment of Mill's account of explanation in the

social sciences or of the claims made in his analysis and evaluation of

political behavior, institutions and events requires careful reexamination of this conceptual framework.

It

cannot simply be assumed that

further empirical research will rectify or eliminate any deficiencies
what
in this account because it is difficult even to determine to
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extent the central issues here are empirical and to what extent they
are conceptual.

Mill is, as Sabine argues,

a

key transitional figure in the evo-

lution of liberal political thought.

But ii is not the case, as Sabine

suggests, that after Mill and other liberal revisionists the connections between liberal political, social and ethical theory and the con-

ceptual problems concerning thought and action (which Sabine identifies
with the doctrine of egoistic individualism) simply disappear.

From

Mill onward, the connections between mind and politics become less

direct, more complex and typically neglected features of the study of

political phenomena.

In the shift from classical

liberal to modern

liberal thought through such transitional figures as Mill, the egoistic

individualist views of human nature and human action appear less as
systematic models of human nature and human behavior which are ex-

pressly linked to philosophical accounts of knowledge and mind and more
as fragmental, hidden background assumptions in the conceptual frame-

work through which political phenomena are identified, classified,
explained and evaluated.
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CHAPTER

III

THE CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF MIND AND POLITICS

"Psychological Man" and "Sociological Man"

The classical empiricist philosophers recognized that

a

theory of

human nature is an implicit part of any theory of politics and attempted to apply the Newtonian method to the study of mind and human nature
in order to provide a solid,

and political theories.

scientific foundation for their ethical

They developed an introspective theory of mind

which was designed to classify the various components or contents of
mind, to break these contents down into their most elementary or atomic

units, and to explain both the workings of the human mind as well as
the relationship between these inner workings and the external behavior

of human beings in terms of these basic atomic units.

This psycho-

logical theory was intimately tied to an epistemological search for

certain "ideas," sense impressions or experiences which would provide
an indubitable foundation for the body of human knowledge.

Thus,

in

the entire history of political thought, the early British liberals

provide one of the clearest, most systematic examples of how political

theory is grounded in

a

particular theory of human nature, in turn

supported by systematic theories of knowledge and mind.
This notion of explicit linkages between philosophy and political
theory, or more specifically between empiricist philosophy, particu-

larly the empiricist accounts of philosophy and mind, and liberal
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social, moral and ethical theory, did not die out completely
with the

classical liberals.

For example,

Bertrand Russell not only acknow-

ledged that the empiricist view of knowledge does have political implications, but also contended that empiricism is "the only philosophy
that affords

mind."

1

theoretical justification of democracy in its temper of

a

However, this traditional liberal conception of intimate

connections between (empiricist) philosophy and (liberal) political
theory has been overthrown and is now largely rejected in contemporary

Anglo-American philosophy and social science.
Despite his general claim concerning empiricist philosophy and
liberal democratic theory, Russell's own detailed analyses of meta-

physical and epistemological issues were never linked to his political

thought in the same way that substantive philosophical theses were used
to support and defend the political theories of the classical thinkers,

including Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel as well as Locke, Hume and the
early liberals.

Indeed, as Stuart Hampshire has argued:

Russell did not apply to politics the analytic
methods which he called for in the theory of knowledge.
He made no solid contribution to political philosophy,
although he thought continuously about politics from
.

.

.

1914 onward.

2

Although Russell was deeply concerned and actively involved in the
central political debates of his time, including nuclear disarmament
and American intervention in Vietnam, his political and moral positions

remained divorced from his epistemological and metaphysical doctrines.

^
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In

this way,

Russell is

a

true representative of the prevailing

"positivist" conception of the relationship between philosophy and

political science and theory set out in the first chapter of this
essay.

3

In general,

the last fifty years of Anglo-American philosophy

has, under the influence of logical positivism, championed the view

that there is no logical connection between technical philosophical

issues on the one hand and moral and political issues on the other.
More importantly, mainstream American political science has, for the

most part, remained isolated from the most far-reaching and fundamental

critiques, reassessments and reformulations of this positivist conception.

Contemporary political research and theory continues to

articulate or rest upon

a

conception of

a

science of politics which

has, by adopting the same methodology used in the physical sciences,
freed itself of the philosophical, normative and speculative diffi-

culties addressed by traditional political philosophy.
One of the most important dimensions of this perceived advance of

the modern social and behavioral sciences over traditional political

philosophy is the contrast between the speculative,

a

priori accounts

of human nature set out by the traditional theorists and the contem-

porary conceptions of "psychological man" and "sociological man."
Clearly, there is

a

tremendous gap between the classical liberal char-

acterization of thought and action which is tied to the doctrine of
abstract individualism and conceptualization of human motivation and
behavior which has emerged from the social and behavioral sciences.
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Thus, few political scientists, particularly those focusing on
the

study of political behavior, deny that there are important connections

between the study of political institutions and processes and the study
of human motivation and behavior.

Not only do many political scien-

tists now acknowledge that the theoretical frameworks used in research

incorporate background assumptions concerning personality and motivation, but the used of concepts expressly borrowed from psychology in

research on political behavior is on the increase as well. 5
However, researchers focusing on political behavior emphasize the

radical differences between this conception of certain basic connections between psychology and political science and the classical

liberal treatment of mind and politics.

After all, the models of per-

sonality utilized on contemporary political science are grounded not in
the philosophical underpinnings of the doctrine of abstract indivi-

dualism but rather on the major development

in our

understanding of

human character, motivation and behavior achieved in the social and

behavioral sciences.

Even the terminology of human nature which per-

vaded the classical liberal treatment of mind and politics has been

discredited by the reconceptualization of human motivation and behavior
tied to the emergence of psychology as

a

separate and autonomous dis-

cipline in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Charles Darwin's Origin of Species

,

published in 1859, marked one

of these major shifts which set the modern view of personality apart
empirifrom traditional views of human nature, including the classical
cist account.

Darwin's conception of human beings as, like other

181

animals, the products of an evolutionary process represented

a

funda-

mental challenge to any surviving elements of the religious and metaphysical frameworks which stressed the unique character of human nature
as established by God or a purposive order.

evolutionary doctrine was advanced not as

a

More importantly, his

general theory of human na-

ture grounded in certain philosophical theses, but rather as

entific theory supported by

a

set of empirical observations.

a

sciFrom

Darwin to the present, the attempt to explain human nature has been

identified with the study of man as an organism which developed through
an evolutionary process and the study of mind as an organ which devel-

oped in and through man's successful adaptation to his environment.

Darwin's theory was thus considered
of psychology from philosophy as

a

a

significant step in the emergence

separate discipline which attempts

to follow the lead of the natural sciences in uncovering the biological

foundations of human motivation and behavior.^
Of course,

the early empiricists themselves are considered key

transitional figures in this break of psychology with philosophy in
science of the mind

that they attempted to convert philosophy into

a

and to remake the study of human nature into

scientific enterprise.

a

However, the empiricists lacked the kind of understanding of human

beings as the end results of an evolutionary process as well as the
kind of thoroughly naturalistic and mechanistic explanatory framework

offered by Darwin's evolutionary doctrine.

In the post Darwinian era,

psychologists held that there was no longer any need for the kind of
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speculative, philosophically-grounded models of human nature sketched
by the classical empiricists.

This reconceptualization of human nature was reflected in the

abandonment of the search for the universal wants and needs of "natural
man" and the initiation of

a

search for the biological base of human

wants and needs within the human organism.

In other

words, psycho-

logists discarded the speculative and introspective approach of the
early empiricists and began to establish laboratories in which the

experimental method would become the basis for

understanding of human nature.

a

genuinely scientific

Whereas the early empiricist philoso-

phers had suggested that one study human nature by "looking" into

oneself or examining one's own "ideas" and experiences, later empirical

psychology increasingly adopted the standpoint of the detached observer
as the proper basis

for the study of human nature and human behavior.

The Darwinian revolution was thus

a

7

major factor in the eventual

rejection, by psychologists and other social scientists, of the very

terminology of human nature tied to the classical liberal treatment of
mind and politics.

According to this post-Darwinian perspective, the

early liberals had, like the traditional political philosophers, offered theories of human nature which were based on

a

priori

,

sophical assumptions about the nature of man or human action.

philoLate

nineteenth and twentieth century social scientists and theorists susof
pected that the variety among the competing, incompatible accounts

centuries was
human nature set out in the seventeenth and eighteenth

itself the reflection of

a

prevailing tendency to promote theories of

—
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personality on the basis of their ethical, political or social
implications rather than on scientific, objective grounds.®

The demand for

scientific objectivity as the basis for the study of man seemed to
preclude the mentalistic psychology, the speculation about "natural
man," and the philosophical discussions of theories of knowledge and

mind which constituted central elements of the early liberal-empiricist

accounts of human nature.
Freud was

a

second major figure whose contributions to our under-

standing of the human mind and personality set these modern conceptions
apart from the classical liberal views of man and mind.

He revolu-

tionized thinking about the workings of the mind, particularly our

conception of the scope and power of human rationality, through his
attempts to demonstrate that much human behavior is the result of

motives of which we are not even aware.
the personality as

a

Freudian psychology portrayed

complex combination of conscious, partially con-

scious and unconscious desires, thoughts and beliefs.

He offered a

systematic model of mind in terms of the human organism's inherent
psychic energy and attempted to outline the central characteristics of
and relationships between what he considered the three basic components

of the human psyche:

the id, the ego and the superego.

According to Freud, the first of these three parts, the id
contains everything that is inherited, that is
present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution
above all, therefore the instincts, which originate in
.

.

.

the somatic organization

9
.

.

.

The id, which constitutes the entire psychological structure of the
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newborn child, is

a

powerful, chaotic mass of undirected and undif-

ferentiated drives and forces including the fundamental physiological
wants as well as the basic sexual and aggressive instincts.

The id has

"no direct relation with the external world" and operates according to
the pleasure principle, seeking immediate gratification of the primi-

tive drives and instincts and avoiding pain or discomfort

.

The id

attempts to eliminate frustration and tension through impulsive motor

activity and image formation or wish fulfillment.

However, since the

newborn child's wants are not always immediately satisfied, the id is

inevitably subject to some frustration and tension.
The two remaining components of the psyche, the ego and the superego,

ment.

emerge in consequent stages of the organism's biological developThe ego is formed as reality impinges upon the id and is thus

the product of the process of interaction between the child and the ex-

ternal world, including the child's parents.

The ego develops as the

child develops powers of perception, thought and memory which allow it
to deal with the external world so as to satisfy the basic needs and

desires of the organism.

As a kind of intermediary between the

id and

external reality, the ego operates according to the reality principle
and introduces "an intellective activity" into the organism's efforts
to satisfy its basic drives and instincts.

The third component of Freud's model, the superego, develops
the
through the interaction between the child and the various agents of

socialization process, especially the parents.

The superego emerges

conceptions of right
with the internalization of parental commands and
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and good (ego-ideals) and conceptions of wrong and bad
(conscience).
As,

Calvin Hall's words, "the moral or judicial branch of the per-

in

sonality,"

12

the superego is charged with the task of regulating the

basic sexual and aggressive instincts inherent in the id.

Thus, the

superego is an agent of civilization which operates within the individual personality "like

a

garrison in

a

conquered city."^^

The tension between the instinctual, biologically-given demands of
the id and the demands of culture as interalized in the superego in-

evitably produces conflicts within the personality.

It

is the function

of the ego to attempt to reconcile the sexual and aggressive drives of

the id, the superego's internalized feelings of right and wrong, and
the demands of reality itself.

According to Freudian theory, the

primary defense mechanism used by the ego to protect the personality
and to deal with anxiety and guilt is repression, although other

defense mechanisms such as rationalization, projection, reaction
formation and regression are also used.

These notions of inevitable

conflict in the personality and of defense mechanisms to deal with such
conflict are central features of the Freudian account of human nature.
The Freudian view of man is thus pessimistic, for he holds that

a

certain amount of repression of the orgaism's basic drives and in-

stincts is necessary for the maintenance and progress of civilization.
Freud's theory of personality clearly presents

a

powerful chal-

lenge to certain of the central components of the early liberal notions
of human nature and of a science of human nature.

In

offering

a

dy-

namic theory of the unconscious, Freud emphasized that the "inner life"
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represented by dreams, wishes and fantasy is as important as
observable
behavior in the attempt to understand human motivation and action.
However, Freudian psychology is not "mentalistic" in the same sense
as

classical liberal psychology.

His emphasis, reflecting post-Darwinian

trends, is upon uncovering the biological, organic base of the mental
life of human beings.

The unconscious is advanced as a theoretical

construct which is utilized to explain empirical correlations between
certain kinds of childhood experiences and certain personality traits

exhibited later in life.
In addition,

14

the Freudian conception of unconscious desires and

thoughts is incompatible with the introspective psychology advanced by
the early British empiricists.

His examination of unconscious moti-

vation reveals the fundamental shallowness and inadequacy of the li-

beral-empiricist treatment of desires and other mental contents as, in
all cases, given and transparent.

Psychoanalysis itself is

a

technique

which aims at enabling the patient to become aware of motives and
desires which previously have been unconscious factors influencing his
behavior.

The psychoanalytic tradition emphasizes the difficulties

inherent in this process of becoming aware of certain motives and

desires which are already influencing our behavior, portraying this
process as involving much more than simply an intellectual apprehension
of given objects or forces.

Psycholanalysis can thus be viewed as an attempt to extend the
realm of rational control which

beliefs and actions.

a

In a sense,

person has over his own feelings,

Freudian psychoanalysis represents

a

187

return to the classical or Socratic conception of mind where
selfknowledge, which is considered radically different from knowledge
of
the external world,

thought and action.

is a

focal point in the relationship between

Within the Freudian framework, the problems con-

cerning self-knowledge take on an added significance and must be approached differently than they were within the classical empiricist

framework.
Of course, many of Freud's central conceptions have been criti-

cized as ambiguous or inaccurate, and there is

a

series of continuing

controversies regarding the adequacy or validity of the Freudian theory
of human nature.

Within the psychoanalytic tradition, Adler and other

neo-Freudian analysists have objected that Freud places too much emphasis on sexual instincts and neglects other instinctual urges, that
he pays insufficient attention to the ego and ego-development, or that
he ignores significant social influences on human motivation and be-

havior.

Adherents of other schools of psychology have raised more

fundamental objections to explanations in terms of unconscious psychic
factors, claiming that such postulating of unobservable entities represents

a

return to pre-scienti f ic theorizing about human nature.

These

controversies are compounded by other factors, including the complexity
and scope of the Freudian conception of the unconscious which is di-

rectly connected to theories and analyses of infantile sexuality,
psycho-social development, repression, sublimation and fantasy.
addition, the primary concern of psychoanalysis has been with the

In
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treatment of cases rather than the testing of hypotheses concerning
human nature.
Yet, whatever the outcome of these various debates, it is clear

that Freudian theory has fundamentally revised the conceptual framework

within which we think about and discuss human nature and human behavior.

Freud not only introduced many additional concepts and new

interpretations of human behavior but also altered the basic distinctions, classifications and assumptions which were implicit in previous

theories of and everyday accounts of thought and action.

In short,

Freud revolutionized the basic material from which any future theory of

human nature would have to be constructed.

This Freudian revolution

constitutes another fundamental dividing line separating the liberal-

empiricist conception of human nature from contemporary accounts of
personality and human behavior.
The emergence of the behaviorist school of psychology in the

twentieth century marked yet another major break with the kind of
thinking about mind and human nature characteristic of the classical
empiricists.

In a sense,

the behaviorist movement was but another

step taken in the name of the empiricist's own goal of constructing
truly scientific theory of mind or human nature.

viorists believed that the achievement of such

a

a

However, the beha-

scientific psychology

required sweeping changes in the methods and concepts that were central
in traditional treatments of human nature,

including the "mentalistic"

psychology constructed by the early empiricists.

haviorist theorists called for

a

In addition,

the be-

fundamental shift away from the

.
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Darwinian-Freudian emphasis on the biological, genetic base of the
human organism toward an emphasis on the environmental factors which
shape human behavior.

Representative of this behaviorist perspective

was Pavlov's Conditioned Reflexes

published in 1927, which maintained

,

that the learning processes of the higher vertebrates could be explained in terms of a model of stimulus,
In this country,

was

J.

B.

neural processes, and response.

the most influential of the early behaviorists

Watson, who constructed

a

powerful defense of

a

learning

theory based solely on the description of observable behavior.
Watson's central aim was to make psychology genuinely scientific by

following more rigorously and completely than ever before the successful example of the physical sciences.

He argued that in order to

accomplish this goal, psychology must be firmly grounded on objective
methods which allow different observers to observe the same events and
processes
Since the states of consciousness emphasized by earlier psycho-

logical theories are private and non-observable, the traditional at-

tempts to develop

a

theory of personality based on introspection had to

be dismissed as hopelessly subjective.

Only scientific observation and

measurement of external behaviors could provide the necessary data for
an empirically-based psychology.

Watson and McDougall's The Battle of

Behaviorism clearly states how extensively the accepted conceptual
framework must be revised in order to accomplish this goal:
The behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem
of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval subjective
terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire,

8
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purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were
originally defined. ...
The behaviorist asks:
Why
don't we make what we can observe the real field of psychology? Let us limit ourselves to things that can be
observed and formulate laws concerning only the observable things.

17

Watson and other early behaviorists held that it

is

possible to

explain all animal and human behavior completely in terms of only those

concepts which make reference to observable events and objects.

The

various "mentalistic" concepts such as consciousness, which were central terms in the hypothetical constructs advanced in traditional phi-

losophy of mind, were rejected as inherently problematic and irrelevant
to the construction of a truly scientific psychology.

The behaviorists

concentrated on the search for empirical correlations between the

observable responses of the organism and the observable features of the
organism's environment (stimuli).

The various studies conducted within

this stimulus-response framework suggested that human beings are much

more manipulable or maleable than the earlier psychologists who emphasized inherent or genetic factors had thought.
Watson went even further, claiming:
and I'll guarantee
Give me a dozen healthy infants
to take any one at random and train him to become any
type of specialist I might select doctor, lawyer,
artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggarman and
thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies,
.

.

.

—

abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.
This seemed to represent

human mind as

a

a

1

return to the Lockean conception of the

blank slate upon which virtually anything could be

written given the proper environmental influences or conditioning.

:
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However, the kind of hard or radical behaviorism which Watson
championed did not simply emphasize environmental over hereditary factors
in

explaining human behavior, but rather challenged the very notion

that there was any set of characteristics or qualities which could be

labeled "human nature."

In

contrast to Pavlov, who had acknowledged

the role of the organism in determining human behavior, Watson's pre-

occupation with the observable led him to an environmental determinist
position denying any sense to traditional conceptions of human nature.
B.

vances

Skinner, the modern champion of radical behaviorism, ad-

F.

a

theory of operant conditioning which characterizes all learn-

ing and behavior in terms of a history of positive and negative rein-

Skinner follows Watson in stressing the necessity of

forcements.

eliminating the language of goals, intentions, and purposes from scientific attempts to explain human motivation and behavior.

In Beyond

Freedom and Dignity he explicitly rejects the kind of causal chain
connecting "ideas" and action posited by the early empiricists,
stating
we do, indeed, feel things inside our own skins,
but we do not feel the things that we have invented to
explain behavior. ... We do feel certain states of
they are
our bodies associated with behavior, but
.

.

.

.

.

.

by products and not to be mistaken for causes.

20

Moreover, he like Watson is an environmental determinist who rejects

any notion of an internal structure of inherent instincts, driven or

unconscious urges.

1
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Skinner, like Watson before him, rejects not only
the mentalistic,

introspective psychology of classical empiricism but also
the notion
that there is

construct

a

a

valid, objective basis for discussing or attempting
to

model of human nature.

The radical behaviorists view the

tendency to attribute the behavior of individuals to some kind of
internal force or structure called human nature as

pre-scientific

,

a

hold-over from

religious and metaphysical conceptions of human beings

and their place in the universe.

2

The problems and issues associated

with traditional accounts of human nature are banished to the black
box, and the psychologist concentrates on the observable components of

the stimulus-response paradigm.

22

This behaviorist rejection of the

notion that we can meaningfully speak of

a

human nature systematically

infected twentieth century psychological thought and contributed ex-

tensively to the suspicion with which modern social scientists treat
all accounts of human nature.

23

Of course, there are many significant differences separating the

various psychologists who consider themselves "behaviorists," and not
all of those who adhere to the basic tenets of behaviorism accept this

"radical" doctrine set out by Watson and Skinner.

More moderate be-

haviorists tend to avoid such forms of "metaphysical" behaviorism which
claim that consciousness does not exist and to champion various brands
of "methodological" behaviorism which centers in the more limited claim
that consciousness cannot be studied according to objective,

tific methods.

In

scien-

addition, the moderate behaviorists have increas-

ingly acknowledged the importance of "intervening variables" between
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the stimulus and response ends of the model and have offered
hypotheses

about capacities within the organism, such as "drives" or

a

"drive-

reduction structure," in their attempts to explain human behavior.
They do continue to insist, however, that

a

scientific psychology must

avoid reference to unobservable inner processes and must always link

theoretical terms with observable factors.
In

general, behaviorists

,

whether radical or moderate, have argued

that internal psychological constructs must be avoided, placed an

emphasis on the study of observable behavior, aimed at discovering laws
of animal and human behavior, attempted to reduce behavior to its

simplist and most basic elements, adhered to some version of the

stimulus-response paradigm, and emphasized environmental rather than
genetic determinants of behavior.

25

Under the influence of this be-

haviorist program, modern psychology has moved steadily away from the
conceptions of human nature and of
forth by the early empiricists.

a

science of human nature as set

In fact,

psychologists has. proved instrumental

in

the research of behaviorist

directing attention to and

attempting to correct many of the most obvious weaknesses in the empiricist models of man and mind.

For example, numerous psychologists

have made use of the behaviorist methodology to reexamine the

a

priori

conception of human nature as inherently aggressive, competative and
egoistic.

More importantly, like the Darwinian and Freudian theories,

behaviorism has altered certain of the basic concepts and classifications used to describe and explain human thought and action.
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While this brief summary does not constitute

a

comprehensive

survey of the modern psychology, it does illustrate the wide gap sepa-

rating the contemporary conception of "psychological man" from the

classical liberal portrayal of human nature which is emphasized by

contemporary researchers studying political behavior.

This contem-

porary view of of "psychological man" is clearly not simply an extension of the early empiricist account of human nature but rather is

a

composite of several different, sometimes competing and sometimes

complementary developments in psychology in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.

The psychological theories attached to the

classical liberal doctrine of abstract individualism have been made

obsolete by such changes as Darwin's substitution of the biological for
the philosophical mode of thinking about mind and personality, the

Freudian emphasis on the power of unconscious motivation and rejection
of the notion of consciousness as fully transparent, and the behaviorist critique of the introspective approach and general challenge to
the Cartesian-empiricist dualistic account of mind and body.

constitutes

a

This

central underpinning of the prevailing assumption that

contemporary accounts of political motivation and behavior are far
removed from the classical liberal doctrine of egoistic individualism
supported by an introspective psychology and an individualistic episte-

mology and philosophy of mind.
In

addition, although these advances in our conception of "psy-

the
chological man" were significant factors in the general decline of
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kind of theorizing about human nature characteristic of historical
political thought, these changes do not fully account for either the

distance separating the classical-liberal account of human nature from
the modern conception of personality or for the general abandonment of
the terminology of human nature in the late nineteenth and early twen-

tieth century political and social theory.

The classical liberal

treatment of mind and politics was made obsolete primarily not by these
revisions in the conception of "psychological man" but rather by

equally fundamental changes in the prevailing conceptions of "sociological man" and of the nature of
In other words,

a

science of politics and society.

the ground-breaking anthropological and sociological

studies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries identified significant differences not only among the individuals living in different
social and cultural settings but also among the workings and function

of the basic social arrangements and practices which influenced human

character and behavior.

These discoveries, as Mill had recognized,

mandated fundamental revision of the theory of abstract individualism
and the conception of a science of politics or society derived or

deduced from such

a

theory.

Focusing on the contributions of sociology, Dennis Wrong states:
All the great nineteenth and early twentieth century
sociologists saw it as one of their major tasks to
expose the unreality of such abstractions as economic
man, the gain-seeker of the classical economists; political man, the power-seeker of the Machiavellian tradition in political science; self-preserving man, the
security-seeker of Hobbes and Darwin; sexual or libidinal man, the pleasure-seeker of doctrinaire
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Freudianism; and even religious man, the God-seeker of
the theologians.^^
The main point here is, of course, that despite the very real advances
in our understanding of individual psychology,

such conceptions of

human nature as are presented in the Darwinian and doctrinaire Freudian

accounts of human nature remain one-sided.

In a sense,

the abstract individual persists because of

a

the image of

general neglect of the

sociological and cultural dimensions of human life and behavior.

Although very real and significant differences divide the founders
of modern sociology, including such diverse thinkers such as Marx,

Durkheim, Weber, and Mosca, they do place common emphasis on analysis
of the social, historical and institutional factors which influence

human motivation and behavior.

The conception of the abstract indivi-

dual, whether in the doctrine of egoistic individualism set out by the

classical liberals or implicit in the various theories of "psychological man," disappears only as sociologists and anthropologists detail

the variety of human motivation and behavior as mediated by the basic

social relationships and institutions

religious and so on
and activity.

—which

In short,

— economic,

political, familial,

are essential components of all human life

it is only with this sociological perspective

which views men and women as essentially social beings that social and
political theorists have the conceptual base for moving beyond the con-

ception of abstract individualism.
This sociological reconceptualization of the basic notions of innature
dividuality and sociality and the consequent redefiniton of the
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and scope of social science and theory completely undercuts
the class-

ical liberal approach to mind and politics.

The early liberals, as we

have seen, portray social institutions and relationships as instru-

mental devices constructed by asocial or pre-social human beings in
order to satisfy or realize certain pre-established desires, needs or
interest.

However, society, according to this sociological perspec-

tive, is not simply a set of contractual, artificial arrangements

designed to serve the independent and prior desires and interests of

abstract individuals.

Rather, society is

a

complex web of values,

norms, roles, relationships and customs which do not merely confront
the individual as external barriers or constraints but are internalized

by individuals thus shaping their desires and interests.

Personality

and even individual identity are the products of a socialization pro-

cess which can be characterized in terms of internalization of

socially-defined norms and values, the adoption of socially-defined
roles and so on.
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The basic core of this model of "sociological man" is a focus on

social interaction, relationships, arrangements and institutions as

significant factors influencing individual character and behavior.
Although the various social theorists and sociologists certainly do
advance more specific and detailed accounts of human nature, the nature
of society and social relationships, and the connections between human

nature and society, these accounts very extensively.
Marx,

for example,

sets out a view of human nature that emphasizes

the extent to which human motivation is the product of the
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socialization processes of various social systems.

At the same time,

he acknowledges certain species needs and powers which are
blunted by

particular forms of social organization and structure.

His account of

social relations and social order focuses on the conflicts of interest
and the power relationships among the different classes of society.
But this analysis of existing social structures is coupled with a

vision of

a

future society in which such conflicts of interests are

eliminated and these power relationships evolve into "truly human"

relationships.
are,

for Marx,

In

a

fundamental sense, both human nature and society

productions or creations of human activity, and one of

the central tasks of social theory is to promote the conscious control
of this activity.
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However, the more specific conceptions of "sociological man" which
have exerted the greatest influence in American social science present

fundamentally different accounts of human nature and society.

One

alternative conception of human nature is summarized accurately if

crudely by Durkheim's statement that "Individual natures are merely the
indeterminate material which the social factor moulds and transforms."
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In other words,

man" moves from

a

this more detailed account of "sociological

general emphasis on the social influences on human

character and behavior to the thesis that individual character is
molded by social institutions and norms and that individual behavior is

determined by common norms and institutional factors.

Individuals are

the products of a socialization process in the sense that they
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internalize socially-defined values, norms and roles
and then conform
to these in their behavior.
In addition,

this Durkheimian perspective focuses on the problem

of order in human society and views consensus or shared norms
and

values rather than conflict of interest or power relationships as the
most basic feature of social structure and social life.
social order is based upon

a

Thus, the

shared value and belief system which

assigns to various individuals the rights and duties corresponding to
their place, function or role in the social order.

The socialization

process through which individuals internalize and accept as legitimate
this value system is the basic source of social order and social

cohesion

"^^
.

This is, of course,

a

simplified summary of

a

complex set of

issues at the base of social and political theory, but this contrast

between the general model of "sociological man" and the more specific

theories of human nature and social structure which have filled out
this general model is essential to understanding recent debates con-

cerning "sociological man" and "psychological man."

For it is essen-

tially that derivative of the Durkheimian perspective called functionalism, particularly as revised and expanded by Parsons, which has been
the most influential variant of the conception of "sociological man" in

American social science and theory.

32

Although there are significant differences between the early and
more recent versions of functionalism as well as among the various
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contemporary functionalist approaches (such as structural functionalism," "systems analysis" and "general systems theory"), the adherents

of this approach have consistently emphasized that political and social
behavior can only be understood by examining its institutional and

cultural context.

In all

its forms, the functionalist approach has

rejected all attempts to explain political and social behavior by

reducing it to the thoughts, desires or interests of individuals.

It

has focused on the examination of patterns of behavior, as tied to

patterns of group-orientation, patterns of social interaction, and
normative patterns in

system as

a

whole.

a

society, in maintaining the social or political

Functionalism is thus one of the major contemporary

approaches to the study of society and politics which acknowledges the
central importance of sociological influences on human character,

thought and behavior.
At the same time,

it has been criticized as having an inherently

conservative or status quo orientation because of what Wrong calls its

"overintegrated view of society" or its preoccupation with questions

concerning social order or system maintenance and neglect of questions

concerning social conflict and the distribution of power.

33

Moreover,

critics have charged that American social science has, under the influence of functionalism, moved toward

a

kind of "sociological deter-

minist" conception of personality and behavior.

In other words,

the

in
implicit functionalist conception of personality which is embedded

psycontemporary explanatory frameworks typically ignores the crucial
and thus
chological factors affecting social behavior and institutions
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lies at the extreme opposite end of the spectrum from the classical

liberal conception of human nature.
For example, Abraham Maslow maintains that:
A total cultural determinism is still the official,
orthodox doctrine of many or most of the sociologists
and anthropologists.
Ihe doctrine not only denies
intrinsic higher motivations, but comes perilously close
34
sometimes to denying "human nature" itself.

Two of the most powerful critiques of this conception of personality
are set out by George C.

Homans

who labels this conception

,

a

"social

mold theory of human nature," and Dennis Wrong, who calls it "an oversocialized conception of man."
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In general,

their argument can be

summarized as holding that in contrast to the classical liberals who
advanced an abstract, asocial conception of human nature and an overin-

dividualized conception of society, contemporary social scientists
standardly proceed with an oversocialized conception of human nature
and an overintegrated conception of society.

Wrong's argument is particularly important because it, in

a

sense,

formulates the dominant position concerning what is wrong with the

contemporary social and behavioral sciences and what must be done to
correct this problem.

He identifies two basic components of the over-

socialized conception of human nature which is implicit in the conceptual framework used in contemporary sociology.

model of man treats human nature as simply

a

First, this implicit

product of the "inter-

nalization of social norms," where internalization is equated with
"learning" or "habit-formation

.

"^^

Thus, this model of human nature

202

completely neglects Freud's insights concerning the inner
tension
generated by the inevitable conflict between such internalized norms
and basic instinctual urges.

Secondly, contemporary sociologists have

constructed an "extremely one-sided view of human nature" by focusing

exclusively on one motive, "the desire to achieve
image

...

a

favorable self-

by winning acceptance or status in the eyes of others," as

underlying all human behavior. 37

Again, the basic insights into the

internal or organic determinants of human motivation and behavior which
are stressed by the Freudian model of "psychological man" are ignored.

Wrong's thesis is that American social scientists must abandon
this unref lective

oversocialized model of man and develop "a more

,

complex, dialectical conception of human nature."

Although he uses

the example of the more balanced, traditional notion of human nature as

divided between

neither

a

"social man" and

a

a

"natural man," his is certainly

call for a return to the speculative conceptions of human na-

ture constructed by the traditional theorists nor an argument for

reconsideration of the conceptual and philosophical issues concerning
thought and action.

All that is needed is a conception of human nature

which integrates Freud's conception of man "as
being entirely

a

a

social animal without

socialized animal" with the very real advances in our

understanding of the institutional and social influences on human
character and behavior offered by modern sociology.
It

is

in this

39

sense that Wrong accurately summarizes the pre-

vailing view of the remaining agenda of the social and behaviorial
sciences concerning the construction of an adequate conception of human
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nature, particularly as this agenda is set out in the
contemporary

literature on political motivation and behavior.

The basic task is to

push beyond the unnecessary debates between the champions of
"psycho-

logical man" and "sociological man" and reconcile these two indispen-

sible sides of

a

truly comprehensive conception of personality.

course, it is assumed that each of these conceptions rests on

a

Of

solid,

scientific base and is far removed from the classical liberal doctrine
of abstract individualism linked to empiricist theories of knowledge
and mind.

Moreover, it is assumed that the troublesome philosophical issues

addressed by the early liberals or associated with traditional dis-

cussions of thought and action in general have been eliminated or
resolved by these two major avenues of advance in the social and behavioral sciences.

Certainly, there are some remaining difficulties

which must be addressed through careful analysis of the problematic

boundary area where psychological and sociological factors interact or
overlap.
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But this is, of course,

a

task for empirical research and

not discussion of the outdated philosophical issues associated with

traditional treatments of thought and action or mind and politics.

Personality and Politics

Many political scientists acknowledge that since politics is

largely

a

matter of human behavior, the study of human motivation and

personality is necessarily
politics.

In

a

central dimension in the study of

fact, the field of political psychology or the study of

1
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personality and politics is
the discipline.

a

rapidly growing area of specialization in

Although this field encompasses

a

wide range of dif-

ferent kinds of approaches to the study of personality and
political
behavior,

general consensus concerning the basic concerns, methods

a

and problems of the field clearly emerges in the works of its leading

scholars, typified by James C. Davies

Jeanne

K.

,

"Where From and Where To?",

Knutson, "Personality in the Study of Politics," Fred

Greenstein, "Political Psychology:

A

I.

Pluralistic Universe," and other

articles in The Handbook of Political Psychology as well as in
Greenstein'

s

Personality and Politics and his article, "Personality and

Politics," in the second volume of the Handbook of Political Science
The following statement by Knutson provides

a

4
.

representative summary of

this prevailing perspective on personality and politics:
In political psychology, it has become a truism that
personality in some unspecified way affects political
beliefs and activity.
This assumption can be traced
back to Plato, who expresssed a concern with the promotion of personality growth supportive of the polity.
It received general professional acceptance through the
seminal work of Harold Laswell, whose books Psychopathology and Politics Power and Personality ) advanced
the thesis that political behavior results from intrapsychic predispositions being displaced on public
Yet, in all the years since Laswell's early
objects.
work, the assumption that personality at least partially
determines political beliefs and political behavior has

—

—

(

,

received inadequate critical analysis.
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In other words,

although the publication of Laswell's Psychopathology

and Politics in

1930 marks the beginning of the modern union between

psychology and political science, the historical roots of the study of

personality and politics lie in classical political theory.

Moreover,

.
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while there are definite advances in our understanding
of the general
linkages between personality and political beliefs and behavior,
more

detailed analysis of the specific nature of these linkages is

necessary
This identification of the modern study of political psychology

with the major concerns of the historical theorists is very strong.
For example,

James Davies criticizes the studies of political behavior

in mainstream political science as being unimaginative,

assembly line

work which focuses on the "epiphinomenal" or the study of "manifest
effects" and which ignores the most significant issues regarding the

connections between personality and politics.

The principal exceptions

to this prevailing interest in "precisely validating the self-evident"

are found in the work of those theorists and researchers who return to
the traditional task of attempting:

... to establish the fundamental linkages between
people and institutions, in stable and in turbulent
times, that Hobbes attempted.
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He points to such contributions as his own Human Nature in Politics

Bay's The Structure of Freedom

,

,

Lane's Political Thinking and Con-

sciousness and Knutson's Human Basis of the Polity as combining

a

contemporary research orientation and methodology with "an awareness of
the intellectual heritage in political theory."

Heinz Eulau, one of the leading figures in the behavioral movement
in political science,

certainly does not share this critical view of

the contributions of recent studies of political behavior.

However, he
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does hold

a

similar view of contemporary research in this
field as

a

continuation of the historical tradition with its emphasis
on the

connections between human nature and political institutions
and processes.

As he states,

What makes the so-called classic theories great are
their sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit assumptions

about human nature in politics.
In his view,

the modern behavioral approach itself is "a direct and

genuine descendent of the classical tradition" because it corrects the

pre-behavioral preoccupation with the study of institutions and con-

stitutions and "returns to the study of man as the root of politics. "^^
Of course,

although contemporary students of political psychology

and political behavior acknowledge th intellectual and historical roots

of the enterprise in traditional political philosophy, they emphasize

that these traditional accounts of the connections among human nature,

political beliefs and behavior, and political institutions and processes tend to be vague,

empirical research.

priori and in conflict with the findings of

a

Eulau puts the objection in the following way:

But to say that

a

man's personality has something to do

with his political behavior is not saying very much.

^7

Contemporary researchers studying political behavior and political psychology insist upon specifying exactly what the study of personality
can contribute to our understanding of political behavior.

Their

emphasis is on empirical research which utilizes the tremendous advance
in conceptual and technical tools separating modern political science

from historical political philosophy.
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Thus, in general, current approaches used in the analysis of pol-

itical psychology and political behavior are thought to represent not

a

revolt against the classical traditional of political theory but rather
a

technological breakthrough which promises solution (or dissolution)

of the problems inherent in classical accounts of human nature and politics.

This technological breakthrough, a social scientific method-

ology which makes use of the insights offered by both the conception of
"psychological man" as well as that of "sociological man," is considered one of the most significant steps in the "linear aevelopment"

marking the emergence of the social* and behavioral sciences from the
philosophical treatments of mind and politics.
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One of the most frequently cited differences between the contem-

porary and traditional approaches to the analysis of personality and
politics is the rejection of the kind of grand-scale theories of human

nature utilized or articulated by the historical theorists.
to the present view of this enterprise,

According

the analysis of political psy-

chology or political behavior can progress only if we strip from the
conception of personality those philosophical, metaphysical and prescientific elements which became attached to it in classical discussions of human nature.

Moreover, the notion that such

a

systematic

and comprehensive theory of personality is necessary to the study of

political behavior or political psychology is itself considered highly
suspect.

Most contemporary political scientists consider the attempt

not as a preto construct such a comprehensive, general-level theory

which
requisite to research in the field but rather as an obstacle
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would hinder future research.

In general, modern students of political

psychology and political behavior favor the utilization of

a

variety of

different research strategies, holding that any consistent, systematic
theory of personality must be built from the ground up in the basis of

research findings rather than imposed from the top down on the basis of
philosophical assumptions.
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Greenstein's summary and assessment of the various approaches now
used in the study of political behavior and personality clearly il-

lustrates this prevailing view of broad-scale treatments of human nature and of the connections between human nature and politics.

He

advances the following classification of works on political behavior
and personality:

1)

those which aim at discovering the characteristics

shared by all men as part of their basic nature,

2)

those which focus

on characteristics shared by some men, i.e. similar personality types,

and 3) those which concentrate on those characteristics which are

unique to

a

particular individual and shared by no other men.
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Greenstein argues that the first approach is inherently problematic not
only because

".

,

it

.

is difficult to find satisfactory analytic

leverage for studying invariant universals ('human nature')
also because of

".

.

.

.

.

."

but

the absence of variation that can be explained
In each of his

by standard correlational or experimental means."

various discussions of the existing literature on personality and politics, he sets aside

"...

'human nature'

as an intractable if un-

doubtedly highly important congeries of issues

.

.

."

and proceeds to

examine those analyses of political behavior and personality which
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utilize the latter two approaches in the above classification to make
more solid and lasting contributions to the field.
In general,

any discussion of personality or political behavior

raising philosophical or general level issues concerning thought and
action is interpreted as an attempt to find

a

"master theory" of per-

sonality that is to serve as the basis for theory or research in the
field.

To adopt such an approach is to return to the search for man's

universal or essential nature and to the "broad, almost metaphysical
accounts of society in terms of human 'stuff of society" which are
tied to the traditional accounts of human nature.
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Any such slippage

into the philosophical, speculative language associated with tradi-

tional accounts of human nature can only be an obstacle to proper

empirical analysis of the socialization process, personality development and other essential ingredients of an adequate theory of personality.

Moreover, to examine the connections between personality and politics with such

a

philosophical terminology and orientation is to

return to the traditional speculative treatment of the connections
between mind and politics.

Greenstein, for example, characterizes such

works as Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents

Life Against Death

,

,

Norman

0.

Brown's

and Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization as

being so speculative, general and metaphysical that they do not make
any real contributions to the study of personality and politics.

Though sometimes stimulating, the works have "a short citational
or
half-life" because they are essentially philosophical psychologies

.
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philosophical treatments of man and society.

All such general,

speculative and philosophical approaches to mind and politics simply
present obstacles to empirical study of the actual relationship between
the psychological make-up of individuals and political structures and

arrangements

Greenstein and most of the other leading scholars in the field

maintain that the real progress in our understanding of political behavior and political psychology has resulted from individual case
studies of political actors and typological, multi-case studies of political actors.

Included in the case study category are such works on

individuals in general populations as Lane's Political Ideology as well
as the kind of psychological analyses of public figures or political

leaders illustrated by Wolfenstein'
Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi
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.

multi-case studies encompasses

s

The Revolutionary Personality:

The second category of typological,
a

wide range of studies:

fications of political actors in terms of

a

simple classi-

single "psychological

variable" or "trait" such as "efficacy" or "self-esteem"; more complex
typologies, such as that of the "authoritarian personality,"

vriiich

attempt to identify "syndromes" of interrelated "traits" or charac-

teristics affecting political behavior; and attempts to explain political behavior utilizing complex, holistic theories of personality

which entail accounts of the basic structures and dynamics of the
entire personality.^'''
Of course, significant differences continue to divide these

various studies of political behavior and political psychology which
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frequently draw on competing sets of concepts and theories from
psychology.

There is clearly no universally agreed upon theory of person-

ality which unifies these various approaches to the study of personality and politics.

However, even though the controversial state of

the psychological literature on personality is sometimes cited as a

principal barrier to further progress in political psychology, the

major scholars in the field hold that

a

general consensus has been

achieved in the most fundamental areas.
Thus, despite the variation in the details of the different the-

ories of personality, the dominant approaches to the study of political

behavior and political psychology share certain basic assumptions and
assertions concerning personality.
defined in terms of

a

First,

personality is standardly

set of "psychological predispositions," "internal

dispositions" or "stable attributes" that comprise the "physical under-

pinnings of personality," the basic psychological structure against
which the individual confronts the situational context of political
CO

belief and behavior.

Second, it is also standardly assumed that this

set of "psychological predispositions" or "attributes" is stable or

consistent, providing the individual with an established or fixed

orientation to his environment.
The third common assertion or assumption underpinning these various

approaches to the study of political behavior or political psy-

chology

is

the notion that these "psychological predispositions" deter-

mine or are causally connected to political beliefs and political behaviors.

that
Of course, researchers in this field continually caution

"

1
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the relationship between a particular disposition and

havior varies according to the specific situation.

a

However, even the

more limited typologies which do not attempt to set out
theory of personality incorporate

a

particular be-

a

comprehensive

"covert causal theory" that posits

certain connections between the psychological characteristics of in-

dividuals and their political beliefs and behaviors.
Finally, the conceptions of personality utilized in analyses of

political behavior and political psychology are increasingly tied to
the standards of methodological behaviorism.

In particular,

the cur-

rent conception of personality is closely associated with the require-

ment that psychological concepts must be defined in behavioral and

observational terms and with the conviction that the study of personality must be approached from

"...

states,

behavior

a

behavioral perspective.

As Knutson

personality can be understood only as an inference from

60
.

In addition to this emerging consensus concerning the basic out-

line of

that

a

a

definition of personality, there is also general agreement

"multivariate approach" is essential to the analysis of pol-

itical attitudes and behavior.

One of the most widely used and dis-

cussed examples of this multivariate approach is

M.

Brewster Smith's "A

Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," which presents an

anlytic model to be used as an organizational framework in the study of
political behavior and political psychology.
five basic components or panels:
social environment as

a

1)

6

His model consists of

distant social antecedents, 2)

context for the development of personality and

.
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the acquisition of attitutes

,

3)

personality processes and disposi-

tions, 4) the situation as the immediate antecedent of action, and
5)

political behavior.
The central and most detailed component of Smith's map, which

concerns the psychological factors influencing political behavior,
focuses on attitudes, defined as

dispositions, when they represent integrations of
cognitive, emotional and connative tendencies around a
psychological object such as a political figure or
.

.

.

issue
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His model is designed to clarify not only problems concerning the

relationship between an individual's attitudes and his political behavior but also those concerning the function of attitudes in relation
to the "ongoing operations of the person's psychological economy."
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Within this third panel of Smith's map, the central linkages between
attitudes and the "functional bases of attitudes" in the deeper per-

sonality structure are classified in terms of object appraisal, the

mediation of self-other relationships, and externalization and ego
defense.
The focus of Smith's model, reflecting the principal concern of

political psychology, is upon the internal and psychological, as opposed to the social and environmental, determinants of political behavior.

However,

social and environmental factors are treated as

essential to the explanation of political behavior and are classified
in terms of the remaining three categories:

context of

a

the immediate situational

particular behavior; the immediate social environment

"
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(including information, social norms, basic life situations, etc.)
which shapes the individual's psychological development; and the distal
or remote social environment which includes basic historical, economic,

political and social factors indirectly influencing behavior.
This multivariate approach represented by Smith's map is consi-

dered

a

fundamental advance over the kind of philosophical speculation

about human nature characteristic of traditional political theory

because it relies on analytic models which generate testable propositions about the specific causal relationships between personality

characteristics and political behavior.
variate approach places

a

In particular,

such

a

multi-

dual emphasis on both the psychological as

well as the sociological influences on human behavior.

According to

Smith, this approach thus transcends the "silly and outmoded" debate

regarding whether psychological or sociological factors are the key

determinants of behavior and provides

a

research framework which treats

both sets of factors as "jointly indispensible
In other words,

.
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research concerning behavior and political psycho-

logy can now proceed within

a

behavioral-functional framework which

leaves the unanswered questions concerning personality and politics to
be resolved by empirical discovery.

The leading scholars in the field

champion the basic behavioral equation, B = f (OE )~human behavior is

a

function or product of the interaction between the organism and the

environment

— or

the modified behaviorist paradigm, stimulus-organism-

response, as providing an analytical framework which combines the

central insights of our understanding of "psychological man" and

.
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"sociological man."

This framework is

a

vehicle which allows the

study of personality and politics to move beyond the kind of "explana-

tory one-sidedness" characteristic of those traditional accounts of
human nature that were committed on philosophical grounds to either an

exclusively sociological or an exclusively psychological view of man.^^
According to the prevailing view of the study of personality and
politics, the basic task now confronting the field is analysis of the
empirical links in the causal chain which connects underlying person-

ality structure on the one hand and the social and political structure
on the other.

Contemporary studies of political behavior and political

psychology explicitly or implicitly posit the following links
causal chain:

1)

basic psychological dispositions, 2) the environ-

mental influences of childhood,

characteristics,

in this

4)

3)

adult personality structure and

conscious adult attitudes, beliefs and political

orientations, 5) immediate environmental influences,

6)

individual pol-

itical behavior, and 7) collective or aggregative political structures
and processes

Most of the current work in the field tends to focus on examining
the linkages among the first six components of this causal chain con-

necting personality and politics.
tempts to link the

Moreover, although there are at-

"micro-phenomena" of individual personality cha-

racteristics and behavior with the collective, "macro-phenomena" of
political structures and processes (what Greenstein calls "analyses of

aggregation"), these attempts to bridge the final, and most important
behavior and
for the political scientist, connection between individual

"
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socio-political outcomes are acknowledged to be inadequate .^^

As Neil

Smelser admits.
We do not at the present have the methodological capacity to argue causally from a mixture of aggregative
states of individual members of a system to a global

characteristic of
In addition,

a

system.

6Q

as Greenstein repeatedly points out,

at this level of

study of the macro-phenomena of politics the happy synthesis between

"psychological man" and "sociological man" breaks down.

Such analyses

of large-scale political practices and institutional patterns typically

either ignore psychological factors completely or return to some variant of "psychological reductionism

.
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Of course, this failure to deliver on the one topic which is the

focal point of the enterprise of personality and politics, namely the

relationship between personality characteristics and behaviors on the
one hand and political structures and processes on the other, is some-

what of an embarassment to political psychology and, more generally, to
the behavioral movement to which it is attached.
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Moreover, the

various responses to this perceived dilemma by the most important

researchers in political behavior and political psychology reveal an

inability to come to terms with the most fundamental problems and
issues concerning personality and politics.

Greenstein acknowledges the necessity of conceptual and theoretical clarification to eliminate conceptual confusions, calls for
more emphasis on the standards and criteria which must be applied when
presenting, analyzing and interpreting evidence, and insists upon more
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adequate measures of dependent and independent variables.

He also

restates his call for "methodological pluralism" and research flex.

.

.

ibility.
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In short, the same combination of rigorous standards
and

diverse research approaches which achieved such success at the microlevel will eventually solve the problems faced at the macro-level.
Davies, as we have seen, is more critical of the "printout" orien-

tation of contemporary research in political behavior and maintains
that students of personality and politics must follow Hobbes in fo-

cusing on the connections between people and institutions.

What he

then argues is that the major deficiencies evident in recent work on

political psychology stem from the dominance of conceptions of personality which either treat organic factors in an "unnecessarily vague"

manner or completely ignore the organism and concentrate exclusively on

environmental variables.
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Much like Wrong, he maintains that the

basic corrective is simply an increased concern with the organic

factors influencing human behavior.
More specifically,

Davies champions Maslow's theory of

a

hierarchy

of needs as providing the kind of biologically-based theory of human

needs and personality which will put the study of political beliefs,

attitudes and behavior on

a

solid,

scientific foundation.

Ultimately,

he views the relationship of psychology to political science to be

directly parallel to the relationships of organic chemistry to biology
and of physics to chemistry.
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Modern psychology is presently devel-

oping the type of comprehensive, empirical theory of personality which
will eventually serve as the base for

a

science of politics that is
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free of the conceptual and philosophical problems inherent in tradi-

tional discussions of mind and politics.
A similar

conception of the relationship between psychology and

political science is set out in John

C.

Wahlke's 1978 Presidential

Address to the American Political Science Association, "Pre-

Behavioralism in Political Science."
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Acknowledging the present

dissatisfaction with the achievements of the research on political behavior since the so-cslled "behavioral revolution" in the discipline,

Wahlke argues that the very real problems in this work have nothing to
do with the dominant methodology or its epistemological premises.

Rather, the basic problem common to this extensive body of research is
that it continues to use "deficient and inappropriate concepts" and

remains in

a

"pre-behavioral stage" of development.

He offers a detailed,
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extensive list of the principal failings of

contemporary research on political behavior which includes such criticisms as that it concentrates on

a

very limited range of theoretical

problems, it overemphasizes voting behavior, it focuses almost exclu-

sively on individual political actors, and ignores "macro-level"
topics, it is preoccupied with the study of attitudes and neglects behavior, and so on.

All these various problems are then attributed to

two fundamental conceptual shortcomings:

this research is not really

"anchored in macro-level political theory" and this research incorporates

a

"deficient general behavioral theory" or

of human nature."

77

a

"flawed conception
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Wahlke like Davies argues that these various deficiencies can be
remedied only by systematically building future research on an empirical theory of the individual human organism.

Despite its methodo-

logical rigor, contemporary research on political behavior still assumes or works from:

... a dualistic, half-empirical, half metaphysical
conception of the human individual, in which the body is
governed by inner mental impulses which lead to chosen
destinations and goals.
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The elimination of this flawed, largely unreflective conception of per-

sonality will require more than borrowing
chology.

a

few more concepts from psy-

Rather, the program of political behavior research must be

totally rebuilt on the knowledge of the human organism emerging from
the "biobehavioral sciences."

This is, of course, essentially the same conception of
of politics resting on

a

a

science

science of human behavior and the workings of

the human organism presented by Davies.

As Wahlke states.

The desired relationship between political science and
the biobehavioral sciences is analgous to the relationship between astronomy on the one hand and physics and

chemistry on the other.
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After all, the people studied by the political scientist are just as

subject to the "laws of behavioral dynamics" as the phenomena studied
by the astronomer are subject to the laws of physics and chemistry.

The political scientist who ignores these basic laws determining or-

ganic functions and processes simply cannot explain political behavior.
who
He is in the same untenable position as the would-be astronomer

1
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attempts to explain the movements of celestial bodies in isolation
from
the laws of physics.
It must

ception of

a

also be noted that for both Wahlke and Davies, this con-

science of politics founded on the biobehavioral sciences

represents the kind of synthesis between the models of "psychological
man" and "sociological man" that is now required in the contemporary

study of political behavior and political psychology.

According to

Wahlke, this approach rectifies the present imbalance inherent in the
"two dimensional, oversimplified, supercognitive

model of the acting individual."

8

,

social-psychological

Furthermore, it takes us beyond the

dogmatic debates about the relative significance of genetic and cultural determinants of human behavior and character and recognizes "the

inseparable independence of both."
science provides

a
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In short,

this model of political

framework within which the real puzzles concerning

personality and politics, including the question of nature and nuture,
can be resolved through

a

systematic program of research.

Certainly, Wahlke 's vision of

a

political science securely founded

on the laws of biobehavioral sciences is not shared by all political

scientists or all those now doing research on political behavior.
However, it does accurately reflect one of the growing trends in the

discipline which is very much in evidence in the literature on "biopolitics" and the use of "psychophysiological" and "psychophysical"

methods

in

the study of political attitudes at Stony Brook.
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More

importantly, Wahlke's statement is fully representative of the most
incorporated
basic assumptions about human thought and action which are
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in mainstream political

science.

Although he clearly pushes these

basic propositions concerning the nature of human thought and behavior

further than most of his colleagues, he works with essentially the same

conceptual framework which dominates not only contemporary political
science but also American social and behavioral science in general.
As one major aspect of this

framework,

Davies, Greenstein, Wahlke

and others concerned with the study of personality and politics hold

that the answers to the most pressing problems concerning political be-

havior and political psychology will be provided by empirical research
guided by ever more rigorous application of scientific methods and

techniques.

In other words,

they share

a

positivist conception of

a

science of politics, which, through the application of the same meth-

odology used

in the natural

sciences, can achieve the same kind of

knowledge of political attitudes and behavior that has already been
attained in the physical sciences.

According to this positivist model, the modern study of personality and politics is free of the kinds of philosophical and conceptual
issues addressed in the traditional accounts of mind and politics.
More specifically, the conceptions of personality which ground con-

temporary research do not rest on the kinds of contestable philosophical assumptions which infected the classical conceptions of human na-

ture.

Of course, the general methodological and epistemological prem-

and
ises of the scientific approach to the study of political behavior

of modern personality theory itself are acknowledged.

Yet, these

modern
epistemological questions are not examined in detail, and the
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conceptions of political behavior and personality are clearly considered to be independent of the problematic and contestable issues in

philosophy of mind and philosophy of action.
However, careful examination of the personality and politics

literature or of the general explanatory frameworks used in the study
of political processes and behavior indicates that this is not the
case.

In

fact, at several crucial points, the conceptual framework

which dominates contemporary political research and empirical theory

incorporates what are basically empiricist assumptions about knowledge,
mind and action.

Many of the acknowledged problems concerning the

study of political behavior and political psychology are, at least in
part, conceptual or philosophical issues which are linked to the em-

piricist distinctions and categories implicit in the dominant classificatory framework.

Although this certainly does not mean that em-

pirical research is irrelevant to the attempt to answer the central

questions regarding personality and politics, such research alone
cannot be expected to resolve the most fundamental issues and problems

concerning the explanation of political behavior, political attitudes
and so on.

Only an approach

vrfiich

data provided by such research with

combines careful assessment of the
a

systematic reassessment of the

prevailing classif icatory framework promises to resolve the problems
addressed by Greenstein and Wahlke.
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The Empiricist Conception of Mind

The characterization of the conception of mind which is implicit
in contemporary work on political behavior and political psychology as

"empiricist" does not rest on the implausible claim that contemporary

conceptions of political behavior and personality are identical to the
account of mind which supported classical liberal political theory.

As

we have seen, developments in the social and behavioral sciences have

destroyed the classical liberal attempt to reduce human nature or per-

sonality to the psychological attributes of abstract, asocial individuals.

The doctrine of abstract individualism as embodied in the

introspective psychology and, in turn, the uncompromising epistemological individualism of classical empiricism is clearly not the pre-

vailing conception of personality underpinning contemporary political
theory and research.
In addition,

contemporary political science does not, like early

liberal theory, treat society or political institutions as simply

aggregations or collections of abstract individuals.

Again, the class-

ical empiricist notion that political institutions or arrangements can
be explained in terms of the given desires and interests of autonomous,

pre-social individuals has been soundly rejected.

Modern researchers

studying political behavior repeatedly emphasize that their approach

synthesizes the perspectives of both "sociological man" and "psychological man."

In other words,

they expressly acknowledge that we must
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examine both how political institutions and "political culture" influence individual traits, attitudes and behavior as well as how in-

dividual traits, attitudes and behaviors influence political institutions and political life.
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At the same time, certain elements of the doctrine of abstract in-

dividualism live on in the form af basic background assumptions concerning mind, knowledge and reality.

These assumptions, which center

in an essentially empiricist account of mind,

are extremely difficult

to identify and assess because they are not expressly acknowledged or

defended but rather lie hidden in the deepest, most fundamental levels
of the conceptual scheme used to classify and explain political behavior.

Political scientists, even those specializing in the study of

personality and politics, are unaware of the connections between their
theories of political behavior and significant conceptual and philosophical issues concerning thought and action.

Thus, the task of

drawing out these hidden, implicit connections between mind and politics as these are incorporated into modern political science is

a

formidable one.
Certainly, the prevailing account of the nature and scope of the
study of personality and politics and the conceptions of personality

advanced by the researchers investigating political behavior and political psychology do provide some intimations of these background

assumptions concerning knowledge, mind and action.

For example, al-

though the leading scholars in the field locate the historical roots

o
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the study of personality and politics in traditional political philosophy, they insist that the kind of speculative, philosophical concerns

of the classical thinkers are quite irrelevant to the contemporary task
of explaining political behavior.

On the basis of our scientific

methodology, we have moved from traditional philosophical speculation
about the linkages between mind and politics to empirical research

which is uncovering the actual relationships among individual personality characteristics, individual attitudes and behaviors, and political structures and arrangements.
In addition,

as we have seen,

guides this research is either

a

the conceptual framework which

covert or explicit causal theory that

posits certain definite connections among basic psychological characteristics, individual attitudes and behaviors, and political processes
and events.

There are obvious affinities between these various analy-

tical models illustrated by Smith's map and the empiricist conceptual

framework of

a

mechanistic, causal theory linking bodily happenings

with internal, mental events.

However, as modern specialists in the

field of political psychology are quick to point out, these contem-

porary analytical models, unlike the early liberal approach to the

study of politics, specifically include the distal as well as the
immediate social environmental influences on individual character,

attitudes and behavior.
More importantly, they hold that the conception of the individual
models
which constitutes the central feature of these modern analytic
is far removed

from the kind of

a

priori

,

philosophical conception of
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human nature advanced by the early liberals.

The conceptions of per-

sonality that underpin modern research on political behavior draw on
the increased knowledge of the human organism which is offered by psy-

chological investigation of personality and human behavior.

Although,

as we have seen, contemporary studies of political behavior and pol-

itical psychology build on various psychological theories, the pre-

dominant influence is clearly that of psychological behaviorism.
One of the most important common features of the mainstream li-

terature on personality and politics is an insistence on the methodological requirement that all psychological concepts must be defined
in behavioral

and observational terms.

Indeed, the most visible dif-

ference between the conception of mind advanced by the early empiricists and any conception of mind which could be reasonably attributed
to the dominant characterization of personality in recent research on

political behavior is the treatment of personality characteristics as

psychological dispositions or predispositions.
Thus, in contrast to the classical empiricist theory of mind in

which all mental concepts seem to be simply labels corresponding to

private, inner events or states, the prevailing behavioral ist perspective portrays such "mental" terms as dispositions to respond to parOf course, whereas the early empiri-

ticular stimuli in certain ways.

cists treated various mental states as given, this alternative behav-

ioralist account emphasizes that basic psychological dispositions are
shaped by, in their terminology,
or reinforcement.

a

particular history of conditioning
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However, those doing research in political behavior would cer-

tainly reject any characterization of such

a

shift to

a

dispositional

account of central psychological terms as some kind of difference
between competing philosophies of mind.

In their view,

this conception

of psychological traits or characteristics as dispositions, like the

rejection of philosophical, speculative issues concerning human nature
or mind and the various causal theories used to guide research, is not

dependent upon any contestable philosophy of mind but rather simply one
of
a

a

number of technical advances linked to the rigorous application of

scientific methodology to the study of human behavior.

attempt to find an implicit conception of mind embedded

In short,

in

the

contemporary

approaches to the study of personality and politics is doomed to fail

because no such philosophical conception is present.
After all, according to the mainstream perspective, the contem-

porary approach to the study of personality and politics
a

is

based upon

closer relationship between psychology and political science and an

abandonment of the traditional linkage between philosophy and the study
of politics.

Research into political behavior draws from or builds

upon the concepts, theories and empirical findings of psychology and
follows the lead of behavioral psychology in adopting the same meth-

odology which achieved such success in the natural sciences.
Given this acknowledged relationship between contemporary research
on political behavior and behaviorist psychology,

it would seem that

which
this conception of a science of politics and political behavior
is

to the same
free of challengeable philosophical assumptions is open

.
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objections which have been raised against psychological behaviorism.
Critics of behaviorism have linked certain of its basic tenets as well
as its general conceptual framework to classical empiricist as well as

logical positivist views on experience, mind and body, observation,

language and so on.^^
In particular,

recent linguistic challenges to psychological be-

haviorism have focused on the attempt to explain human behavior solely
in terms of concepts which designate observable objects and events.

As

we have seen, the radical or strict variants of behaviorism insist that
a

genuine science of human behavior c?n only be achieved through the

complete elimination of all "subjective" or "mentalistic" terms, in-

cluding purposes, intentions, and reasons, and by accepting only directly observable variables as being theoretically significant.^^

Be-

havioral psychologists have standardly focused on two major kinds of
such variables, the observable stimuli which influence an organism and
the observable behavioral responses made by the organism to particular

stimuli
In other words, behavioral psychology has attempted to break human

behavior down into more basic, more primitive units or variables which
can be characterized in terms of

sical vocabulary.

a

purely mechanical, causal and phy-

These units or variables are the "brute data" which

are independent of our conceptual and theoretical frameworks and pro-

vide the building blocks for

a

genuine science of behavior.

87

The be-

havioral psychologist proceeds to try to discover the laws regarding
the connections between the stimuli and the responses which determine

.
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the pattern of individual behavior.

All references to internal mental

states, such as an individual's ideas, beliefs and attitudes, are

either, at the most, totally unnecessary to or, at the least, to be

avoided in our explanations of his behavior.

Although this approach clearly rejects the "mentalistic

,

"

intro-

spective conception of mind championed by classical empiricism, it
remains closely linked to the radical empiricism of the logical positivists.

For example,

Clark Hull's Principles of Behavior

,

"classical" statements of psychological behaviorism, offers
a

one of the
a

vision of

science of human behavior in which the "secondary principles" of "so-

called purposive behavior" are deduced from or analyzed into "more

elementary objective primary principles."
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The mentalistic concepts

and "anthropormorphic subjectivism" pervasive in traditional and or-

dinary language accounts of human behavior must be either reduced into
an observation language suitable for a science of human behavior or

eliminated as part of the untestsble speculations of metaphysics and

purposivism
Hull's conception of
a

a

genuine science of human behavior provides

clear illustration of the basic ties between psychological behav-

iorism and logical positivism.

conceptions of

a

He shares not only the positivist

hypothetico-deductive science based on "explicit and

exact systematic formulation, with empirical verification at every

possible point" and of the social sciences following the pattern of

development of the physical sciences, but also the positivist conception of the reduction of subjective, purposive concepts to

a

more
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primitive terminology which is causal, mechanistic and observational.^^
Most importantly, he like the logical positivists takes it as
a given

that the kind of reductions he proposes are possible.
a

He takes this as

given because he, again like the positivists, assumes that reality

itself is made up of "a complex of basic, simple elements. "^^
mately, Hull's notion of

a

Ulti-

"data language," a basic set of observa-

tional concepts to which all other concepts must be reducible, depends
upon the same kind of

priori conception of reality that underpinned

a

the program of reductive analysis or the "reductionist paradigm. "^^
Of course,

this is but a simple illustration of the complex his-

torical and conceptual connections between psychological behaviorism
and logical positivism.

In addition,

there have been several signi-

ficant reformulations of behaviorism, and Hull's statement can hardly
be treated as representative of all psychologists who now consider

themselves behaviorists

.

At the same time, this is a clear example of

the significance of questions concerning the philosophical assumptions

incorporated in the conceptual frameworks used to describe and explain
human behavior.

Moreover, critics of behaviorist psychology continue

to challenge certain of its philosophical underpinnings.

The contin-

uing debates over the use of purposive and intentional concepts in

explanation as well as the role of so-called teleological or purposive
explanations as opposed to causal, mechanistic explanations represent
one of the most extensive treatments of the linkages between issues in

philosophy of mind and philosophy of action on the one hand and the
92
attempt to explain human behavior on the other.
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As we have seen, there is no treatment of such challenges
or

questions concerning the attempted explanation of human behavior in
causal, mechanistic terms in the mainstream literature on personality
and politics.

In general,

those investigating political behavior

consider such charges of "reductionism" and the issues concerning

purposive and causal explanations to be completely irrelevant to the
behavioral movement in political science.

After all, research in pol-

itical behavior has certainly not followed radical psychological be-

haviorism in attempting to eliminate all subjective, "mentalistic"
concepts or in attempting to reduce political behavior to patterns of

observable behavior.
After noting the decline of this kind of "pristine behaviorism"

within psychology itself, David Easton states:
Aside from a rather quaint, not entirely consistent, and
for that matter, not too intelligible formal adoption of
Watsonian behaviorism by A. F. Bentley in his Process of
Government I know of no one associated with political
research who has advocated a position that even begins
to approximate so rigid an exclusion of subjective data.
Ideas, motives, feelings, attitudes, all appear as
By design at least, students of
important variables.
political behavior have given no indication of intending
,

to adopt a behavioralistic posture.
In short,
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research in political behavior has never been based upon any

such rejection or attempted reduction of subjective or "mentalistic"

terms including beliefs, attitudes, and values.

Indeed, the mainstream

research literature has consistently stressed that it is impossible to

understand an individual's political behavior in isolation from his
ideas, desires,

feelings, attitudes, beliefs and values.
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In

addition, there has been no movement which aims at reducing

political behavior to sets of movements or physical behaviors or at

characterizing all political activity in terms of observable physical
stimuli and behavioral responses.

Behavioral political scientists have

long acknowledged that the most important types of political behavior
are not only purposive but also follow certain institutional or social

rules.

It

is

clear, for example, that there are a number of different

overt behaviors or physical motions which could constitute the political behavior of voting or civil disobedience.

Thus, Eulau argues

that the behavioral approach to the study of politics simply focuses on
the individual as the basic empirical unit of analysis and attempts to

explain political processes and systems in terms of individual behavior.

But this research approach certainly does not require that we

treat individual behavior outside of the institutional rules and social

setting which assign significance and meaning to that behavior.
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Defenders of the behavioral approach argue that given this dual

emphasis on the importance of individual beliefs, attitudes and values
as reflected in behavior as well as the institutional rules and social

setting within which political behavior takes place, behavioral political research, with the exception of Bentley's crude formulation of
it, cannot be charged with ignoring the so-called problem of meaning.

Indeed, the more sophisticated advocates of behavioralism have acknow-

ledged that the standpoint of the observer in the social sciences is
prenot identical to that of the observer in the physical sciences

cisely because he must come to terms with the meanings of particular
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situations and behaviors for the agents involved, not simply
physical
events and movements.

In their

characterizations of the process of

observation they not only acknowledge that there must be some "unity of

meanings" between observer and observed but also recognize the assignment of false meaning by the observer to the agent's own view of his

situation and/or behavior as
of political behavior.

a

major source of error in the observation
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Yet, while this is acknowledged as

a

source of unique difficulties

which set, the study of human behavior apart from the study of molecules or atoms, it is seen as

a

problem complicating the process of

discovery but not affecting the logic of verification.

For example,

Muford Sibley maintains that:
Once concepts meaningful to both student and studied
have been discovered, the behavior of human beings in
politics can then be examined within the framework of
understanding thus demarcated.
The investigation does,
of course, involve a more complicated process than that
connected with the study of purely natural phenomena,
but the fact that common meanings must be identified
before behavioral studies can proceed does not mean that
the procedure of verification and empirical validation
cannot take place by methods not unlike those utilized
in the natural

Thus,

sciences.
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the so-called problem of meaning is present in our attempts ot

construct survey research questions which are meaningful to respondents, but it is irrelevant to the validation procedures which apply to
the research findings.

This points directly to an important theme which is stressed by
Easton,

Eulau,

Sibley and other champions of the behavioral revolution,

s
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namely that what

is

attempt to build

a

called behavioral political science is not an
science of politics upon psychological behaviorism

but rather a particular model of such

a

science of politics.

As

Easton

characterizes this model, it stresses the attempt to develop theories
with explanatory and predictive value, the verification and testing of
these theories, the quantification of data, the careful demarcation of
the distinct tasks of ethical evaluation and empirical explanation, the

systematization of research, and the integration of political science
with the rest of the social and behavioral sciences.
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The common goal

of the behavioral movement is -the construction of, again in Easton'

words, "a science of politics modeled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences."
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In

short, the behavioral movement is

the official representative of the positivist conception of
of politics or society.

havior is underpinned by not only
a

science
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This behavioral or positivist conception of

physics but also by

a

a

a

science of human be-

particular epistemology and meta-

specific conception of mind and action.

In other

words, fundamental empiricist assumptions about the nature of mind or

of thought and action as well as about the nature of reality and knowledge are attached to and provide crucial support for this model of

scientific explanation and theory.

The task of uncovering the basic

philosophical assumptions supporting this approach to the study of poldo
itical behavior is so difficult precisely because these assumptions

theories of personnot lie close to the surface, embedded within the
are submerged
ality used in research on political behavior, but rather

.
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in

the most fundamental levels of the conceptual scheme
attached to the

positivist model.

These philosophical assumptions can only be flushed

out by considering an alternative conception of thought and
action and

examining its repercussions on political theory and political
science.
At this point, only a rough outline of some of the contestable
assump-

tions concerning knowledge, reality and mind which are linked to the

dominant account of the proper approach to the study of political behavior is possible.
The most obvious of these connections between the positivist model

of a science of politics and empiricist philosophy, both classical em-

piricism and logical positivism, is the epistemological one.

The aim

of the behavioral approach is clearly the type of objective knowledge,

completely free from the problem of competing interpretations of political behavior, which is linked to the empiricist quest for certainty.

Such

a

science of politics ultimately requires the discovery of certain

"brute data" which are given and independent of the conceptual and

theoretical frameworks we use in classifying and characterizing the
political world and which thus provide the basic building blocks neces-

sary to the empiricist conception of knowledge.

Without the acqui-

sition of such brute data, the process of verification is

impossible
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Of course, this presupposes that social reality is made up of such

brute data.

Although most political scientists generally avoid onto-

logical claims, it is exactly this assumption that underlies Easton's
plea that the social sciences:

.

.
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face up to the problem of locating stable units
of
analysis which might possibly play the role in social
research that the particles of matter do in the physical
.

.

.

sciences

Certainly, Easton does not limit the search for such
"universal

particles of political life" to individual characteristics and behavior
for he suggests that it may prove to be his own conception of
"systems"

which will provide the "common variables" to unify the social and be-

havioral sciences.

However, his notion of "stable units of analysis"

clearly envisions the kind of brute data necessary for

a

unified

science of society and human behavior:
Ideally, the units would be repetitious, ubiquitous, and
uniform, molecular rather than molar.
In this way they
would constitute the particles, as it were, out of which
all social behavior is formed and which manifest themselves through different institutions, structures, and

processes
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In addition, he expresses his conviction that these "particles," which

must be there according to this empiricist conception of reality, will
be found.

^"^"^

What makes Easton

's

statement exceptional is not simply that he

expressly lays out this conception of reality but also that he holds
that this search for brute data must continue.

In contrast, most

research in political behavior proceeds according to the assumption
that we have already acquired the brute data which provide the foun-

dation for

a

genuine science of political behavior.

Indeed, it is

exactly this presupposition which underpins the behavioralists

'

claim

to have handled the problem posed by the fact that human behavior.

.
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unlike physical processes or animal behavior, involves subjective

meanings for the agents.
The behavioralists attempt to deal with this problem of meaning

principally through the use of survey research techniques, by asking
people questions about their beliefs, values, attitudes, and percepProper use of thse techniques is considered

tions.

a

difficult task,

particularly because certain of these beliefs, values, and so on are
not easily measured.

However, it is assumed that, even though the

instruments which must be used to collect data concerning the meanings
of situations and behaviors for agents are different from those used in
the physical sciences, the basic procedures of this process are logi-

cally identical to the measurements made in physics or chemistry.
Thus, the beliefs, values, feelings, attitudes, perceptions or
goals of the individuals whose behavior is being studied, which are

reported to an interviewer or measured by some type of survey research
technique, are considered brute data.

The mental states or processes

are treated as "properties" of the individual subject or "facts" about
him,

and become some of the "variables" used to explain political be-

havior
Behavioral methodology has been used in

a

variety of different

ways to study these variables which constitute the meaning that agents

ascribe to their own situation and actions.

In the voting studies,

political scientists have focused on "party identification" and

a

of
number of other variables in order to explain the voting behavior

general populations.

The measurement of attitudes, perceptions, and

s<
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on, has also been used in attempts to explain the behavior of decision

makers as in the analysis of the relationship between legislators'
perceptions of their constituents' desires and their own voting
records.

In

addition, the study and measurement of the internal vari-

ables affecting political behavior have been particularly important in
recent examinations of political culture, which has been characterized
as "the distribution of socially relevant attitudes in the population"
or as "the psychological dimension of the political system."
In all these studies,

1

05

the goal is to discover correlations between

the independent variables of attitudes and values and the dependent

variables of various forms of political behavior.

The process of

verifying these correlations, which are considered the major basis of
the expanding body of knowledge concerning political behavior, is

considered completely independent of any problems concerning the in-

terpretation of subjective meanings.

But this, of course, presupposes

that the meanings of particular situations and behaviors for the agents

involved can be adequately captured by treating them as brute data or
facts about each individual.
It

is

precisely at this point that the conceptual framework at-

tached to this behavioralist methodology draws on an implicit and con-

testable conception of mind.

In particular,

this approach assumes that

exall the meanings which are part of the political behavior to be

plained are essentially individual ideas, attitudes and values or in-

dividual states of consciousness.

These ideas, attitudes, beliefs and
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so on are treated

as the given,

and frequently transparent as wellj^'''

contents of individual consciousness.

Such

a

conception of conscious-

ness or mind neglects or rules out those "intersubjective" meanings

which are grounded in

tices and

a

a

shared language,

a

common set of social prac-

common form of life and which cannot be adequately cha-

racterized as simply
values and goals.
In addition,

a

concurrence of essentially individual attitudes,

^"^^

this approach to the study of political behavior

assumes that beliefs, attitudes, and values on the one hand and political behaviors on the other are phenomena which are separately and

independently identifiable.

This separation of the various states of

individual consciousness, which are supposed to constitute the meaning
of the situation and behavior for the agent,

from the agent's observ-

able behaviors underpins the search for the correlations that are

considered the major components of our knowledge of political behavior.
This is, as we shall see, again

a

contestable assumption concerning

thought and action which has significant implications on the conception
of the relationship between theory and fact in the social and behavloral sciences.
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Finally, since this approach treats beliefs, attitudes, feelings,

emotions and other mental states as essentially separate and discrete
brute data, it ignores the crucial logical connections between certain

attitudes or emotions and the beliefs of the agent.

It

thus assumes an

account of mind which has an extremely narrow conception of rationality
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and which neglects certain of the most significant features
of self-

knowledge and self-consciousness

J ^°

As

is the case with these other

assumptions, challenges to this essentially empiricist conception of
mind undermine the conceptual scheme with which the behavioralist

classifies and characterizes political behavior.
These themes in the empiricist conception of mind and their con-

nections to the positivist conception of

a

science of politics will be

explored in more detail as we consider an alternative account of mind
and its implications for political theory and political science.

The

most important point here is that the behavioral political scientist
cannot simply assume that, with the adoption of

a

methodology modeled

after the natural sciences, the study of political behavior is freed
from the type of philosophical and conceptual issues addressed by the

traditional theorists.

Champions of the behavioral or positivist ap-

proach standardly reject traditional attempts to understand politics
and society as lacking objectivity because they were linked to specu-

lative, unsupported and vague theories of human nature.

Yet, a similar

kind of conception of human nature, in the form of basic assumptions

about mind and action embedded within its classif icatory scheme, infects the positivist conception of

a

science of political behavior.

.
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CHAPTER

IV

TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF MIND

The Critique of the Spectatorial Framework

Central components of this empiricist account of mind and know-

ledge which is implicit in the explanatory frameworks used in contem-

porary political science have been seriously challenged by recent work
in linguistic philosophy of mind.

Since the publication of Gilbert

Ryle's The Concept of Mind in 19^9 and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations in 1953, Anglo-American philosophy of mind or phi-

losophical psychology has increasingly focused on examination of the

concept of action and such related concepts as motive, desire, purpose
These investigations of the relationship between

and intention.

thought and action, the connections between belief and emotion, the

apparent incompatibility between causal, mechanistic explanations of
human behavior and the purposive view of human behavior reflected in

ordinary language and everyday accounts of human activity, and other
central topics and issues have identified significant conceptual problems in the standard Cartesian-empiricist account of mind.^

Moreover,

a

number of linguistic philosophers and social theorists

have, building on this work in philosophy of mind, explicitly charged

that there are deep-rooted conceptual confusions embedded in the ex-

planatory models which dominate American social and behavioral science.
Such works as

A.

R.

Louch's Explanation and Human Action
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,

R.

S.

Peter's

250

The Concept of Motivation and Charles Taylor's The Explanation of

Behaviour have challenged established views on causal explanation, the

distinction between causal and teleological explanation, the notion of
a

mechanical theory of human behavior, the distinction between action

and physical motion, and the role of intentionality in human action.^

Although the details of their specific critiques as well as their

alternative accounts of thought and action vary extensively, they have
clearly posed some common and powerful objections to the account of
mind attached to the positivist model of

a

science of politics.

These challenges emerging from linguistic philosophy of mind have

been ignored or summarily dismissed by mainstream political scientists
and theorists, particularly those concerned with the study of political

behavior and political psychology.

Of course, this is hardly surpris-

ing since even recognition of the relevance of such analyses of the

conceptual and philosophical issues concerning thought and action is
precluded by the central assumptions underpinning the dominant conception of theory and explanation in American social science.

Thus, from

the perspective of those who accept this conception, such "armchair

philosophizing" about the use of language, including the concepts used
to classify and characterize thought and action in ordinary discourse,

seems quite irrelevant to the descriptive and explanatory tasks confronting the social scientist.

Much of the explicit as well as implicit resistence to the kind of

challenge advanced by Taylor, Louch and others centers in such

a

re-

jection of the value and significance of linguistic analysis for social
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science.

This rejection of conceptual analysis or linguistic philos-

ophy is itself based on the dominant set of assumptions concerning the
proper boundaries between philosophy and social science.

An example of

one of the more sophisticated versions of this argument is provided by

May Brodbeck's "Explanation, Prediction and Imperfect Knowledge."^
Brodbeck argues that linguistic philosophy is concerned solely with the

study of linguistic expressions as these are used in the process of
communication, whereas the social scientist is principally concerned

with the task of describing "the real world" and is only concerned with
the conceptual problems which relate to the connections between his de-

scriptive concepts and this world.

The challenges to the dominant

model of scientific explanation which are grounded in linguistic phi-

losophy are flawed because linguistic philosophy itself is preoccupied
with the study of ordinary language as

a

medium for communicating with

other persons and neglects the study of language as it is used to

describe the world.
Utilizing the distinction between reference and significance,
Brodbeck charges that the Wittgensteinian "meaning as use" doctrine has
blurred the fundamental distinction between the concepts we use, which
are "contributions of the mind," and "what is not such
but independently of the way we speak about it, is

the world goes."^

a

a

contribution,

matter of the way

Thus, by ignoring the descriptive tasks which are

fundamental to language, the practioners of linguistic analysis ignore
"^
"the world that language is supposed to be about.

As a result,

lin-

unravel an
guistic theorists become entrapped in an unending attempt to

:
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infinite regress of related concepts or meanings which reveals nothing
about the basic ties between our concepts and the real world.

Brodbeck is here attempting to defend the covering law model of
explanation against arguments advanced by both its "moderate" and
"extremist" linguistic critics.

At the center of her defense is the

claim
Our concepts may be open textured but the world is not.
If language is to be descriptive, it must indicate what
there is in the world, no matter how variably we talk

about it.^
Thus, the real debate between Brodbeck and these linguistic critics of
the dominant model of explanation is not, as she contends, over the

primacy of the descriptive or the communicative functions of language.
Rather, the fundamental disagreements concern the conceptions of lan-

guage, meaning, knowledge and reality which underpin the account of de-

scription she presents.

Brodbeck'

s

case rests upon the notion of an

independent and objective reality or set of facts and the view that we
can provide

a

complete, neutral record or description of these facts

which is independent of our interpretation, conceptualization and classification of these facts.

That is, of course, essentially the same

conception of "the given" which empiricist philosophers have typically
made the foundation of scientific objectivity and scientific knowledge.
As Hampshire has noted,

this "view of 'the facts' which are al-

ready individuated in reality independently of our reference to them

..."

has been extensively challenged and abandoned by Anglo-American
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philosophers since the work of Russell and the early Wittgenstein.

In

general, linguistic philosophers hold that we simply cannot make the
kind of sharp distinction between the facts and our conceptualization
or interpretation of the facts which underpins Brodbeck's account of

description.

Yet, as A.

J.

Ayer

,

who was at one time one of the

leading advocates of the logical positivist program and is certainly
not a radical critic of the empiricist framework, points out, this

certainly does not mean that linguistic philosophy is not concerned
with the real world or the relationship between language and the world:
I have argued that what passes for linguistic philosophy, at least as it is represented in the works of such
authors as Wittgenstein and Ryle, is concerned with language only to the extent that a study of language is
inseparable from a study of the facts which it is used

to describe.^

Ayer argues that what linguistic philosophy has inherited from

Wittgenstein is "a realization of the active part that language plays
in the constitution of the facts" and not a neglect of the real world

or of the descriptive tasks of language.

9

Much of recent analytic philosophy has followed Wittgenstein in

attempting to understand the structure of our thought about the world

through investigation of the structure of our language.

In general

terms, linguistic philosophers hold that, given that we are human

beings, our reality is necessarily

a

conceptual reality.

They focus on

the actual use of linguistic expressions and concepts because these

constitute "the sole and essential point of contact" between human
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beings and the reality which they wish to describe and understand.
While they do not maintain that language is prior to all experience of
this reality, linguistic philosophers generally emphasize that language
is

prior to our characterization and interpretation of experience.''^
Of course, this does not mean that linguistic philosophers are in

agreement concerning what, if anything, such investigations of our language can possibly contribute to the study of society or politics or,

more generally, concerning the relationship between philosophy and social science.

Indeed, there is extensive disagreement among contempo-

rary linguistic philosophers regarding the nature, tasks and methods of

philosophy itself, and there is no single "school" of linguistic philosophy unified by

a

common program and approach.

Certainly, all the

variants of linguistic philosophy do have common roots in the so-called
"linguistic turn," characterized by

a

prevailing concern with inves-

tigation of language as the most promising path toward clarifying,
resolving, dissolving or reformulating philosophical problems.

Richard

Rorty characterizes linguistic philosophy in general terms as:
the view that philosophical problems are problems
which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming
language, or by understanding more about the language we
.

.

.

""^

presently use

.

But this characterization itself points to what is widely con-

sidered

a

central dividing line in recent analytic philosophy, namely

that between ideal language philosophy, which attempts to salvage part
an
of the program of reductive analysis by reformulating it as

language
attempted construction of an artificial language, and ordinary
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philosophy, which stresses description of actual linguistic usage.
addition, there are

a

In

number of other controversies and divisions

within recent linguistic philosophy which are not fully captured in
this general distinction between ideal language philosophy and ordinary

language philosophy.

Of these controversies, one of the most signi-

ficant concerns whether analysis of language is only useful in clearing

away the misconceptions and difficulties attributed to traditional

statements of philosophical issues or can also provide some insight
into the structure of the world which language is used to describe.

In

short, there is no concensus among linguistic philosophers concerning
the basic nature and tasks of the enterprise of philosophy, let alone
the relationship between philosophy and social science.

However, it certainly would be inaccurate to construct

a

general

account of the linguistic view of the relationship between philosophy
and social science on the basis of a generalization which assimilates
all the various linguistic approaches and techniques to either

of "therapeutic positivism" or

a

a

form

preoccupation with "very detailed and

minute studies of ordinary language."

14

Therapeutic positivism,

a

doctrine which has been attributed to Ryle, Wittgenstein and Waisman,
portrays philosophical questions as merely conceptual puzzles or mis-

understandings of language which will disappear with careful analysis
of ordinary language and the elimination of confusing and ambiguous use
of words.

The detailed study of ordinary language, an approach

usually identified with Austin, reflects not simply an interest in
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resolving philosophical puzzles, but an interest "in the study of language for its own sake."''^

Given such views, it definitely seems that the possible connections between philosophy and social science are quite limited.

This is

so not only because the nature and scope of philosophical concerns seem
so narrow here but also because such positions seem to assume that

"ordinary language is in order, just as it is" and to make ordinary
language the final court of appeal in all philosophical and conceptual
'^'^

disputes

.

But all linguistic philosophy does not fit into such
tion.

a

formula-

Certain philosophers working in the linguistic tradition speci-

fically acknowledge that philosophers must do more than simply describe
the use of various linguistic expressions.

Peter Strawson,

for ex-

ample, has stated:
for the old, limited and theory-ridden programme of
analysis, we are to substitute a different aim; that of
coming to understand philosophically puzzling concepts
by carefully and accurately noting the ways in which the
related linguistic expressions are actually used in
Of course, not all features of these exdiscourse.
pressions will be relevant to the philosopher's task.
It is his special skill to discern which are relevant,
So,

and how they are relevant.

1

g

Strawson emphasizes that he is not simply concerned with how our

conceptual equipment functions, but also and more importantly, with why
it functions in the ways that it does.

This latter question of why we

use our language in certain ways is considered more central to the phi-

losophers task because it concerns, again in Strawson' s words, "how the
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nature of our thinking is rooted in the nature of the world and in our
own natures.

"^^

Hampshire advances
essential task.

a

similar conception of the philosopher's

He, much like Strawson,

suggests that linguistic phi-

losophers can move beyond analysis of our present linguistic practices
and attempt to discover the necessary conditions for the possibility of

language itself.

This enterprise is portrayed as simply a return to

what has been the central question in "the critical stage of philosophy

since Kant:"
what are the conditions necessary for making
statements and for making any recognizable distinctions
.

.

.

between truth and falsity in referring to reality.

20

Both Hampshire and Strawson are concerned with exhibiting those fea-

tures of language which are necessary if true statements are to be

distinguished from false statements as opposed to those features which
belong to particular languages.

21

This is certainly not the only or even the dominant characteri-

zation of the goals and methods of linguistic philosophy, and it is

certainly not above challenge or controversy.

22

However, this ap-

proach, especially as developed by Hampshire, is very important and

merits the attention of social theorists concerned with the problems

relating to the classification and explanation of thought and action.
This work has such significance because it forces critical reexami-

nation of the dominant assumptions concerning knowledge and mind and
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investigates the basic requisites of an adequate account of knowledge
and mind.
In more general terms,

Rorty suggests that such an analysis of the

epistemological difficulties inherent in the spectatorial account of

knowledge is

a

more significant development within analytic philosophy

than the linguistic turn itself.

Its importance lies, of course,

in

the intimate relationship between this spectatorial epistemological

framework and the problems it generates in other fields of philosophy,
such as the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind.

Indeed, as Rorty

points out,
If the traditional "spectatorial" account of knowledge
is overthrown, the account of knowledge which replaces
it will lead to reformulations everywhere else in phiSpecifically,
losophy, particularly in metaphilosophy .

the contrast between "science" and "philosophy"

may come to seem artificial and pointless.

.

.

.

23

Certainly, as we shall see, Hampshire makes no such grade-scale
claims based upon his wide-ranging analyses of questions concerning

identification, classification, description, knowledge, mind and action.

In

fact, he specifically cautions that "we have no final insight

into the essence of man and of the mind, we have no final insight into
the essence of philosophy.

..."

Yet, he does set out an alterna-

tive account of knowledge and mind and examines the implications of
this alternative philosophical framework for moral theory, political

theory and social science.

Hampshire's and Strawson's analyses of the architectonic features
of our conceptual system share

a

common starting point and reach

"
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strikingly similar conclusions.

Strawson's Individuals begins with an

examination of the conditions which must hold if identifying references
to particulars can be made and understood in our discourse.

heading of "indentif ication of particulars," he focuses on
situation in which
and

a

a

speaker makes

a

reference to

a

Under the
a

speech

particular or thing

listener is able to identify this same particular or thing, and

investigates the criteria and tests used for such "hearer's identif ication

.

25

Later in his argument, the term reidentif ication is used to dis-

tinguish the kind of case in which one identifies

a

particular thing

encountered or described on one occasion as being "the same" as that

encountered or described on another occasion.

26

His essay explores the

criteria which are necessary in order to determine whether or not
something is "the same" in these two kinds of cases and examines the
basic facts or conditions which we must allow for in our use of the

term 'identify.'

Strawson argues that the methods and criteria of

identification must allow for "the discontinuities and limits of observation" which are inherent in the basic facts of human experience.
Among such facts are the follov;ing:
that the field of our observation is limited; that
That is to say they must
we go to sleep; that we move.
allow for the facts that we cannot at any moment observe
the whole of the spatial framework we use, that there is
no part of it that we can observe continuously, and that
.

.

.

we ourselves do not occupy a fixed position in it.

27

and
In less systematic and more general terms, Hampshire's Thought

Action also opens with an examination of our ability to identify and
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refer to enduring objects or things in our environment as

a

fundamental

prerequisite of our being able to communicate with one another about
the world.

Thus, Hampshire like Strawson follows Wittgenstein in

focusing on language as

a

means of singling out and directing attention

to certain elements of reality and experience.

Rejecting the notion

that language simply mirrors reality, he advances two general rules

which are necessary to correlate verbal signs with recurrent elements
in reality and experience; rules of classification which allow us to

single out certain elements in reality or experience as being "the
same," and rules of identification, which are necessary if we are to

differentiate one element from another.

28

Hampshire also holds that the use of such criteria of classification and identification does not arise simply from the grammar of

particular languages but rather "is

a

necessity in any language what-

ever in which statements are made and contradicted."

29

Moreover, he

agrees that there are certain basic and essential facts about the human

situation which do establish limits on our methods of and criteria for
identifying particulars and, in turn, upon language and thought.

Hampshire's analysis of these facts which must be allowed for in
identification is more difficult to follow because it is tightly woven
into a number of other arguments and theses.

In particular,

he em-

phasizes that we must approach with extreme caution any attempt to

distinguish between the limitations on our ways of talking and thinking
about the world and ourselves which are imposed by the nature of human

261

experience and those which are established by the peculiar set of identifications and classifications embodied in

a

particular language.

Thought and Action attempts to remove from the discussion of our conceptual framework any vestiges of:
the assumption that there must be natural, presocial units already discriminated as the ultimate
subjects of reference in our experience: that social
convention and artificiality enters only at the second
tier of language, resting on a first tier of basic and
natural discrimination which is independent of any
.

.

.

institutions of social life.

30

This, of course, challenges the very basis of the distinction

between what is "natural" and what is "conventional" which has played
such

a

central role in liberal-empiricist accounts of human nature and

experience.

It

is

not reality itself but rather our "practical needs"

and the "grammar of actual languages" that establish the limits on the

variety of objects of reference which we can single out and the variety
of resemblances between objects which we can pick out.

Since our

principles of individuation and classification are acquired through our
language, art and "forms of social life," the possibility of returning
"to

a

state of nature and to an innocent eye" is forever closed, but

the possibility of developing new principles of individuation and clas-

sification and new descriptions of the world and of ourselves remains
forever open.

31

There is then, from the beginning, an important difference between

Hampshire's and Strawson's analyses of the basic features of our

conceptual framework.

Strawson's main concern is with the tasks of
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"descriptive metaphysics" which attempts "to describe the
actual structure of our thought about the world" or "to lay bare
the most general

features of our conceptual system."-^
a

According to Strawson, "there is

massive core of human thinking which has no history.

.

.

,"

a

set of

concepts and categories which are characteristic of the least refined
rather than the most refined forms of thought and discourse but which

constitute "the indispensible core of the conceptual equipment of the
3-3

most sophisticated human beings.

"•^'

His avowed task is to expose the

basic structure and interrelationships of this indispensible core of

our conceptual apparatus which does not lie on the "surface" of our

language but rather is deeply "submerged" within it.
In contrast,

Hampshire does not classify his work as an exercise

in deductive metaphysics and is principally concerned with questions

concerning thought and action.

Since many of the most important con-

cepts we use in discussing and thinking about our beliefs, emotions and

behavior operate at the most sophisticated levels of our conceptual

framework and are undergoing continual evolution, it is clear that our

understanding of this level of language and thought must be primarily
historical in nature.

At the same time,

Hampshire seems to hold with

Strawson that there are certain features of language and thought which
are essential and unchanging because they follow from certain basic

facts about human beings and their situation in the physical and social

world around them.

Analysis of these features constitutes the starting

point in Hampshire's investigation of knowledge and mind.
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Hampshire and Strawson are in general agreement concerning the
basic features of our conceptual framework which are forced upon us by
the nature of human experience and the requirements of communication.
First, since we must locate some persisting and recurrent objects in

order to communicate about the world, reality must be conceived as

consisting of such objects, things or particulars.

In

Hampshire's

words.

Singling out elements in reality as constant objects of
reference is singling out persisting things.
I am in
effect arguing that we must unavoidably think of reality
as consisting of persisting things of different types
and kinds.

Strawson makes the same point in more philosophical language by simply
stating that "our ontology comprises objective particulars."

35

Both

philosophers regard our ability to discriminate and identify persisting
things in our environment not as something contingent and accidental
but rather as a necessary and essential condition of human life.

It

is

thus essential that our general conceptual scheme, with which we dis-

cuss and think about the world, contains such things or particulars as

"historical occurrences, material objects, people and their shadows."
A second,

36

closely related feature of the conceptual scheme through

which we come to terms with the world is the framework of spatial and

temporal relations
the world.

—

a

framework which serves to unify our picture of

Both philosophers consider the spatio-temporal system basic

because it provides us with
each person

a

a

common, unifying framework which gives

definite place or point of reference in his immediate

,
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environment and assigns each element

a

unique relationship with other

elements in the system, including individual persons.

According to

Strawson, it is only against the background of this "framework of our

knowledge of the world and its history" that we can move beyond "storyrelative" identification of particulars.

^7

He concludes that:

particular-identification in general rests ultimately on the possibility of locating the particular
things we speak of in a single unified spatio-temporal
.

.

.

system.

38

This does not simply mean that we as speakers occasionally use

dating and placing references in our discourse about the world, but
rather that the spatio-temporal framework "always and necessarily"

underpins our attempts to identify and add new particulars to our conceptual scheme.

This framework has

a

"particular comprehensiveness and

pervasiveness" which is connected to the nature of human experience and
"our practical requirements in identification."

Thus, the system of

spatial and temporal relations is something more than "a contingent

matter about empirical reality" because it "conditions our whole way of

talking and thinking" and is absolutely central to our conception of
reality.

39

As we have seen, Hampshire emphasizes that our conceptual system
is continually changing as new forms of social life evolve.

However,

as he notes

The world is always open to conceptual re-arrangement.
But the re-arrangement is only the addition of new tiers
of discrimination to a foundation that remains constant:
the recognition of persisting things singled out by
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active observers who have

statable standpoint as

a

objects among other objects.
He like Strawson focuses on the individual speaker's or thinker's place
in the system of spatial and temporal relations as establishing the

frame of reference which conditions our talk and thought about the
world.

Although Hampshire does not investigate the function of the

spatio-temporal framework as carefully and systematically as Strawson,
he clearly assigns a kind of primacy to the "spatio-temporal continuity

which is characteristic of physical things."
elements in reality have

a

He emphasizes that

"history" which accounts for how they come

to be standing in particular relations with an observer.

42

Moreover,

his portrayals of pointing as the natural foundation for reference and

of touch as "the most authoritative of the senses" are extensions of
his belief that the spatio-temporal framework constitutes

part of the constant foundation of our conceptual system.

a

central

43

The third significant feature of our conceptual scheme is that,

from the point of view of particular identification, material objects
and persons rather than sense data or sense impressions constitute the

basic particulars in our ontology.

Hampshire states:

Ordinary physical objects, and more important, persons,
are the plain and unavoidable cases of particular things
that retain their identity through change.
In part,

44

this claim rests on the argument that sense impressions, which

do not meet the identif lability requirements of publicity and obser-

vability, cannot be identified without reference to physical objects or

material bodies.

In

this vein,

Hampshire contends that we can pick
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out, classify and describe our sensations and impressions
only within
the context of

a

language which already provides

fying and referring to physical objects/^

a

means for identi-

Strawson holds

a

similar

view of the "unique and fundamental" role of material bodies in particular identification.

46

Hampshire and Strawson not only maintain that sense impressions
cannot be identified without reference to material bodies, but also
argue that sense impressions, sense data, sensations and other kinds of

"private particulars" exhibit
class of particulars, persons.

"

identif lability
Thus,

it

is

— dependence"

on another

ridiculous to think of

sense impressions as the basic particulars in our conceptual scheme

because we always make at least an implicit reference to

particular

a

person whenever we attempt to pick out or describe private particulars.

Strawson contends that such an implicit reference to

a

particular

individual is "essential to the identif icatory force of demonstrative
phrases referring to private experiences.

Similarly, Hampshire holds

that sensations are more like situations than material objects because

there are no principles of individuation attached to our concepts of
'situation' or 'sensation.'

48

Moreover, it is the unique and funda-

mental role of persons in particular-identification which follows

directly from the nature of our spatio-temporal framework:
unavoidable that any speaker or thinker should
carry with him the idea of referring to at least one
persisting object, namely, himself. With this idea he
carries the idea of himself as an object changing his
relation to constant objects around him, and to objects
He can
around him changing in relation to himself.
therefore attach even his most impressionistic and
It

is
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subjective descriptions to a particular position in
space and time, and because of this there arises the
possibility of incompatible statements referring to the
same subject.
In

sum, Hampshire and Strawson view these features of our concep-

tual scheme

— the

conception of reality as consisting of persisting

things, the framework of spatial and temporal relations, and material

bodies and persons as the basic particulars

— as

essential and basic in

the sense that they are imposed upon us by the nature of human exper-

ience and the requirements of communication.

In other words,

these

features are not accidental or incidental, but rather are necessary and

unavoidable given the nature of man as

a

bodily creature in

a

world of

objects and given that there are certain "necessary feature(s) of any
system of communication in which true statements are distinguished from
false.

..." 50

Of course, this is not to deny that if the world we

confronted in our daily lives was radically different, if human

experience was different, or if human beings were different, our conceptual system itself would have

a

different structure.

Moreover, when Hampshire and Strawson characterize such features
as being "necessary," "unavoidable," or "primitive," they are suggest-

ing neither that such conceptions as material bodies or persons func-

tion as the given terms in an axiomatic system in which all additional

terms are defined in terms of these primitive ones, nor that the conceptions of material bodies and persons be assigned the same kind of

privileged metaphysical and epistemological status granted to sense
impressions in empiricist philosophy.

Rather, such features of our

.
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conceptual scheme are considered unavoidable, necessary and primitive
because they reflect the basic features of human experience and the
shared social interests which condition our attempts to observe and

describe the world, to communicate with other persons, and to act in
the world.

51

Both philosophers hold that the analysis of these necesary features of our conceptual system has important implications for philos-

ophical discussions of perception, knowledge, mind, action and ethics.
However, neither philosopher attempts to derive final and definitive

theories of knowledge and mind from such an analysis.

Hampshire, who

explores the implications of these essential features of our conceptual

scheme much more extensively than Strawson, states that the limits

established by our conceptual framework can be "expressed as truisms
about language as an institution, or as truisms about the human mind in
its relation to the external world."

52

But he immediately cautions:

We cannot claim an absolute and unconditional finality
for these truisms, since the deduction of them is always
But the
a deduction within language as we know it.
deduction only shows that we are not in a position to
describe any alternative forms of communication between
intentional agents which do not exemplify these

truisms
This is clearly not an attempt to deduce ontological conclusions from

linguistic analysis or to develop unchallengable theories of knowledge
and mind on the basis of the study of certain features of our present

conceptual scheme.
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Certainly, both philosophers do suggest that examination
of the

fundamental features of this framework not only exhibits the
central

deficiencies of the empiricist treatment of perception, knowledge,
mind
and action, but also points the continuing efforts to resolve
philos-

ophical problems concerning these topics in

a

certain direction.

It is

Hampshire who offers the more comprehensive and sustained attack on em-

piricist positions, although Strawson's analysis supports his argument
at

several key points.

In addition,

Hampshire explores much more

extensively the alternative accounts of knowledge and mind which begin
to emerge from such an examination of the basic features of our concep-

tual system, but there are again basic similarities between the two

works, particularly between Strawson's analysis of the concept of

person and Hampshire's conception of the unity of thought and action.
The connections which Hampshire sees between this analysis of our

conceptual framework and the central philosophical issues concerning

knowledge and mind are not clear at first glance.
of Thought and Action

,

In the

first chapter

Hampshire raises issues which bear upon phenome-

nalism, sensationalism, idealism, sense data theories, introspection
and numerous other philosophical doctrines.

His approach to these

issues is difficult to follow not only because his general argument

moves rapidly from topic to topic and then back again, but also because
he uses none of the established philosophical terminology which domi-

nates the standard treatments of these problems.

In addition,

he fails

to identify, either in the text or through footnotes, either those phi-

losophical positions which he opposes or those which have influenced,

270

support, or are compatible with his own.

Yet,

it

is clear that one of

the major targets of his criticisms is the portrayal of perception and

knowledge which emerged from classical analysis and logical positivism.
Moreover, despite the frequently noted similarities between Hampshire's

work and that of continental and traditional philosophers,
that his critique of positivist positions is,

upon

a

it

is clear

for the most part built

foundation layed by other philosophers working within the

analytic tradition.
For example, many of the arguments in Thought and Action are

directed against the position known as (linguistic) phenomenalism,
which holds that all statements concerning physical objects are in
principle reducible to or translatable into statements about sense
data.

Hampshire advances

a

number of different arguments against such

an attempted translation of statements about objects into statements

which describe only momentary impressions.

55

But there is certainly no

new ground being broken here, for the phenomenalist account of perception is closely tied to the verif iabil ity theory of meaning and has
been subjected to the same attacks directed against this theory.

Under

the constant pressure of the various criticisms advanced by certain

analytic philosophers, the reducibility claim or translatability thesis
had been almost universally abandoned before the publication of Thought

and Action

.

Of course, Hampshire voices objections not only to this trans-

latability thesis but also to the very conception of sense data and the

s
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so-called certainty claim, the notion that sense data or sense impressions provide an indubitable foundation for knowledge.

But again his

arguments do not depart radically from the general critique of "the

myth of sense data" which has been

a

central theme of recent linguistic

philosophy, resting on the work of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Quine
and others.

The criticisms advanced in Thought and Action are but an

extension of

a

vast literature on phenomenalism which has questioned

the possiblility of constructing

making

a

a

"pure" sense data language or even

"pure" sense datum statement, pointed to the phenomenal ist

'

inability to account for the publicity and persistence of objects, and
noted the phenomenal ist
"

'

s

neglect of the connections between the

fragmentariness" of perception and the perceiver's bodily position and

bodily movements.

57

Hampshire contends that sense data or sense impressions cannot be
identified without reference to the physical objects or events with

which they are associated, presenting

a

version of what Peter Machamer

has labeled "the harmless view of sense data."

Hampsnire in the same category with

N.

R.

58

Hanson,

Machamer places
G.

E.

M.

Anscombe,

William Kneale and Anthony Quinton arguing:
What they all seem to have in common is that their sense
data are not certain and they are not in any sense more
fundamental than physical object seeing. In fact, they
are usually taken as being derivative from the physical
object use of perception verbs and meant to be used in
cases where caution or a particularly specific descrip5Q

tion is called for.-"^

Hampshire is thus but one of

a

number of contemporary analytic

: .
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philosophers who challenge the certainty claim and the special ontological status assigned to sense data which historically provided the

basic appeal of sense data theories.
It is only natural that

Thought and Action should focus so ex-

tensively on discussion of sense data because the most detailed work on
perception and knowledge in recent analytic philosophy is found in the
debates on this topic.
in these

But those philosophers who are deeply immersed

issues find very little in Hampshire's work which contributes

to or advances discussion of the problems surrounding sense data.

analysis concentrates not on setting out

nomenalism or presenting

a

a

His

detailed critique of phe-

strong case for the alternative "harmless"

view of sense data, but rather on exposing the connections between the
doctrines associated with logical positivism and more basic empiricist
assumptions.

The thesis of phenomenalism is thus treated as

a

clear

illustration of the central deficiencies of the empiricist epistemological framework.

It

is

Hampshire's position that the problems which

continually reemerge in empiricist theories of perception and knowledge
can be resolved only through critical reassessment of the basic foun-

dations of such theories and not merely by increased attention to their
details
It

is

for this reason that the major thrust of the arguments in

the first chapter of Thought and Action is directed against the specta-

torial epistemological framework which the early analytic philosophers
took over from the classical empiricists.

states

For example,

Hampshire
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The deepest mistake in empiricist theories of perception, descending from Berkeley and Hume, has been the
representation of human beings as passive observers
receiving impressions from 'outside' of the mind where
the

'outside'

includes their own bodies.

The standard Cartesian-empiricist starting point,

sciousness which is

a

a

dimensionless con-

passive recipient of sense impressions of

"ideas," is attacked as

a

logically inconsistent and totally inadequate

basis for developing coherent accounts of perception and knowledge.
The most fundamental problems embedded within this Cartesian spec-

tatorial framework are revealed by how radically the model of the

disembodied thinker departs from the conception of perception which is

deeply rooted in our conceptual framework.

It

requires that we treat

as matters of contingent fact the very conditions which are essential

to the notion of perception as well as to reference and identification.

Among these essential conditions are the facts that the body is the

medium of perception, that the perceiver has
cupies

a

a

point of view and oc-

definite position in time and space, that

a

person's percep-

tions change as he moves or changes his point of view, that

a

perceiver

can shift his point of view or perceptual field through his control

over his own body, that the perceiver acquires his principles of indi-

viduation and classification in the social context of communication
with other perceivers confronting the same conditions, and that the
perceiver interprets and assesses his perception against "a great bank
of stored background knowledge."

62
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The empiricist starting point of

a

disembodied consciousness which

is a passive recipient of experiences not only cannot satisfy the

conditions of reference and identification which are necessary for
conscious thought, but also removes any consequent account of perception from these same conditions, thereby destroying the most basic

distinctions which are fundamental to any coherent theory of perception.

In

the Cartesian-empiricist framework, the distinction between

perceiver and object of perception collapses entirely, and there is no
point of view from which "here" can be differentiated from "there. "^^
Moreover, it becomes impossible to contrast "the appearance from the

reality" and we can no longer distinguish between genuine perception
and illusion.

64

Finally, because this spectatorial framework ulti-

mately severs the connection between an agent's sense organs, which as
part of his body, fall into the "external" realm, and his purposive

efforts to use and direct them, which fall within the "internal" province of mind, the notion of observation itself collapses entirely.

65

These arguments challenge the basic assumptions which underpin the

empiricist attempt to construct

a

world of persons and objects from

private world of sense data or sense impressions.

a

While this alterna-

tive position does not deny that we acquire our knowledge of the world

through our senses, it does abandon the traditional empiricist thesis
that sense impressions, directly presented to consciousness and in-

dubitable, provide the ultimate foundation for our knowledge of the
external world.

Moreover, it rejects the notion that our experience of
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the external world is some kind of "synthesis of
impressions" presented
to a passive observer.

Any adequate account of knowledge must come to terms with
the
basic conditions of identification and perception, which
establish that

human beings are both observers of and agents in the world or
that perception and action are essentially complementary.

As

Hampshire notes,

even scientific knowledge, which is the least anthropocentric in the

sense that scientific descriptions "make the minimum reference to

standard human interests and to the standpoint of the observer," is the
product of active interference with rather than passive observation of
the natural course of events.

The empiricist account of knowledge

breaks these essential connections between perception and action and

between knowledge and action

—a

break which has radical consequences

throughout the liberal treatment of thought and action.
In addition,

the empiricist conception of knowledge is artificial

and distorted because it treats human knowledge as something which must

somehow transcend the basic facts of human experience and communication.

In particular,

theories of knowledge which begin with the hypo-

thesis of the disembodied thinker do not acknowledge the standpoint of
the perceiver or knower in a world which extends beyond his experience

of it, and whose knowledge of the world is subject to the limitations

imposed by the nature of his perceptual apparatus as well as by the

nature of reality.

This notion of a disembodied consciousness is, in a

sense, a remnant of the traditional metaphysical systems which aim for
a

kind of perfect knowledge transcending human experience, and it
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provides no solid ground for developing an account of knowledge which

acknowledges the very real limits imposed by the human situation
Thought and Action thus offers

a

.

^'^

broad-ranging attack on the

central core of the Cartesian-empiricist epistemological framework

discussed in the second chapter of this essay.

Several other linguis-

tic philosophers, who have examined particular elements of this frame-

work in greater detail, provide, at least in part, support for certain
of Hampshire's arguments.

For example, numerous analytic philosophers

are challenging the Cartesian quest for certain truths as the only

answer to skepticism and are instead reexamining the grounds of

Cartesian skepticism from which empiricist epistemology has traditionally proceeded.
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Moreover, in more general terms, there are marked

similarities between arguments in Thought and Action and

G.

E.

M.

Anscombe's challenge to the prevailing "incorrigibly contemplative

conception of knowledge," John Dewey's criticisms of "the spectatorial
conception of knowledge," and the Hegelian and Marxist critiques of the
spectatorial framework.
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One of the major weaknesses of Thought and Action in particular
and Hampshire's work in general is his failure to make explicit the

linkages between his wide-ranging indictments of positivist and empiripercist philosophical assumptions and the more detailed analyses of

ception and knowledge offered in recent linguistic philosophy or in
or Marxism.
other philosophical traditions such as American pragmatism

critique of the
This failure to marshall supporting evidence for his
the major reasons
Cartesian spectatorial account of knowledge is one of

1

:
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why some critics have dismissed Thought and Action
as
essay on

a

"discursive

group of related concepts" or characterized his treatment
of

a

important topics as neither rational nor analytic, but rather
"deter-

minately literary and at the same time deliberately abstract

"'''^
.

However, such charges are misleading in the sense that Hampshire himself is firmly committed to the standard analytic emphasis on attention
to detail,

step by step analysis, precision and clarity as the fun-

damental basis of philosophical insight. 7
Certainly, Hampshire does suggest, in his introduction to Thought
and Action

,

that

there are purposes and interests which require
that accurate and step-by-step analysis should not
always be preferred to a more general survey and more
.

.

.

tentative opinions, even in philosophy.
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The major contribution of this book and of Hampshire's work in general
is just such a survey which focuses on tracing the connections between

issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics and

political theory.

But this certainly does not mean that Hampshire is

returning to the conception of philosophy as deductive metaphysics or
system building.

He is attempting to set out and reassess the basic

features of the general philosophical framework within which empiricist

theorists have treated these issues.
The major thesis of Hampshire's reevalution of the empiricist

epistemological framework is that any coherent account of perception or

knowledge necessarily starts, not with the notion of

a

Cartesian dis-

embodied consciousness but rather with the conception of

a

"finite
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observer" who perceives the world through his body,
who is

moving body in

a

a

self-

world of objects, who can change "his own situation

and limited range of observation" through his control
over his body,
and who learns to use his perceptual apparatus and body
in the social
.

context of communication with other observers

'^^

The emphasis in this

account of perception and knowledge is upon the conception of point of
view,

around which revolves such distinctions as those between per-

ceiver and the object perceived, sensation and perception, and illusion
and reality.

This notion of point of view is treated as essential not

because it is derived from

a

particular philosophical theory of per-

ception or knowledge but rather because it is

a

central component of

the conceptual framework which is fundamental and necessary to identi-

fication and perception.
One of Hampshire's central points is that even in the most ele-

mentary forms of perception an observer continually makes allowances
and adjustments for the limitations and potential distortions which are

inherent in the particular point of view from which he presently

observes the external world.
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The proper path for resolving the

philosophical problems of perception and knowledge is not by sketching
an abstract reconstruction of this situation which attempts to

guarantee certainty by eliminating point of view from perception, but
rather by carefully examining the manner in which we can and do

compensate for our unavoidably limited point of view.

The philosopher

as well as the observer in everyday situations cannot escape the

constant and never-ending struggle to obtain knowledge which "is more
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and

more objective, and less and less limited by our particular

standpoint.

.

.

.
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Moreover, just as the notion of perception makes no sense without
the conception of point of view, the notion of point of view requires
that observers be able to move about in the world.

7A

Thus, our under-

standing of perception and knowledge is necessarily linked to an analysis of intention and action.

After all, my body is not simply the

medium of perception which occupies

certain position in time and

a

space, it is also "the instrument of my intentions," though an instru-

ment of

a

very special kind since

I

cannot simply lay it aside.
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The

central claim advanced in Hampshire's analysis of the connections

between knowledge and action is that

a

person does not know his own

situation in the world through observation alone because he also has

direct knowledge of what he is doing or trying to do at any given
moment.

The following quotations illustrate this conception of such

"direct knowledge:"
No knowledge is more direct and underived than this
knowledge of the fact of my own intention to move or to
.

''^^

bring about

a

change.

know directly whether
moved of its own accord.
I

I

moved my arm or whether it
My knowledge is not derived

from some perception or sensation

."^^

It is essential to the idea of an action that a person's
knowledge that an action of his own action is not the

conclusion of an inference.

80

with
The empiricist philosophical tradition has standardly begun

receiving ideas
the conception of a disembodied consciousness passively

1
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or impressions and focused on a person's "direct knowledge" of his own

ideas or impressions, which are treated as given and transparent ob-

jects.

contrast, Hampshire's alternative works from

In

a

notion of the

"necessary interconnection of the concepts of action, observation and
personality," and focuses on

a

person's direct, non-inferential, non-

observational knowledge of his own intentions and actions.

8

He con-

tends that it is this direct knowledge of what one is doing and trying
to do which is the fundamental core of one's consciousness and iden-

More generally, analysis of this form of direct self-knowledge

tity.

is crucial to the entire range of topics in philosophy of mind and phi-

losophy of action:

the mind-body relation, personal identity, con-

tinuity of experience, memory, consciousness and self-consciousness,
emotions, desires, the relation between reason and the passions, freedom and responsibility.
This conception of self-knowledge and the alternative "critical

theory of knowledge" which Hampshire advances must be examined in more
detail.

But first, Hampshire's analysis of the connections between

knowledge and action or, more broadly, between thought and action must
be set out.

His thesis is that the major problems in the accounts of

mind, action and freedom advanced by the empiricist philosophers are

directly linked to the deficiencies of this Cartesian spectatorial
framework.

in
Thus, to treat these problems in philosophy of knowledge

mind
complete isolation from the most central issues in philosophy of

severing the crucial
and action would be to follow the empiricists is

connections between knowledge and action.
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The Unity of Thought and ActioP and "the Metaphor of Shadow"

The critique of the empiricist account of mind and the attempt to

outline an alternative conception of mind presented in Thought and
Action are as difficult to follow as the earlier discussions of metaphysical and epistemological issues, for again the argument winds

through

a

complex maze of topics and problems.

However, it is clear

that the main targets of this critique are the central elements of the

conception of mind sketched by the early British empiricists, including
the four themes discussed in the second chapter of this essay:

the

Cartesian account of the mind-body relationship, the view of the contents of consciousness as given and transparent, the conception of
reason as the servant of the passions, and the portrayal of self-know-

ledge as identical in kind to empirical knowledge.

In addition,

it is

again evident that while Hampshire's analysis seems to draw from or

exhibit basic affinities with some of the non-linguistic attacks on the

Cartesian-empiricist theory of mind and consciousness, his own critique
and alternative account of thought and action are developed primarily

against the background of recent linguistic discussions of these issues

.

One of the main themes in Hampshire's analysis of mind is

jection of Cartesian dualism.

a

re-

Of course, this is hardly a revolution-

ary thesis, for linguistic philosophers have been, since the publi-

cation of Ryle's The Concept of Mind

,

criticizing and seeking an al-

ternative to the dualist conception of mind which has long dominated

.

:
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the empiricist tradition.

Yet, while Hampshire's general approach to

the mind-body problem is similar to that of other linguistic
philos-

ophers, there are very real differences between his and the
established

treatments of these topics.

Hampshire sets out these differences most

clearly and comprehensively in his critique of Ryle's influential book.
Ryle attributes the principal weaknesses of "the official doc-

trine" of mind, which he calls the "dogma of the Ghost in the Machine,"
to the influence of Descartes and other seventeenth century speculative

philosophers.

This "para-mechanical" portrayal of mind rests upon

a

"category mistake" or "family of radical category mistakes" which
represent
the facts of mental life as if they belonged to
one logical type of category (or range of types and
.

.

.

op

categories) when they actually belong to another.
Such category mistakes result from philosophical speculation about the

mind which artificially removes and abstracts mental concepts from
their established use in ordinary discourse.

Although Ryle is not

consistent in establishing the philosophical grounds of his critique,
he,

at certain points,

clearly argues that Descartes' speculative

account of mind conflicts "with the whole body of what we know about

minds when we are not speculating about them" and can be overcome by
focusing on the logical categories and distinctions embedded within our
language
In his review of The Concept of Mind

,

Hampshire makes several

points that set apart his analysis of the Cartesian-empiricist
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dualistic account of mind from Ryle's attack on the dogma of the
"Ghost
within the machine."

In particular,

he argues that "the first cardinal

mistake pervading the book" is Ryle's characterization of the conception of the mind as

a

ghost within

a

machine as

a

doctrine which was

artificially introduced by Descartes in particular and philosophers in
general.

In

fact,

as even a cursory investigation of the historical

development of the concept of mind reveals, the dualist myth is "primitive and natural" and is,

for better of worse,

vocabulary and structure of our languages."

"deeply embedded in the

84

Hampshire writes:
Professor Ryle is here protesting not (as he believes)
against a philosophical theory of mind but against a
universal feature of ordinary language itself namely,
that most of its forms of description have been and are
being evolved by the constant transfer of terms from
application in one kind of context to application in
another, and in particular by the transfer of what were
originally physical descriptions (e.g. "wires and pul
leys," "impulses," "pushes and pulls," "agitations,"
,

etc.) into psychological descriptions.

Because Ryle confuses what is

a

—
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feature of ordinary language with the

particular epistemological and metaphysical claims set out by Descartes
and taken over by the empiricists, he never clearly identifies the

enemy he is fighting, the philosophical battlefield upon which he

chooses to fight, or the philosophical weapons which are appropriate to
the kind of war he is waging.

As a result,

Ryle is ultimately "be-

trayed into using the weapons of his enemy" and adopts central elements
of the very Cartesian-empiricist framework he seeks to destroy.

86
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In the background of Hampshire's analysis of the
mind-body rela-

tionship is

a

constant emphasis on the "firmly dualisitic" structure of

natural languages, which exhibit

a

complex, continually evolving set of

distinctions between the mental and the physical.
not somehow establish

a

Of course, this does

dualistic theory of mind or make it immmune

from philosophical criticism, but it does require that the philosopher

must clearly distinguish between the dualistic aspects of language and
the particular characterization of the relationship between the mental
and the physical presented in the Cartesian-empiricist portrayals of

knowledge and mind.
The basic problem with the Cartesian account of mind and body is
not that it introduces a dualist myth but rather that its characteri-

zation of the relationship between mind and body starts with the spec-

tatorial conception of

a

but passive observer.

It

disembodied consciousness or
is

a

transcendent

for this reason that the Cartesian-empiri-

cist portrayal of mind cannot provide coherent accounts of conscious-

ness, of action, or of the relationship between thought and action.
In contrast,

Hampshire, building on the notion of point of view,

contends that it is the continuing awareness of one's own position in
the world which is the foundation of consciousness and sel f-conscious-

ness.
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A person distinguishes himself from the rest of the world,

in

part, by characterizing his own situation as being "here" rather than

"there."

If he were to think of himself as a Cartesian ego which is

removed from any real situation or position in the world, an individual
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would have no basis for distinguishing between himself and the rest of
the world and would lose all sense of his own identity.
In addition, building on his conception of persons as self-moving

bodies, Hampshire contends that

a

person also distinguishes himself

from other things in the world through his capacity to plan to change
his situation in the world by moving from "here" to "there."

This

ability to initiate such change and to formualte intentions to do so

constitutes "the most unavoidable feature of our consciousness" and
gives each individual "his sense of being in the world."

89

By neglect-

ing this essential feature of human existence, the capacity to plan or
to formulate intentions, the conception of man as

a

disembodied con-

sciousness destroys one of the most fundamental distinctions in our

conceptual scheme, namely that between what
happens to him.

a

person does and what

Ultimately, an individual's search for some kind of

guarantee of his own distinct existence ends not in the Cartesian
cogito but rather in his own references to himself as

purposive movement and intentional action.
It

is,

then, this combination of

a

a

source of

90

person's perceptions of and

beliefs about his own situation and environment plus his immediate

intentions to alter his situation or point of view, the combination of
person as observer and person as agent, which constitutes the foundation of consciousness.^^

By

focusing on this foundation, which has

begin
been completely neglected in the spectatorial framework, we can
of the
to unravel the misleading and confused empiricist treatments

various issues in philosophy of mind.

For example, we will look for
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the continuity of a person's consciousness not, as did
the classical

empiricists, in "some blinding thread of memory running through
the

separate data of consciousness," but rather "within the trajectory
of
action, with its guiding intention.

.

.

."^^

Similarly, we will drop

the efforts to distinguish waking life from sleep and dream-states
on
the basis of passive awareness as opposed to unawareness of the ex-

ternal world and concentrate instead on "the consistent flow of in-

tention into action" which marks the essential difference between

waking experience and dream experience.
In

short,

Hampshire holds that we must reformulate the relation-

ship between thought and action which follows from the Cartesian-em-

piricist portrayal of "pure" thought as something prior to and com-

pletely independent of the use of language or the expression of thought

m

statement or behavior.
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A major element on this attempted reform-

ulation is his rejection of the possibility of making statements about
our ideas or immediate experience which are completely independent of
any bodily conditions.

Throughout his discussions of identification,

perception, knowledge, mind and action, he emphasizes the unique and
special role of

a

person's body in his experience.

is in one sense an "external" object,

Although the body

it is also in another sense not

"external," since the "mind animates, and enters into, the movements
and reactions" of the body.
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A major theme throughout Hampshire's various writings on mind is

this notion of the unity of mind and body which follows from the

.
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conception of action as "a combination of intention and physical movement."
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The constant flow of intention into action is the basis of

this unity of mind and body.

Indeed, Hampshire seems to deny even the

logical possibility of existence in

a

disembodied state, as in the

survival of bodily death:
It

is a necessary,

and not a contingent, truth that my
body has not been removed, physically separated from

me
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This clearly challenges the dominant view of mind, whether por-

trayed as

a

Cartesian mental substance or as

a

Humean series of ex-

periences, as logically distinct from and only contingently related to
the body.

Yet, many of Hampshire's critics complain that here, as

elsewhere, Hampshire simply offers

a

quick overview of issues and

topics which are crucial to analysis of the mind-body relationship

(including the problem of personal identity, Wittgenstein's denial of
the possibility of a private language, the problem of other minds, the

so-called argument from analogy as

a

justification for believing in

other minds, as well as the possibility of disembodied existence) and

fails to examine these complex problems in sufficient detail.
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However, as before, Hampshire's main concern is not the clari-

fication and resolution of these specific problems in philosophy of
mind but rather

a

more general-level assessment of the overall coher-

ence of the empiricist framework within which these topics have been

raised and addressed.

His principal interest here is clearly not with

disembodied
the question of the logical possibility of existence in a
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state.

Instead, his concern is with the proper starting point or

paradigm for raising philosophical questions about thought and action.
Of course, he challenges such an assumption and offers an alter-

native approach to these questions which focuses on the notions of

agency and intentional ity as essential and fundamental dimensions of
our concept of person.

Hampshire's position here is similar to

Strawson's contention that the concept of person is "primitive," meaning that it cannot be analyzed in terms of or reduced to simpler ele-

ments as empiricist philosophers have typically held.

Cn the basis of

his examination of the requirements for identifying particulars,

Strawson argues that the concept of

a

person is "logically prior to

that of an individual consciousness" and cannot be reduced to or under-

stood as either "an embodied ego" or "an animated body."
In

ness or

other words, the conception of
a

99

"pure" individual conscious-

a

"pure" ego, which has functioned as the most basic and fun-

damental unit of analysis in Cartesian-empiricist discussions of mind
and body,

is

itself "a secondary, non-primitive concept" which ulti-

mately must be understood or analyzed in terms of the concept of person.

^"^"^

Although it is possible to conceive of

a

disembodied "person,"

he would lack both bodily sensations and perceptions of the world

around him as well as the power to initiate changes in the world (the
two factors which for both Hampshire and Strawson are absolutley cen-

tral to our conceptions of consciousness and person).

best characterized, Strawson argues, as

make sense of such

a

a

Such

a

being is

"former person," for we can

conception of disembodied existence only against

289

the background of the standard criteria of personal identity which

involve direct and indirect reference to the bodyJ*^^

According to this alternative philosophical perspective, we cannot
resolve the mind-body problem, the problem of personal identity and

related issues until we begin to focus on our public language, in its
depth and not simply its surface structure, rather than the private
"ideas" or experiences of Cartesian egos as the fundamental interface

between

a

person and the world around him.

The search for an alter-

native conception of mind must begin with an investigation of the

conditions under which we do ascribe states of consciousness to ourselves and to others.

Moreover, this investigation will be primarily

concerned with the differences between mental concepts or predicates

which imply that the subject to whom they are attributed is conscious
and physical concepts or predicates which carry no such implication.

One of the principal supports of the conception of mind as some-

thing which is essentially separable from the body or of consciousness
as something which does not require corporeal embodiment was undercut

by Wittgenstein's attack on the notion of ideas, passions, and other

mental contents as given objects which can be directly known through

introspection.

A central aspect of Hampshire's work is an attack on

the still influential "semi-Cartesian" view of the relationship between

mind and body, thought and action, or between feeling and behavior
which pictures persons as first distinguishing and identifying states
of mind, feelings, emotions and desires by their "phenomenological
feel" and then moving on to an independent consideration of the
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"typical manifestations in behaviour" linked to these private
experiences.

102

^

One such enemy is the so-called privileged access doctrine

which portrays mental states as private experiences which are linked
causally and contingently to their behavioral manifestations

Hampshire's appraisal of this doctrine emerges directly from his
analysis of how we actually identify and classify mental contents in

a

language in which true statements can be distinguished from false ones.
As we have seen,

his examination of the essential features of our

conceptual scheme insists upon the logical primacy of the world of
persisting things which can be observed from various points of view.
He holds that this order of dependence which is inherent in our concep-

tual framework determines, at least in part, the "conditions of appli-

cation" attached to our mental concepts.

104

According to this analysis of our conceptual scheme, the order of

dependence in the classification of mental states and behaviors established by the Cartesian-empiricist portrayal of

a

pure ego working

"outwards" from its private "ideas" or experience is mistaken.

Hampshire's position is that

t'-e

order is just the reverse:

our clas-

sifications of different mental states are made on the basis of our

classifications of particular patterns of behavior or expression under
certain sets of circumstances.

This point is made as

a

part of

a

more

general theme which is central to all of Hampshire's work on thought
and action, namely that the "metaphor of 'shadow'" is "peculiarly

appropriate" to dicussion of thought, feeling and other aspects of
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^
mmd.
.
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While he does not deny that "the play of the mind"— those

thoughts, beliefs, feelings and so on which are never expressed in behavior, judgement or statement

— is

real, he cautions:

But any description of it is derived from the description of its natural expression in speech and action, as
a description of the play of shadows is a description of
the movement of some corresponding bodies which are not
necessarily the bodies that cast the shadows.
If we had
not encountered and classified the movement of bodies in
the way that we have, we would not interpret and de-

scribe the play of shadows in the way that we do.^*^^

Although Hampshire discusses this metaphor in only

a

few short

passages in various of his writings, its elements appear throughout all
his work on thought and action.

It

is clearly designed to provide an

alternative image to the spectatorial model of the "solitary thinker,
who has never used his language in communication with others" and the

Cartesian conceptions of "thought as an interior monologue, and of
beliefs forming themselves in the mind, without being expressed."
In part,

107

this conception of the shadow is based upon rejection of the

notions of language as

a

set of labels for given objects and "ideas"

and as an artificial, secondary layer added on to the more basic chain

of ideas which is "pure" thought.

Hampshire's account of mind not only stresses the essential connection between language and thought but also emphasizes that language
has developed within the context of

a

basic need for communication

among people and "instituting and maintaining co-operation and the
forms of social life."^^^

Moreover, it is only at

a

later stage of the

development of language that individuals use language in forms of

^

.

292

thought which are divorced from this communication process and
its
social context.

This revised conception of the relationship between thought and

language is best illustrated by the connection between

expression of it.

Since

a

a

belief and the

belief is essentially something which

person is willing to express or affirm in

a

a

statement, the possibility

of having beliefs depends upon the possibility of expressing them in

statements.

109

In fact,

beings who lacked

a

we could not legitimately attribute beliefs to

language in which their beliefs could be expressed.

Thus, contrary to what the Cartesian-empiricist model of mind assumes.

The expression of a belief is not the inessential act of
clothing it with words; it is the only way of making the
belief definite, as a belief in this statement rather
than that

However, in contrast to the public expression of assent to

belief in

a

a

written or spoken statement, the kind of assent which takes

place only in an agent's own mind and is not communicated remains

a

kind of "shadowy" assent, even to the agent himself:

have to embody my thought, which is in this sense
The question of whether
parasitic upon its expression.
accept it in my own
agree
with,
or
I did or did not
mind, that which you said to me at that moment has a
logical indef initeness that distinguishes it from the
question of whether I actually said "Yes" or "No." The
question of unexpressed agreement could never even have
risen if there had not been the possibility of my saying
My unexpressed agreement simply
"Yes" or "No."
consisted in my disposition to say "Yes," which was for
I

some reason inhibited
In this way,

.

^ ^

an agent's belief that a particular statement is true can

be considered a

"disposition" (as we shall see, Hampshire does not use
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this term in the prevailing manner) which can be inhibited or not, to

publically affirm that statement.
Yet, this is only part of what makes the metaphor of shadow so

appropriate to discussions of mind, for it is both the mental life of
feeling, including sensations, emotions and moods, as well as that of

thought which is "necessarily directed outwards" toward action or ex-

pression.

This is not to deny that there is

a

central difference

between thought and feeling with regard to linguistic expression.

Because of the essential connections between thought and language, an
agent's thoughts can be completed, identified or "given" to another

simply through spoken or written expression of them.

But this does not

hold in the case of feelings, for an agent cannot "give" his feelings
to another by simply describing them, and there is no sure way of

identifying one's feelings by following the established rules of language.

112

At the same time, the metaphor of shadow remains appropriate to

the "inner" life of feelings because

there is still no sure way of identifying recurrent states of consciousness except by some reference to
the recurring situations in which they are enjoyed, and
.

.

.

to the behavior which is their natural expression.
In other words,

113

the shadow metaphor is central to understanding the re-

lationship between an agent's feelings and behavior because the
"inner," private life of feeling is

a

^

"outer," public world of behavior

.

^

development or derivate of the
Our "inner," unexpressed

feelings and other states of mind are, again in

a

certain sense,
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inclinations or dispositions to behave in certain ways which have been
inhibited or cut off from their natural expression.
This view of mental states clearly rests, in part, on the position
that we identify and classify particulars, including private partic-

ulars or states of mind, within

a

conceptual scheme which assigns

logical priority to persisting things.

But,

in addition,

a

the metaphor

of shadow draws upon the linguistic perspective which holds that

a

detailed investigation of the more sophisticated distinctions and clas-

sifications embedded within our vocabulary of feelings and other mental
states necessarily involves examihation of the "forms of life" within

which we learn to use those mental concepts.

As Hampshire states,

Entry into a certain "form of life" is a necessary
background to using and attaching a sense to these
concepts; namely, entry into that adult human form of
life which includes, among other things, the habit of
deliberately controlling the natural expression of
inclination, and includes also a growing knowledge of
1

restraining conventions of speech and behaviour.
Thus, when applied to

a

15

discussion of the development of an indi-

vidual person, the metaphor of shadow emphasizes that part of the

process of becoming an adult is learning to control and inhibit certain
inclinations

.

^

The development of this power of inhibition proceeds

hand in hand with the learning of language and the psychological vo-

cabulary which is embodied within that particular language.

We clearly

or
cannot consider these processes as occurring within the private mind

learns to
secluded life of an autonomous individual because each person

apply this psychological vocabulary in

a

social world where there are

.
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established rules and conventions which frequently conflict
with basic
instinctual urges and inclinations.

Moreover, as in the case of

thought or beliefs which are not expressed in communication,
the "full
inner life" of emotions, feelings and other states of mind which
are
not expressed in behavior is the product of

a

later stage of develop-

ment constituted in this case by the power of intentional inhibition

117

As an illustration, Hampshire outlines three crude stages of

inhibition or internalization in relation to anger:

one moves from

primitive stage, where the natural expression of anger is

a

a

form of

aggressive behavior; then to an intermediate stage where the "abstracted residue of aggressive behaviour remains"

(such as

a

scowl or an

angry glance), but the rest of the behavior is inhibited; and in turn
to a final stage where all the natural behavioral as well as the facial

expressions of anger can be intentionally controlled.
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The main

point here is that the behavior which naturally expresses an emotion or

feeling may be inhibited or not, but the behavior remains intrinsic to
and "is originally constitutive" of that particular emotion.

thus

a

1

1

9

It

is

mistake to view the expressive behavior as something which is

merely extrinsic to, added to, or correlated with the particular emotion or feeling in question.

An important part of the metaphor of sha-

dow is Hampshire's view that our entire psychological vocabulary is
founded on such essential linkages between inner feelings and certain
natural, standard patterns of behavior or expression.

120
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Yet, although Hampshire's account of the relationship between

thought and action treats the internal life of the mind as

a

shadowy

counterpart to the public world of language and behavior, he rejects
the kind of behavioral position which Ryle and other linguistic theo-

rists have attempted to substitute for Cartesian dualism.

In fact,

the

metaphor of shadow is an attempt to point to "a possible middle way"
between Cartesian dualism and the behavioralist reduction of "that
which is distinctively mental to its overt behavioral expression."
In

part, his account of thought and action rests upon the linguistic

critique of the Cartesian notion that feelings, emotions, desires and
mental states are inner occurrences which can be differentiated from
one another on the basis of their felt qualities.

At the same time,

the metaphor of shadow rejects the behavioralist alternative which

holds that every psychological concept designates no mental processes
or occurrences but rather only

a

pattern of behaviors or dispositions

to behave in certain ways.
In more positive terms,

Hampshire's account of thought and action

is constructed upon his analysis of our conceptual structure, parti-

cularly the differences in the conditions of application attached to
mental concepts and those attached to physical concepts.

Beyond this,

he follows Wittgenstein in holding that we must ultimately examine the

"forms of life" in which we learn to use our mental concepts.

Finally,

throughout his work on thought and action, Hampshire attempts to draw
upon the insights of Freudian psychology and explores the connections

between the concepts used in ordinary language accounts of mind and
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action and the Freudian account of mind and behavior.

In this view,

the examination of the use of mental concepts is only part of the phi-

losopher's concern for it is also part of his task:

... to explore ways of recovering for attention those
phenomena of the inner experience which are partly, or
even wholly, left out of account in the commonplace explanatory scheme.
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In short, Hampshire's account of mind is an attempt to find a middle

position between the Cartesian privileged access doctrine and the be-

havioralist open access doctrine, principally by building on

a

com-

bination of linguistic philosophy and Freudian psychology.

Hampshire's attempt to move from the Cartesian and behavioralist

models of mind to this alternative is evident throughout his analyses
of various mental concepts, which draw heavily on recent linguistic

critiques of the classical empiricist assumptions concerning mind and
action.

Starting with the notions of pleasure and pain, which have

been treated throughout the empiricist tradition as the ultimate de-

terminants of human behavior, Hampshire challenges the special emphasis
still frequently given to the concept of pain by linguistic philos-

ophers when they examine mental terms and the problems inherent in our
attempts to characterize mental states and processes.
pain sensation seems to be

a
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Certainly, a

phenomenon which we passively experience,

which is fully transparent to the person experiencing it and which

clearly belongs to the "inner" private world as opposed to the "outer"
public world.

It

might seem then that the word pain is simply

a

occurrence.
for a particular kind of inner sensation, feeling, or

label
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However, both 'pain,' which applies to sensations, and 'pleasure,'
which applies to

a

more complex range of states of mind and feelings,

are "special cases" because they imply that the person to whom they are

attributed has

a

reason for acting, and this implication is part of the

meaning of these concepts.

Thus, it would not make sense for

a

person to characterize something as pleasurable and deny that he had
any reason to seek or pursue it.

Moreover, an agent who makes a first

person report that he is in pain may be in somewhat of

a

privileged

position in making this claim, but his statement conveys little specific information except that he has

a

reason or inclination to avoid

whatever it is that he is now experiencing.

According to Hampshire,

To be in pain is to be disposed or inclined to react
with some movement of avoidance, although the notion may
The feeling is inconceivable
be inhibited at will.
without the tendency to action, and the action is a

natural expression of the feeling.

126

Although the behavioralist position correctly captures this notion
of pains and pleasures as dispositions of avoidance and attraction, it

maintains that these patterns of avoidance and attraction can be identified and described solely on the basis of objective, scientific

observation of behavior.

In contrast,

the perspective Hampshire adopts

is one which emphasizes that we learn how to apply and use our sen-

sation words such as 'pain' neither as detached observers of our own
and other people's behavior nor as Cartesian egos introspecting our

inner "ideas" or experience.

Rather, we learn to use such concepts in

our basic
the context of our attempts as intentional agents to satisfy
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needs and interests in

a

world of persisting objects and in constant

interaction and communication with other intentional agents.

''^'^

As

Pitkin states in explaining Wittgenstein's view of pain and other

sensation words:
Talk about pain occurs among human beings who experience
and express pain and respond to it, in contexts involving such activities as comforting, helping,
apologizing, but also warning, threatening, punishing,
gloating.
Part of what we learn in learning that pain
is, is that those in pain are (to be) comforted, gloated
over, and the like, and that we ourselves can expect
such responses to indications of our pain.

1

PR

These themes are, for the most part, implicit in Hampshire's

discussion of sensations rather than expressly defended, but they
constitute important background elements in his critiques of classical
empiricist and behavioralist accounts of mind.

More explicit and

detailed indictments of empiricist assumptions concerning mind emerge
as he moves from discussion of sensations to consideration of more

complex and "higher" mental states.

One of the central deficiencies

commonly found in the various accounts of mind advanced within the empiricist tradition is the focus on sensations, particularly pain and
pleasure, as either representative of or as completely determining the

other mental states.

Building upon Spinoza's distinction between

active and passive states, Hampshire maintains that there is

a

broad-

ranging spectrum of mental states which cannot be adequately classified
or characterized in this way.
At one end of this continuum are the sensations and "blind

passions" which happen to

a

person or he passively experiences and
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which "do not require an appropriate object."^^
are,

These mental states

in a sense, given and transparent to the person experiencing them

and thus seem to fit the characterization provided by the empiricist

account of mind.

Yet,

at the other end of this spectrum are "active

thinking, which is constituted as such by the requirement of appro-

priateness in its objects," and those states of mind which are thoughtdependent, or at least in part, products of an agent's thought processes.
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^
These thought-dependent mental states are neither given,

for they are altered with changes in thought, nor transparent, for the

person may very well be unsure or confused about his own mental states
if his thoughts are themselves confused.

Hampshire's use of this distinction between active and passive
states of mind does not commit him to Spinoza's thesis that an agent
can systematically and completely free himself from the influence of

passive mental states and be left with only those mental states and
processes which are the product of his rational beliefs.
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His ac-

count of mind allows room for the kind of thought-dependent mental
states which emerge through such thought processes as imagination,
fantasy, day dreams or faith rather than what is properly characterized
as belief.

Moreover, there are those cases where
that

a

a

person comes to believe

particular mental state is inappropriate or irrational, but

remains under the sway of it.

Hampshire offers the example of someone

who comes to believe that his fear of darkness is groundless, that

darkness offers no real harm or threat, but he remains "a passive
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victim of his fear."

His fear of the dark may be thought-dependent in

ways that would be of interest to his psychoanalyst, but it is cer-

tainly not belief-dependent:
the fear is not in this case constituted by a
belief, e.g. the belief that the object feared is dan.

.

.

gerous, but by
Thus,

a

fantasy or imagination.

.^^^
.

.

although Hampshire does not always clearly differentiate between

thought-dependent and belief-dependent mental states, he does view the
latter as

a

subset of the former.

However, this is

a

very important subset, for examination of such

belief-dependent or "belief-impregnated" mental states is crucial to
achieving an adequate understanding of mind.

For example, in focusing

on the various human emotions, there are clearly those cases, such as

person who is infatuated with another, where the mental state is

of "passive emotion" which happens to or "descends" upon him.

1
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a

a

kind
Yet,

many of the most important emotion concepts which we use in describing
human motivation and behavior are not of this kind but rather are

belief-dependent.

Among such belief-dependent emotions are resentment,

gratitude, remorse, regret, shame, confidence, hope and discouragement.

Such belief-dependent emotions cannot be identified and distin-

guished from one another either by introspecting some inner feeling or
sensation as the Cartesian position supposes or by observing certain
patterns of behavior as the behavioralist position requires.

In

order

to understand belief-dependent mental states, one must focus not only

on felt inclinations or dispositions to behave in certain ways, but

:
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also upon those beliefs which comprise

a

central element in the defi-

nitions of such states.
For example, the emotion of resentment is neither

sation nor simply

a

disposition to behave in

rather is necessarily connected to
liefs.

a

a

a

unique sen-

certain manner but

particular belief or set of be-

To attribute the emotion of resentment to someone is to claim

that he believes that he has been wronged in relation to an established
set of conventions governing interpersonal relationships.

1
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If this

person comes to believe that what he originally interpreted as such
wrong was the result of

havior or

a

a

a

misunderstanding of another's motives or be-

misreading of unfamiliar customs and practices, his emo-

tional state changes as well.

Speaking more generally, Hampshire

states
If one is convinced that one's regret, shame, discouragement, disapproval, hope, confidence, admiration, are
utterly inappropriate to their objects, the state of
mind must disappear, even if some lingering affect,
pleasant or unpleasant, still associated with the ori-

ginal object, remains.

Hampshire's analysis of the concept of desire also makes use of
this distinction between active and passive mental states in attempting
to plot a middle course between Cartesian and behavioralist theories of

mind.

Of course,

as he recognizes,

'desire' is not an essentially

belief-dependent concept as are the more sophisticated emotion concepts
like 'resentment.'

We can and do ascribe desires to animals or infants

nor any
who have neither a language in which to formulate their desires
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beliefs about their desires.

Since "desire presupposes only the ca-

pacity to act and to feel," as long as it acknowledges that desires are
linked to behavior as well as to the sensations of pleasure and pain,
the empiricist view of mind can provide

a

fairly adequate account of

the identification and classification of the non-thought-dependent

kinds of desires such as those arising from bodily needs.

However, the Cartesian and behavioralist portrayals of desire fare

much worse when one begins to consider the problems confronted in the

identification and classification of the desires of agents who are able
to communicate about their desires and have the capacity to reflect

upon, criticize and raise questions about their desires.

The power to

communicate and to reflect self-consciously upon one's desires at any
given point in time necessarily extends the range of potential desires
and wants tremendously.

This is so not only because certain of our

desires are thought-dependent or belief-dependent and could not arise
if we did not have the capacity of rational thought, but also because

self-conscious human beings can formulate

a

certain of their present desires and wants.

desire to change or modify
As

Hampshire points out.

One's desire to act in certain ways becomes something
that one may reflect upon, criticise, and abandon,
because of the criticism, and not merely something that
Desires do not only
one has, as one has a sensation.
occur; they may also be formed as the outcome of a
process of criticism.
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Because fully developed human beings, in contrast to animals and
they
infants, can reflect upon, evaluate and criticize their desires,
kind of
can intentionally alter their desires and therefore assume a
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responsibility for their desires. "°

Of couse

,

this does not mean that

all desires are belief-dependent or even alterable through

conscious reflection and criticism.

In

a

process of

fact, one of the major themes

in Hampshire's account of mind is that the desires of a human being are

frequently unconscious, confused, ambiguous or conflicting.

Yet,

failure to differentiate between those desires which are belief-

dependent and those which are not, or between those desires which are

characteristic of language users and conscious agents as opposed to
animals and infants, remains

a

fundamental deficiency in the various

empiricist accounts of mind.
From this brief summary of Hampshire's discussion of desires and
other states of mind, it is clear that his conception of belief-

dependent mental states not only challenges the Cartesian treatment of

mental contents as given and transparent occurrences but also presents
the behavioralist account of mind with some real difficulties.

Since

some desires are dependent upon an agent's beliefs, which if altered

change the desires themselves, these belief-dependent desires cannot be
defined simply in terms of behavioral criteria.

In addition,

there is

always the possibility that an observer can make an error in character-

izing those beliefs or thoughts which enter into an agent's desires and

thereby misrepresent his desires, his motivation, and his behavior.
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This is but one way in which the explanation of human thought and

action is radically different from explaining the behavior of animals
or the movement of physical bodies.

Any approach to the study of human

behavior resting upon this essentially empiricist characterization of

1

.
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desires, emotions and other mental states inevitably
neglects and

ultimately cannot account for this difference.
Yet, while it is clear that Hampshire perceives these
points as

fundamental objections to the behavioralist theory of mind, it seems
that his own alternative account of mind shares certain of the
same

basic features with the behavioralist view.

After all, his shadow

metapnor certainly stresses the primacy of the public and therefore
observable or audible expressions of belief and feeling.
seems to adopt what is essentially

a

In fact,

he

dispositional treatment of beliefs

and feelings in his account of the shadowy internal life of the

mind

However, although Hampshire frequently uses the term 'disposition'
in his

analysis of mental concepts, he does not use this term in the

same way as it is used by other linguistic philosophers or psychologists.

The dominant use of 'disposition' does remain tied to the dis-

positional account of mental concepts which has been, within the empiricist tradition, the most popular alternative to the discredited
classical empiricist conception of mental concepts as labels for introspectable "inner" experiences.

Hampshire rejects this dispositional

or behavioralist account of mind as but a modified version of the

mechanistic classical empiricist model of mind which portrays the mind
as an association of "ideas" governed by the same kind of laws we find
1

in the physical sciences.

4

Thus, while in

a

sense the behavioralist

account of mind is an alternative to Cartesian-empiricist dualism, it

.
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fails to provide

a

viable alternative because it continues to incor-

porate fundamental elements of the Cartesian-empiricist framework.
The contrast between Hampshire's account of mind and the behavioral or dispositional treatment of mind is most systematically layed
out in Hampshire's critique of Ryle's attempted move to

logical behavioralism.

a

type of

Ryle contends that many of the "cardinal con-

cepts" which we use to describe thought and action are actually "dis-

positional" concepts and not, as they have been treated under the

privileged access doctrine, "episodic" concepts.

The myth of the ghost

in the machine is thus linked to a mistaken treatment of hypothetical

or quasi-hypothetical statements about human dispositions as if they

were categorical statements about private occurrences.

Ryle argues:

when we characterize people by mental predicates,
we are not making untestable inferences to any ghostly
processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we
are debarred from visiting; we are describing the ways
in which those people conduct parts of their predomi.

.

.

nantly public behavior.
In other words,

1

42

there is nothing in the "inner life" of the mind which

is unique and specifically "inner" and moreover,

there is nothing

particularly significant about those aspects of our mental life which
remain "inner" because they are never expressed in behavior or state,

ment

143

Certainly, Ryle acknowledges that the various mental concepts

which are of central concern to the philosopher and psychologist are
not "single-track" dispositions, but rather highly "generic"

dispositions which are indefinitely "heterogeneous" and cannot be
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characterized in

a

single type of action or reaction.

Accordingly, we

must avoid the "epistemological trap" of expecting concepts like 'know'
and 'believe'

to represent

"one-pattern intellectual processes," and

acknowledge that they like other important mental concepts "signify
abilities, tendencies or proneness to do, not things of one unique
kind, but things of lots of different kinds. "^^^

Yet,

although the

terms we use to characterize human dispositions are typically more
complex, they have the same basic structure as those dispositional

concepts which we use in describing animal behavior or physical
processes.

Concepts like know, believe, aspire, proud, clever and

humorous which we use to describe thought and action are no different
in

structure and function from such concepts as brittle, magnetised,

soluble and hard which we use to describe the physical world.
As

1

45

Ryle makes clear, the behavioral or dispositional analysis of

mental states rests on the claim that to attribute

character trait to someone is to make

a

a

mental state or

set of hypothetical statements

about that person's behavior under certain circumstances.
trast, Hampshire argues that it is

a
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In con-

mistake to treat statements about

human dispositions and descriptions of character as such hypothetical
or quasi-hypothetical statements.

Statements about human dispositions

are radically different from statements concerning the "dispositional

properties" of material objects (e.g., soluble in aqua regia).

For

example, while the statement that something is soluble in aqua regia
does not carry the implication that the object or material has ever
been dissolved in aqua regia, the statement that someone is generous
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does carry the implication that the person actually has acted in a

generous manner on certain appropriate occassions. 47
1

In addition,

whereas the dispositional properties of material ob-

jects are defined in terms of definite and specific reactions or events

which occur under carefully prescribed conditions, the various incidents or behaviors which might be considered manifestations of

ticular human disposition are "essentially various."

a

par-

The difficulty

here is not simply that human dispositions are more complex and the

variables affecting behavior cannot be controlled as in the laboratory,
but rather that the concepts used to characterize human dispositions

remain "essentially vague, summary, interpretive and indeterminate."
It

is not just that the most

148

important human dispositions can be ex-

pressed in an almost infinite variety of different behaviors, but more

importantly that our understanding of human dispositions is different
in kind from our understanding of dispositional properties.

A state-

ment about human dispositions or character is "a summary and inter-

pretive statement of
a

a

tendency in human behavior and calculation," not

hypothetical statement about dispositional properties.

149

Although the conscious mind must be, given our present understandof
ing of it, treated "as, at least in part, a vastly complicated set

dispositions of different orders of complexity," such mental dispositions,

must be inin contrast to physical dispositional properties,

terpreted genetically or historically

.

We cannot at the present,

remains open,
even though the theoretical possibility of doing so

dispositions,"
extend the "scheme of past states determining future
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which we use in explaining the development of the body or other physical processes, to explain the development of human dispositions,

emotions and character.

151

Of course, there are certain basic dispositions and character

traits which arise from primitive satisfactions or frustrations of

fundamental instinctual needs and which continue to influence

a

per-

son's present behavior and his immediate dispositions to behave in

certain ways.

152

However, both the acquisition of further inclinations

or dispositions as well as the capcity to inhibit basic inclinations

are inextricably tied to

a

child's imitation of adult .behavior

,

the

learning of language and development of powers of communication, the

emergence of intentional states of mind, and the development of conscious memory.
We cannot specify the influence of primitive dispositions and

character traits on the continuing acquisition of dispositions and on
person's immediate

subsequent behavior or specify the influence of

a

dispositions on his actions unless we utilize

model of mind which

a

acknowledges these central components in the development of self-consciousness and of the power of reflective choice.

Such

a

conception of

mind stresses the use of memory, reflection and other powers of mind in

altering, modifying, or resisting the pattern of existing desires, dis-

positions, inclinations and so on which have in the past influenced
person's behavior.

a

The mechanistic account of mind, in both its clas-

to setsical empiricist and behavioralist forms, remains an obstacle

ting out this kind of alternative model of mind.
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Hampshire argues that two of the most important elements in this
alternative account of mind are Spinoza's distinction between the

passive and active sides of mind and Freud's analysis of projection,
repression, displacement, and so on in the resolution of mental conflict.

Moreover, he suggests that the substitution of

a

scheme of

explanation which stresses the roles of memory, reflection and choice
for the mechanistic, empiricist scheme of explanation remains in its

formative stages and requires much additional analysis before we can

fully realize its implications.

15"^

Although Hampshire nowhere presents

final and complete version

a

of such an interpretive account of human dispositions or of mind, his

entire effort to reformulate the relationship between thought and action is an attempt to outline the general direction that this refor-

mulation must take.

Near the beginning of his second chapter, "In-

tention and Action," in Thought and Action

,

he argues that we must set

out new distinctions in order to rectify the confused treatment of the

opposition between thought and action.

He then starts by stating:

shall assume that we can distinguish, in any activity
in which we are engaged, the predominant point or purAt any time, when a man
pose or end of that activity.
is awake and conscious, there is at least one, and gen
erally more than one, answer that he would give to the
154
I

question

— 'What

Furthermore, there is

are you doing?'
a

"logical connection" between what

thinks he is doing and what he intends to do, for

a

a

person

person cannot do

something intentionally without in some sense knowing what it is that
he is doing.

It

is

in fact

intentionality which constitutes the

"
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essential difference between human action and animal behavior, and it
is the concept of intention which is absolutely central to understand-

ing the relation between thought and action, the mind-body relation,

dispositional concepts and other mental concepts, and the other major
topics revolving around mind and action. 156
In

addition to this emphasis on intention,

a

second principal

theme in this attempted reformulation of the connections between
thought and action is that of the indeterminate nature of the concept
of action.

Focusing on the concept of action as it is used in ordinary

discourse, Hampshire contends that there are certain features which are

standardly considered essential to action:

an action is something a

person does rather than something which happens to him and is, therein some sense,

fore,

a

product of his will; an action must be iden-

tified according to our temporal and spatial system, it is done at some

particular time and in

a

particular place; and an action, as opposed to

the shadowy life of the mind, "constitutes some recognisable change in

the world

.

157

But these and other such criteria which might be set out are not
exact,

and the action remains indeterminate in

a

fundamental sense.

Since there are no atomic actions just as there are no atomic facts,
the problem we face in describing actions is parallel to that which we

confront in our attempts to describe the world of objects.
essential features of

a

158

The

particular action are not preselected and

identified for us, but rather must be distinguished and identified

according to the language and classif icatory scheme we use.

An action

.
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is something which invites a description,

and there is always the

possibility that different, even competing or contradictory description
can be given of the same action.

addition, we cannot make the concept of action any more de-

In

terminate by limiting ourselves to those criteria used in the observation of overt behaviors and physical movements.

sarily something more than merely

a

An action is neces-

combination of physical movements,

and when we observe an agent performing an action, "we normally see

whole performance in

physical movements."
action

a

a
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standard social setting, not simply

a

a

set of

However, this social setting does not give an

determinate content because there is no "s*-andard meaning"

assigned by social conventions unless this performance is purely symbolic or ritualistic in nature.

Moreover, any such performance or

action may be designed to hide the actual feelings, desires or intentions which "lie 'behind' it."
an agent

is

161

This ever-present possibility that

purposely presenting potential observers with

a

deceptive

performance, which aims at concealing his real purposes, motive or

intentions, is

a

central feature of the concept of action and must be

taken into account in any adequate theory of human behavior or human

nature
In his analysis of the concept of action, Hampshire emphasizes

that there is one feature of the concept which remains fundamental and
basic despite its indeterminate nature.

This essential feature of

action is that it always and necessarily has two faces or
aspect:

a

dual

one being the attempt, intended effect or project and the
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other being the achievement, actual effect or result.

This "double

face of human action" or "antithesis of attempt and success" is "es-

sential and ineliminable" however we choose to characterize or describe
a

particular action.

For any given action or performance, there is

always the logical possibility of intending or attempting to do some-

thing and failing to do or not succeeding in doing it.
As Hampshire recognizes,

such

a

distinction may be very difficult

to apply in particular cases, especially for an observer attempting to

describe another person's action.

Even the situation of the agent

himself, who is in the best position to know whether or not he really

intended or tried to bring about

complex and present
faces of action.

a

a

certain result, can be extremely

variety of difficulties in characterizing the two

However, this distinction between attempt and

achievement is deeply embedded in our conceptual scheme and remains
crucial to the attempt to sketch adequate accounts of mind and action.

Hampshire holds that it is possible, by building on

which includes this dual face of action, to arrive at
and sophisticated account of thought and action.

a

a

foundation

more detailed

But such an effort is

necessarily quite different from the attempts to devise

a

comprehensive

theory of mind or "scheme of deliberate action" which group the seem-

ingly infinite varieties of human motivation, purpose, intention and
behavior under

"happiness

."

a

single heading such as Aristotle's "wanting" or Mill's

These traditional conceptions of thought and action

between
correctly insist that there must be some minimum of consistency

what

a

person wants and what makes him happy on the one hand and his
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actual behaviors or actions on the other, if he is

intentional agent.

a

rational and

However, the problem with such formulations of mind

and action is that they typically do not allow for the
various levels

of rationality and deliberation,

including half-intentional actions and

half-conscious thought as well as the various unconscious desires and
thoughts which influence human behavior.
Yet, although any adequate theory of thought and action must come
to terms with the unconscious as well as the partially conscious and

partly irrational aspects of human motivation and behavior, it is the
analysis of that "certain minimum of consistency and regularity," which
sets apart intentional human action from mere behavior or movement,
that is absolutely central to achieving

action.

a

coherent account of mind and

The focus here is upon:

the requirements of connectedness, of a trajectory
of intention that fits a sequence of behavior into an
intelligible whole, intelligible as having a direction,
.

.

.

the direction of means toward an end.
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Rational action, in contrast to impulsive action is necessarily

governed by

"consistency of intention" and is part of

a

policy "that wholly occupies
short.

"^^^

It

is,

a

in the final

a

project or

particular period of time, however
analysis, this "inside" of an action,

which "is wholly in the thought and purpose of the agent," rather than
the external view of an action as some kind of change which he brings

about in the external world, that gives an action its sense and

meaning.

^^"^

An agent may make mistakes

in

characterizing his
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intentions and plans, or he may not be able to put into words what
he
is doing or trying to do.

But there is a sense in which he unfailingly knows what
he is trying to do, in contrast with an observer, simply

because it is his intention and not anyone else'sJ^^
In Hampshire's account of thought and action,

a

special status is

assigned to an agent's own descriptions of his actions based upon his

knowledge of what it is that he is trying or intending to do.

His

argument has moved from consideration of issues concerning knowledge to

discussion of topics in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action and
back again to the analysis of knowledge.
action,

In his account of mind,

intention and knowledge are all interconnected and any par-

ticular topic cannot be considered in isolation from the others.

His

central indictment of both the classical empiricist and behavioral

account of mind is that they cannot provide adequate accounts of self-

knowledge and self-consciousness, chiefly because they treat all human

knowledge according to the model of empirical knowledge.

In addition,

his own alternative account of mind stands or falls with his analysis

of a person's own knowledge of what he is attempting or planning to do
as a unique and highly significant kind of human knowledge.

Two Kinds of Knowledge and Self-Consciousness

As

Hampshire acknowledges in his essay "Disposition and Memory,"

his philosophical analyses of the relation between mental states and

behavior, of the stages of human development "beginning with primitive

.
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behavior and ending with concealed emotion," or of the relation between
thought and action in general may appear to some to be simply

a

return

to the kind of a priori psychology characteristic of traditional phi-

losophy of mind.

169

Indeed,

it does seem that the answers to the kinds

of questions he raises must be provided by observation of behavior and

scientific experiment, not by philosophical argument.
His reply to such objections is that any answers that we can

provide to these problems concerning such mental states as emotions,

sensations, desires, dispositions and intentions are necessarily part
of a "more general, and of course disputable theory of language" (and

theory of meaning) which conerns how mental concepts are to be applied
in normal contexts.
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It

is therefore proper that one begin with an

investigation of the use of mental concepts in ordinary discourse,
focusing on the conventions of application and methods of confirmation

which are attached to our statements about emotions, dispositions and
intentions

Through

a

descriptive analysis of the conventions of application

and confirmation of the various mental expressions in

a

particular

language, the philosopher can sketch "the outlines of the concept of
mind, as it is embodied at any one time an any one language.
At the same time, the philosopher can undertake

a
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"more fundamental

inquiry" inherent in the contrast between those expressions concerning
mental terms whose conditions of application and confirmation seem

"entirely clear and unproblematical" because their conditions of certainty "have evident parallels in other familiar and unquestioned kinds
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of discourse" on the one hand, and on the other, those
expressions

which seem to have doubtful conditions of certainty because they are

peculiar and without parallel in other kinds of discourse

J

'''^

Hamp-

shire suggests that philosophical doubt and skepticism regarding cer-

tain kinds of statements about mental states or characteristics is

essentially tied to such

a

comparison of the different degrees of cer-

tainty obtainable when we use various expressions.

On the basis of

these comparisons, the philosopher may challenge the rules of appli-

cation and confirmation which govern our ordinary use of particular
types of statements about mental processes and states.
Of course, all such challenges to the conventions of application
and confirmation associated with particular expressions in our psycho-

logical vocabulary do not originate within philosophy.

Freudian theory has played

a

For example,

leading role in altering the conditions of

use and the meaning of various concepts used in characterizing human

motivation and behavior.

Yet,

Hampshire does hold that the "weighted

and critical comparisons" of the methods of confirmation tied to dif-

ferent types of statements about mental states, characteristics and

activities remains

a

primary contribution which philosophers can make

to our understanding of mind and action.

Thus, he disassociates his

own approach from that of those linguistic philosophers who, "in exag-

gerated respect for ordinary language," do not allow room for such

comparisons and doubts about certain of the expressions we use, thereby
refusing to enter "the domain of philosophy."

173
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The major deficiency of past philosophical inquiry
concerning how
we apply and confirm statements about thought and
action is that phi-

losophers traditionally selected one particular pattern of
application
and confirmation as

a

standard and attempted to apply this standard to

all types of psychological expressions.

As Hampshire states:

In any period there is a

tendency to take one method of
confirmation, appropriate to some one type of expression, as the self-explanatory model to which all other
types of expression are to be assimilated.^''''^
For Hume and the classical empiricists, the model of certain knowledge

was provided by the standard of application and confirmation provided
by direct reports of one's own sensations, sense experiences and

feelings.

When compared to this model of certainty, the standards of

certainty attached to other expressions, including statements about the
external world, seem problematic and open to question.

In

contrast,

for Ryle and the behavioralists the model of certain knowledge is

identified with the conditions of certainty appropriate to descriptions
of physical movements and behaviors.

According to this model, it is

the certainty conditions tied to reports of sensations and other

"inner" mental states which seem dubious and open to challenge.
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The problem with both the classical empiricist and behavioralist

analyses of our psychological vocabulary is this attempt to make various kinds of statements, each with their own appropriate methods of

confirmation, fit into one self-explanatory pattern.

While Hampshire,

like philosophers within the empiricist-positivist tradition, is very

much concerned with the connections between meaning and confirmation
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and with comparing the methods of confirmation attached
to various

types of statements, he rejects this attempt to assign
of statement

with

a

a

privileged status.

a

certain kind

Instead, the philosopher must begin

careful, unbiased analysis which allows for the possibilty that

there are different kinds of certainty and different kinds of knowledge

conveyed in different types of statements about mind and behavior

Hampshire's attempt to find
is,

to a great extent,

a

J'''^

middle ground between Hume and Ryle

based upon his reexamination of the notion of

direct knowledge or "knowledge by acquaintance" in light of this analysis of various types of certainty.
he repeatedly points to

a

Throughout his books and articles,

distinction between two different kinds of

challenges or attempted rebuttals characteristically expressed in the
form of "How do you know?" or "What is your evidence?", which questions

whether

a

person has

a

reliable source of knowledge or is in

to know what he claims to know.

In contrast,

a

a

position

second kind of chal-

lenge, summarized in the question "Are you sure?", is designed to force
a

person to insure that he has not been careless or made

utilizing what is standardly accepted as
method of obtaining knowledge.

a

a

mistake in

legitimate source of or
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On the basis of this distinction between these two types of chal-

lenges to knowledge claims, Hampshire divides statements about mental

states, attitudes and feelings into two categories.

The first grouping

consists of various statements which are open to both the challenge
"How do you know?" as well as the question "Are you sure?".

Into this

category fall all "heterobiographical statements" or statements
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describing someone's sensations, feelings, or other states of mind
which are not first person reports.
In contrast,

the second category is made up of those statements:

which show, in their grammar and vocabulary, that
.
the speaker is in the best possible position for claiming to know that the statement is true, that he is the
authority, and that no question about the source of his
.

.

knowledge arises.

.^"^^
.

.

The challenge "How do you know?" is out of order with regard to these

statements, although the question "Are you sure?" is clearly in order

because it is appropriate "to any claim to knowledge of any kind,
whatever the grammar and the vocabulary of the statement may be."
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Included in this second category are all "autobiographical statements"
or an agent's first person singular statements about his own sensa-

tions

,

what he wants to do, or what he intends to do.

1

80

Empiricist philosophers have typically focused on first person,

present tense reports of sensations and momentary feelings, which
belong to this latter classification, as incorrigible statements.

although it correctly emphasizes that

a

Yet,

person is in the best possible

position for making statements about the sensations or feelings he is

experiencing, the empiricist account of such direct knowledge is incorrect to the extent that it fails to acknowledge that

remains

a

a

person

fallible authority in such cases.

On the other hand,

philosophers adopting

a

behavioralist position

have usually denied that such reports are really statements or knowextent
ledge claims or suggested that they are meaningful only to the

.
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that they can be supported or challenged on the basis of observable

behaviors.

The behavioralist position has the advantages of

indentifying the limited nature of the knowledge or information conveyed by such first person reports and of acknowledging cases where

inductive evidence can be used to conclude that someone is mistaken in

making

a

particular claim about his own sensations.

However, behav-

ioralists are themselves mistaken when they characterize

a

statement

such as "I am in pain" as involving no certainty and no knowledge or

when they suggest that such

a

statement standardly requires inductive

181

support^

Hampshire attempts to unravel these controversies about the notion
of direct knowledge of one's own mental states by starting with the

simple case where a person is genuinely uncertain about his claim to be

experiencing

a

particular sensation when challenges of the form "Are

you sure?" are pressed against him.

describing
a

a

He offers the example of someone

particular pain sensation to

a

doctor who is pressing for

more specific and exact description or characterization of his sen1

sation.

82

Confronted with such questioning, the patient may be unsure

as to whether the sensation he experiences is properly characterized as
a

pain or as

a

discomfort.

Hampshire is suggesting that the typical kind of uncertainty which
arises in relation to first person reports of sensations and momentary

feelings occurs when

a

person is forced to confront the possibility

that he is mistaken in his classification or description of a partic-

ular sensation or feeling.

This type of uncertainty is essentially

a

.
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"semantic uncertainty,"

a

problem of matching the correct description

or classification with the phenomenon experienced.

Of course,

the cri-

teria used here are necessarily different from those which apply when
one attempts to insure that he is giving

physical object.
one of

a

Yet,

in that it

is an

a

correct description of

a

uncertainty about "matching up"

set of possible descriptions with "an independent reality," it

is not essentially different

from the kind of uncertainty which can

arise in connection with empirical statements

Hampshire's analysis of direct knowledge shifts emphasis from the
certainty conditions attached to first person reports of sensations to
those appropriate to first person statements concerning what
wants, plans or intends to do.

example of

a

a

person

Again, he focuses on the practical

person being asked questions about what it is that he

wants or intends to do.

As in the case of sensations,

a

person is in

the best position to know the answer to such questions, and the

challenge "How do you know?" is out of place.

At the same time,

there

are clear cases where an individual does not know or is uncertain about

what he wants or intends to do.

Hampshire holds that these are genuine

cases of not knowing or uncertainty and, moreover, that investigation

of such cases is absolutely central to achieving an adequate

understanding of the nature of self-knowledge.
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From Hampshire's discussion of the spectrum of desires and other

mental states, it is clear that the situation confronted by someone who
is uncertain about what he wants to do or have is potentially much more

:
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complex than that of someone who is unsure of the proper classification
of a particular sensation.

Of course,

especially in relation to non-

thought-dependent desires, his uncertainty may be the same kind of
semantic uncertainty that

a

person faces in attempting to describe or

identify the sensations he passively experiences.

He may be unsure,

both in his own reflection as well as in communicating with others,

which of

a

variety of different descriptions correctly characterizes

his already formed desires or wants.

However, because desires are not, at least in all cases, the kind
of given and transparent facts of consciousness pictured by the classical empiricist, a person who is attempting to answer

a

question or

resolve some doubt about what he wants may be confronted with

a

type of

uncertainty which is completely different from semantic uncertainty.
Someone may be unsure of what he wants to do or have because his desires are themselves confused because they are conflicting, or simply
1

because they are not clearly formed.
In at

least some of these cases where someone is unsure of what he

wants to do, particularly when the wants in question are thought-dependent or belief-dependent, his uncertainty parallels that of someone who
is unsure about what he intends to do.

uncertainty about what

a

In

such instances, resolving an

person wants to do or coming to know what he

wants to do is very much like the formulation of an intention.

Hampshire writes
he who is asked whether he wants to do X rather
than Y, and who hesitates and is not sure whether he
wants to do X or Y, has to think and to make up his

...
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mind; in this setting his thought will be a consideration of the reasons that make X and Y desirable things
for him to do; the conclusion of his consideration
will
be a decision, from which a definite desire emerges.
He
now knows what he wants to do, because he has now formed
his desire, and not because he now knows how a preexisting desire is properly to be characterized.
He is not in the position of a man who reports an
impulse or inclination that has occurred to him, as he
might report a sensastion.
His position, in respect of
his claim to know what he wants, is more like that of a
.

.

man who announces his intention.
This kind of "intentional uncertainty" is not

about the correct matching of

a

a

process of deliberation which cul-

a

decision or the formulation of an intention.

The situation of

a

person in

a

vacillating state of mind concern-

ing what he plans or intends to do is

lacking

a

semantic uncertainty

statement with an independent reality

and can only be resolved through

minates in

a

a

genuine case of uncertainty, of

particular kind of knowledge. Likewise, his making up his

mind about or knowing what he will attempt to do is

knowledge.

a

genuine kind of

Although this type of intentional uncertainty and the kind

of intentional knowledge it requires do not constitute the whole pic-

ture of self-knowledge, examination of their peculiarities, partic-

ularly how they differ from the types of uncertainty and knowledge

which have been emphasized in the empiricist tradition,

is essential to

understanding the nature of self-knowledge and the connections between
knowledge and action.
The case of

a

person being questioned about his intentions is like

the previous examples of someone being questioned about his sensations
or his wants in that an inability to provide a correct description of

"
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what he intends or will try to do is

uncertainty.

Yet,

potential source of error and

a

intentional uncertainty is unique in that

a

person

cannot claim to have formed an intention to do something, but be
un-

certain about what his intention is.

If a person's intentions are

uncertain in this way, then he has no "fixed and formulated intentions

.
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His knowledge of what he will try to do is necessarily direct

knowledge, the same kind of direct knowledge that he has of what he is

now doing.

Just as his certainty about his present action is the cer-

tainty of what he is attempting to do, his certainty about his future

action is the certainty of what he will attempt to do. 8Q
1

In addition,

such certainty about the future is inseparably connected to one's cer-

tainty about the present because:
knowing what I am doing at this moment necessarily
involves knowing what I have just done and knowing what
.

I

It

.

.

am immediately about to do

1
.

.

.

90

.

is clear then that there are very real differences between

knowing what one wants and knowing what one intends to do as forms of
The process of resolving uncertainty about what one wants

knowledge.

typically involves both discovery and decision, where one will be more
predominant depending on the nature and complexity of the desires in
question, but:
coming to know what one will do is always and
necessarily a case of making a decision and is not a
.

.

.

case of making

a

discovery.

1

91
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It

is because intentional knowledge is always a form of direct know-

ledge based upon decision and never

a

kind of reflexive or "double"

knowledge based upon discoveries about one's own mental states and
character that the phrase "knowing what one intends" is artificial and
pointless whereas the phrase "knowing what one wants" is not.

1

Q2

Of course this does not mean that an agent's intentions are not

standardly formulated against the background of or based upon such
reflexive knowledge.

The point is simply that intentions lie at the

opposite end of the spectrum of mental states from those types of

non-thought-dependent desires which one discovers through the process
of reflection.

Hampshire holds that only by setting apart such "pure"

intentional knowledge do we achieve an adequate understanding of the
full range of mental states and of the complexities of human knowledge.

Building upon this analysis of intentional uncertainty and intentional knowledge, Hampshire makes

a

crucial distinction between two

kinds of uncertainty and two kinds of knowledge about the future which

conerns all agents.

This distinction draws out the implications of his

notion of the dual face of action as attempt and achievement.
The first type of uncertainty is that which can arise when an
agent is confronted with questions about the probable outcome of future

events and activities such as "What will happen?" or "Will you
succeed?".

Such questions explicity call for the agent to make

a

his
prediction based upon his empirical knowledge of the world and of

situation in the world.

It

is, of course,

absurd to think that one's

by
uncertainty about the future course of events could be resolved

a
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decision or the formulation of an intention.
what will happen on

accomplishing

a

a

If he is uncertain about

future occasion or whether he will succeed in

given task, he needs additional empirical knowledge.

A second kind of uncertainty arises when someone
cannot provide

answers to questions concerning what he plans to do or will do which

typically are expressed in the form "What will you do?" or "Will you
try?".

In this case,

the agent is being asked not to make

a

predic-

tion, but rather to make a decision or to state his intentions or

plans.

Hampshire suggests that just as one cannot resolve doubts about

the future course of events through decision, there is something equal-

ly absurd in someone's attempting to resolve this kind of intentional

uncertainty through discovery of additional empirical knowledge.
has in mind the picture of

a

He

person attempting to determine what he

will do or try to do (the attempt face of action) by predicting what he

will do on the basis of his knowledge of his own character or evidence

concerning his past successes and failures.

As he states.

—

There seeems therefore an absurdity in behaviour an
absurdity that is more than the infringement of a con
vention of language in trying to find grounds for

—

predicting what

I

myself will do.

1
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An adequate account of the relationship between knowledge and

action requires recognition of this fundamental distinction between two

kinds of knowledge and of the different roles of prediction and
decision.

Philosophers in the empiricist tradition have neglected

intentional knowledge and focused exclusively on empirical knowledge or

knowledge based upon evidence that an empirical statement is true.
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Empirical knowledge is knowledge of something that is independent of
the process of knowing and,

as such,

is open to both challenges con-

cerning the source of knowledge (How do you know?) as well as challenges aimed at the claim to knowledge (Are you sure?).

When

a

claim

to empirical knowledge of the future or so-called "knowledge founded

upon induction" is challenged in this latter way, it:
will normally be justified by appeal to some rule
.
of inference, itself an empirical proposition, which
links an observed fact with the predicted, but so far
.

.

unobserved, happening.
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The empiricist tradition has tended to neglect or misrepresent the

second type of knowledge, intentional knowledge, which is most com-

pletely and purely embodied in someone's knowing what he will do.
Hampshire argues that the empiricist tradition has not adequately

examined such knowledge because it:
has difficulty admitting that the very same process of thought may be both a coming to be sure or to
know, that something is to be the case and a process of
The reasoning that makes me sure
making it the case.
that something is true of me is sometimes also the
reasoning that makes it true of me e.g., I have to
.

.

.

—

admit that

I

want

X,

or that

I

am trying to do X.

1
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Not only is this kind of knowledge not open to challenges concerning
its source, but it also requires that challenges of the form "Are you

sure?" be handled or rebutted in

a

different manner.

In particular,

claim to such knowledge is standardly justified through reexamination
of the process of thought, deliberation or practical reasoning from

which it emerged.

a

329

In short,

this second category of knowledge does not conform to

the same certainty conditions which are attached to empirical know-

ledge.

Because the empiricists and behavioral ists have not understood

the peculiarities and significance of such intentional knowledge, they

have distorted the relationship between these two different types of

knowledge which is essential to the conception of self-knowledge,

self-consciousness and freedom.

Hampshire's own account of the rela-

tionship between intentional and empirical knowledge, or between decision and prediction as well as the analyses of rationality and

self-consciousness which follow from this account are complex.

difficulty of the topics themselves

is

compounded by the fact that his

discussions of these issues are scattered through
books and essays.

It

The

a

number of different

is thus not surprising that much of the critical

comment on Hampshire's work has mischaracterized his analysis of self-

knowledge by linking his views with radically different accounts of
self-knowledge or by treating
isolation from the whole.

a

particular segment of his work in

The first step toward achieving an under-

standing of his treatment of self-knowledge, self-consciousness, selfcontrol and the relationship between reason and the passions

is to

distinguish it from other positions with which it is mistakenly identified

.

First, Hampshire's distinction between prediction and decision is
not meant to be the foundation of

a

comprehensive or complete cate-

gorization of all types of knowledge.

As he acknowledges, one could

,

330

also stress the contrast between knowledge of
empirical facts and know-

ledge of mathematical and logical truths or Ryle's
contrast between

"knowing how" and "knowing what."^^"^

Moreover, Hampshire recognizes

that there are many additional important distinctions which
can be made

within the category of intentional knowledge.

For example, as we have

seen, he emphasizes the significance of distinguishing "knowing
what

one wants" from "knowing what one will do."
Yet,

he holds that an investigation of the certainty conditions

attacthed to such expressions provides solid grounds for grouping these

distinct forms of knowledge into the category of intentional knowledge
and distinguishing this category from empirical knowledge.

He chooses

to focus on this particular distinction because he believes that anal-

ysis of the relationship between intentional and empirical knowledge is

essential to unraveling the problem of human freedom.

1

98

Secondly, Hampshire's position does not entail the view that em-

pirical knowledge and intentional knowledge are "independent and un-

combinable" or that

a

person's knowledge of what he will do is unre-

lated to his empirical knowledge of the world around him.
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In fact,

he repeatedly emphasizes the complementary and mutually dependent

nature of thse two types of knowledge and holds that one could not

possess either type of knowledge in isolation from the other.

As he

states

Knowledge of the natural order derived from observation
is inconceivable without a decision to test this knowledge even if there is only the test that constitutes a
change of point of view in observation of external
Correspondingly, a man who knows what he is
objects.

.
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doing, or will now do, must have some knowledge of, and
beliefs about, his own situation within the natural
200
order
His notion of the mutual dependence of thse two kinds of knowledge

follows directly from his rejection of the empiricist conception of

persons as detached and passive observers of the world and his adoption
of

a

conception of persons as objects moving among other objects in

continual flow of intention into action.

In addition,

a

he expressly

rejects the separation of intentional knowledge from empirical knowledge which he attributes to the doctrine of the transcendent will

advanced by Kant, Schopenhauer, and the early Wittgenstein.

In his

this doctrine, which separates one's self-knowledge, treated as

view,

part of the domain of ideals and values,

from his knowledge of fact,

can provide no coherent account of intentional action, deliberation or

moral judgment and artificially divorces the will from our desires and
interests
It

.^'^^

is this mistaken notion that Hampshire regards intentional

knowledge and empirical knowledge as independent and unrelated which

underpins the interpretation of his work either as an attempt to substitute the incorrigibility of one's reports of his intentions for the

empiricist incorrigibility of one's reports of his sensations or as

a

portrayal of intentional knowledge as "not susceptible to challenge.

However, as we have seen, Hampshire expressly acknowledges

that claims to intentional knowledge, such as the declaration of what
one will do on

a

future occasion, are not incorrigible and, like all
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forms of knowledge, remain open to certain kinds of challenges and

possibilities of error.

In

defending his position from criticism aimed

at Thought and Action and elaborating on his arguments, he specifically

acknowledges that there is an "inductive component" to one's knowledge
of his own future voluntary actions and that his claim to such knowledge can be challenged on the basis of inductive arguments.
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Freedom of the Individual provides two important examples of such
challenges and potential sources of error.

First, an agent's claim to

know what he will do can be questioned on the grounds that he

is making

faulty assumptions about the circumstances which he will confront when
he attempts to do what he intends to do.

the difficulty of

a

He may have underestimated

task, have overestimated his own ability to perform

task, or simply have not taken account of certain likely changes in

a

the circumstances in which he will act.
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Secondly, his announcement of what he intends to do may be challenged as mistaken because he has

a

long record of making plans and

declaring his intentions to do something and then failing to carry out
these intentions.

A common example is provided by persons who repeat-

edly state that they intend to give up smoking but in fact never do.
In

such

a

case,

someone's statement of what he will do is unreliable

not simply because he is not making a realistic appraisal of the dif-

ficulty of

a

task, but because he has frequently changed his mind in

similar past circumstances and has an established record of unreli-

.....

ability in carrying out his stated intentions.

205
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In short,

a

person's intentional knowledge of what he will do is

always, at least in part, dependent on his knowledge of the probable

course of events and of the general set of circumstances under which he
must carry out his intended course of action.

As Hampshire states,

A error in

judging the natural course of events may lead
to error in an agent's statements about his future
voluntary action; for he has to make some assumptions
about the future course of events, and about the situation and opportunities that will confront him, if he is
to form intentions, whether they are unconditional or
206
1

conditional

This inductive component of intentional knowledge, the implicit assump-

tions concerning circumstances and future events which are incorporated
in an agent's intentions or plans,

is what

differentiates practical

intentions from mere wishes, hopes, dreams or vague ambitions.
is also because of this

207

It

interdependence of the two types of knowledge

that Hampshire argues that someone cannot truly intend or try to do

something which he knows is impossible to do.

208

Finally,

this is the

reason that he treats as peculiar and ambiguous those cases where an
agent declares his intention to do something no matter what obstacles
he may face.

209

Of course, the more difficult problems concerning the relationship

between intentional and empirical knowledge arise in connection with

how an agent uses his empirical knowledge of himself and his own past
behavior in formulating intentions.

This points to

misunderstanding of Hampshire's thesis.

a

third possible

Although he does argue that

a

first person statement of what someone will do or
try to do is the ex-

pression of

a

decision or an intention and not the expression of

a

prediction, he does not hold that an agent cannot make predictions
about what he will do or attempt to do.

This latter thesis is advanced

by those who would use the distinction between prediction and
decision
to mark two completely autonomous realms:

one in which we explain and

predict events and behaviors according to causal laws and the other in
which we explain and criticize human action in terms of reasons, in-

tentions, and decisions.

Hampshire's distinction between decision and prediction should not
be read as a variant of this reasons-causes dichotomy.

He

acknowledges

that the "categories of causal explanation" have deep roots "within our

experience of ourselves as agents."

210

Again, he stresses that de-

cision and prediction are mutually dependent and that the formulation
and

interpretation of an agent's intentions are intimately tied to our

predictions of future events and actions.

For example, when an agent

announces his intentions, he provides an observer with information

which can be used to predict the agent's future behavior.

The observer

must, of course, assess this statement of intention against the back-

ground of other information, including the necessarily limited knowledge of the future situation which the agent possesses and his history

of reliability in carrying out his stated intentions.
Any one can readily adopt this "spectator's attitude" or point of

view of an observer toward his own probable decisions and actions when

considering "theoretical" situations which are purely hypothetical or
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remote from his present situation.

However, the case where an agent

adopts this spectator's attitude toward and attempts to predict his own

immediate, "practical" decisions and actions is much more problematic.
To a certain extent,

each agent must assume such

a

stance if he is to

formulate his intentions self-consciously and carefully, avoiding the
kinds of errors or mistakes he has made in the past.

He must consider,

much like an observer who uses an agent's announced intentions to
predict his decisions or behavior, how the limits of his own knowledge

of future circumstances and events might condition his plans and in-

tentions as well as review his own record of reliability or unreliability in acting upon stated intentions under similar circumstances.
In such practical situations,

the distinction between decision and

prediction is not clear-cut and apparent and can only be clarified by
examining the related distinctions between one's role as an agent and

one's role as an observer and between theoretical and practical questions.

Of course, definitive answers to questions about this relation-

ship between decision and prediction are not going to emerge from

analysis of ordinary language since none of these distinctions are

clearly drawn in ordinary language.
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Hampshire's most complete

statement of his position on this issue is worth quoting at length:

These are points in our discourse at which we are
compelled to think dialectically, that is, to acknowledge the possibility of an objective contradiction,
which arises when two lines of thought, each legitimate
within their limits, are pressed too far beyond their
The contradiction is objective, in the sense
limits.
that it does not arise merely from carelessness or
The contradiction here
ignorance in the use of words.
arises from the situation of a speaker speaking about

—
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himself as he would commonly speak about others; and
simultaneously making a double reference to himself;
first as the observer of himself, who is the author of
the statement, and, second, as the independent agent
observed. ...
I may become aware of myself as someone
who is trying to annoy somebody else; 1 suddenly observe
myself doing this. But as soon as I become in this way
self-conscious about my own activity the situation as I
see it, that is, the situation to which my action is
adapted, changes.
The situation, as viewed by an informed outside observer, has also changed, because of
the additional factor of my self consciousness. ...
I
cannot escape the burden of intention, and therefore of
responsibility, which is bestowed upon me by knowledge
of what I am doing, that is, by recognition of the situation confronting me and of the difference that my
action is making. As soon as I realize what I am doing,
Any impartial
I am no longer doing it unintentionally.
and concurrent awareness of the tendency and effect of
my own activities necessarily has to this extent the
In virtue of this new
effect of changing their nature.
awareness, my action may need to be re-described, even
though I continue with 'the same' activities as before
'the same,' that is, when externally viewed, without
regard to the intention. That which began as impartial
observation turns into something else the knowledge
,

;

becomes decision

.^^

The boundaries between decision and prediction have been redrawn

repeatedly in the history of Western thought.

A

representative example

of the general direction that such boundary change has taken in con-

junction with the rise and growth of the social and behavioral sciences
is provided by Freud,

who showed that many actions which had previously

been considered the product of an agent's decisions were actually

determined by forces which were neither recognized nor controlled by
the agent.

Hampshire acknowledges that this general trend will

human
probably continue, and that the discovery of new facts about

traditional
motivation and behavior will continue to undercut the
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picture of rational human beings who determine their
own actions and
lives through autonomous decisions.
At the same time, Hampshire holds that the continuing
discovery of

basic psychological and sociological forces influencing human
behavior
is

not sufficient to support the view that we can now or will
in the

future adopt,

systematically and completely, the spectator's attitude

toward our own decisions and actions.

As long as an agent has the

means of uncovering or infering those forces which influence his behavior, the possibility of "doubling" his references to himself (as both

agent and observer) as well as the "dialectical movement" between pre-

diction and decision remain.
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One way of looking at this dialectical relationship is to focus on
the situation of an agent who uncovers new knowledge about the psycho-

logical or sociological factors which have, up to the present,

determined certain of his thoughts, mental states, motives or behaviors.

Hampshire's claim is that this situation presents the agent with

another possible uncertainty, namely the intentional uncertainty con-

cerning his attitude toward this newly discovered fact about himself or
the factors influencing his character, motivation and behavior.

This

claim is the central feature of his account of the relationship between
the two types of knowledge:
My argument is that any knowledge which a man acquires
from experiment and observation about his own present
and future states presents him with another potential
uncertainty and with the need of knowledge of another
215
kind, and that this is a feature of knowledge itself.
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In other words,

such additions in an agent's empirical knowledge

of the "internal" psychological or the "external"
sociological factors

determing his thought and behavior always leaves open the "normative"
question, "Do

I

want them to be otherwise?"^

It

is an essential

feature of all such discovery or knowledge of the basic determinants
of
human thought and action that it presents the agent with at least the

possibility of utilizing this empirical knowledge in trying to alter
the basic pattern of causal factors which have determined his thought
and behavior in the past.

Of course,

it may be that the agent cannot

successfully alter this pattern even with his increased knowledge of it
and his intentional efforts to do so.

At the same time, the normative

question of whether or not one should make this attempt cannot be
resolved by further empirical discoveries about one's character or

a

prediction based upon one's empirical knowledge of his own motivation
and behavior.

Rather, this normative question and the intentional

uncertainty attached to it can only be answered by
formulation of an intention.

a

decision or the
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This intentional uncertainty or normative question about an

agent's attitude toward his recently acquired knowledge of himself lies
at the center of Hampshire's conceptions of self-consciousness and of

the relationship between reason and the passions.

He holds that when

an agent raises such reflective questions about his own desires,

emotions and so on, his states of mind are thereby changed or altered,
and that this marks the essential difference between self-knowledge and
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knowledge of the external world.

Again, he is following the philos-

ophical path explored by Spinoza in examining how

a

person's knowledge

of the causes of his present states of mind, including his desires,

intentions beliefs and emotions, modifies these states of mind.^''^
The ever-present possibility of raising such reflective questions,
as

for example concerning the desirability of certain desires,

is what

Hampshire is referring to when he discusses the "necessary regress of

self-consciousness" in Thought and Action

:

Every influence bearing upon me is added to the factors
in the situation confronting me, as soon as I become
aware of the fact of the influence.
It

is

also what he characterizes,

219

in Freedom of the Individual

process of "stepping back" or the "recessiveness of
into the concepts of action and of knowledge."

I"

,

as the

which "is built
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This regress of consciousness or recessiveness of

I

is not the

product of some mysterious inner power or exercise of will, but rather
is a product of the intellect in that it follows directly from the re-

lationship between empirical and intentional knowledge.
stepping back or reflex iveness is

a

The process of

natural outcome of an advance in

our understanding of the causes of our own thought and behavior, which
is provided not only by scientific psychology but also by increasingly

sophisticated classifications and distinctions used in ordinary language and everyday conduct.

In much the same way that one person can

use scientific and practical knowledge about another to manipulate or

such
control him, any individual who can criticize and reflect can use

3U0

knowledge in trying to achieve self-control over or attempting to
alter
certain of his own mental states and behaviors

Hampshire is clearly not advancing

a

position which "idolizes"

decisions and intentions or which substitutes

a

model of persons as

perfectly rational agents for the empiricist conception of reason as
the servant of the passions.
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In the first place,

gesting that all human action is preceeded by

a

he is not sug-

prior stage of self-

conscious doubt, deliberation, and decision or intention-formulation.
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Intentions can, like beliefs, be "unquestioned and silently

formed" and are not necessarily the results of self-conscious reflection.

22U

Moreover, there is much variety in intentions in that they

may be either firmly fixed or highly tentative, unconditional or con-

ditional, specific or vague.

225

Finally, there is the central distinc-

tion between those intentions which, even when firm and fixed, are

essentially indescribable (such as the intention of an artist or
craftsman in creating

a

piece of art) and those intentions which are,

at least in part, mediated and constituted by a particular description

of an object or activity.
In short,
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an adequate theory of mind and action can be achieved

only if we move away from simplistic conceptions of intentionality and

come to terms with

a

vast range of complex combinations and inter-

actions of these different kinds of intentions.

In

addition,

a

co-

herent account of intentionality and rationality must allow for those
"mixed, confused situations" where an agent "drifts into

a

course of

action," apparently perceiving his course of action to be determined by
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his given character and past behavior while not denying that he could

alter his conduct through decision and effort.^^"^

Also, even when

someone does self-consciously reflect on the forces which have
influenced his behavior and states of mind and carefully considers the

alternative actions and policies open to him, he may be unable to reach
a

decision or lack the power to carry out his sincere intentions to

change present facts about himself.
Hampshire focuses on deliberation and decision not because they

characterize all or even most thinking and behaving, but rather because
we must understand those occasions when human beings do deliberate and

decide if we want to understand the crucial role of reflexivity in
human behavior and social life.

While his account of mind certainly

challenges the notion that reason is the servant of the passions, it
does not move to the opposite extreme by viewing the passions or

emotions as essentially rational and purposive objects of choice or by
ignoring the roles of imagination and feeling in thought and action.

Hampshire specifically contrasts passions, feelings and desires with
actions as things which typically happen to us rather than things that
we do or choose.
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Of course, an agent can, using the more sophisticated forms of

language and classification which develop interdependently with self-

consciousness, characterize his own passions and desires as, like
physical objects, either instruments or obstructions of his purposes
and intentions.

But when we characterize certain passions, inclina-

we can
tions or dispositions in this metaphorical way as objects which
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"watch" rather than simply experience, we are treating
them as objects
in relation to the will of an agent who can

make decisions. 230
when he is in

a

formulate intentions and

Although an outside observer may criticize someone

position to recognize that certain of his desires and

feelings are "squalid and evil" and fails to make the attempt to
inhibit or control the influence of these baser passions over his

calculation and behavior, this does not mean that an agent is free to
choose his passions.

They remain the material upon which his will,

informed by rational criticism and reflection, must act, rather than
the direct products of his will or his decisions .^^^
In this account of mind,

self-consciousness is clearly identified

with the active as opposed to the passive states of mind.

The major

unifying theme in this account is the notion that the more

a

person

knows about the causes of his own states of mind, character and behavior, the better the chance that the gap between attempt and achievement

can be closed.

However, this does not entail the view that there is

some realm of perfect autonomy, total rationality and full knowledge
which, when attained, marks the final elimination of those factors

outside an agent's control and understanding that determine his thought
processes and actions.

Such complete rationality and total knowledge

remain ideal goals which can be sought but never actually attained.
There are always limits to reason and knowledge imposed not only by the

basic features of one's physical existence as

a

self-moving object in

world of objects, but also by one's language and system of classification, culture and form of life, and one's own desires and interests

a
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which are themselves the products of

a

social environment.

The

fundamental prerequisite of any adequate account of mind and human
nature is that it comes to terms with these sets of the necessary
limits within which human beings know, reflect and act in the world.
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CHAPTER
A REEXAMINATION OF THE

V

CONNECTIONS BETWEEN MIND AND POLITICS

Freedom and Responsibility

The alternative account of mind which Hampshire outlines, with its

emphasis on the unique features of self-knowledge, has significant
implications for political inquiry and political theory.

In several of

his essays, such as "Russell, Radicalism, and Reason" or "Political

Theory and Theory of Knowledge," he specifically examines certain of
the connections between fundamental issues in philosophy and the con-

cerns of the political scientist and political theorist.''

But these

essays invariably fail to capture the full scope of the challenge to
the most basic assumptions underpinning the dominant conception of

a

science of politics which is presented by this alternative view of
thought and action.

In

addition, even his extensive work on freedom

and responsibility, which is clearly relevant to the traditional inte-

rests of political theory and which is the one topic where his position
is developed most

thoroughly, is widely ignored or mischaracterized

In Thought and Action

,

Hampshire states that his main goal is

"(t)o show the connection between knowledge of various degrees and

freedom of various degrees.

..." 2

Analysis of this connection is,

either explicitly or implicitly, the principal unifying theme throughout all his work.

Not only Thought and Action but also Freedom of the

Individual and the collection of essays presented in Freedom of Mind
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revolve around the linkages between questions concerning the peculiarities of intentional knowledge and problems regarding freedom of will
and freedom of mind.

He repeatedly and consistently argues that the

major issues concerning human freedom "arise at the points of intersection" between intentional and empirical knowledge, or between de-

cision (or intention) and prediction.
The key to understanding Hampshire's analysis of freedom and

responsibility thus lies in the dual face of action as attempt and
achievement.
and Action

,

His central claim, which is set out most fully in Thought
is that an agent

free and can be held responsible for

is

his actions to the extent that his achievements correspond to his in-

tentions and decisions.

An agent becomes increasingly free and respon-

sible through knowing what he is doing, "in every sense of this

phrase," and through acting "with
tion."

a

definite and clearly formed inten-

According to this view.
in so far as his behaviour is constantly correlated with his evident or declared thoughts
and intentions at the time of action rather than with

He is a free agent,

antecedent conditions of some other kind.

Such

a

5

general and consistent fit between an individual's intentions or

decisions and his actions is the best single indicator that he is
behaving as

a

free and responsible agent.

As we have seen,

Hampshire treats the distinction between decision

linguistic
or intention and prediction quite differently from those
or
theorists who draw sharp distinctions between reasons and causes

between action and causation.

His position is thus fundamentally
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different from those offered by philosophers, both within and outside
of the linguistic tradition, who have attempted to make room for human

freedom by positing

a

realm of autonomous human action which cannot be

explained or predicted according to causal models.

frequently led philosophers defending

a

Such attempts have

free will position to charac-

terize free action as action which is not governed by laws and therefore unpredictable.

But this identification of free action with random

or chance action does make the conception of human freedom appear to be
an illusion which is out of step with our scientific knowledge of the

environmental and genetic determinants of human behavior.^
In contrast,

Hampshire holds that the accurate prediction by an

outside observer of what an agent will do or try to do before he him-

self knows or has decided what he intends to do is "not by itself
threat to the reality of human freedom.

..." 7

a

Just because an

agent's decisions and actions can be predicted on the basis of an

observer's knowledge of that person's general character, his past

decisions or actions on similar occasions, his avowed or inferred
desires and interests, and other such information, this does not mean
that the agent is neither free nor responsible.

It

is only when a

person's sincere declarations of his intentions and decisions are not

reliable guides to his future actions that he is clearly at the mercy
of forces outside his control and cannot be considered

responsible agent.

a

free and

The central indicator of free action remains the

his
fit between an agent's intentions and his actions, or whether

.
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sincere declarations of his intentions provide

a

basis for making

accurate predictions of what he will in fact do.
In short,

the idea of freedom is dependent not upon unpredicta-

bility but rather upon the capacity to formulate and implement
intentions.

Of course,

in order to

formulate intentions which can be

carried out, an agent must know what he is doing, which includes empirical knowledge of himself and of the situation confronting him.^
Thus, one of the necessary conditions for someone's being

a

free and

responsible agent is that he possesses some minimum of such predictive
knowledge
In

addition,
there must be a comparatively wide range of
achievements open to him, in which he would succeed if
he tried, none of which have been made ineligible by
.

.

.

human actions and institutions.

9

Although he does not equate increased freedom with

a

larger number of

alternative choices, Hampshire acknowledges that free choice is
fundamental to the notions of freedom and responsibility.

As has been

emphasized in traditional discussions of the topic, it is essential to
the idea of freedom that

a

free action is one which is performed by

choice rather than as the result of coercion or constraints imposed by
another individual or some authority.

Hampshire maintains that these two conditions (knowing what one is
doing and the absence of external constraints and limitations on freedom of choice) are necessary, but not jointly sufficient, for claiming
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that someone is

a

free and responsible agent.

For in order to for-

mulate and carry out intentions, an agent must also be able to discover
and perhaps alter the causal influences which have, up to the present,

determined his thought and action.

The conceptions of freedom and

responsibility can only be fully understood if one examines the kind of
reflexive or intentional knowledge through which agents can actively

intervene in the complex causal sequence connecting thought and action.
This position clearly has very real affinities with that set out

by Spinoza, who portrayed the idea of freedom in terms of the active
exercise of the powers of the mind and who presented
free agent as an active, self-determining being.

a

picture of the

In this view,

freedom

and responsibility are inextricably connected to the processes of

deliberation and decision involved

in

practical reasoning as well as

the processes of criticism and correction involved in self-conscious

reflection on one's own past attempts and achievements.
The presentation of this account of freedom and responsibility

suffers from many of the same problems evident in the treatment of the
His most systematic dis-

conception of mind to which it is attached.
cussions of the topic move rapidly through

a

series of complex issues

and draw upon the support of the more detailed analyses of those issues

provided in various of his essays.

Also, as before, Hampshire fre-

quently fails to identify exactly which positions he opposes or which

positions support or are similar to his own.

At the same time, his

work offers some important contributions to the analysis of the concept

1
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of freedom and is certainly not as simplistic and one-dimensional
as

many of his critics have portrayed it.
In

particular, Hampshire clearly does not, as some of his critics

have asserted, revive the doctrine that "freedom is the knowledge of

necessity."

1

As he states.

It is not true that as soon as I understand why I behave
in a certain way, where the 'why' connects my behaviour

with some regular and general causal pattern, I imme
diately become, by virtue of this knowledge alone, an

exception to the causal law.
Just because someone discovers

a

12

law-like generalization linking cer-

tain of his own states of mind or behaviors with certain antecedent

conditions, he does not automatically become free of this pattern of
influence.

Moreover, this does not mean that

a

free agent always or

even generally has the capacity for the kind of detached observation
and critical reflection necessary in order to recognize and then alter

the influences which presently determine his character and his behavior

.

However, the discovery of additional knowledge of the causal
factors, both external and internal, which influence one's ideas and

behavior does open up new possibilities of self-conscious choice and
action.''^

For example,

when an agent makes such

a

discovery, he recog-

nizes additional potential obstructions to the achievement of his

consciously formed intentions and decisions.

He is now in a better

position to formulate plans to circumvent such obstructions or to

4
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attempt to change the conditions which have made his thought and be-

havior the product of forces outside his control.

The possibility of

such intervention in the causal pattern which has determined one's behavior in the past is yet another necessary (but again not sufficient)

condition of free and responsible action.

1

Hampshire aligns himself with Spinoza in holding that the kind of

reflexive self-knowledge which underpins the formulation and implementation of intentions is aboslutely central to the idea of freedom.
He is siding with Spinoza against the accounts of freedom and respon-

sibility, most systematiclly set out in the doctrine of abstract indi-

vidualism, which have dominated political and moral theory in the
liberal tradition.

In

addition, he is suggesting that the major weak-

nesses inherent in this liberal treatment of freedom and responsibility
can be directly attributed to the neglect of such reflective self-know-

ledge in the empiricist view of mind.

Again, Hampshire's principal

concern is assessing the overall coherence of the conceptual framework
with which the liberal theorists have addressed the problems centering
in the concept of freedom.
In

general, representatives of the liberal-empiricist tradition

have identified freedom with an absence of coercion or constraints

imposed upon an individual by another person, the state or some other

external agent.

Freedom itself is typically defined in terms of

a

person's capacity to pursue and satisfy his own desires and preferences.^^

A person

is

considered

a

free and responsible agent as long

choose to
as he is not being forced to do what he would not otherwise

.

do and he is not being prevented from gratifying his desires by the

imposition of external obstacles.
This focus on so-called "negative freedom," or the definition of

freedom as the absence of external constraints, is only natural given
the basic assumptions incorporated in the empiricist account of mind.
In the

first place, there clearly are no significant obstacles to free-

dom inherent in the workings of the mind of the abstract individual.
Free choice is simply the translation of given and transparent desires

into action.

Likewise, free or voluntary action is simply action in

accordance with the agent's strongest desires or aversions, or action

which expresses the agent's particular ordering of his desires and
preferences
if someone's understanding of the relevant facts or of

Of course,

the proper means for satisfying his desires was faulty, he might be

less able to gratify his desires.

constitute, in

a

Such

a

lack of knowledge would

sense, an obstacle to greater freedom.

Similarly,

additional knowledge might increase an agent's freedom to the extent
that knowledge of causal laws provides one with more sophisticated and

productive strategies for attaining what he wants.
However, the connection between knowledge and freedom as under-

stood by the liberal theorist ends here because the empiricist account
dictated
of mind portrays the ends or goals of human behavior as being

by the desires and passions.

Since one's passions and desires cannot

be opposed or modified by his rational beliefs,

rational criticism and correction.

they are immune to

Given such an account of mind, it

.
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is

not surprising that the only real limitations on
freedom which

concerned the classical liberals are the possible external
constraints
on agents'

attempts to satisfy those given desires, passions or

inclinations which are the common denominators of an unchanging
human
nature

Another central component of the classical liberal treatment of
freedom and responsibility is the "soft determinist" view that the

so-called problem of free will

is

essentially

that freedom is compatible with determinism.

a

verbal difficulty and

This view hinges,

in

large part, on the Humean view of causation, according to which, what
we call causes and effects are merely changes or events that are found

to be constantly conjoined.

Thus, there is, contrary to Spinoza's

treatment of causation, no necessary connection between causes and
events.

Since human actions are caused in the same way that every-

thing else is caused, the laws of psychology do not entail necessity.
Of course, underlying this position is the view of human action as

bodily behavior which is caused by some kind of internal event such as
desire,

a

volition or an act of will.

It

is this interpretation of

action and causation which underpins the classical empiricist stance
that freedom and responsibility are not incompatible with determinism

but rather presuppose it.

17

The conceptions of freedom and responsibility which follow

directly from the classical empiricist account of mind have been modified or challenged on the basis of those changes in our understanding

of human nature discussed in the third chapter.

For example, many

8
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developments in sociological theory and research have,
either directly
or indirectly,

undercut the characterization of individual freedom
as

the power to gratify universal desires and preferences.

This early

liberal view of freedom clearly incorporates an inadequate,
pre-sociological conception of human nature that does not acknowledge
the extent
to which an agent's desires and preferences are the product
of his

social environment, including his roles and place in the social order.

Studies of socialization processes, educational systems and commu-

nication networks have shown the ways in which these can be used by

members of one class, group or segment of society to restrict the
freedom of others.

One of the consequences of such work has been an

increased understanding of how the manipulation or limitation of the
range of alternatives available to an agent when he deliberates or

chooses may constitute an even more severe and effective restriction of
his freedom than external constraints on his actions.

Such an emphasis on the historical and social context within which

"sociological man" must make his choices and exercise his freedom has
had an extensive influence on political and social thought concerning

freedom and responsibility.

Certain liberal theorists, beginning with

Mill, have used such a perspective in pressing for

a

more "positive"

conception of freedom v^^ich acknowledges the importance of an agent's

awareness of possibilities of choice.

1

According to this "positive"

conception, freedom does not simply mean the absence of external constraints, but also encompasses the freedom to shape one's own life

course and to realize one's own potential.

The free individual is seen
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as a subject rather than an object,

as being self-directed rather than

determined by forces outside his control.

Focus thus shifts from an

agent's freedom of opportunity to implement his given choices to an
agent's freedom to conceive of or explore various alternative choices
or courses of action.

19

Of course, this distinction between "positive" and "negative"

treaments of freedom can be overstated.
liberal theorists did offer

a

After all, the classical

picture of political institutions and

social arrangements as not only operated but also designed by essen-

tially autonomous, free and rational (in
sense) individuals.

a

prudential or utilitarian

This idea of the autonomous, rational citizen or

consumer who deliberates and acts so as to maximize his own selfinterest or utility has long been central to the liberal conceptions of
liberty, democracy and the free market.

At the same time, there is a

marked difference between those discussions of freedom and autonomy
which start from the model of asocial, abstract individuals with given
desires and passions and those which work from

a

model that emphasizes

the possibilities of choice, growth and change inherent in "sociological man."

20

In addition,

several social scientists and theorists have, on the

basis of the modern conception of "sociological man," launched

a

more

fundamental and far-reaching attack on this traditional liberal paradigm of free, responsible and autonomous action.

According to their

phireading of the findings of the contemporary social sciences, the

early
losophical views of freedom and responsibility advanced by the
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liberals are at odds with our scientific knowledge of the social factors influencing an individual's thought and behavior.

advanced variations of

a

Some have

moderate thesis such as criticism of liberal

historians and social theorists who attempted to explain and evaluate
the decisions and actions of historical figures or agents in alien

cultures without considering the social and historical forces shaping
each person's choices and behavior.
In addition,

the more radical sociological determinists suggest

that every individual's desires, choices and behaviors are simply the

products of that person's roles, class, status and other social factors.

In either case,

the conceptions of freedom, responsibility and

autonomy which we have inherited from the early liberals must be substantially revised.

21

This sociological challenge to the notions of freedom and respon-

sibility defended by the classical liberals has been reinforced by an
even more vigorous critique of these conceptions inspired by develop-

ments in modern psychology and psychiatry.

The position known as psy-

chological determinism asserts that all human behavior is the product
of psychological causes of various kinds.

Such determinism is thought

to hold not only in the cases of pathological disorders and various

kinds of deviant behavior, but also across the entire spectrum of the

thought and action of normal agents.

According to this view, all of an individual's conscious desires,
choices and behaviors are determined by unconscious forces, defense
control
mechanisms, inner compulsions and so on, over which he has no
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and of which he has no knowledge.

The "hard determinist" position

follows this claim to its logical conclusion, maintaining that while
the conceptions of freedom, responsibility and autonomy may have played
a

central role in earlier philosophical speculation about man and mind,

these terms are no more applicable to an empirical approach to human

behavior than they are to physics.

In short,

determinism cannot be

reconciled with free will, moral responsibility and moral judgment. 22
Of course,

although this problem is now frequently posed in lan-

guage and examples emerging from the modern social and behavioral
sciences, the basic dilemma is not

a

new one.

The free will-deter-

minist debate has been with us since the beginning of philosophy and
has reemerged again and again in the clashes between competing theories

of human nature.

However, there have been some significant changes in

this debate, and these also make the early liberal attempted recon-

ciliation of determinism and free will much less attractive than it
once seemed.
For example, much of the recent philosophical debate has proceeded

from Kant's forceful statement of the tension between determinism on
the one hand and freedom, responsibility and other moral notions on the

other.

When we say that someone performed an action of his own free

will or hold him responsible for what he has done, we are not claiming

simply (as the early liberal reconciliation requires) that he could
have done otherwise if the factors influencing his action (e.g., his
desires) were different.

Rather, we are claiming that he could have

chosen to do otherwise or taken

a

different course of action under
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exactly the same set of conditions.

The notion that all events, in-

cluding human choices and actions, are completely determined by other
events seems incompatible with the assumption, which is basic to our

moral judgments, that persons are free to choose among two or more

possible courses of action.

23

In sum, both the "negative" conception of freedom as the absence

of external constraints as well as the classical liberal attempt to

reconcile determinism with the ideas of freedom and responsibility seem
much less tenable in the prevailing climate in the modern social and
behavioral sciences and

in

post-Kantian philosophy.

summary only briefly characterizes two of

a

In addition,

this

number of different issues

and problems where there has been extensive revision of the classical

liberal conceptions of freedom and responsibility.

The contemporary

treatment of questions centering around freedom and responsibility is

marked by significant changes in prevailing views concerning the logic
of moral discourse and the status of moral judgments, the basic

components of an adequate theory of human nature and several other
relevant issues.

24

Hampshire himself emphasizes and attempts to build upon the contributions to our understanding of human action and freedom offered by
the developments represented by the conceptions of "sociological man"
and "psychological man."

Thus,

although he does not specifically

discuss the contributions of sociology, his analysis emphasizes that
confronted
the issues concerning freedom, autonomy and action must be

individuals but
not in the context of an artificial world of abstract
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rather as they apply to

a

truly social world in which particular lan-

guages and forms of life, as well as economic and political arrangements, shape human thought and action.

Also, he examines in detail the

challenge posed to the idea of human freedom by Freudian psychological

theory and explores Freudian theory as

a

framework for dealing with

questions concerning self-knowledge and individual autonomy.
At the same time, Hampshire suggests that the treatment of the

problem of freedom within liberal political theory and positivist
social science remains flawed because of deeply embedded assumptions

centering in the empiricist conception of mind.

Despite empirical

discoveries and increased knowledge of human motivation and behavior,
the background conceptions of mind,

agency and rationality incorporated

in the classif icatory framework into which the data are fitted have not

been carefully analyzed and reassessed.

This is the principal reason

why characterizations of freedom and responsibility which are directly

linked to

a

discredited theory of mind continue to exert

a

pervasive

influence throughout American social science and social theory.

The

development of more viable accounts of freedom, autonomy and respon-

sibility presupposes systematic reexamination of these conceptual and
philosophical assumptions which underpin contemporary attempts to
explain and evaluate human behavior.
Hampshire's central indictment of the contemporary account of

freedom and responsibility is that modern theory and research follows
between
classical liberal theory in ignoring the essential connections

knowledge and freedom.

This claim is likely to strike most social
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scientists and liberal theorists as blatantly false.
example,

To cite but one

Peter Berger closes his Invitation to Sociology with

a

charac-

terization of our increasing knowledge of the sociological determinants
of behavior in terms of

a

"puppet theater."

Although we may "for

moment" perceive ourselves as puppets being manipulated on

a

a

stage, we

soon recognize that there is "a decisive difference" between our own

position and that of the puppets:
Unlike the puppets, we have the possibility of
stopping in our movements, looking up and perceiving the
machinery by which we have been moved.
In this act lies
the first step towards freedom.

25

Neither the acceptance of the modern conception of "sociological man"
nor of "psychological man" necessarily commits one to

a

"hard"

determinist position which dismisses the possibility that human beings
can use their knowledge of causal laws to augment their freedom and

autonomy.
In addition,

Hampshire's charge seems to have little merit in

relation to liberal political thought.

After all, recognition of the

connection between knowledge and freedom has been

a

major driving force

behind the repeated resurgence of the theme of "positive" freedom

within the liberal political tradition.

Both classical and modern

liberal theorists have emphasized the values of liberty and autonomy
and, at least implicitly,

acknowledged that human beings can use their

discoveries about themselves and their environment to become more
self-determining.

As Berlin suggests,

this liberal notion of "posi-

sometimes
tive" freedom comes very close to Rousseau's idea that it is
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a

necessary condition of becoming free to recognize one's chains for

what they are rather than decking them with flowers.

It

is thus

nothing new or particularly challenging to the liberal theorist to
suggest that knowledge of one's chains is, in many cases, the first
step toward freedom.
Yet, in order to make sense of any such notion of becoming more
free or becoming more self-determining through additional knowledge of

the determinants of one's own thought and behavior, we need some co-

herent account of the connections between knowledge and action.

More

specifically, Hampshire's argument is that we need adequate accounts of

self-knowledge as

a

form of knowledge and of the powers and limits of

self-reflection and deliberation.

In

short, we cannot account for

freedom and autonomy in the absence of more sophisticated conceptions

of mind and agency than the dominant empiricist framework provides.
Hampshire's analysis of free and responsible action clearly

stresses the roles of deliberation, decision and conscious reflection
in human action.

Yet, he is not suggesting that an agent is free only

when he is actually deliberating and choosing or when he is actually

acting to carry out clearly-formed intentions.

Rather, he emphasizes

the fundamental point that our notions of freedom, autonomy and respon-

sibility all require

a

distinction between thought and action which are

an agent's own rather than the product of forces outside his control.
In

turn,

this distinction requires not unpredictability of decisions

and actions, but that an agent has the capacity to reflect upon his

current situation and to formulate intentions.

It

is in this sense

,
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that the model of free and responsible action is provided by the picture of an agent who examines his desires, interests, roles and so on
in a self-conscious manner and then formulates intentions and acts on

the basis of such rational reflection.

27

One of Hampshire's major interests is in clearing away some of the

common misunderstandings which make this paradigm of free action seem

incompatible with the causal explanatory models used in the social and
behavioral sciences.

In the

first place, acceptance of this model of

free and responsible action does not entail

a

denial of the vast body

of empirical evidence demonstrating the extent to which human behavior
is determined by psychological

impulses or inclinations outside of the

Instead, this model simply requires that we regard

agent's control.

agents who acquire knowledge of such causal influences as being confronted with the "normative" choice of either acquiescing in or at-

tempting to resist these factors.
Although

it

cessfully resist

may be impossible for the agent to overcome or suca

particular temptation or inclination, it is always

possible that he can try or formulate an intention to do so.

It

cannot

be "impossible" for an agent to intend to do something in the same way

that it might prove "impossible" for him to do something.

As

Hampshire

states
there is no sense in which it is impossible for
him to intend to do something, provided that he knows
.

.

.

what would be involved in doing it.

28
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In addition,

this model of free and responsible action does not

necessarily rest upon the assumption that individuals are asocial,
ahistorical beings whose choices and actions are independent of their
social environment.

In fact,

Hampshire emphasizes that the range of

a

person's thought or the range of possible alternative actions which he
can conceive of and consider is limited by social and historical

forces.

Historians and social scientists who are concerned with ex-

plaining

a

particular person's decisions and actions must start, not by

assuming that an infinite range of possibilities

is open to

every

individual, but rather by examining "the genuine possibilities of

action" which are available to agents in
social situation.

29

a

particular culture, time and

Each person's thoughts,

ideas,

interests, and in

turn his actions are always restricted not only by such general factors
as his language and culture but also by more particular factors such as

his education, upbringing, class and status.

However, we must not confuse saying that someone could not have

been expected to conceive of certain alternatives or to take certain

actions given his background and environment with saying that it was

impossible for him to have chosen or acted otherwise given his background and environment

.

It

is

exactly this confusion which underpins

the "misleading metaphor" of a person being "imprisoned" within his own
set of thoughts, interests and classifications.

who is, in

sense,

a

a

Unlike the neurotic

prisoner to his obsessions,

the man whose thoughts and interests in fact
revolve within a particular narrow circle is not
honestly to be described as imprisoned within this
.

.

.
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circle, even if we can explain very clearly why his
interests are so narrow by reference to his past and to
historical causes.
No matter how tightly this circle may be closed, it is always
possible

that an agent can attempt to break free of it and achieve at least

a

partial extension of the range of his thought.
We hold human beings responsible for their decisions and actions,

despite the limitations imposed by social and historical forces, pre-

cisely because they are intentional agents capable of reflection.

Whenever an agent recognizes that certain factors in his background or
environment have limited his own thoughts, intentions and actions, he
faces the "normative" question of either simply accepting these

limitations or attempting to alter them.

consciousness confers

a

In short,

the regress of

corresponding regress of responsibility.

An agent can thus be held responsible not only for the more ob-

vious "sins of commission" but also for the less obvious "sins of

omission" in thought and action.

If an

agent's discoveries concerning

the psychological and social determinants of his past behavior have

given him the potential power to intervene in this pattern of influence, or even to move

a

step closer to such intervention, he must be

held responsible for failures to use this knowledge in attempting to

correct or alter any morally defective aspects of his behavior or character.

Although the original pattern of influence shaping his charac-

ter and behavior is not something which he consciously chose or even

377

had any control over, he is now responsible for any aspect of his char-

acter and behavior which he could change if he actually tried.
This constitutes

a

central aspect of the asymmetry between the way

in which an agent judges and

excuses his own conduct as opposed to the

manner in which we judge and excuse the conduct of others.

Oil

When we

criticize and evaluate another person's decisions and actions, we do
consider that individual's upbringing, educational opportunities,
social position and other factors in his environment which may have

limited his thought in certain ways.

It would be

unreasonable to hold

an agent fully responsible for decisions made or actions -performed when

his background and social environment have made it highly unlikely that
he v/ould even conceive of or consider some of the alternatives availa-

ble to him.

In

short, we do offer excuses on the basis of, or make

allowances for those limitations on an agent's thought and action which
are the result of his language, culture and environment.
Of course,

agents frequently adopt such

toward their own past decisions and actions.

a

spectator's attitude

Examination of the way in

which one's own thought and behavior have been shaped by environmental

factors is in fact one of the principal avenues to increased under-

standing of one's own failures and successes and of possible changes in

one's own habits of thought and character.

Thus, a person might at-

tempt to explain, and at least in part excuse, his past acts of dis-

crimination toward members of

a

particular race through examing the

unrelective prejudices which had had acquired in his own upbringing.
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In such cases,

an agent uses the same standards of criticism and cor-

rection which are applied to the decisions and actions of others in

explaining and evaluating his past patterns of thought and behavior.
As we saw in the preceeding chapter,

Hampshire maintains that an

agent cannot completely adopt this kind of spectator's attitude toward
his present and future choices and actions.

For example, an agent

cannot excuse his continuing to behave on the basis of racial prejudice
by arguing that, given his background and environment, this is the only

kind of thought and behavior which can be expected of him.

To adopt

the spectator's attitude in this way is to disclaim responsibility for

one's actions by denying that one has any freedom of choice.

When

someone attempts to explain and predict his future choices and behavior
from this spectator's point of view, he is characterizing his decisions
and actions as not freely taken, as determined by forces over which he

has no control.

Hampshire's analysis of this kind of attempt to escape the burden
of responsibility by adopting the spectator's point of view should not
be confused with the type of position taken by Sartre in his discussion

of "bad faith."

Sartre characterizes "bad faith" in terms of an

agent's attempts to escape from the "anguish" of freedom and the burden
of responsibility by viewing his own decisions and actions as the

products of either internal or external forces over which he has no
control.

agent
He and Hampshire both appear to be arguing that each

decisions
must ultimately accept responsibility not only for his own

ultimately the
and actions but also for his own character which is
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product of his own choices among

a

variety of different possibilities

open to him.
However, from Hampshire's perspective, it would be

portray

a

a

mistake to

person's patterns of thought, his emotions, desires and

interests, and the other features of his character as the products of

deliberate, conscious choices or of his will.

Human beings are not

free and responsible in the sense that they can completely determine

what they are and what they will become through autonomous decisions.

Instead, they are free and responsible in the sense that the process of

"backward stepping"

— the

exploration of new alternatives based upon

additional understanding of the factors shaping past and present decisions and behaviors

— can

never be completely closed off.

37

The essen-

tial point of this model of free and responsible action is that the

development of habits of self-conscious relection and criticism may
modify prevailing habits of thought and behavior.
is

This stress on habit

important because freedom is not something directly experienced at

some existential moment of choice but rather the end product of

a

long-

term and difficult policy of self-reflection.
This analysis suggests that one of the most serous deficiencies of

liberal moral and political thought is

a

preoccupation with weakness of

will as the major problem regarding freedom and responsibility.

The

alternative being advanced shifts the focus to freedom of mind or freedom or intellect, recognizing that agents frequently act irresponsibly
in the moral and

political realms not because of weakness of will but

of
rather because they have too narrow or limited an understanding
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themselves, their situations or their alternatives.

In other words,

each person necessarily decides and acts, in political as well as in

ethical matters, within the context of

a

particular frame of reference

or system of classification and thought.

It

is always possible that

this sytem of classification and belief may blind him to significant

features of his own situation, factors influencing his decision-making
and behavior, or consequences of his decisions and actions.
The self-conscious agent is one who recognizes that his own

thought and action is enclosed within such
and meaning.

a

system of classification

He realizes that this system is,

for the most part,

something which he has inherited from his own culture and language and
that it is the product of historical and social conditions.

He at-

tempts to guard against potential blind spots inherent in his framework
by exploring alternative systems of classification and thought and

evaluating his own on the basis of such comparisons.

The self-con-

scious agent is constantly testing his own perceptions and classifica-

tions as well as his own intentions and actions in the political and
social world in light of these alternative characterizations or de-

scriptions.^^

It

is

in this

sense that freedom of mind or freedom of

thought is the central dimension of what it means to be

a

free and

responsible agent.
Certain of Hampshire's critics have argued that this analysis of
freedom represents not

a

direct challenge to the liberal tradition but

rather is merely an extension of the same basic liberal framework.

The

which has not
main question they pose is, what is there in this account
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been long recognized or emphasized by liberal theorists?

Mill's On Liberty

,

For example,

the classical statement of the individualistic,

"negative" conception of freedom, incorporates many of the same themes
which Hampshire stresses.

After defining the free individual as one

who deliberates and chooses. Mill emphasizes the need for expanding

possibilities of choice and celebrates the ideal of "individual spontaneity" as well as discussing the dimensions of "negative" freedom.
Moreover, he argues that human beings are most likely to exercise such

freedom of choice in

a

pluralistic society in which individuals are

able to pursue different ends and experiment with different ways of
life and in which power is widely distributed.

shire advances

a

Finally, he like Hamp-

notion of individual self-development, suggesting that

each person has the power to shape his own character as he wants

it to

be.

Hampshire's emphasis on intentions, this line of criticism continues, is

a

minor alteration rather than

liberal conceptions of mind and freedom.

a

significant change in the

He has simply substituted a

portrayal of freedom as the power to implement clearly formed intentions for the earlier picture of freedom as the power to satisfy

emerging desires.

One of the indicators that this slightly modified

definition of freedom incorporates the same deficiencies inherent in
the classical liberal definition is the manner in which it remains open

liberal
to the same kind of objection standardly raised against the

conception of freedom.

If we define

freedom in terras of the ability to

satisfy desires or implement intentions,

it

follows that individuals

.
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can become more free simply by scaling down their desires or their

intentions
More fundamentally, it appears that Hampshire's work rests on the
same individualistic premises which underpin the classical liberal

conception of free and responsible action.

The individual is for

Hampshire, as for the classical liberals and utilitarians, the real

center of all value.

Morality becomes the private domain of indivi-

dually chosen values as contrasted with the public world of determinate
facts.

Politics, or more specifically liberal democratic politics,

becomes

a

method of offering alternatives to rational individuals who

can be held responsible for the choices they make.

the modifications,

In short, despite

Hampshire has not moved beyond the picture of the

abstract individual set out by the early liberals.

These essentially

liberal conceptions of mind and freedom continue to ignore not only the
ways in wtiich society, culture and custom confer meaning on human

actions and human life, but also the ways in which consciousness and

ideology enter into our understanding of ourselves and our society.
A forceful example of one variant of this line of criticism is

provided by Iris Murdoch in The Sovereignty of Good

.

She argues that

Hampshire's portrayal of the free and responsible agent is not really

challenge to the dominant liberal framework, but rather is simply

a

a

more comprehensive statement of the same conception of man which is

unreflectively and partially present throughout modern liberal thought.
Hampshire's ideally rational man not only is the dominant figure in
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contemporary writing on moral philosophy and politics, but also "is the
hero of almost every contemporary novel." 42
The central problem with this account of man is that the center of

personality and individuality is ultimately identified with the
choosing will, which is completely divorced from reason and belief.
Given this view of mind or man, the only kind of freedom which really
counts is individual freedom of choice, whether one is choosing between

political candidates, deodorants or moral values.

sibility becomes merely
based upon

a

sonal will."

Murdoch

a

Moreover, respon-

function of an agent's "impersonal knowledge

scientific model of knowledge and of his completely per43

is

most directly interested in the implications of this

view of man for our conception of morality, but her arguments clearly
concern the liberal conception of politics as well.

She argues that

Hampshire's conception of free and responsible agents assimilates

morality (and politics) to

a

visit to

a

shop:

I enter the shop in a condition of totally responsible
freedom, I objectively estimate the features of the
The greater my objectivity and
goods, and I choose.
larger
the number of products from
the
discrimination

which

I

can select.

44

According to this typical liberal portrayal of human nature and human
excellence, an individual's primary struggle to increase his freedom is
as
to conceive of as many different alternatives of choice and action

he can or "having as many goods as possible in the shop."

45
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According to this interpretation, Hampshire's treatment of human
freedom and moral responsibility is nothing more than
ment of "bourgeois capitalist morals."

a

revised state-

Although Murdoch does not

explore this theme further, this suggests that his conception of political freedom remains preoccupied with the same abstract principle of

freedom of choice which is championed by liberal democratic theory and
the capitalist market economy.

Indeed, if Murdoch is right, his entire

analysis of freedom of thought remains tied to the standard liberal

metaphor of the marketplace of ideas, where ideas, like political
parties or economic producers, must be free to compete for the alle-

giance of consumers.

Murdoch suggests that the basic problem with Hampshire's analysis
of the free and responsible agent is that he is unable to break away

from the liberal conception of human nature.

The image of man pre-

sented in Thought and Action is at once, "behaviorist
and utilitarian," but above all it is

a

,

existentialist

summary statement of the con-

ception of "linguistic analytical man" which is pervasive in modern

analytic philosophy.

46

The virtues of this model of man are its em-

phasis on freedom (although defined in terms of detachment and

a

utili-

tarian rationality) as well as "responsibility, self-awareness, sincerity, and

a

chief defects

lot of utilitarian common sense."
is

47

However, one of its

that it omits such notions as sin, love and other

concepts which are deeply embedded in human customs, habits and

traditions.

In

addition, it excludes Marx's insights concerning the
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possibilities that ideological distortions must affect an agent's
capacity for free and responsible action.

Hampshire's account of freedom and responsibility does appear to
be overly abstract and very much in line with the standard

liberal-utilitarian treatment of the topic as long as it is severed
from other central points in his argument.

In order to assess

Murdoch's criticism, we must examine the principal supports for this
conception of freedom of mind.

Description and Evaluation

At the end of Thought and Action

Hampshire sketchily explores

.

certain of the implications of his analysis of knowledge and freedom in
a

brief discussion focusing on morality and art.

only

a

Although he makes

few passing references to politics or political decision making,

several of his main arguments bear directly on the attempt to explain

political behavior.

In this section,

I

will focus on drawing out those

claims which are most relevant to the tasks of the political scientist
and political theorist.

I

believe that, contrary to Murdoch's cri-

tique, these themes represent significant and sometimes revolutionary

departures from the standard set of assumptions and positions underpinning not only liberal political theory but also the positivist model
of

a

science of politics.
In the first place,

Hampshire's policy of testing one's percep-

tions and intentions by alternative descriptions and classifications is
not compatible with just any kind of moral or political theory. Indeed,
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it

is

directly contradictory to those accounts of how we describe and

evaluate human actions which rest upon the empiricist notion that

reality comes pre-divided into units independently of our classificatory and descriptive schemes.

is because of this empiricist

It

conception of social reality, that behavioral political scientists have
tended to portray human conduct as

actions.

They have retained

a

a

series of distinct, easily-labeled

notion of "the facts" as setting out or

defining an individual's political, social or moral situation and
choices .^^
However, in the attempt to describe as well as to evaluate human
behavior, it is misleading to think of "the facts of the situation" as
a

closed set of propositions which precisely determines or defines the

situation or activity.

There is no one description which uniquely

captures or directly corresponds to the particular moral or political

situation in which someone must decide how to act or not act.

The

situations that confront agents, as well as their actions themselves,
remain "open" in the sense that they are susceptible of an indefinite
number of alternative descriptions.

50

Many of the central problems and most fundamental debates in political inquiry as well as in ethics concern the proper description of

particular situations and particular actions.

The subject of contro-

versy is what constitutes an adequate characterization or description
of "the facts" in

a

particular case.

Marxist who challenges

a

Hampshire cites the example of

a

liberal by arguing that the liberal's actions
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have "a political significance and intention" which he does not recognize.

51

The Marxist's argunent is that the liberal has too narrow

and restricted a conception of politics and that his classification of

political behavior must be redrawn.

His descriptions of political

situations and actions omit certain of the central features of, or the
most important facts about the actual situation he confronts or the

actions he performs.
The difference between the Marxist and the liberal is not simply

matter of contrasting political opinions or differing evaluations of
set of given and established facts.

a

a

Rather, the difference is between

two competing conceptual systems through which political phenomena are

individuated and classified.

There is here

a

contrast between two

incompatible ways of thinking about the political world and the kinds
of practical decisions which political agents must make in this
world.
Of course, both the Marxist and the liberal do make appeals to the

facts, but in each case such appeals pass through the particular de-

scription of the facts which that side offers.
remains enclosed within

a

53

Each proponent

certain system of thought and belief,

a

conceptual system designed for describing and evaluating political
situations and action.

different, there is

a

When such conceptual systems are radically
sense in which the combatants are not discussing

"the same" action at all, even though they may be considering the same

agent and the same phase of his activity.

5U
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In order to understand the nature of such fundamental conceptual

disputes, we must abandon the notion that either the physical or the
social world is already divided up into "facts" or atomic units, inde-

pendently of the methods we establish for identifying and differen-

tiating its aspects.

In

addition, we must give up the closely-related

idea that when the social scientist describes this world, he is simply

naming particular distinctions, similarities and differences which are
provided by "the facts" or the elements of reality and experience

themselves.

Hampshire is suggesting that when we describe an event,

situation or action, we are actually characterizing it from
ular perspective or point of view.

a

partic-

His analysis builds upon the work

of Wittgenstein and other linguistic philosophers who maintain that

descriptions are instruments used for particular purposes.

If this

account of description is correct, we must examine the human purposes,

interests and so on that comprise the points of view from which we

describe the world and that enter into the concepts which we use to
describe this world.

55

The proposed alternative account of description is based upon an

analysis of descriptive concepts which is fundamentally opposed to the
notion that our concepts simply mirror elements in the world.

Thought and Action

,

In

Hampshire seems to return to the Greek notion that

something can only be defined in terms of the end or purpose which
things of this particular type are designed to serve.

He states:

'Same church' and 'same building' have a sense that is
specified by the sense of the concept of a church and of
The criterion of
the concept of a building. ...
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identity for churches is part of the sense of the
concept of a church:
the criterion of identity for
buildings is part of the sense of the concept of a
building.

Hampshire does not expand upon this claim but rather moves rapidly
through

a

number of related arguments

,

many of which require more

support than he provides.
Among the various points he makes is the notion that our classi-

ficatory concepts necessarily involve some kind of "contrast between
the central and unquestionable specimens falling under the concept and
the border-line and challengable cases.

.

.

."
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In our application

and use of these concepts, we must distinguish between those standard
and normal cases where something clearly falls under the concept and

those abnormal and

imperfect cases where there is doubt that the

concept legitimately applies.
The grounds of the classif icatory concepts used in ordinary dis-

course are typically provided by the part that the things being classified under the concept in question play in human life.

In other words,

our common sense vocabulary evolves and is used against the background
of standard human interests, needs and purposes.

Given that human

beings are purposive and intentional agents, it is only natural that

they standardly classify objects as potential instruments to be used or
as obstacles to be avoided in carrying out their purposes and inten-

tions

.

The conditions of application of most of the concepts used in

acitivities
day-to-day human life are in this way tied to normal human

.
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and the practical uses of things.

is thus

It

inevitable that people,

in their use of such concepts, make "evaluative" comparisons of various

objects "as serving their typical purposes, or playing their typical
CO

part in human life, more or less well."
v;ere

Of course,

if human beings

only passive observers rather than agents, it might well be the

case that they would classify things simply on the basis of observable

similarities and differences and not make such "evaluative" comparisons

59

A similar

analysis of descriptive concepts, which is presented

more systematically and in greater detail, is found in Julius Kovesi's

Moral Notions

.

Using the concept of 'table* as an example, Kovesi

argues that concepts cannot, either historically or logically, be
viewed as constructed out of various perceivable qualitites (or what he
calls the "material element" of the concept) such as hardness, smoothness, shape, number of legs, and so on.^^

In order to understand the

concept, we must focus on the "guiding principle" or "formal element"

of the concept which we use in calling some objects 'tables' and refusing to call other objects 'tables'.
Thus, we cannot sketch the relevant features which we use in

determining what is and what is not

a

table unless we consider our

reasons for having tables, our need for tables in

purposes which tables are designed to serve.

a

way of life, or the

In general,

what makes

a

particular term or concept "descriptive" is the point or purpose served
or of our
by selecting and grouping certain features of the world
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behavior.

Moreover, we cannot provide

a

final and closed characteri-

zation of this point or purpose of the concept because our reasons for

having tables and our uses of tables may change along with changes in
our needs and social conventions.^''

Certainly, this notion of defining something in terms of its end
or purpose seems to be more problematic when we move away from dis-

cussing objects which are designed for definite human purposes
('church'

and

'table') and turn to examining the concepts used to char-

acterize the political and moral dimensions of human action ('legitimacy',

'freedom',

'murder' or 'good').

However, both Hampshire and

Kovesi hold that those more "abstract" concepts used to describe

thought and action are also classif icatory and descriptive concepts.
Here, as before, we must examine the point or purpose of grouping

certain elements of the world or of our behavior under

a

particular

They are expressly abandoning the notion that our concepts

concept.

simply mirror corresponding elements in reality and insisting upon

investigating the point of view from which each of our concepts, including political and moral ones, are formed and used.
In the preceeding chapter, we saw how Hampshire tied the condi-

tions of application of concepts such as 'pain' and the various emotion

concepts to the manner in which these concepts function in
life and

a

shared set of meanings.
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a

form of

The emotion concepts are not

unique in this respect, for our entire political and moral vocabulary
is

also embedded within

constitutes

a

a

particular web of shared meanings which

common view of the world, society and human nature.

In
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the process of determining the proper rules for the application and use
of these concepts, one must examine the rules inherent in the set of

social practices and the way of life in which these concepts

function.

Hampshire's account of mind emphasizes that certain emotional
states enter into human motivation and behavior only if the agents

possess the concepts for identifying and characterizing such states of
mind.

Similarly, it is only because agents share certain political and

moral concepts that there can be particular types of social action and

political behavior.

Social actions and practices are, in this way,

partially constituted by the concepts and beliefs held by the agents
a

particular society and period of time.

understanding of

a

In addition,

just as

a

in

proper

certain vocabulary of the emotions requires exami-

nation of the form of life and social practices in which these emotion

concepts function, an adequate understanding of

a

particular political

vocabulary is dependent on investigation of the form of life and social
practices in which these political concepts function.

Inherent in

Hampshire's analysis of descriptive and classif icatory concepts, par-

ticularly political and moral concepts,

is

an approach to political

inquiry which challenges the empiricist assumptions supporting the

positivist conception of

a

science of politics.

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of this approach as

applied to the social sciences is that it blinds the social scientist
to conflict by assuming that meanings, beliefs, actions and social

practices are always consistent and have an inherent rationality of
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their own.

However, such

a

neglect of conflict does not necessarily

follow from the kind of approach to political inquiry suggested in

Hampshire's work.

In

fact, his analysis emphasizes and illuminates

central dimensions of political conflict which are frequently ignored
by contemporary political scientists.

In particular,

his analysis

suggests why conceptual disputes in ordinary political discourse as
well as in political science are not necessarily minor terminological

disagreements, but rather frequently express significant political
issues

.

Returning to the example cited above, we find Marxist and liberal
theorists divided over the proper boundaries of the concept of 'politics'

.

Such conceptual debates tend to be heatedly contested precisely

because the classification of certain activities as 'political' or
'non-political' has important political repercussions.

In

classifying

certain activities and decisions as 'economic' rather than 'political'
in nature,

the liberal establishes a framework in which it is taken as

self-evident that such activities should not be regulated by political

institutions and that such decisions should be left in the hands of
private individuals or organizations.

Part of the force of the Marxist

redescription of these activities and decisions as 'political'

is to

raise questions concerning social control of these activities or the

extension of the process of public decision making.
More generally, the revision or overthrow of

a

person's conception

of 'politics' changes his view of his situation and opens up or
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restricts his range of possible actions.

While such conceptual dis-

agreement and conceptual change do not constitute the whole of
politics, they are certainly central aspects of political conflict and

political change.

Hampshire further argues that final resolution of conceptual
debates concerning 'politics' and similar notions is not to be expected.

The concept of 'politics'

is

among those

that are permanently and essentially subject to
question and revision, in the sense that the criteria
of their application are always in dispute and are
.

.

.

recognized to be at all times questionable.

64

These "essentially disputed concepts" have two main characteristics.

First, they are intimately tied to human desires, interests and emoThus, the

tions as well as to social practices and forms of life.

grounds of these classif icatory concepts will change with changes in
human emotions, interests and social practices and arrangements.
In

addition, essentially disputed concepts tend to be "very gene-

ral and abstract" such that changes in their use and application have

broad-ranging effects throughout the entire conceptual framework.

A

dispute about where to draw the boundary between political activities
and decisions and other kinds of activities and decisions quickly

escalates into

a

number of disputes concerning other concepts. These

general-level concepts embody or are integral parts of
sificatory system and to reject

a

a

complex clas-

particular interpretation of the

of
proper boundaries of the concept is to reject central components

that system of classification.
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Many of the central concepts in ordinary discourse about politics,
which must be incorporated into
'polities',

a

science of politics (concepts such as

'democracy' and 'freedom'), are essentially disputed in the

manner Hampshire describes.

He suggests that a comprehensive analysis

of these concepts should proceed on the assumption that there are

certain "nuclear contexts" in which there is general agreement

concerning the application of the concept and various related notions
despite disputes which might arise at the "periphery" of the concept.
One of the central questions confronted in such conceptual analysis

thus concerns whether and how

a

particular concept is to be applied in

new, changed or unusual circumstances.

Of course, the attempt to

answer this question, and thereby differentiate between the "super-

ficial" and the "essential" features of

a

concept, ultimately aims at

"uncovering the point or purpose of the concept, the ultimate ground of
the classification" it embodies.

tional discussion of

a

67

We can clarify and initiate ra-

conceptual dispute only if we examine the point

or purpose which the selection and classification of certain features

of the world, of ourselves, or of our behavior is designed to serve.

The analysis of essentially disputed concepts, of "competing

possibilities of classification," of the connections between related
concepts, and of the consequences of accepting one system of classification rather than another is essentially

a

philosophical task.

es

^.
This

notion of essentially disputed concepts thus constitutes one of the
most significant of the various linkages between philosophical analysis
and political

inquiry identified in Hampshire's work.

That central

.
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concepts of our political vocabulary are open-ended and always subject
to challenge is one of the major reasons why we cannot treat modern po-

litical science as having made
ophy.

a

complete and final break with philos-

This is also one of the ways in which the work of the tradi-

tional political philosophers, who typically analyzed key terms in the

prevailing political and moral vocabulary, remains relevant to the
modern task of explaining political behavior.

In

short, the specula-

tive and normative issues addressed by traditional political theorists

continue to enter into modern political inquiry at its foundation
through the basic concepts with which we describe and explain political

behavior
Political inquiry continues to have what Hampshire calls

a

"spec-

ulative" dimension, in part, because its concepts and classifications
remain tied to inherently speculative accounts of mind and man.

As

investigation of any of the essentially disputed concepts in politics

demonstrates, competing explications and definitions of central concepts are ultimately rooted in competing classifications of human

powers, characteristics and activities.

For example, the Marxist

challenge to the liberal account of liberty ultimately rests on

a

conception of the free individual as someone who has the possibility of

realizing certain potential abilities and powers.

recharacterized from

a

Freedom can also be

Freudian perspective by presenting

the free individual as one who has, at least in part,

a

model of

freed himself of

the influence of certain desires and fixations acquired in infancy.
is
each case, the debate concerning competing accounts of freedom

In
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directly linked to controversies concerning the proper characterization
and classification of the powers of the human mind and the essential

activities of human beings.
It

is

in this sense that

Hampshire considers the concept of 'man'

to be the "natural starting-point" in the analysis of essentially

disputed concepts and competing classif icatory systems.

The concepts,

distinctions and classifications which make up our political and moral

vocabulary are bound to human interests, powers and activities as well
as

in

social practices and forms of life.

Since the philosopher or po-

litical theorist who undertakes the analysis of such concepts and clas-

sifications must set out or make assumptions concerning the division
and classification of human powers and activities, philosophy itself
can be characterized as "a search for

'a

definition of man'"
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Al-

though the traditional political theorists were frequently mistaken in
identifying this search with

a

search for "an immutable essence," they

correctly perceived the connections between their attempts to understand society and politics and their attempts to set out coherent

accounts of man and mind.
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This emphasis on the "speculative" dimension of political philos-

ophy and political inquiry in general, or the claim that ultimately the

enterprise of political inquiry is like philosophy involved in

a

"spec-

to
ulative" search for "a definition of man" in particular, is so alien

that
the prevailing mode of thought in contemporary political science
it

almost invites misinterpretation.

Yet,

Hampshire's claims do have
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significant implications for political inquiry, and it is worthwhile to

separate carefully his argument from mistaken characterizations of it.
In the

first place, it must be reemphasized that it would be

serious mistake to interpret his position as

a

a

call for the substi-

tution of the kind of metaphysical system-building identified with
Hegel for the empirical study of political phenomena.

The most basic

point which underpins his analysis is not that "speculative" political

theory must replace empirical research, but rather that, in Hannah
Pitkin's words, "empirical investigation presupposes conceptual definition."
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If a

political scientist is to investigate the "political"

characteristics of modern corporations and corporate behavior or the
various "interests" advanced during the formulation of

particular

a

public policy, he must have an adequate conception of what 'politics'
or 'interests' are.

In other words,

it

is the conceptual

framework

utilized by the researcher, including the explicit or implicit definitions of key concepts, which provides the basis for classifying

certain facts as relevant and other facts as irrelevant to the study of
a

particular topic.
Yet, most political scientists would find nothing which is es-

pecially revolutionary in this emphasis on conceptual frameworks and

would certainly challenge the idea that this introduced

dimension into political inquiry.

a

speculative

Mainstream political science has

long recognized the importance of concepts as the basic building blocks
of an empirical social science and has devoted much attention to con-

cept formation.

Of course, Hampshire's perspective does seem to place
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strong emphasis on utilization of the techniques developed in linguistic philosophy in the clarification of concepts used in political

inquiry.

Moreover, if he is correct, it is clear that examination of the

concepts used in everyday political thought and action is the necessary
starting point when addressing the basic problems of conceptual clarification and definition found in political inquiry.

His analysis does

suggest that the distinctions and classifications embodied in the

everyday language of politics (including such concepts as authority,
freedom, equality, democracy, justice, power and coercion) capture or

express some of the most important features of political life.

Thus,

the clarification or explication of these concepts is, at the very
least, a necessary prerequisite to the empirical study of politics.

Although this emphasis on analysis of the concepts of everyday political discourse raises little controversy, Hampshire's characterization of this enterprise as inherently "speculative" seems problematic.

Certainly, as Hampshire himself acknowledges, the process of clarifying
or explicating concepts necessarily involves more than simply reporting

the ways in which people define political concepts, and philosophers

engaged in this enterprise frequently recommend the modification of

a

concept in order to eliminate ambiguity or confusion.

Hampshire's use of the term "speculative" seems to suggest that
there is something mysterious about this process or its results:
it does not utilize public criteria of adequacy,

kind of uncheckable,

that

that it involves some

intuitive procedures, or that the results of
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concept clarification remain essentially vague and mysterious.

How-

ever, as practioners of linguistic analysis repeatedly point out, the

explication and modification of concepts are attempted on the basis of
an examination of the rules which people implicitly use in applying the

concept in certain cases and not others, or in classifying certain
things and not others as falling under

a

particular concept.

Thus, the

explication of political concepts proceeds not by any abstract speculation but rather by attempting to make these rules explicit, by

identifying the essential features of
logical relationships among

a

a

concept, and by examining the

particular concept and related con-

cepts J'^

However, Hamphsire maintains that the definitions of essentially

disputed concepts utilized by the researcher or the explications of
these concepts provided by the theorist are "speculative" not because
these concepts remain vague and mysterious despite our attempts at

clarification, but rather because these concepts are essentially provisional, open-ended and normative.

Since the vocabulary of thought

and action (a vocabulary which includes such fundamental, essentially

disputed concepts as man, mind, need, want, intention, etc.) is

a

central part of our political vocabulary and our political life, the

concepts we use to describe and evaluate political life exhibit the
same open-ended quality which is characteristic of these mental terms.
In

part, this open-endedness of our political concepts simply

reflects the ever-present possibility of social change.

With the

development of new forms of human association or fundamental changes

ii
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social forms and practices, there is change in the human interests,

needs and purposes which our political vocabulary must serve. '^"^

Be-

cause human society is dynamic rather than static, and our concepts

evolve as they are applied to new or changed circumstances, the most

central concepts in our political vocabulary are inherently open-ended.
In

addition,

Hampshire's analysis connects this open-endedness of

our political concepts with the human powers of self-reflection or the

reflexivity of human life.

As numerous social theorists and philos-

ophers have acknowledged, our vocabulary of thought and action continues to evolve with the discovery of additional empirical knowledge
as well as, although this is not so frequently recognized, through the

impact of the creative powers of the arts.

simply

a m.atter

However, this is not always

of change in the conceptual framework through which we

understand the world and our place in it.

Rather we ourselves are

changed to the extent that part of what we consider human nature, par-

ticularly the spectrum of human emotions and feelings, changes along
with changes in our forms of knowledge and self-consciousness.
In short,

any account of an essentially disputed concept such as

politics or freedom remains provisional despite advances in our empirical understanding of political behavior and political phenomena as

well as in our philosophical analyses of the problems connected to

these concepts.

Hamshire argues that the work of social theorists and

philosophers must be continually reexamined, not simply because their
charanalyses may be mistaken in certain ways, but also because thier
stages
acterizations of thought and action may not be adequate to later

.
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of human knowledge, self-understanding and social life.

This same

qualification applies to the conceptual frameworks which guide empirical political inquiry,

and the explanatory frameworks used in the

social sciences are no less "speculative" than the classical models in
this sense of the term.

Since the possibility of change in either our

understanding of human nature or in the basic subject matter, human
nature itself, is always open, no particular classif icatory scheme

concerning thought and action, including those used by the researcher
studying political behavior, can be allowed to stand uncriticized and
7 ft

unchallenged

Hampshire's analysis also advances

a

second claim concerning the

"speculative" nature of contemporary political inquiry:

the normative

and evaluative dimensions of traditional political philosophy have not

been eliminated by adopting scientific methods and procedures.

normative dimension enters political inquiry not through

a

This

limited set

of questions concerning the "just state" or the best form of govern-

ment, but rather through the concepts which are used to describe as

well as to evaluate political behavior.

The political researcher and

theorist, like the citizen and politician, must apply and use

a

broad

range of essentially disputed concepts in order to characterize political life.

The adoption of

a

particular definition or use of one of

these concepts is not an isolated, technical problem concerning only
the usefulness of this definition in

adopt

a

a

particular context.

Rather, to

particular definition or use of an essentially disputed concept
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is to make a choice among competing systems of classification,

where "systematic judgements of value have to be
It

is

a

choice

made."''"''

at this point, where Hampshire makes the claim that there is

an ineradicable normative dimension built into the language of poli-

tics, that the disagreements between Hampshire and the adherents of the

dominant model of

a

science of politics come to

a

head.

According to

this prevailing positivist model, it is clear that the political scien-

tist cannot use the ordinary language of politics exactly as it stands

because it is unsuitable for the scientific purposes of political
inquiry.

After all, one of the basic prerequisites of scientific

inquiry in any field is the establishment of objective, scientific
criteria for the application and use of key concepts.

Clearly, such

criteria must be acceptable to various users of these concepts despite
any normative differences which might divide them.

In

short, the

everyday language of politics with its normative dimensions must be
restructured into
a

a

neutral descriptive language which is suitable for

science of politics.
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From this perspective, any approach to the study of politics which

ignores this distinction between facts and values, failing to separate

empirical discourse about what is from normative discourse about what
ought to be, will fall into the same errors and confusions which marred

traditional political philosophy.

This positivist conception of a

science of politics does not rest upon the claim that normative con-

siderations must be totally excluded from political inquiry, but rather
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that these two types of discourse or sets of concepts are
analytically

distinct and must be kept separate.
Implicit in this view of the fact-value dichotomy is

political inquiry as the product of

a

two-stage process.

a

notion of

At the first

stage, that of empirical political inquiry, the political scientist

utilizes descriptive concepts in order to construct neutral descriptions of political phenomena which are acceptable to any investigator

regardless of his ideology or values.

Only after this task has been

completed can the political scientist undertake the second stage of the
process, normative political inquiry:
the described phenomena.

making normative judgments about
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From the perspective of those who accept this fact-value dichotomy
and the two-stage model of political inquiry,

Hampshire's analysis of

essentially disputed concepts and the speculative dimension of political inquiry seems fundamentally confused and mistaken.

For Hampshire's

treatment fails to distinguish those descriptive concepts with regard
to which intersubjective agreement among different observers can be

attained from those normative concepts which are value-laden and

necessarily controversial.

inquiry is formulating

The first and essential step in political

neutral descriptive language by eliminating

a

the predominantly normative concepts from this descriptive vocabulary
and by eliminating any normative criteria in the application of all

concepts which are primarily descriptive.

of this process will be

a

Presumably, the end product

neutral, descriptive language formed from the

point of view of the scientific observer.

.
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The major thrust of Hampshire's argument is that this notion of

a

value-neutral, descriptive language of politics as the foundation of

a

value-free empirical science of politics

is

underpinned by mistaken

views of how we describe, of how we evaluate, and of the relationship

between description and evaluation.

As we have seen, the task of de-

scription is much more complicated than simply picking out or naming

certain given and obvious facts and actions which make up the real
world and social life.

We select and group certain features of ob-

jects, states of affairs and actions under the rubric of

a

particular

concept because such classification serves general as well as particular human purposes, interests, and needs.
Among the various purposes and interests which enter into the con-

cepts, distinctions and classifications used to characterize political

phenomena and behavior are those which are evaluative and normative.
For example, just as in the case of classif icatory concepts such as

'table,' we cannot,

in our use of concepts like

'freedom' and

'politics,' avoid the contrast between those situations, activites and
so on which advance standard human interests and those which do not.
It

is

in

this sense that our political vocabulary as well as our moral

vocabulary revolves around some notion of the contrast between:
activities that are essential to men as men and
those that are essentially destructive and that prevent
men from realizing their potentialities as human
.

.

.

beings
The argument is not that the political scientist has an ethical

obligation to address certain normative issues raised by such

a

M06

contrast, but rather that this contrast is an essential feature of the

concepts we use to describe and explain political behavior and events.
In other words,

many of the concepts used to describe or characterize

those aspects of human motivation and behavior which are of interest to
the political scientist are formed from

a

normative point of view.

This is true not only of the general-level concepts such as

'rights,'

'justice'

or

'good'

which have been typically stressed in

analyses of moral concepts in analytic philosophy, but also of
host of more specific concepts as well.

a

whole

We describe 'political actors

as making promises, owing debts, lying, committing treasonable acts or

being corrupt.

We characterize the general policies of governments or

the acts of governmental officials as being legitimate, dictatorial,

tyrannical, racist or sexist.
The claim that these and other such concepts describe from

normative point of view is not an attempt to construct
system of ethics which provides

a

a

a

particular

set of norms guiding human conduct.

Rather, the point is that we would not have these concepts at all, that

they would never have been formed, if it were not for the basic normative human interests and purposes which these terms embody.

words, these concepts do not group

a

In

other

set of certain activities under a

rubric on the basis of purely descriptive considerations which are

detached and separate from the evaluation of these activities.

More-

not come
over, the evaluative or normative force of such concepts does

from the expression of an attitude or the making of

about

a

a

value judgment

particular set of facts already and independently collected.

.

U07

The attempt to eliminate the normative dimension of such concepts would

necessarily destroy the point or purpose which these concepts serve in
our discourse.

For example, as Hampshire's analysis of the concept of freedom

demonstrates, our characterizations of particular political activities
as

"free" or "unfree" is hardly divorced from normative criteria.

When

we use the concept of freedom, we are describing from a point of view

which involves

a

notion of autonomy or the extent to which

a

person's

thought and action is his own rather than determined by external forces
(and Hampshire emphasizes the extent to which this includes the ca-

pacity to form intentions and purposes as well as the absence of external constraints),

dividual, and

a

a

notion of human dignity or the value of the in-

notion of opportunity for self-development of one's own

potential.
Of course, it is possible for the political scientist to redefine

'freedom' such that these normative dimensions are eliminated.

But to

the extent that theorists and researchers, in the interest of construc-

ting

a

value-free science of politics, successfully eliminate the

normative elements attached to such concepts as 'freedom,' they destroy
the very point or purpose which these concepts serve in our political

discourse
It

is

largely due to the fact that such reformulations of basic

concepts have focused on one concept or

a

narrow range of concepts that

not been
the radical nature and consequences of this enterprise have

realized.

Yet,

if we take this position seriously,

it mandates a
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systematic purge of the normative dimensions of the entire complex web
of interrelated concepts which make up our political vocabulary, and it

calls for
If

ject,

a

a

revolutionary reformulation of our language.

Hamshire's analysis is correct, the aim of this radical pro-

purely descriptive language of politics which reflects the

point of view of

a

detached scientific observer, is

pursuit of this false conception of

a

false ideal.

a

In

purely descriptive conceptual

framework, such an approach would restructure our language by elimi-

nating or gutting those concepts which are most useful in describing
the more significant and sophisticated froms of political behavior.

would be left with

a

We

conceptual framework which might be adequate for

describing crude physical movements, but certainly could not deal with
the kinds of complex human actions which are of greatest interest to
the political scientist.
In addition,

it should be noted that such a radical reformulation

of our political vocabulary would involve much more than simply
•change in our terminology.

a

The evaluative and normative interests and

purposes which our concepts incorporate are themselves the products of
our nature as human and social beings, of our social practices and

forms of life.

This redefinition of concepts thus involves not simply

a

change in the words we used to describe the world around us, but also

a

basic change in the way we think about ourselves, our social rela-

tionships with others and our social life.

Given that reflexivity is

central dimension of human life, this is ultimately

a

proposal for

a
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revolutionary change in human nature, social relationships and
politics.

Qq

Certainly, few political scientists have explicitly advocated the
kind of radical reformulation of our political vocabulary which would

ultimately result from their treatment of concepts.

However, the basic

assumptions, particularly the fact-value dichotomy, which remain per-

vasive in contemporary views of the scope and methods of political
science, do incorporate this same limited view of political discourse.

Indeed, these contestable accounts of description, evaluation, and the

relation between the two continue to be serious obstacles in our attempts to develop more adequate and accurate explanations of political
behavior, to understand the potential biases and distortions incor-

porated in the conceptual frameworks which guide empirical research,
and to come to grips with the issues and problems raised by the search
for objectivity in political inquiry.

The Reflexive Relation Between Theorv and Fact

Hampshire makes no attempt to set out a systematic political
theory or a model of political inquiry, and he nowhere offers a com-

prehensive statement of the implications of his work for political
theory or political inquiry.

Yet, it is clear that his analyses of the

connections between knowledge and freedom, essentially disputed conquescepts, and related topics are directly revlevant to a number of

including
tions which concern the political theorist and researcher,
political
such questions as "What kinds of concepts are admissible in
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inquiry?" and "What is the relationship between fact and value or de-

scription and evaluation?"

It is also clear, contra Murdoch,

that this

work challenges certain standard assumptions, such as the fact- value
dichotomy, which have underpinned liberal political theory and the

positivist model of a science of politics or society.
However, it might still seem that Hampshire's analysis of these

philosophical issues remains peripheral to those questions which are
now at the forefront in political theory and political inquiry.

After

all, political scientists are generally agreed that political inquiry

involves more than simply collecting and recording "facts" or pieces of
information, and that it involves more than simply doing case studies
or presenting the kinds of descriptions of political behavior and

institutions offered by the journalist.

The aim of political inquiry

is to provide explanations of political phenomena,

to provide adequate

and coherent accounts of political behavior, political life, and poli-

tical change.
As we have seen, the dominant account of such explanation remains

that provided by the positivist model, according to which there are no

fundamental differences in method between the natural and the social
sciences.

This model portrays the many seemingly different kinds of

explanation used by political scientists as but variations of one model
that
of scientific explanation, the covering-law model, which dictates

scientific explanation requires genuine, law-like generalizations.
At the same time,

this model of political inquiry is not accepted

constitutes
universally and there is now growing debate concerning what
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an adequate explanation of political behavior.

Adherents of an al-

ternative, so-called "interpretative" or "interpretive" model of political inquiry hold that there are basic methodological differences

which set the social sciences or human sciences apart from the physical
sciences.

In brief,

their main contention is that the phenomena

studied by the social scientist, human actions, are fundamentally

different from the phenomena studied by the physcial scientist because
they are constituted, at least in part, by the concepts, intentions,
and purposes of, or meanings for, the agents involved in the

activity.
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From the perspective of the political scientist, Hampshire's work
on thought and action must be judged largely on the basis of its con-

tributions to this discussion.

It might well seem that Hampshire has

very little to offer here, that his philosophical treatment of thought
and action is for the most part irrelevant to the central questions

concerning the structure of an adequate or proper explanation.

Al-

though he discusses extensively the concept of action and its relation
to intentions,

purposes and beliefs, he makes no real effort to relate

these to major problems in political theory or research.
Indeed, his primary concern seems to be with the problems of the

individual moral agent who is deciding between alternative courses of
action or who is criticizing and evaluating the actions of others, not
with the problems of the scientific observer who is trying to give an

accurate and adequate account of the political behavior.

Moreover,

while he does stress the centrality of intention to action, he offers
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no specific criticism of the covering-law model and makes extensive use

of causal explanations in his own accounts of human behavior.

In

short, Hampshire's position, at least as it relates to this debate,

seems ambiguous and unclear, and he seems unaware of the questions

concerning the explanation of human action which are most important to
political inquiry.
If Hampshire' s contributions to this debate concerning the proper

structure of scientific explanations of human action seem minimal, his

contributions to a second significant topic, the role of theories in
political inquiry, seems virtually nonexistent.

Most political scien-

tists continue to accept the view that the development of adequate

explanations of political phenomena is ultimately dependent upon the

discovery of genuine, testable theories of politics.
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According to

the positivist model, singular events or facts are explained in

reference to empirical generalizations or laws, and these laws are in
turn explained in reference to a theory.

The accepted model of a

genuine scientific theory remains that of a hypothetico-deductive
system in which the laws of generalizations subsumed under the theory
can be deduced from the basic principles of the theory.
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However, the role and structure of theories in scientific expla-

nation in general and in explanation of social phenomena in particular
is also a topic of controversy.

In contemporary philosophy of science,

various critiques of the covering-law model of explanation have genof a
erated a number of serious challenges to the positivist conception

scientific theory.

The debates stimulated by these criticisms involve
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a number of complex,

technical issues, particularly controversies

surrounding the validity of the distinction between theoretical and

observation terms which has underpinned the standard or "orthodox" view
of theories as well as debates over the difficulties regarding the

testability or falsif lability of theories.

8ft

In regard to political inquiry or the social sciences in general,

certain advocates of the interpretive model have argued that the study
of politics or society requires a different type of explanation which

neither leads to nor depends upon the development of the kinds of
theories of politics envisioned by the positivists.
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In contrast,

while most political scientists admit that we cannot, at least at
present, claim to have discovered any theories of politics in the sense
of the "high-level" model of theory sketched above, we can continue to

utilize a "lower-level" notion of theory as

a

collection of empirical

generalizations which functions to organize and systematize knowledge
in a particular field,

such as the study of voting behavior.

90

Moreover, according to this pragmatic approach to the problem of
theory, political researchers can utilize models and various other

heuristic devices, which, while not genuine theories of politics, can
be used to guide research and generate hypotheses that can be tested.

Accordingly, we can point to a number of different "theories" in the
sense of conceptual frameworks, paradigms or approaches to the study of

political phenomena, (psychological theory, game theory and decision-

making theory, role theory, group theory, communications theory, the
power approach and systems analysis) which have promise as explanatory

.
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or potentially explanatory devices.^

Of course, basic problems con-

cerning theory development, the construction of operational definitions, the relationship between theoretical and observational concepts,
and the testing and evaluation of rival conceptual frameworks remain.

This brief summary of the controversies surrounding the question
of the role of theory in political inquiry suggests a second general

criterion for judging the significance of Hampshire's work for the political scientist.

As we saw in the case of the controversy over

explanation of human action, he does raise and examine a number of
different issues, in particular the notion of "the given" which underpinned past attempts to provide scientific theories with a bedrock of

certainty, that are relevant to questions concerning the role of theory
in science.

But his treatment of these issues not only includes no

specific discussion of the theoretical difficulties confronted in the
social sciences, but also seems unclear, unorganized and written in the

language of outdated philosophical discussions of such issues rather
than in the terminology which prevails in contemporary philosophy of

science or empirical political theory.

Again, Hampshire's analysis

seems to have little to offer, either in relation to the fundamental,

general-level debate concerning whether

a

genuine theory of politics is

essential or possible, or in relation to more specific problems con-

cerning the testability of theories or the assessment of competing
theories
I

have been considering

a

possible line of criticism of

Hampshire's work offered from the perspective of mainstream political
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science:

namely, that although some of his theses bear indirectly on

issues which are of some concern to political inquiry, his work fails
to make any kind of precise, lasting contribution to attempts to deal

with the most significant and troublesome problems we now face in the
discipline.

The controverises concerning the explanation of human

action and the related questions regarding the role and structure of

theory in political inquiry are rather obvious examples of these more
crucial concerns.

However,

I

believe that this line of criticism is

mistaken and that Hampshire's analysis, v/hich covers a broad range of
philosophical and conceptual problems, offers important insights

concerning the nature of political inquiry and political theory.
In particular, his work makes a valuable contribution to on-going

efforts to clarify and resolve the complex problems concerning the

methodological sameness or distinctiveness of the social sciences and
the physical sciences.

One of his principal claims, which is implicit

in such works as Thought and Action and is stated expressly in his

essay "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," is that any

explanation or theory or political behavior, because it must account
for human thought and action, faces a set of difficulties which are

fundamentally different from those in the physical sciences.
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At the

very least, his views provide a valuable corrective to the continuing
tendency within contemporary political science to assimilate, auto-

matically and uncritically, explanation and theory in political inquiry
to models from the physical sciences.

In addition, his analysis
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identifies and examines the central issue separating the positivist and

interpretive models of political inquiry.

Hampshire's argument that theory and explanation in political
inquiry, or more broadly, in the social or human sciences, are essen-

tially different from the models of theory and explanation appropriate
to the physical sciences rests upon a general point and a more specific

point.

The general point is simply that Hampshire, like the tradi-

tional political theorists, recognizes and addresses the crucial con-

nections between certain theories of knowledge and mind on the one hand
and a particular theory of politics on the other.
In his view,

the explanations and theories generated in political

inquiry are more accurately characterized as conceptual frameworks
rather than deductive systems.

They must be characterized in this way

not because they represent a pre- theoretical

process which culminates in

a

,

preliminary stage in a

genuine theory of politics but rather

because they necessarily rest on a number of philosophical and essen-

tially contestable positions.

More specifically, the explanatory

frameworks and theories utilized in political inquiry are distinct from
those in the physical sciences in that they presuppose a conception of

mind or a model of human nature:

a set of fundamental,

provisional as-

sumptions concerning human motivation and behavior, human knowledge and
self-knowledge, the nature of society and social relationships, and

human rationality.
This general point about political and social theory and the

explanatory frameworks used in the social sciences is ultimately
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grounded upon Hampshire's thesis concering the distinctiveness of

mental and physical concepts.

As we have seen, Hampshire holds that

there is an element of prescriptive and speculative choice inherent in

our selection and definiton of the mental concepts used to describe and

explain human motivation and behavior.

However, most of the commentary

on his work has focused on the implications of this for the fact-value

dichotomy and ignored its more general implications for political
inquiry.

One of the few social scientists to recognize the broader

significance of Hampshire's thesis is

Science and Political Theory

,

W.

G.

Runciman, who in Social

acknowledges:

What this means, in the context of these present essays,
is that a political sociology
that is, an explanation
or set of explanations of political behavior must
depend even for its vocabulary on some kind of philos-

—

ophical position.

—
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Although such philosophical positions underpinning explanation and
theory in the social sciences vary widely in the extent to which their

component parts are expressly articulated or even acknowledged, they

necessarily include some basic assumptions about the nature of reality,
knowledge and mind,
Runciman correctly links this general point concerning the methodological distinctiveness of the social and physical sciences with the

frequently stated but seldom understood "fact that the social sciences
deal with actions and not events."

Moreover, he, again correctly,

notes that this fact imposes real limits on the "validity of positivist

methods" in the social and behavioral sciences.

But Runciman fails to

418

examine in sufficient detail exactly what Hampshire means when he
claims that explanations of human activities (unlike explanations of
events) and political and social theories (unlike theories in the phy-

sical sciences) pre-suppose a philosophical, provisional view of mind
or human nature.

In short, Runciman fails to identify and discuss the

more specific point which Hampshire makes about these differences as
they relate to the difference between mental and physical concepts.
In addition,

this claim that the explanatory frameworks used in

the social sciences presuppose a philosophical conception of mind or

human nature is highly susceptible to misinterpretation.

In the first

place, Hampshire is not arguing that any such model is immune, or

should be treated as if it were immune, to modification or correction
on the basis of future discoveries emerging from empirical research.
He also certainly does not take any existing model of mind or human

nature, including any model which is implicit in our ordinary discourse
about thought and action, as providing definite limits on the possible

future developments in the study of human motivation and behavior.
Finally, he does not hold that there is a model of human nature which

establishes clear limits on what the future holds in political inquiry
or sociology,

precluding for example, the possibility of the discovery

of fundamental social determinants of human behavior or social change

which are not now recognized or understood.
In contrast, Hampshire maintains that the kind of

a

priQri anthro-

pologies, with their static and limited views of human nature and
philosophy
social forms of life, which dominated traditional political

.
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will be displaced as the human and social sciences advance.
as he notes,

However,

advances in psychology, sociology and other disciplines

have not, up to this point, yielded a "powerful theory, empirically
tested, and confirmed and to a high degree exact. "^^

Also, he points

out that the very possibility of the development of an empirical theory

of human nature or political behavior, which fundamentally alters our

everyday classifications and explanations of human thought and action,
IS a matter of dispute.
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Hampshire's central thesis is that no matter how this debate turns
out, no matter what the future holds for the social and human sciences,

there remains an essential and ineliminable difference which will

always set explanation and theory in the social sciences apart from

explanation and theory in the physical sciences.

In short,

this basic

difference is that there is a special kind of interplay between theory
and fact which is unique to the social sciences.

The argument is not

only that the scheme of classification and categorization attached to

any political theory or explanatory framework incorporates contestable

assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, but also that a political
theory, and the theories of knowledge and mind embedded within it, "are

part of the consciousness, and of the self-conscious attitudes, which

they also interpret,"

In other words, the theories which are used to

explain political attitudes, political behavior and the political
process modify political attitudes, political behavior and the political process when they become part of the consciousness of political

agents
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The paradigm for understanding this interplay between theory and
fact is provided by Hampshire's account of the relationship between our

emotions, desires, attitudes and other mental states on the one hand
and the theories which we use to classify and explain these states on
the other.

One of the most important insights offered by Hampshire's

account of mind is that human emotions, desires and so on change as our

understanding of the classification and causes of these various states
of mind change.

In short,

the acceptance of a modification in the

prevailing theory or explanatory framework used to characterize and
Qft

explain human emotions alters the emotions themselves.

This basic

difference between such mental concepts and our physical concepts is
crucial to understanding the fundamental difference between the ex-

planation of human action, including political action, and the

explanation of animal behavior or physical events.
The social scientist must confront this same reflexive relationship in the theories used to classify and explain social action and

social structure, and this is the source of a whole set of difficulties

which are peculiar to the social sciences.

Clearly, this position in

no way implies the idealist view that simply changing people's beliefs

about power relationships or institutional structures automatically

changes the distribution of power or the institutional arrangements.
In addition, Hampshire expressly acknowledges that social scientists

must continue to look for the causes of social change in basic economic
and social relationships,

institutional arrangements and historical

conditions rather than in beliefs or mental states.

QQ

This analysis of
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social explanation and theory calls not for a radical shift in what

social scientists study, but rather for change in the approach to the

study of social phenomena, particularly in the prevailing lack of

awareness or self-consciousness of this relationship between these phenomena and the theories by which they are explained.
The reevaluation of the role of political and social theory which

Hampshire demands begins, not with

a

radical restructuring of the scope

and aims of such theory, but rather with an emphasis on exactly those

functions of theory which are still stressed in contemporary social
science.

Accordingly, the major general function of political or

social theory is to provide a coherent and accurate world view or image
of social reality.

At the very least,

this entails analysis of the

existing social structure, including its component parts and how they
are related to one another.

Also,

the theory attempts to account for

the basic mechanisms or causes of social change, placing the contem-

porary social order in some kind of historical and comparative con.

,

text.
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However, according to Hampshire, the basic explanatory function of

political and social theory, or the activity of political and social
analysis, cannot be considered completely separate and divorced from

practical life and everyday politics.

Every political agent is a poli-

tical or social theorist in the sense that he requires some conceptual
scheme, no matter how crude or mistaken, for classifying and explaining

what is happening in the world around him and why.

This political

situation and
theory, which he uses to characterize his own political
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his political attitudes and actions, is in part constitutive of his po-

litical situation, attitudes and activities. Thus, his theoretical

understanding of the basic divisions in society, of his own position in
relation to these divisions, and of his own political interests and
purposes of others provides the basis of his group identifications,
loyalties and basic political attitudes.

In other words, his self-

consciousness of those interests and attitudes, including his knowledge
of their sociological causes, is part of the process through which

these interests and attitudes are formed.

""^^

To the extent that political actors accept a new political theory,

using it to characterize their own political situation and political

activities, and using its explanatory power to understand what is

happening within and to themselves as well as what is happening in the
world around them, their political situation and potential range of political activities is changed as well.

A rather abstract but still

powerful example of exactly this kind of change can be drawn from the
first chapter of

C.

Wright Mill's The Sociological Imagination
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It starts with the picture of a group of people who, accepting the

classifications and explanations inherent in a prevailing political
theory, perceive themselves as isolated individuals whose basic political interests and purposes are in conflict with those of all others be-

cause of a war of all against all for scarce resources.

Given this

individualistic perspective, each person interprets the fundamental

difficulties and problems which he confronts in daily life as personal
troubles, essentially unrelated to the personal troubles of others or
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to more general social conditions.

Moreover, since these troubles are

viewed as the consequences of individual decisions, actions and omissions, the individual must take full responsibility for them, and any

possible resolution of his personal troubles must be achieved through

individual effort.
These individuals are now exposed to a rival political theory
which,

incorporating what Mills calls "the sociological imagination,"

provides

a

more sophisticated analysis of the social structure, its

component parts, the process of change, and how an individual is
affected by all this.

As a particular individual begins to apply the

classifications and explanations offered by this alternative theory, he
becomes aware of other individuals in social situations which are
similar to his own, and begins to realize that the troubles which he

experiences in his personal life are commonly experienced by others in
similar social circumstances.

In other words, as he comes to a deeper

understanding of the causal mechanism that links the problems which he
confronts in daily life to basic structural and institutional arrangements, he comes to see these problems as not simply the consequences of

individual failings.

Given his new understanding of the political and

social system, it is clear not only that individuals cannot be held
fully responsible for the problems which pervade their daily lives, but
also that any real solution to these problems must somehow alter the

basic social and structural causes of these difficulties.
In short, the same problems which were previously viewed as per-

sonal troubles are now seen as a social issue.

The individual, on the

.
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basis of the more sophisticated social theory which is now available
to
him,

recognizes that he is a member of

a

group with common interests

and purposes in eliminating or alleviating shared problems, and begins
to identify with this group and its common goals.

emphasizes

a

Hampshire's analysis

particular feature of this transition:

that theoretical

self-consciousness or awareness of common interests and purposes in
dealing with this social issue is part of the process through which
political attitudes are changed and new interests and purposes are
formed

Both Hampshire and Mills suggest that further examination of this
special kind of interplay between theory and fact is an essential task
facing contemporary American social science.
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Hampshire, in partic-

ular, contends that neglect of this interplay between theory and fact

has been a central deficiency common to both liberal political theory
and positivist social science.

As we saw in the second chapter, the

early empiricist accounts of knowledge and mind lacked an adequate

conception of self-knowledge and consciousness, thereby precluding

recognition of the central role of self-consciousness or reflexivity in
human action.

As a result,

liberal political theory largely ignored

the central function of consciousness of common interests and purposes
or of a particular historical role in social groups and classes.

Hampshire, of course, also maintains that this remains a central

deficiency in contemporary social science.
a

In short, Wrong's vision of

dialectical union of the conceptions of "sociological man" and "psy-

chological man" has not been achieved because American social science
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continues to rely on

a

methodological approach which incorporates

fundamental empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind,

thereby neglecting or distorting the role of self-consciousness and
reflexivity in human action and social life.

Thus, his principal

charge in relation to political inquiry is that the dominant model of

a

science of politics, founded on empiricist conceptions of knowledge and

mind as these were reformulated by the positivists, ignores the crucial

reflexive relationship between fact and theory.
Most political scientists would reject this charge as being fun-

damentally confused and completely unfounded.

After all, Hampshire's

point that human beings sometimes modify their political behavior as a

result of gaining new knowledge of or an alternative theory of political processes and social structures is hardly innovative.

It has long

been recognized that political theories can and do become ideologies,
and that, as ideologies, they are significant factors affecting political behavior and social change.

On the micropolitical level, it is clear that the acceptance of

certain beliefs about the political structure or political change may
result in the formation or alteration of particular attitudes, interests, or other states of consciousness which, in turn, affect an indi-

vidual's political behavior.

Likewise, on the macropolitical level,

political scientists have long acknowledged that ideologies, when

widely shared, are part of the complex causal mechanism which accounts
for social change.

In short, most social scientists consider this

feature of human behavior to be a rather minor difficulty which can be

.
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safely ignored in most cases or which can be controlled for when ne-

cessary

105

Yet, Hampshire's contention is that, although political scientists

acknowledge political beliefs, theories, attitudes and states of consciousness as separate parts of the causal chain explaining political
behavior or political change, they ignore the "more intimate reflexive
relation, in which the theory is part of the state of consciousness
v/hich it interprets.

..."

Because positivist social science rests

on an epistemology which shares the same fundamental flaws inherent in
the theory of knowledge of the Enlightenment, modern political scien-

tists like the Enlightenment thinkers neglect:

questions about ref lexiveness the complicated
loop that intelligibly connects the theory of the
changes in one's own society with oneself, together with
.

.

a group or class,

In short,

,

.

as the agent of change.
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reflexivity is a crucial feature of political behavior and

political life, and the same models of theory and explanation which
have been used quite successfully in the physical sciences cannot

adequately account for this feature of human activity.
There is a basic disagreement here between Hampshire and those who
accept the basic tenets of the positivist model of a social science

concerning the importance of this reflexive relation and of the problems it presents to the social scientist.

Defenders of the positivist

conception challenge the theses that this notion of reflexivity repreit
sents a problem which is unique to the social sciences and that

,
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reveals any real deficiencies in prevailing models of theory and explanation.
Ernest Nagel provides a systematic and comprehensive statement of
this position under the heading "Knowledge of Social Phenomena as

Social Variable" in his The Structure of Sciencp J^^

a

Nagel holds that

what Hampshire calls the reflexive relation actually presents two

different problems to the social scientist:

one concerning the actual

study or investigation of social phenomena and another concerning the

validity of the conclusions reached in the study of social phenomena.
The first difficulty can be clearly illustrated by considering

survey research concerning voting behavior, attitudes toward minority
groups and so on.

The problem, briefly stated, is even if we are

satisfied that all the established guidelines for survey research are
followed (including research design, construction of the questionaire

interviewing techniques, and so on) and that the data have not been
distorted through improper methods or procedures, it is still possible
that the respondent's knowledge that he is being interviewed, or more

generally, that he is the object of a study, radically affects the

responses he gives.

In other words,

it remains problematic whether the

social scientist has produced changes in the subject matter through his

investigation of the subject matter.
While Nagel acknowledges the seriousness of this problem, he
argues that it is neither unique to the social sciences nor insurmountable.

He notes that when a physical scientist immerses a thermometer

into a liquid to measure its temperature, this procedure introduces
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some change in the temperature of the liquid.

Moreover, physical

scientists have become much more aware of the extent of this general

problem of producing change in the subject matter through the

investigation process in connection with the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle in quantum mechanics,

Nagel's argument is that the only real difference between the
physical and the social sciences is found in the specific mechanism

through which such changes are introduced.

In the social sciences,

this mechanism is simply more complex, involving a subject's knowledge
that he is the subject of a scientific investigation.

But this dif-

ference in the mechanism of change does not have any bearing on the

nature of the problem presented by such changes.

In either case,

the

investigator must search for independent evidence concerning the extent
of change introduced by certain investigative procedures.

In the

social sciences, this search requires the use of techniques insuring
that subjects remain unaware that they are being studied or making it

impossible for them to know the precise objectives of the study.
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The second part of Nagel's treatment of problems raised by the

reflexive relation focuses on arguments challenging the validity of the

conclusions reached in a social science which adopts the same methods
used in the physical sciences.

On this topic, Nagel, like those social

scientists who accept the positivist model, focuses on the so-called

problem of the "self-fulfilling prediction" and its counterpart, the

problem of the "suicidal prediction."

The perceived difficulty here is

that the subjects' awareness of a prediction about their behavior may
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serve to validate or invalidate the prediction itself.

More generally,

the problem as typically stated is that people, again in light of their

knowledge of the results of certain research concerning human behavior,
may alter the basic patterns of behavior which provided the data upon
which the original research conclusions were reached.
As before, Nagel argues that this factor merely complicates the

attempt to discover valid generalizations about human behavior and
social phenomena and that it does not, as critics of the positivist

model maintain, rule out the possibility of discovering general laws or

genuine law-like generalizations concerning human behavior and social
phenomena.

He presents three different counterarguments against this

interpretation of the factor of reflexivity in human knowledge and
action.

First, since laws or law-like generalizations are conditional in
form, a generalization based on the investigation of certain patterns

of behavior or social processes is not shown to be invalid if one of
the conditions stated or. assumed in the law, namely the subjects'

lack

of knowledge of these behavior patterns or social processes, is

changed.

Secondly, although it may prove to be impossible to predict

precisely the exact effects of new knowledge on specific behaviors or
social processes, there are no a priori grounds for excluding the

possibility of discovering genuine law-like generalizations regarding
bethe acquisition of such knowledge and its general effects on human

havior and social processes.
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Finally, even though it is always possible that action based on

knowledge of behavior patterns or social processes can result in the

modification of these patterns or processes, this possibility can be
legitimately ignored in most cases of interest to the social scientist
because "such action does not generally transform radically the overall pattern of habitual social behavior."

In other words, Hamp-

shire's position overemphasizes the role of deliberate and reflective
choice in human action and neglects other significant determinants of

human behavior and of the outcomes of social action which are operative
in any actual social setting,

including unintended consequences as well

as the basic confines of habit, custom,

social structure and institu-

tional arrangements.

Nagel's position has been set out in detail because it illustrates
the superficiality of the treatment of the interplay between theory and

fact and of the connection between thought and action in even the most

extensive analyses of these issues by defenders of the positivist
model.

As we have seen,

the whole question of reflexivity is reduced

to the relatively minor "difficulties" that a subject's awareness of

his being an object of a scientific study might affect the responses or

behaviors which are being investigated or that awareness of

a

predic-

tion about human behavior may serve to validate or invalidate the

prediction itself.
Nagel argues that to make the notion of reflexivity into

a

central

the
point about human behavior and social philosophy is to fall into

human
trap of adopting an over- rationalized conception of human nature,
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action and social processes.

To push the reflexivity thesis beyond the

problems he identifies is to return to

a

philosophical rationalism

which treats human behavior and social action as solely determined by

reflective deliberation and conscious choice.
notes, is certainly at odds with what

v/e

Such an account, he

have discovered about human

motivation and behavior, particularly the manner in which habit, institutional and social roles, and other such factors establish boundaries
on what individuals think and do.

1

12

However, this line of criticism as well as the other arguments

Nagel presents fail to confront Hampshire's main thesis concerning how
the reflexive relation challenges basic assumptions underpinning the

positivist conception of explanation and theory in political inquiry.
Certainly, with regard to questions concerning the concept of individual freedom, Hampshire emphasizes that the philosopher or social

scientist must recognize the potential roles of self-knowledge and

reflection in extending an individual's range of thought and action.
But this analysis of reflective thought on the individual level does
not fully capture the interplay between theory and fact which Hampshire

identifies.

This point becomes clear if one carefully examines his

account of reflection in moral reasoning.

Hampshire maintains that practical reasoning concerning moral
issues is much like the process involved in perceptual identification
and illustrates "a very general feature of human activity and func-

tioning."^

This general feature is that while an agent's attention

or activity,
is concentrated on at most a few features of his situation
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he brings to any task or activity a vast store of background knowledge

which has been acquired through imitation, language and learning in
general.

1

14

In short, a typical social actor confronts the social

world with a body of background knowledge consisting of an extensive
set of concepts, beliefs, categories, internalized rules and conven-

tions.

For the most part, he is not even conscious of, let alone

reflective about, this store of knowledge.

He does not even identify

and separate the various steps or stages involved in a particular

activity or mental process (although these may have been clearly distinct during the learning process) except in rare cases of "difficulty
and breakdown."

1
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This point is important to social inquiry because it is this body
of background knowledge which is used to identify and classify the

situations which a social actor confronts as well as the various
actions which he and the others are performing or can perform.

In

other words, a social actor does not confront a social world of "brute
facts" in which social situations or processes are already broken up

into "a definite and final set of elements" or in which the flow of

human action is already divided up into patterns of basic actions or

observable behaviors.
In addition, the background knowledge which each agent draws upon
to classify and identify the features of social reality cannot be

thought of either as simply corresponding to given and independent

features of this reality or as attempting to characterize this reality
from a purely descriptive point of view.

This background knowledge is
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itself a product of the reflexive character of theory and fact in the
sense that the situations, actions and so on which make up our social

world have been identified and classified according to the interests
and purposes of social beings engaged in common practices and sharing a

particular form of life.
It is this "deeper level" of the reflexive relation between theory

and fact which Nagel in particular and positivist social science in

general fail to confront.

In order to understand fully this reflexive

relation, we must consider not only the conscious, reflective processes
of individuals but also the general importance of reflexivity in human
life and activity.

1
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If we are to understand the political behavior

of social actors, we must come to terms with their shared reflexive

characterization of the world, or more specifically, with the reflexive
relation between the concepts and meanings which identify and classify
social reality on the one hand and social reality itself on the other.

Certainly, this alternative view of the nature of the social

reality which the political scientist investigates poses more fundamental challenges to the dominant accounts of the proper study of human

action and social processes and of the role of theory in social inquiry
than Nagel acknowledges in his discussion of the notion of reflexivity.

Hampshire stands in fundamental agreement with other advocates of
the so-called interpretive model of social inquiry in holding that
by
human actions are fundamentally different from the phenomena studied

least in part,
the physical scientist because they are constituted, at

themselves.
by the concepts, ideas, beliefs and thoughts of the agents

This account of human action and social inquiry maintains that human

action is distinct from animal behavior or physical events in that it
is intentional, conventional and meaningful.

Thus, whereas the physical scientist studies events which can be

supposed to exist independently of the concepts we used to describe and

explain these events, the relationship between the kinds of sophisticated actions which are of interest to the social scientist and the

concepts which are used to characterize and explain these actions is

more complex.

For example, Peter Winch contrasts the relationship

between the concepts of command and obedience and acts of command
obedience on the one hand with the relationship between the concepts of
thunder and lightning and claps of thunder and flashes of lightning on
With regard to the latter, it makes sense to think of the

the other.

phenomena of thunder and lightning as existing prior to and

independently of the concepts used to describe the phenomena.
But it does not make sense to suppose that:

human beings might have been issuing commands and
obeying them before they came to form the concept of
command and obedience. For their performance of such
acts is itself the chief manifestation of their possession of those concepts. An act of obedience contains, as an essential element, a recognition of what
.

.

.

went before as an order.
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To characterize particular acts as acts of command or obedience

presupposes that the human agents whose behavior we are describing or

explaining share the concepts, conventions or meanings which constitute
these activities.

9
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Although it makes sense to talk about a distinction between
physical reality and the concepts which are used,
a certain era,

in a particular society or

to describe and explain this reality,

this kind of

distinction is much more problematic in social inquiry.

There can be

no such clear distinction between social reality and the concepts
which

are used to characterize that reality because the concepts used in

social life and human activities are essential constituent parts of
that social reality.

1 1

The concepts which people in a particular

society use in communicating and interacting with one another, or which
they use in thinking and talking about themselves, their activities and

their social life, are essential parts of what they, their activities
and their social life actually are.

The approach to social inquiry which follows from such a perspective clearly focuses on the fundamental concepts or "constitutive

meanings" which support, unify and embody any particular society or
form of life.
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Moreover, as Hampshire's account of mind emphasizes,

such an approach must treat concepts of language not just as a des-

criptive tool used by passsive observers of the world but rather as a

medium of human activity and social practices.

The concepts or concep-

tual schemes which are used to characterize human activities and social

life are not only essential components of these activities and form of
life, but also are grounded in (in the sense that their point or pur-

pose is determined by) these activities, practices or form of life.

This is, of course, a central aspect of the reflexive relation

between theory and fact.

Changes in the activities and practices
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characteristic of a particular society will be reflected by and indeed
require modification of the concepts through which these activities and

practices are carried on.

In addition,

successful change in the con-

cepts or conceptual scheme, including prevailing theories of human

nature or politics, through which we characterize and conduct various
forms of social activity modifies the very nature of that activity.

This analysis of the reflexive dimension of political behavior and
social life does not simply identify a set of technical difficulties

which must be confronted in survey research of the type Nagel
discusses.

Rather, it poses a fundamental challenge to the assumptions

supporting such an approach to the study of political thought and behavior.

As we saw earlier,

the survey research approach presupposes

that beliefs and attitudes are essentially private mental phenomena

which can be treated as brute data about individuals and which are

contingently related to individual political behavior.
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If Hampshire's analysis of the interplay between theory and fact

if correct,

these presuppositions and this approach to investigating

beliefs and attitudes are suspect when we are considering the most

fundamental beliefs, attitudes and other mental states which unify a
form of life.

Accordingly, the central deficiency of a positivist

social science with its empiricist conception of knowledge, as represented by the survey research approach, is its inability to deal with
the fundamental concepts or constitutive meanings which support and

unify a particular society.
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This is not to deny that individuals may hold certain beliefs and

attitudes (regarding the redistribution of income, confidence in existing political leadership, and so on) which are properly treated as
in(jivi(jugl beliefs and attitudes.

1

22

These beliefs and attitudes are

certainly significant for political inquiry because they do influence
political behavior.

Moreover, with regard to these individual beliefs

and attitudes, it is appropriate to talk about whether or not there is
a "consensus" or general agreement among separate individuals concern-

ing their ideas or thinking on a particular topic.

It would seem then

that survey research can adequately deal with this type of "subjective"

meanings and values.
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However, the challenge to the survey research approach, which is

implicit in Hampshire's analysis of reflexivity and which has been

forcefully pressed by Charles Taylor, is that the prevailing treatment
of "consensus" as always and essentially a convergence of individual

beliefs and attitudes is mistaken.

Their point is that we can talk

about the presence or absence of a "consensus" of these individual

beliefs and attitudes only in the context of that vast store of background knowledge, consisting of common concepts, beliefs, categories,

internalized rules, conventions or norms, which is shared by every
competent political actor in a particular society.

In Taylor's ter-

minology, the very possibility of agreement or disagreement concerning

individual beliefs and attitudes is itself dependent upon the common

possession of a complex set of "intersubjective meanings," or a "common

"
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language of social and political reality in which these beliefs are

expressed

.

These intersubjective meanings, unlike the subjective meamings and

values discussed above, cannot be adequately studied or understood if
the social researcher is searching for a convergence of various indivi-

dual ideas, attitudes, and beliefs.

Intersubjective meanings are

different from individual beliefs and attitudes in that they cannot be
treated as brute data or basic facts about individuals or individual
states of consciousness.

The basic or constitutive meanings cannot be

the property of a single individual any more than the concepts, lan-

guage or background knowledge which embodies them can belong to a
single individual.
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They are both grounded in and constitutive of

social practices and forms of life

— shared

forms of social interaction

and interpersonal relationships which cannot be coherently characterized as simply a composite of essentially individual attitudes and be-

haviors.

In sum,

these intersubjective meanings, which are central to

any adequate analysis of "consensus," cannot be captured by surveys of

people's avowed beliefs and attitudes and "fall through the net of
•

.

•
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mainstream social science."

In addition, Hampshire's analysis challenges the standard

counter- argument which has been made against this thesis:

even if it

was granted that the above account of social reality is essentially

correct and, therefore, the political scientist must examine those

intersubjective meanings which underlie and constitute the political
the most
practices and political relationships of a particular society,
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crucial features of the positivist account of a science of politics

remain intact.

The argument, in short, is that although the study of

human action and social processes may require an interpretation on the
part of the investigator, surely this interpretation must be verified

according to public, objective standards. 1 27

The study of social phe-

nomena and human actions may involve specific techniques which differ
from those used in the physical sciences, but the end-product or con-

clusions of this process must still be assessed and evaluated according
to the same procedures and standards used in any scientific enterprise.

Essentially the same argument can be pressed by granting that the

investigation of a particular society or political system involves some
kind of interpretation of shared concepts or meanings, but insisting
that the essential task of political inquiry is to offer generaliza-

tions or theories whose application is not limited to a single political system or one set of political practices and relationships.

Again,

the point is that these generalizations or theories must be tested and

assessed, and the positivist conception of a social science identifies
these standards of evaluation and assessment.

Such a counter-argument is based, of course, upon the standard

distinction between the generation and evaluation of theories or between the context of discovery and the context of justification in the

scientific enterprise.

The general claim is that it is the process

of critical appraisal and assessment according to public standards,

no1

the
the process of discovery or theory generation, which constitutes

essential core of the scientific method.

^

Since the criteria which
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govern the appraisal of theories or hypotheses are not a product of how
these are generated, the interpretive challenge leaves untouched the

most crucial components of the positivist account of explanation and

theory in the social sciences.

Perhaps social inquiry must utilize

certain interpretive procedures in discovering generalizations and
theories about human behavior and social phenomena, but these generalizations and theories must still be appraised in exactly the same way we

appraise theories in the physical sciences.

Hampshire's analysis of the interplay between theory and fact
undercuts this notion that the same standards of evaluation and assessment which apply in the physical sciences are also appropriate in

political inquiry.

As we have seen, he emphasizes the reflexive re-

lation between political theory and political reality, particularly in
the sense that a political theory which has become part of the con-

sciousness of political actors is "a partial determinanat of what they
intend to achieve and of what they actually achieve."

1

30

Certainly,

this does not mean that we must abandon all attempts to assess a par-

ticular theory on the basis of its adequacy in providing an accurate
and complete account of the political behavior and political phenomena

which it is supposed to explain.

In other words, it does make some

sense to talk about whether or not a given theory actually "corresponds" to political reality.
But, of course, the central thrust of Hampshire's thesis concern-

about the
ing the nature of social reality is to deny that we can talk

theory
absence or presence of such a "correspondence" between social
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and social reality in the same way as in the physical sciences.

As he

argues, the physical scientist can properly use the term "correspon-

dence" in the sense of "the ordinary truth relation" between two com-

pletely independent terms.
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The example he cites is the relation

between the statement "The snow is white" and the white snow.

Here,

unlike the relations between theory and fact in social inquiry, therr
is clearly no causal relationship between people's beliefs or attitudes

concerning reality and the nature of that reality itself.

Merely

changing the description or characterization of the reality, or altering the way that people think about this reality by introducing new

concepts or altering the concepts used to describe it, cannot change or

modify the external reality.
However, since the shared concepts, intersubjective meanings, and

common ways of thinking about social reality are essential features of
the social reality which both participants and social scientists must
try to understand, these same conditions do not hold in social inquiry.

The so-called problem of self-fulfilling prophecies is not a minor

difficulty which social scientists must occasionally face, but rather
fundamental

,

more general problem concerning the assessment and

evaluation of theories which play an essential role in their own verification or falsification.

Hampshire concludes:

political theory has to be assessed in a more complex
way than a theory in the physical sciences; for it
becomes itself part of the social conditions which it

A

simultaneously diagnoses and predicts.

132
.

.

.

a

.

HM2

Hampshire makes no attempt to offer a definitive account of how we
are to evaluate and assess theories in the social sciences.

But his

analysis suggests that we can make little progress toward achieving an
adequate and coherent account of the assessment of theories in social

inquiry until we carefully examine the empiricist philosophical assumptions underpinning the dominant conception of a science of politics or
society.

In particular, political scientists must recognize that part

of the reality which they seek to describe and explain is constituted
by the conceptual scheme through which the agents in that society

classify and characterize themselves, their behavior and their social
lives
The widespread acceptance of a new social or political theory

provides these agents with a new form of self-understanding or self-

consciousness, opening up (or closing off) possibilities of new forms
of activity, and thereby changing the very patterns of thought and behavio'- which the theory was designed to explain.

This means, at a

minimum, that the role of theory in political science in particular and
the social and behavioral sciences in general is very different from
the role of theory in the natural sciences.

It also directly chal-

lenges any notion of the social theorist or social scientist as a

neutral observer of an external reality and raises questions concerning
the role of the social scientist and social theorist.

Hampshire's

isolation
analysis suggests that these questions cannot be answered in
between knowfrom the fundamental issues concerning the relationship

ledge and freedom.
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CHAPTER

VI

AN "INTERPRETIVE" MODEL OF POLITICAL INQUIRY

Knowledge and Politics

In the preceeding chapter,

I

argued that Hampshire's critique of

the positivist conception of a social science,

focusing on its empiri-

cist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, places him within the

camp of the proponents of the so-called interpretive model of social
This is particularly evident in his analysis of the reflexive

inquiry.

relation between theory and fact, or knowledge and action, and in his

discussion of the implications of this relation for political theory.
The treatment of the notion of reflexivity, the relation between theory
and fact

,

or the connections between knowledge and action constitutes a

crucial dividing line between positivist and interpretive accounts of
.

,

.

.

social inquiry.
Hov/ever,

1

this does not mean that Hampshire is to be considered

either a "representative" or a "full-fledged" member of the group of
social theorists who champion the interpretive model of social inquiry.
In th3 first place, Hampshire presents no detailed examples of the

kinds of actual explanatory and theoretical frameworks which are to be
used in the explanation of human behavior and social phenomena.

More-

over, he offers no systematic account of the logic of the social scien-

conception of
tific method which presumably must replace the positivist
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the methods appropriate to social inquiry.

What he does present is a

powerful critique of empiricist assumptions which provides a foundation
for reexamining and revising present notions of the scientific methods
and standards to be used in the study of human actions and social phe-

nomena.

While his work certainly recommends a reexamination of the

present trends and hidden assumptions of contemporary social science,
no cl3ar and definitive picture of either the results of such an ana-

lysis or of the likely future of the human and social sciences is
offered.
In addition,

there is simply no single, unified "school" of inter-

pretative social inquiry to which Hampshire or anyone else can belong.
The label of "interpretive social inquiry" is used to group a number of

diverse social theorists whose common opposition to positivist social
science is grounded in completely different philosophical traditions:

Winch's and Pitkin's attempts to apply the philosophical techniques of

Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy to problems in political
theory and social inquiry; Schutz's phenomenological sociology and

Garfinkel's ethnomethodology

,

which are grounded in phenomenological

philosophy; and the work of Habermas
school of social philosophy.

,

Apel and others in the Frankfurt

certainly, the work of all these theo-

rists places a common emphasis on human activity, intersubjectivity and

reflexivity as central aspects of social phenomena which require an interpretive understanding.

Moreover, it may also be true that these

different theorists have focused on essentially the

sajne

problems and

approaches.
are moving toward some general synthesis of their various

3

455

But there remain a number of serious methodological and philosophical

divisions which separate these proponents of an interpretive model of
social inquiry.

In short,

at the present,

there is no definite inter-

pretive approach to social inquiry which is underpinned by a common

philosophical perspective.
Finally, and most importantly, the notion of an interpretive

understanding of human behavior and social phenomena, particularly that
variant of it which has emerged from linguistic philosophy, has not
been accurately characterized or adequately analyzed in recent dis-

cussions of the philosophical and methodological issues concerning
social inquiry.

As might be expected, philosophers and social scient-

ists who accept the basic tenets of the positivist model of a social

science have not given arguments for the necessity of an interpretive

understanding of the subject

a

sympathetic hearing.

The interpretive

approach to social inquiry is treated as a misguided return to the

notion of verstehen in the study of social action, which ultimately
relies on subjective and impressionistic techniques rather than empirical methods.

Moreover, even those who claim to be sympathetic to at

least some of the of the claims or aims of this call for an interpre-

tive understanding of social phenomena, frequently fail to present an

accurate or complete account of this approach.

5

In short, this chapter will focus on examining Hampshire's sug-

gestions concerning the establishment of an alternative philosophical
base for political inquiry and completing the sketch of his analysis o
was begun
the special difficulties faced by the social scientist which
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in the preceeding chapter.

My major concern is not to attempt to

sketch a comprehensive model of an interpretive approach to social
inquiry, but rather to analyze Hampshire's contributions to the current, preliminary discussions regarding the principal features of such
a model.

Thus, the topic of possible affinities between Hampshire's

views and those of other advocates of the interpretive aproach will not
be addressed,

although Hampshire's critique of the philosophical foun-

dations of Marxist social theory will be briefly considered.

Moreover,

because so much of the contemporary discussion of an interpretive

understanding of social- phenomena has been marked by oversimplification, confusion and stereotyping,

the bulk of this chapter will focus

on assessment of the standard criticisms of the interpretive model as

they apply to Hampshire's position.
As we saw in the last chapter, a crucial weakness of the dominant

approach to the investigation of social phenomena is that it rests upon
a philosophical framework which neglects the special role of self-

knowledge and self-reflection in human conduct and the reflexive relation between theory and fact in social life.

In other words, the

proper starting point for the construction of an adequate model of
social inquiry is the articulation of a "critical theory of knowledge"

which acknowledges these basic features of human action and human
life.*^

At a minimum,

such a critical theory of knowledge must, unlike

the empiricist epistemological tradition inherited from Locke and Mill,

include an adequate conception of the role of self-consciousness.

7

457

Hampshire acknowledges that a promising and fruitful place to
begin this search for a critical theory of knowledge is the "Hegel-

Marxist doctrine of self-consciousness." Q

Although Marx himself was

not really concerned with epistemological issues, implicit in the

Hegelian conceptual framework, which was taken over, refined and applied to the analysis of social phenomena by Marx, is

a

powerful chal-

lenge to the major components of the spectatorial theory of knowledge
Q

and the dualistic account of mind set out by the empiricists.

In the

first place, Marxist theory stresses the connections between conscious-

ness and human activity (this is of course, a crucial dimension of the

concept of praxis

)

portraying people's perceptions, beliefs, and ways

of thinking about themselves and their world as being linked to and

conditioned by their practical activity in the world, especially their
economic activity.

Moreover, Marx views human agents as self-conscious

beings who can become aware of the nature of their own activities and
modes of thought, including the external forces which have determined
this thought and activity in the past, thereby opening up new possi-

bilities of thought and action.
In sharp contrast to the liberal conception of human nature,

Marx's account acknowledges that human nature changes through history,
or more specifically,

that established patterns of motivation and be-

havior can be altered with changes in consciousness.

The Marxist

theory of human nature is developmental, portraying human agents as
witb
beings who become fully human in and through history, particularly

environment
the achievement of greater self-conscious control over the
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and over society.

Moreover, Marx, again in sharp contrast to the

liberal view, conceives of society not as an external, independent

reality which confronts human beings as

a

given set of fixed laws and

forces, but rather as a product of human activity and consciousness.
In short, both human nature and society are themselves social produc-

tions, not in the sense that human beings always have full control over

what they or their social lives actually are, but in the sense that

consciousness and activity, whether reflectively directed or not, are
fundamental components of human nature and society.
The implications of this implicit theory of knowledge, with its

emphasis on self-consciousness, for political theory seem clear.

In

particular, any application of the concept of self-consciousness to the
study of historical or contemporary individual actions or social processes imposes a distinction between an observer's and a participant's

accounts of what an individual or group was actually trying to do and
of their actual role in bringing about the end result.

The historian

or social scientist must now confront those cases in which his own more

powerful explanatory framework or social theory can provide a more

comprehensive account of the actual role of either an individual agent
or a social group in the social process than the participant's more

limited understanding of his situation or activities will allow.

Marxist theory attempts to provide an explanatory framework with which
we can identify and correct illusionary and distorted forms of con-

sciousness where real human needs and purposes are masked by false

needs and purposes.

In short,

the reflexive relation between theory
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and fact and the problems concerning self-knowledge and
consciousness

ignored in the liberal political tradition and positivist social science are brought to center stage.
It is this emphasis on the problems of self-knowledge and the

interplay between theory and fact that leads Hampshire to focus on the

Marxist doctrine of consciousness rather than empiricist epistemology
as the proper starting point for an analysis of those problems in the

theory of knowledge which are directly linked to social inquiry.

Yet,

despite its usefulness in identifying problems and issues ignored in
liberal political theory and positivist social science, Marxist theory
fails to provide an adea.uate philosophical framework for dealing with

these problems and issues.
and Political Society:

Hampshire, in his essay, "Unity of Civil

Reply to Leszek Kolakowski," identifies three

closely-related, problematic features of Marxist theory, all of which
are the direct inheritance of Hegelian idealism.^''

First, Marxism is an "all-embracing philosophy" which, like

Hegel's philosophical system, attempts to embrace the totality of human
experience, including all the basic purposes, interests and goals of
human beings as well as the entire subject matter of the human and
social sciences.

Of course, Marx explicitly rejects the abstractness

and spiritualism of Hegelian idealism, attempting to remake his phi-

losophical speculations into a scientific examination of human action
and social phenomena in their historical and material settings.

More-

economic
over, in Marx's later work on the dynamics of the capitalist
from this
system, he seems to move toward empirical analysis and away

P
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type of all-embracing philosophy.

Yet, despite his general focus on

social phenomena and social change or his more detailed work on spe-

cific historical periods, Marx's overall aim remains that of providing
a comprehensive and complete theory of human nature.

1

Secondly, Marxism remains, again like Hegel's philosophy, "a

doctrine of the total salvation and redemption of man" or "a doctrine
of the ultimate redemption of alienated mankind."

Marxist theory

aims at resolving all the essential problems facing human beings which

have their origins in social forces, relationships, or structures.

Certainly, Marx's vision of salvation is fundamentally different from
that of religious thinkers in that it is to be achieved through po-

litical means and within the course of human history.

Yet, his con-

ception of the future, communist society and the fully human, communist

individual is no less a radical vision:

alienation and the division of

labor are eliminated, people work for self-realization rather than

material rewards, all class conflict and political conflict disappear,
and the state itself vanishes.

In short, Marx's theory envisions and

calls for the final and total liberation of all human beings.
Finally, and most significantly, Marx's analyses of human behavior,

social processses and historical change rest upon a "quasi-

historical metaphysics" rather than a coherent theory of knowledge (and
mind)

.

The problem here is not simply that Marx fails to set out in

detail an adequate critical theory of knowledge, but that he does not
even provide a base for launching the search for such a theory.

Ac-

did
cording to Hampshire, "Marx's theory of men and of the social order

.
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not start from any theory of knowledge, explicitly worked out and

defended.

..." 14

Hampshire views this as a fundamental deficiency in

Marx's theory and a principal source of fundamental conceptual,
theoretical, and methodological problems that have plagued socialist

analysis and theory to the present.
In the first place, although Marx is in a real sense the founder

of what we now call "the sociology of knowledge," his theory makes no

allowance for the possible limits of the knowledge of human nature and
social phenomena which might infect his own theoretical framework.

Moreover, Marxist theory ignores the possibility that there are inherent barriers to our potential knowledge of human beings and social

processes, which even our future investigations of human behavior and
social phenomena will not break down.

15

By ignoring the possible

limits of our understanding of ourselves and our social world, Marxism

neglects temporary or permanent limits on what can be achieved or

accomplished through social and political activity, including socialist
politics
Thus, even though Marxist theory stresses the reflexivity of theory and fact in relation to understanding past historical periods and
as an aspect of the process of social change and revolutionary

activity, the Marxist theory of human nature and of the social structure remains fixed and unalterable in fundamental ways.

For example,

Marx's social theory diagnoses social problems and prescribes solutions
causes
as if we already possessed comprehensive knowledge of the basic

of historical change and economic activity.

His analysis of capitalism

7
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and his sketch of the future communist society presuppose
that we al-

ready fully understand the principal social causes of alienation,

exploitation, oppression and dehumanization. ''^
In addition, Marx's theory of human nature, though developmental,

remains tied to a teleological conception of universal human progress
toward a goal of complete human liberation which is apprehended only by
the Marxist.

Marxist theory allows no room for "diverse and disputable

philosophies of mind," holding that our knowledge of the basic determinants of human motivation and behavior, of the universal interests,
needs and purposes shared by all human beings, and of the fundamental

goals and ends of human life is complete.

1

It is on the basis of this

comprehensive model of human nature that the Marxist claims to be able
to differentiate between true and false human needs and interests, to

show how the development of true needs and interests is blocked in

capitalist society, and to knowr. how the fully human personality can be
realized in the communist society of the future.
In short, because the philosophical premises underpinning Marx's

own work exclude a critical theory of knowledge, Marx treats his theories of human nature and social structure as final and complete,

ignoring the possibility of future progress in the human and social
sciences in any other direction than that plotted by his own

theoretical framework.

This tendency in Marx's own work has had per-

vasive and lasting negative effects throughout subsequent socialist
analysis and doctrine.

Acoording to Hampshire, these inadequacies in

to
the philosophical foundations of Marxist theory are not unrelated
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continuing confusion and ambiguity regarding the socialist conception
of social planning and the vision of social life in a socialist or

communist society.
First, the notion that Marxist theory provides the social planner,
the policy-maker, or the bureaucrat with a comprehensive theory of

society and human nature automatically minimizes the difficulties and

possible dangers inherent in social planning and the policy-making
process.

Marx's philosophical framework suggests that

a

planner or

decision-maker has available the kind of comprehensive understanding of
social processes and human beings which makes possible fully rational,

comprehensive social planning.

However, since the state of knowledge

in the social sciences has remained,

to the present,

fragmentary and

uncertain, the planner or policy-maker, no matter what his theoretical
or ideological perspective,

is typically faced with the task of making

decisions in the absence of all the information or even sufficient

information to make a rational choice between recognized alternatives.
Thus, Marxist theory distorts our picure of the planning or policy

process by minimizing the problem of the unintended consequences which
result when our theoretical understanding of social process or human

behavior is deficient or incomplete.
In addition to neglecting the more visible practical difficulties

confronted in social planning, Marxist theory, with its supposed

comprehensive understanding of man and society, is fundamentally flawed
their relationship
in its basic conceptions of the social sciences and
to social planning.

Lacking a critical theory of knowledge, Marx fails

^
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to draw,

or even provide a basis upon which one could draw, a
clear

distinction between the physical and the social sciences

Marxist

theory acknowledges the central role of self-consciousness in human
history and social action, but it also exhibits pervasive positivist
elements, particularly when it professes to possess exactly the same
kind of predictive and explanatory power as the physical sciences

J

These positivist elements in Marxism not only lead to the same kind of

methodological difficulties already discussed, but also generate rather
terrifying conceptions of social science and its uses in social
planning.

The Marxist philosophical framework suggests

a

view of the social

scientist or planner as someone who, using his scientific knowledge of
the social world, operates on social processes, institutions and cus-

toms in the same way that the physical scientist, using his scientific

knowledge, manipulates events and processes in the physical world.

In

other words, just as a doctor diagnoses and treats individual illness,
the social theorist and planner diagnose and treat social illness,

which includes all institutional arrangements, systems of belief and
thought

,

and habits and customs which are identified as obstacles to

the full realization of human happiness and human freedom.

In this

way, Marxist episteraology and social theory support exactly the kind of
a social engineering conception of politics which the many critics of
.

.

Marxism find so horrifying.

20

Of course, Marx holds that the end or goal of socialist planning
and policy is the liberation of mankind.

This final liberation of all
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human beings is to be accomplished through the construction of a classless society in which all deep-seated political conflict has been

eliminated and in which all social members are unified by
purpose and a common vision of the new social order.

contends that such

a

a

common

Yet, Hampshire

conception of liberation, with its emphasis on

such notions as freedom, autonomy, and spontaneity, requires at a

minimum, some "diversity and independence of forms of life,

.

.

."

The problem is that this diversity and independence in human thought,

activity and life, which are fundamental requisites of as well as the

justification of liberation, are not compatible with the kind of
"comprehensive and shared vision of

a

desirable social order

which is to be the unifying force of communist society.

22

..."

Either the

common purposes or shared vision must be less comprehensive and complete than Marxist theory requires, or such purposes and vision must

necessarily be limited to fewer than all of the members of the new
society.

In short, the Marxist end of liberation and the related goals

of individual autonomy, community and so on, are incomplete and incon-

sistent because of the absence of an adequate theory of knowledge and

mind to support them.

Hampshire does not argue that the kind of totalitarian politics
associated with Stalin inevitably and necessarily follow from Marx's

philosophical premises.

He does suggest that there are basic tensions

within Marxist theory, particularly between the moral ideals of Marx
and the socialist tradition on the one hand and Marx's positivist
the
tendencies and the social engineering conception of politics on
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other.

Moreover, Hampshire's analysis locates the roots of these

tensions in the philosophical underpinnings of Marx's social theory,

especially his implicit theory of knowledge.

Reexamination of Marxist

philosophical assumptions concerning knowledge, thought and action and
the attempt to set out a more coherent and more adequate conception of

knowledge, mind and action are placed at the top of the agenda for

modern socialist analysis.

Hampshire's analysis suggest that neither the positivist model of
a science of politics based upon empiricist epistemology nor Marxist

social theory grounded in a metaphysical philosophy of history can

provide an adquate conception of political inquiry.

Both the Marxist

and positivist positions, suffering from what Alasdair Maclntyre has

called "epistemological self-righteousness," fail to face up to the

problems and limitations inherent in our understanding of human activity and social phenomena.

23

Only a critical theory of knowledge

offers the kind of philosophical foundation that fully confronts the

complexities which must be allowed for in explanation and theory in the
social and psychological sciences.

It

is the task of a critical theory

of knowledge to identify and examine the present limits in our knowledge of human beings and society, to explore the reasons for our

failure to generate comprehensive theories and explanations in social
inquiry,

to analyze the possibilities of discovering genuine law-like

generalizations despite the unique problems linked to human activity
with the
and self-consciousness, and to develop strategies for dealing

epistemological limitations of the social and human sciences.

24
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Hampshire does not present a systematic list of the guidelines

which such a critical theory of knowledge, even as it stands in its

preliminary stages, provides for the political scientist.

Yet, his

analysis of the complex relationship between thought and action identifies basic difficulties that will infect any discipline which offers

explanations of human action.

More specifically, his analysis suggests

that political inquiry, despite its utilization of a vast array of

scientific methods and procedures, remains fundamentally interpretive
in nature, relying on essentially the same kind of interpretive under-

standing of human behavior and social phenomena which is sought by

ordinary political agents.

In other words,

the principal problems of

possible distortion, ambiguity, incoherence and incompleteness which
the political scientist confronts in attempting to explain political

behavior and political phenomena are basically the same problems which
each political actor faces in his attempts to understand and deal with
the world around him.

Thus,

if Hampshire's analysis of thought and

action is correct, a possible starting place for developing an interpretive approach to political inquiry based on a critical theory of

knowledge is systematic examination of the methods, problems and limits
involved in an ordinary agent's attempts to understand the actions of

others as well as basic social institutions and relationships.

25

Hampshire's most comprehensive statement of his position concerning these difficulties confronting each social agent and the techniques

which can be used in dealing with them is provided in Thought 9hd
Action

.

His discussion here focuses on these problems and techniques

468

as they impact upon the practical reasoning and activity
of moral

agents and upon moral theory in general.

Yet, the same basic points

can be usefully applied in comparing the difficulties and limitations

attached to a political agent's interpretive understanding of his

political world with those which are confronted by the political scientist in his analysis of political phenomena.

A

brief summary of these

points brings together the various themes which have been set out in
the preceeding two chapters and illustrates the rough outline of an

interpretive model of political inquiry which emerges from Hampshire's
treatment of thought and action.
In the first place, Hampshire's analysis focuses on the serious

difficulties confronting

a

social agent as he identifies, classifies,

and describes the various features of his social environment.

In his

attempt to understand and function within a particular social setting,
an agent must necessarily utilize some system of classification and

description which distinguishes various types of social situations and
circumstances, different social roles and positions, various modes of
thought and social action, and so on.

This essential task of iden-

tifying and distinguishing features of the social world, which is
imposed upon the agent in his daily activities, is certainly not
problem- free.
One common problem that faces an individual actor when he classifies and describes political phenomena is that this ability to

identify and characterize the significant features of his political

environment is typically limited by particular immediate interests and

469

concerns as well as his ovm powers of observation and
discrimination.
In other words,

political agents typically provide only a limited de-

scription of what is happening to them or what they are doing at
ticular point in time because they concentrate on

a

a par-

few relevant fac-

tors selected on the basis of their practical interests and individual
powers.

As we have seen,

each agent unref lectively relies on basic

habits of classification or the background knowledge which is embodied

within a particular vocabulary and from of life.

Of course, agents can

and do, particularly when confronted with new and unusual situations or

under the pressure of criticism and questioning, direct more attention
to the shared rules and principles of classification which they stan-

dardly use but seldom examine.
However, even if an agent was able to overcome completely the

limitations imposed by his practical concerns and individual attributes, he still confronts a second, more fundamental difficulty.

The

system of identification and classification provided by his vocabulary,

which is the necessary starting point when an individual attempts to

distinguish and characterize various features of his political life and
surroundings, is never comprehensive, complete and final.

One of the

principal claims in Thought and Action concerns:
the contrast between the unlimited multiplicity of
things and activities, and of features of things and
activities, and our limited power to identify and
.

.

.

distinguish them in a language.
In short,

27

the first crucial problem confronted by the reflective

political agent is the ever-present possibility that the fundamental

,
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system of classification, through which he views the world of politics
and which he has inherited and internalized, omits significant aspects

of political behavior or other political phenomena.

This is a funda-

mental limitation on his characterization and understanding of politics
imposed by what Hampshire calls the inexhaustability of description.
No particular political situation, action, institution or process can

ever be completely and definitively characterized by an agent.

There

is always the possibility of redescribing the phenomenon in such a way

that essential features of the situation, activity,

institution or

process which were previously ignored or not recognized are now revealed

.

Similar difficulties are encountered in the identification, clas-

sification and characterization of political phenomena by the political
scientist.

Of course, the political scientist has available a number

of techniques for dealing with the potential distortions or inadequacies in his classifications and characterizations of political pheno-

mena which result from practical, personal interests or limited powers
of observation.

Political science like other forms of scientific

inquiry, detaches the scientific observer from personal interests and

concerns, attempts to specify and systematize the principles and con-

ventions governing the identification and classification of phenomena,
emphasizes detailed and comprehensive techniques of observation, and so
on

Yet, the political scientist like the political agent must also

confront those limitations in his ability to classify and characterize
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which are the result of his vocabulary or conceptual scheme rather
than
individual interests or attributes.

Political inquiry has certainly

developed more systematic and comprehensive classifications and charac-

terizations of political phenomena than those which are available to
the typical actor.

However, the same contrast between the unlimited

variety of political phenomena and the conceptual limitations inherent
in our power to identify and distinguish these phenomena applies to the

epistemological situation of the political scientist as well as to that
of the average political actor.

The political scientist is no different- from the political agent
in that his observations,

classifications and characterizations of

political phenomena are structured by an elaborate conceptual framework.

Certainly, the conceptual frameworks used in political inquiry

are not identical to the ordinary vocabulary of political agents (the

question of the relationship between these two frameworks will be taken
up next)

.

But the political scientist is in the same position as the

political actor in that he cannot claim that his system of classification or conceptual framework is final and complete either because it
simply names corresponding elements in a given and independent reality
or because it is presuppositionless.

29

Both the political scientist

and the political actor must recognize that there are alternative,

often competing classif icatory systems and vocabularies, and that the

possiblity of reclassifying or recharacterizing a particular political
situation, institution, or activity is always open.

In short,

in

political inquiry as in practical politics, there is no such thing as

a
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definitive system of classification or conceptual framework to be used
in the analysis of political phenomena.

In addition to these problems concerning classification and des-

cription in general, there is an additional set of difficulties and
limitations which are unique to the classification and explanation of
human action.

As we have seen, Hampshire maintains that to charac-

terize a particular human action is not to describe a set of observable

movements or behaviors.

Human actions are constituted in part by the

intentions, beliefs and concepts held, or the meanings attached to the

activity in question, by the agents themselves.

This presents any

observer (whether a political scientist concerned with explaining this
individual's behavior or another political agent concerned with the
practical problems of interacting with this individual) who is trying
to understand another person's actions with a number of serious diffi-

culties.

As before, Hampshire's work suggests that the most fruitful

place to begin an examination of these difficulties, the limitations

they impose, and possible strategies for dealing with them is consi-

deration of the situation of the typical actor.

Because he is immersed in

a

political environment which requires

some minimum of cooperation and also presents the constant possibility

of serious conflict, every political agent must make some attempt to

classify and understand the actions of other agents.

Of course, one of

the primary methods he uses to accomplish this is simply to observe the

behavior of others.

In many cases,

the classification and interpreta-

human
tion of observed behavior is unproblematic because so much
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activity is rule-governed and routinized, clearly fitting certain
institutional or social roles or established patterns of custom,

manners and convention.

Moreover, a political agent can frequently

characterize a given kind of behavior as falling under

a

certain

action-heading, even though he does not have direct access to the
thoughts of others, on the basis of analogy, rules of inference, and
his own experience.

31

At the same time,

there are serious problems and real limitations

inherent in an agent's efforts to classify and interpret the behavior
of others.

First, any particular behavior, such as raising one's arm,

can express a variety of different intentions, thoughts and meanings,
so that the actual nature of the action (such as voting,

signaling, or

surrendering) cannot be determined solely on the basis of observing

external movements.

Also, as we have seen, any particular action is

open to an indefinite number of different characterizations.

More

importantly, since human agents do classify and characterize their own
behavior, it is not always clear which of a set of alternative des-

criptions of an action, if any, enter into the agent's own intentions,
decisions or thought processes.

As a consequence of these and other

such difficulties, an agent's ability to classify and interpret another

person's political activity is necessarily limited and subject to
error.
In short

,

a

relective agent who is faced with the task of inter-

preting the actions of others (as well as his own), recognizes that the
"nature and quality" of a particular act, whether his own or someone
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else's, "may not lie simply on the face of it, to be read off
from a

single description," 32

He,

as an observer of another person's acti-

vity, may be able to provide a description which could be accepted
as a

neutral, true description of the activity and which captures, in some
sense, the purposive and intentional nature of the action.

However,

it is still possible that such a description is misleading and incom-

plete because it fails to grasp:
the inner intention of the other, where the 'inner
intention' is represented by the preferred description
that the agent himself would give of what he was trying
.

.

.

to do.

34

In those cases where an agent's own classif icatory system and descrip-

tions enter into his thoughts and decisions about his activity, or

where the agent's intentions are mediated by his classification and de-

scription of his own activity, an observer can easily misinterpret his
action by imposing a different classification and description on it.
As the earlier discussion of the distinction between individual,

subjective meanings and common, intersubjective meanings suggests, an

observer's interpretation of an agent's political activities can go
wrong on two different levels.

First, an observer can mischaracterize

or misinterpret another person's political behavior because he does not

fully understand the individual political beliefs, interests, attitudes
and values which enter into and are expressed in that agent's acti-

vities.

By projecting his own individual beliefs, interests, etc., on

another agent, the observer can misconstrue, sometimes radically, the
point or purpose of that agent's behavior.
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This is, of course, the most common practical problem that a

political agent confronts in his efforts to classify and interpret the
actions of others with whom he interacts on a daily basis.

Thus, there

are certain inherent limitations in his ability to understand the

actions of other agents who share the same basic concepts, language,
and intersubjective meanings.

In addition, a political actor confronts

a deeper set of problems when he attempts to identify and interpret the

political actions of

a

foreigner who thinks and acts within an alien

set of concepts and intersubjective meanings.

In this latter type of case, the agent-observer may systematically

miscategorize another person'

s

activities by imposing the clas-

sificatory system of one vocabulary and set of social practices upon
conduct which reflects a different classif icatory system, language and
form of life.

The analogies and rules of inference drawn from personal

experience, which serve a political agent well when he interprets

political behavior within a shared vocabulary and common social practices and relationships, may prove to be systematically misleading as

guides to comprehending action grounded in an alternative set of inter-

subjective meanings.

In this kind of case, the interpretive powers of

political agents are so limited that Hampshire states, "The skeptical
doubt reasonably occurs at the meeting of cultures."
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As in the case of the more general problems concerning classifi-

cation and description, Hampshire's analysis suggests that examination
of the rather obvious problems and limitations inherent in the clas-

sification and characterization of human action by ordinary social
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agents is directly relevant to assessing the political
scientist's task
of classifying and explaining political behavior.

The political scien-

tist, like the political actor, is concerned with human actions,
which
are partially constituted by intentions, beliefs, thoughts and mean-

ings, and not simply with observable behaviors or physical movements.

While there are no

a prj,orj.

reasons why the political scientist should

not use classifications and characterizations of actions that the

actors themselves have not or cannot provide, these classifications and

explanations are not immune to the same potential sources of error and

distortion found in the accounts offered by ordinary political agents.
For example, a political scientist's classification and charac-

terization of political behavior may be misleading because it ignores
or misunderstands individual beliefs, attitudes and intentions or the

subjective meanings of these activities for the individual actors
involved.

More significantly, since the political scientist seeks

cross-cultural generalizations about political behavior and genuine
theories and explanations of political phenomena, he is engaged in the

systematic examination of human action in different historical periods
and various societies.

In short,

the political scientist attempts to

observe, classify and explain political activities and institutions in

which the participants themselves classify and characterize their own
activities and institutions within
not shared by the observer.

a set of

intersubjective meanings

The difficulties involved in such an

enterprise have been long recognized; as Hampshire states.
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These are the familiar difficulties of an historian in
finding a narrative that does not misrepresent the
conduct of men whose behavior, naively and externally
viewed, is familiar and whose thought is unfamiliar .-^^
What is not widely acknowledged or understood, at least within the

empiricist tradition, is that the social scientist and historian are

necessarily involved in the same interpretive task, though typically at
a deeper

level, which is confronted by the ordinary social agent when

he tries to make sense of the behavior of others around him.

Both the

social scientist and the historian must recognize that the prevailing

modes and limits of social action in a particular society or historical
period are established by the concepts or intersubjective meanings

available to agents to classify and describe their own thought and
action.
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Thus,

the political scientist like the historian must con-

front the potential sources of error in his limited capacity to clas-

sify and explain human action in alien social and historical settings
in the same way that the reflective moral agent confronts this diffi-

culty.

Hampshire, describing one of the steps taken by the reflective

moral agent, states:

Reading history, I learn that to ascribe certain intentions, now familiar, to men living in earlier centuries would be to put words into their mouths and minds
which could not possibly have occurred there.
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Similarly, the political scientist must learn that to impose a fixed

classificatory and explanatory framework on political activities,
institutions and processes which are embedded in different forms of
life and intersubjective meanings is to invite systematic distortion
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and misunderstanding of alternative modes of political behavior and

political life.
If Hampshire's analysis of thought and action is correct, the

political scientist, again like the ordinary political agent, can
prevent such distortion and misrepresentation only by immersing himself
in the alternative framework of intersub j ective meanings and social

practices.

The task of classifying and explaining political behavior

and political practices in a given social setting cannot be divorced

from an interpretive understanding of the basic conceptual scheme and
form of life which constitute that social setting.

Finally, Hampshire's analysis expressly rejects the claim that the

political scientist's superior powers to theorize, generalize or predict have freed him from difficulties.

He suggests that while the

theories, generalizations and predictions offered by the political

scientist are clearly more sophisticated, systematic and comprehensive
than those relied upon by ordinary political agents, they remain subject to essentially the same problems and limitations.

Although his

analysis does not rule out completely the possibility of eventually

developing genuine law-like generalizations and theories concerning
political behavior and structures, he maintains that this possible if

unlikely development is dependent upon identifying and dealing with the
complex problems inherent in making generalizations or predictions
about human behavior.

Whatever the future outcome of such efforts, the

political scientist now confronts the same episteraological limitations
the
faced by the reflective social agent and must proceed by utilizing

,

479

same strategies which reflective agents use in countering these limi-

tations

.

As we saw in the fourth chapter of this essay, Hampshire contends

that every social agent must have a policy which provides some con-

tinuity to his different activities and which integrates them into his
life.

Certainly, this policy is not a theory either in the sense that

it constitutes a comprehensive set of moral,

political and practical

norms which can be used to direct an agent's entire life and activity
or in the sense that it is as systematic and formalized as the type of

theory which is the goal of political inquiry.

However, this policy

does constitute a theory in the sense that it necessarily provides a

basis for making some predictions and generalizations about the behavior of others.

Without this kind of theoretical understanding of the

general patterns of human motivation and behavior and the general
patterns of behavioral response to certain kinds of situations and
interactions, a social agent simply cannot adequately perform the

practical tasks of planning for the future, making decisions and
choices, acting appropriately and effectively as circumstances change,
and so on

There are, of course, serious limitations on a social agent's

ability to predict, make accurate generalizations, or develop adequate

theories about the behavior of others.

Many of these limitations flow

from his lack of empirical knowledge of human beings or the world

around him or from his lack of knowledge of what other agents intend or
plan to do.

But one of the most crucial difficulties he faces in
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making predictions or generalizations about human behavior follows not
simply from the lack of such knowledge but rather from the fact that

reflexivity is

central component of human behavior.

a

Any competent social agent understands that those patterns of be-

havior or predictable responses which he has identified and now relies
on can and will change if the beliefs and thinking of other agents,

including their beliefs and thoughts about him and his activity and intentions, change.
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Thus, an agent may keep certain of his intentions

or activities secret because he realizes that the responses of others

will be different if they understand the true nature of his intentions
or actions.

In fact,

secrecy, lying and other such common features of

human activity, which increase the problems of predictability and gen-

eralization, are themselves practical strategies for dealing with the
factor of reflexivity in human life.
In addition to these problems in predicting other individual's be-

havior, the reflective moral agent, as he is portrayed by Hampshire,

must also recognize the limits of his understanding of himself and

others which are imposed by the interplay of theory and fact at its
deeper levels.

He understands that his own classification of the moral

and political dimensions of human life as well as his theoretical

understanding of himself, his society, and how he is linked to his
society are the products of

a

particular time and place.

Thus, a re-

flective agent must acknowledge that the theoretical framework that
now
generates the predictions and generalizations which he and others

about human
rely on may well be overthrown as basic beliefs or thinking
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behaviors and social phenomena are modified.

Moreover, he recognizes

that many such changes in the basic conceptual framework used to cate-

gorize and classify thought and action are themselves unpredictable and
surprising because they cannot be conceptualized or imagined in the
present framework.

In particular, Hampshire's analysis of these deeper

limitations upon our ability to make predictions and generalizations
about social action emphasizes the creative power of the arts which,

through the invention of new forms of expression, are

a

fundamental

component of the reflexive dynamic which remakes human beings and
society.
In short, the most crucial difficulties which the political scien-

tist confronts when he attempts to make generalizations and predictions

about political behavior, like the problems which he faces when he

attempts to classify and characterize political behavior and political
phenomena, are essentially the same difficulties inherent in the situ-

ation of the ordinary political agent.

The political scientist cannot

escape the epistemological limitations imposed by the nature of human

activity and human life and, like the reflective moral agent, is presented with the basic alternative of ignoring these limitations and

proceeding as if he were studying something completely different from
human conduct and social life or confronting these limitations head-on
and developing a set of strategies for dealing with them.

Hampshire

holds that the latter alternative is by far the superior path if we are
to place political inquiry on an adequate philosophical grounding.
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Moreover, he suggests the proper strategy for dealing with these epis-

temological problems and limits, whether in political inquiry or in
practical political activity, is provided by the model of the reflective moral agent.

The common goal of the political scientist and the reflective

moral agent is to develop self-consciousness of these limitations and
their effects upon our understanding of political behavior, processes
and institutions.

In the first place, the political scientist like the

reflective agent must acknowledge that his own classification and char-

acterization of political phenomena is the product of

vocabulary or conceptual scheme.

a

particular

He attempts to set out in detail the

various components of this conceptual framework, particularly those
assumptions and presuppositions which are contestable or open to challenge.

The primary method which is available to either the political

scientist or the reflective agent to accomplish this difficult task is
the systematic investigation of alternative classificatory systems or

frameworks for political analysis.

Based upon this investigation of

alternative systems of classification, he tries to identify the most
significant differences which separate these competing conceptual
frameworks and to develop criteria which can be used in evaluating and

assessing alternative conceptual schemes.
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In the social and human sciences, as well as in moral theory, this

analysis and evaluation of competing classificatory systems and conceptual frameworks necessarily focuses on the concept of action itself,
relation
or the relation between thought and action in general and the
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between intention and action in particular. 42

It is at this point that

the political scientist, like the reflective agent, must come to terms

with the other major concerns of a critical theory of knowledge:

the

difficulties concerning the characterization and explanation of human
action and the reflexive interplay between theory and fact.

Hampshire

makes no further effort to complete this conception of an interpretive
political inquiry which requires
own theoretical perspective.

a

self-conscious examination of one's

However, his analysis does suggest that

the political scientist, again like the reflective agent, cannot di-

vorce the empirical investigation of political phenomena from funda-

mental philosophical questions, such as those concerning human

rationality and freedom.
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Criticism of the Interpretive Model

Certainly, the kind of broad-scale reevaluation and reformulation
of the philosophical and methodological orientation of contemporary

political science which Hampshire advocates remains in its preliminary
stages, and there is still much work to be done.

At the same time, his

analysis does offer some promising, if not adequately developed, pro-

posals for clarifying and perhaps resolving the long-standing debates
about the nature, methods and scope of political inquiry.

However, his

classified
work, along with that of the other social theorists who are
largely ignored in
as adherents of the interpretive approach, has been

mainstream political theory and political science.

This is so not only

of the dominant
because he challenges some of the most central features
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positivist model but also because the interpretive approach itself has
been widely mischaracterized and misrepresented.

The interpretive

approach to political inquiry which follows from Hampshire's analysis
of thought and action becomes more clear through consideration of the

criticisms and objections which are standardly raised against any such
model of social inquiry.
In the first place, philosophers and social scientists who accept

the positivist model of a social science challenge the legitimacy of
the interpretive approach by identifying all the various accounts of an

interpretive understanding of social phenomena with the most primitive

verstehen accounts of explanation.

For example, Richard Rudner argues

that any social scientist who attempts an interpretive understanding of

social action necessarily commits what he calls the "reproductive

fallacy," the fallacy of assigning to social science the task of some-

how reproducing "the conditions or states of affairs being studied."
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Similarly, Ernest Nagel characterizes this "subjectivist" approach as
one which mistakenly requires the social scientist "to project himself
by sympathetic imagination into the phenomena he is attempting to
he

understand."

In short, the dominant positivist response to the in-

terpretive model continues to portray this approach as an attempt to
use sympathetic imagination or empathy to "get inside" the subject's

mind or to relive the subject's experiences.
Such criticism clearly has merit when one is assessing early

statements of the verstehen position, such as
Idea of History which advances the notion that

R.

G.

Collingwood'

"...

s IJi£

the historian
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must re-enact the past in his own mind."

However, the positivist

contention that contemporary accounts of the notion of interpretive
understanding, while not as simplistic as Collingwood'

s

position, still

commit the same reproductive fallacy is fundamentally mistaken.
Rudner, for example, acknowledges that Winch's presentation of an

interpretive approach rests upon the claim that social phenomena are
rule-governed and that the social scientist, if he is to understand
these phenomena, must "learn the rules."

Rudner offers the following

objection:
But coming to learn the rules, in turn, entails knowing
the phenomena from the "inside," i.e., having the ex-

perience of behaving in conformance with those rules.
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In other words, the analysis of interpretive understanding which

emerges from linguistic philosophy, like the more primitive conception
of verstehen

^

retains the reproductive fallacy by treating social

scientific understanding as the recreation of the psychological experiences of those being studied.
This critique of the notion of interpretive understanding as

always and essentially an effort to "get inside" the subject's mind or
to recreate the subject's private experiences presupposes that Winch,

Hampshire and other modern proponents of the interpretive model share
the same dualistic account of mind and body which underpinned the

classical view of verstehen

48
.

Yet, as we have seen, one of the prin-

cipal themes of Hampshire's analysis of thought and action in particular and of recent linguistic philosophy of mind in general is that such
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a dualistic account is mistaken.

Hampshire contends that we cannot

treat intentions, beliefs, desires and other "mental states" as private

mental events which cause observable behaviors but remain hidden behind
these behaviors.

According to his view, actions cannot even be iden-

tified independently of beliefs, intentions and so on, and the pre-

vailing dualistic account of the relation between thought and action
must be abandoned.

In short, Hampshire's philosophy of mind and the

interpretive approach to political inquiry which it supports are founded on systematic rejection of the same dualistic framework for clas-

sifying and characterizing actions that Rudner and other positivists

implicitly attribute to all advocates of an interpretive understanding
of social action.
In addition, Rudner and other defenders of the positivist con-

ception of a social science are clearly distorting Winch's and
Hampshire'

s

views when they characterize interpretive understanding as

some kind of psychological experience,

Hampshire, for example, cer-

tainly does not argue that a social scientist's, or an ordinary social
agent's understanding of another individual's intentions or his inter-

pretation of social activities and practices rests upon

a

process giving him access to the subject's "inner" states.

psychological
The focus

of the notion of interpretive understanding is not upon the subjective

experiences of individuals but rather upon those intersubjective meanings which are shared by members of a particular society or form of
life.

or
To "understand" a system of such meanings is not to capture

and
reproduce the psychological experience of what it is like to live
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act within a particular set of concepts, social practices and relationships, but rather to grasp the public rules, conventions and norms

which assign the point or purpose of various actions and which integrate different practices and relationships into a single form of
life. ^9

While this misleading characterization of any interpretive model
of political inquiry as a regression to a primitive verstehen approach

remains dominant among mainstream political scientists, there are also

more powerful objections raised against this model.

These more

forceful criticisms of the notion of an interpretive understanding of

political behavior and social life have been typically advanced by phi-

losophers and social theorists who believe that some revision of the
positivist conception of a science of politics or society is necessary.
Such theorists as J. Donald Moon, Brian Fay and Anthony Giddens ac-

knowledge deficiencies in the positivist model and recognize that the

interpretive approach cannot be dismissed simply on the mistaken
objection that it commits the reproductive fallacy.
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At the same

time, they present several other objections to the notion of an inter-

pretive understanding of social life as a legitimate approach to political inquiry.

The criticisms of the interpretive model advanced by Moon, Fay and

Giddens must be examined carefully because they are based on a more
sophisticated and more accurate analysis of this approach than the
shallow caricature of the notion of interpretive understanding which
remains pervasive in the mainstream of positivist social science.
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However, even their characterizations and criticisms of this alter-

native model of social inquiry drastically distort the account of an

interpretive analysis of politics and society which is grounded in

post-Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy.

One of the major causes of

this distortion is a failure to distinguish between criticism of the

most radical presentations of this approach, such as Peter Winch's, and

criticism of those features of the interpretive model which necessarily
follow from its philosophical and methodological foundation.

The

necessity of such a distinction becomes clear when three of the major
themes of their critique of the interpretive model are examined in
light of Hampshire's analysis of knowledge and politics.
One of the central objections raised by these critics is that the

interpretive approach to political inquiry, like the analysis of
thought and action upon which it is based, focuses exclusively on the
role of intentional human action in political and social life.

As a

result, the interpretive model automatically excludes all the features
of social life and politics which cannot be explained in terms of

individual intentions.

An example of this line of criticism is

provided by Moon's claim that the methodological distinctiveness of the
social and physical sciences cannot be as great as advocates of the in-

terpretive approach claim,
for some of the things that happen in social life
are things no one does and so we cannot think of them
simply in terms of the categories of intentional ac.

.

.

,

tion.

Moon cites such examples as a stock market crash and the outbreak of
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war to illustrate the social scientist's concern with events
which

cannot be viewed as the results of individual or collective intentions.
In short, the argument is that the interpretive model, by mistakenly

construing the task of social inquiry as the classification and ex-

planation of intentional human action, systematically ignores the
problem of unintended and unanticipated consequences.^^
Similarly, Fay holds that one of the major failings of the inter-

pretive model is its neglect of:
the explanation of the pattern of unintended
consequ ences of actions a feature of social life which,
by definition, cannot be explained by referring to the
.

.

.

,

intentions of the individuals concerned.

Moreover, he identifies a particular feature of the problem of unintended consequences which is of special interest to the social scientist and which is necessarily ignored if one adopts an interpretive

approach to social inquiry.

By focusing exclusively on human inten-

tions and intentional activity, the interpretive approach neglects the

ways in which individual beliefs, roles and actions as well as political institutions and practices may serve functions and purposes that
are not even recognized by, and certainly not intended by the indivi-

duals who hold these beliefs or the participants in these practices.
In other words, the interpretive model with its focus on intentional

actions completely ignores the most fundamental insight of the functional analysis of politics and society:

namely that the rules, con-

ventions and norms which people follow may perform functions for the
social and political system which are radically different not only from
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the participants'

intentions but also from the purposes which they

think these rules, norms and conventions fulfill.
Full understanding of the force of this objection to the inter-

pretive model requires examination of the other criticisms raised by
Fay and the others.

In particular, this claim that the interpretive

model's preoccupation with intentional human action excludes consi-

deration of other important dimensions of political behavior and political life is closely linked to a point which Fay lists as a separate

criticism of the interpretive approach.

Fay contends that the inter-

pretive approach:
leaves no room for an examination of the conditions which give rise to the actions, rules and beliefs
which it seeks to explicate, and, more importantly, it
does not provide a means whereby one can study the
relationships between the structural elements of a
social order and the possible forms of behavior and
.

.

.

beliefs which such elements engender.
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In short, the social scientist is concerned not only with the meanings,

beliefs and intentions which are expressed in and are part of social
activity, but also with the various environmental and social factors-

demographic, economic, psychological, political, religious and so
on

— which

limit the scope and modes of social action and which influ-

ence individual decisions and behaviors.

Thus, an interpretive ap-

proach to political inquiry ignores the task of identifying and analyzing the specific mechanisms through which the social structure

channels the thought and action of members of that society as well as
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the task of investigating the influence of such environmental factors
as technology on social action and the social structure itself .^^

Giddens voices this same objection when he argues that it is a

"characteristic error" of those concerned with philosophy of action to
neglect any kind of structural analysis of the social context within

which all action takes place. 57

Thus, he criticizes Winch in particu-

lar and the kind of interpretive approach which emerges from post-

Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy in general for treating forms of
social life as given.

Although the interpretive approach to social

inquiry correctly requires the social scientist to immerse himself in
the conventions and practices which comprise a form of life, it leaves
the origins and nature of social conventions and practices shrouded in

mystery.

Social structure loses its rightful place on the center of

the stage of social inquiry and becomes merely a back drop for the

investigation of intentional actions.
This is clearly one of the most powerful objections to the kind of

interpretive approach to political inquiry which is linked to post-

Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy, and Hampshire's position must be
carefully analyzed and assessed in relation to this line of criticism.

Beginning with Moon'

s

more specific charge that the interpretive model

necessarily treats all human activity and social life in terms of intentional actions and systematically ignores unintended and unanticipated consequences, it is clear that Hampshire does not portray individual actions, let alone the outcomes of the actions and interactions of

.
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several individuals, as always and essentially the result of
conscious

planning and fully formed intentions.
As we saw in the fourth chapter of this essay, Hampshire maintains

that the dual force of action as attempt and achievement is ineliminable.

In other words,

the contrast between what an agent intends or

tries to do and the actual outcome or consequences of his action is a

central and constant feature of Hampshire's account of the relationship
between thought and action.

Thus, according to this philosophy of

mind, a characterization of an agent's activities solely in terms of
his intentions would account for only one face of his actions, and

would ignore that face of his actions which consists of the actual

consequences of his activity, including those which were unforeseen and
unintended
Certainly, Hampshire's account of mind places great emphasis upon
an agent's capacity to form and act upon intentions, and he regards the

concept of action as inextricably bound to the concept of intention.
But this thesis entails neither the claim that we must focus exclu-

sively on intentional action if we want to understand human behavior
and human life nor the claim that the philosopher or social scientist
is concerned only with what people do and never with what happens to

them.

In contrast, Hampshire's position is that the concept of inten-

tion is crucial to making this distinction between what people do and
what happens to them and that neglect of the connections between the

notions of intention and action lies at the roots of the prevailing
lack of exactly this distinction in contemporary accounts of social
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behavior and social life.

However, this does not mean that the social

and behavioral sciences must focus exclusively on one
side of this

distinction and dismiss those things which are properly characterized
as happening to people as unimportant.^^

In addition, whereas it may be true that certain linguistic philo-

sophers and social theorists influenced by linguistic philosophy have

treated rational, intentional and self-conscious action as the paradigm
for classifying and characterizing all social activities,

institutions

and processes, Hampshire clearly does not advance or imply such a model
of human activity and social life.

His analysis does not presuppose

that agents can achieve full knowledge of the possibilities of action,

become fully rational, and become completely autonomous of their social
and physical environment.^^

What he does suggest is that there is a vast spectrum of human

thought and action confronting the social and human sciences.

At one

end of this spectrum are found cases where human agents act rationally

on the basis of their intentions and beliefs.

On the other end of this

spectrum are located those cases where the connection between an
agent's intentions and beliefs on the one hand and his actions on the
other is inconsistent and incomplete.

It is only in these latter

cases that the social scientist can explain human thought and action as

determined by social forces, environmental conditions, and so on in
exactly the same way that the physical scientist explains an event as

determined by natural forces and conditions.

In the overwhelming

majority of often complex cases which fall in between these two

.
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extremes, the social scientist must make significant departures
from
the physical sciences model and utilize an alternative type of
expla-

nation which allows for the mediating factors of self-consciousness and
reflexivity.
Of course, if this account of thought and action is correct, the

social scientist like the philosopher must direct his attention to the

description and explanation of intentional action.

Yet, such a concern

with intentional action does not rest on the assumption that all sig-

nificant social activity is purely or even primarily intentional in
nature or that all social phenomena must be explained in terms of intentions.

Rather, this focus is dictated by the nature of the subject

matter of the social sciences in that the classification and explanation of intentional action does present the social scientist with a

number of difficulties which are not confronted by the physical

scientist
Finally, in relation to Fay's criticism that an interpretive

approach "leaves no room" for analysis of the relationship between
elements of a social order and the beliefs and behavior of individuals

within that order, there is no exclusion of such analysis inherent in

Hampshire's position.

As we have seen, Hampshire repeatedly emphasizes

that the range of an individual's thought and the possibilities of

action which he finds available to him are established by "his up-

bringing and social environment."

Moreover, he acknowledges that the

intentions which an agent forms are typically limited not only by such
(which
individual attributes as his intelligence and imagination

"
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themselves are, in part, a product of his environment
and learning),
but also by the set of concepts and intersubjective
meanings which are

embedded in his society and form of life.
In addition, there is nothing in Hampshire's position to
suggest

that the social scientist or historian cannot examine the range
of

thought and modes of activity which typify a given historical period or
society, including the manner in which various cultural, social and

political factors limit or channel the beliefs and behaviors of members
of that society.

In fact, he acknowledges that on the basis of such

an analysis, what a particular agent will do, try to do, or even think

about doing "may sometimes be predictable with almost perfect accuracy

.

Yet, if this leaves open the possibility of pursuing the type of

analysis which Fay correctly identifies as absolutely central to the
study of politics and society, Hampshire does not push exploration of
this opening very far.

Although he is very much concerned with exami-

ning the various factors which limit thought and action, his more

detailed work consistently focuses on the psychological rather than the

sociological dimension of this problem.

More generally, as Giddens

notes, he does not launch the kind of structural or institutional

analysis which is necessary in order to trace the connections among the
possibilities of thought and action within

a

particular society, the

established norms, values and so on in that society, and the basic

distribution of power and divisions of interest within that particular
social order.
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Giddens holds that it is necessary to complement the linguistic
focus on the study of "the production of social life," the manner in

which social structures are constituted by human activity, with an
analysis of "the social

r eproduction of

structures," the ways in which

social structures are the medium of this process,

In Giddens view,

this simply reestablishes the standard sociological emphasis on the

point that human beings make society but not under conditions of their

own choosing.

However, as Giddens recognizes, the interpretive

approach typically ignores this aspect of social life and activity, but
it does not preclude recognition or analysis of it.

example

,

Hampshire, for

clearly acknowledges that his conception of increased human

freedom through increased self-knowledge or self-understanding requires

certain social conditions.

One of the principal tasks of the social

scientist working from this approach is to focus on analysis of such

conditions.
At this point, we must carefully examine a second line of criti-

cism directed against the interpretive model by Fay, Moon, Giddens and
others.

Any adequate analysis of the nature of intentional activity

and the problem of unintended consequences is closely connected to a

set of questions concerning what constitutes an adequate or proper

explanation of human behavior, social practices and the structure of a
social or political system.

Hampshire's position maintains that an in-

terpretive understanding of social action and social phenomena is
actinecessary if the social scientist is to be able to explain the

intentional
vities, practices, and social order of self-interpreting,
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agents.

Moon and other critics of this notion of an
interpretive

understanding of social life challenge its adequacy as a
model of

explanation for social inquiry, claiming that such a model
unnecessarily requires a total and complete break with the model of
scientific

explanation provided by the physical sciences.
These critics acknowledge the usefulness of the notion of an in-

terpretive understanding of social life in the analysis of

a

particular

political and social system, which is historically and socially unique.
However, they contend that it provides no basis for making comparisons
and generalizations about political attitudes, behaviors and structures
in different social and historical settings.

Moon, for example, admits

that interpretive explanations are necessary in order "to explicate the

meanings of particular actions, texts, practices, institutions, and
other cultural objects

.

.

.",

but also argues that

"...

such ex-

planation does not provide a sufficient basis for the construction of
more general comparisons and theories.

"^^

Of course, this second objection to the interpretive approach is
not unrelated to the first line of criticism:

that even in the ana-

lysis of particular cases, the interpretive model neglects central

features of particular situations and activities (such as unintended
and unanticipated consequences)

,

and therby precludes examination of

general patterns of thought and behavior and the relationship between
such patterns and structural and environmental factors.

But this

second objection presses the attack upon the notion of an interpretive

understanding of social phenomena even further.

Thus, Giddens argues

.
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that the interpretive model grounded in post-Wittgensteinian
linguistic

philosophy, as exemplified by Winch, ignores the problem of how the
rules, norms and conventions which constitute one set of social prac-

tices and form of life are related to those which embody different

practices and different forms of life.

He claims that:

this easily terminates in a relativism which
.
breaks off just where some of the basic issues which
confront sociology begin;
problems of institutional
.

,

change and the mediation of different cultures.
In other words, the interpretive approach to social inquiry not only

generates a kind of cultural relativism, which eliminates the very
possibility of making cross-cultural generalizations, but also neglects

completely the historical change of institutions, meanings and practices
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The general claim that the interpretive approach to political

inquiry leads to a form of relativism and neglects institutional and
social change is underpinned by two more specific and interdependent

criticisms of the interpretive model.

The first of these charges is

that the interpretive model rests upon the mistaken assertion that

human actions and social phenomena cannot be causally explained.

For

example, Moon states:

The interpretive model of political inquiry insists that
laws and generalizations are not necessary to an under-

standing of human actions and institutions.
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According to Moon, the interpretive model asserts that an interpretive
and
understanding of social phenomena is fundamentally different from

natural
incompatible with the physical scientist's explanation of

1
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phenomena because "such understanding does not require
generalizations,
and it certainly does not require 'causal'

laws."'^°

In short, accord-

ing to the mistaken dichotomy presented by the interpretive model of

explanation, an interpretation of an agent's actions in terms of intentions, reasons, meanings, rules or conventions is mutually incompatible

with explanation in terms of causes.
This of course, is the major reason why Moon and the others find
the interpretive model so deficient in its treatment of social struc-

ture, institutional development and change.

Although all of these

critics agree that explanation in the social sciences does not fit the

pattern dictated by the deductive-nomological model, they insist that
the interpretive model goes too far because it rejects completely all

causal explanations.

Fay and Moon follow G. H. Von Wright in holding

that "quasi-causal accounts" of the linkages between elements in the

social structure and natural environment on the one hand and human

thought and action on the other remain a legitimate and essential part
of social inquiry.

7

They believe that the interpretive model must be

extensively revised or combined with other approaches to social inquiry
because it allows no causal or quasi-causal explanations.
This charge that the interpretive model concentrates exclusively
on explanations in terms of rules, intentions and reasons and rejects

completely causal explanations is closely tied to another basic objection to the adequacy of the interpretive approach to social inquiry.
This second criticism focuses on the interpretive model's insistence
understood "in
that social activities and practices must always be
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their ovm terms,"

Giddens lays cut this challenge in detail in his

critique of Winch's analysis of social inquiry, particularly as it
is

presented in his article on magic and witchcraft among the Azande.
In "Understanding a Primitive Society," Winch argues that the

requirement that a society must be understood in its own terms means
that we cannot interpret or assess Zande beliefs and practices

according to the standards of Western science and rationality.'^^

More

generally. Winch's position is that the social scientist can interpret
or "make sense of" beliefs, actions and practices which comprise a par-

ticular society or form of life only by grasping or understanding the
rules and conventions which are shared by the members of that society.
The outcome of such an interpretive approach is, according to Giddens,
the imposition of extensive and highly suspect restrictions on the con-

cepts which are admissible in the social scientist's attempts to classify and explain social actions and practices in different cultures.
For Winch acknowledges that the social scientist may introduce tech-

nical concepts, which are not used by the participants in a particular
set of social practices or form of life, in order to reclassify or

recharacterize their behavior or practices, but he insists that all the
concepts used in social scientific explanations of a particular society
must be in some way "logically tied" to the concepts used by the

members of that society.
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Winch's analysis of Zande culture thus illustrates one of the
fundamental problems inherent in an interpretive approach to social
inquiry:

a

basic and far-reaching confusion about the relationship
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between the technical concepts used by the social scientist
and the lay

concepts used by social agents in a given society.

The interpretive

model's requirement that the concepts used by the social scientist
be
limited to those which are available to social agents or those technical concepts which are logically tied to lay concepts, necessarily

results in the total elimination of any classifications, comparisons or

generalizations which cannot be formulated in the terms employed by the

members of a particular society.

But Giddens points out that the

reconceptualization and recharacterization of social actions and practices by social scientists are designed to carry out their "principal
task," which is

.

.to correct

and improve upon notions which are

used by actors themselves in interpreting their own actions and the

action of others."
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The social scientist introduces technical con-

cepts in an attempt to construct new classifications and descriptions
which, in turn, generate comparisons and generalizations that go beyond
the participants'

understanding of social activities and practices.

In short, the artificial limits on the vocabulary of the social

sciences which are imposed by the interpretive model reduce social
science to the redescription of that which is already known to social
agents.

According to Giddens, the interpretive model of social inquiry

presented by Winch, like that variant of it advanced by Gadamer,

—

places out of court the possibility which is
.
actually a necessity of analyzing social conduct in
terms which go beyond those of actors situated in particular traditions, and which are of explanatory sig.

.

—

nificance in relation to them.
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This mistaken account of the nature and foundation of the conceptual

framework used by the social scientist is, of course, a crucial aspect
of what these critics perceive as the implicit relativism and neglect
of change inherent in the interpretive model.

This second line of criticism correctly identifies crucial

deficiencies in Winch's conception of the scope and methods of social
inquiry.

Given Winch's treatment of causal explanation and the con-

cepts which are used by the social scientist, his conception of social

inquiry is thoroughly relativistic and cannot account for institutional
change.

However, as careful examination of Hampshire's position

clearly shows, this critique of Winch cannot be taken as a critique of
the conception of social inquiry which necessarily follows if one

accepts the legitimacy of the notion of an interpretive understanding
of social life.
In the first place. Winch does treat explanation in terms of

rules, intentions or reasons and explanation in terms of causes as

mutually exclusive, and, in effect, excludes causal explanation from
the social and human sciences.

Moreover, there is some justification

for identifying such a position with recent linguistic philosophy of

mind since a number of linguistic philosophers have advanced similar
theses concerning the relationship between causal explanations and the

explanation of thought and action in terms of reasons, rules and so on.
Thus, Charles Landesman contends that the linguistic attack on

philosophy
Cartesian dualism has spawned "a new dualism" in linguistic
of mind, which claims that there are

"...

two mutually exclusive

.
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language games or conceptual schemes which we use to
talk about human
beings."

Many of these philosophers, like Winch, have argued
that

these two conceptual schemes are mutually exlusive and
that the explan-

ation of human action is necessarily teleological in form and incompatible with the type of causal explanations appropriate to the physical

sciences
riowever, more recent analyses of the so-called problem of reasons

and causes have, under the pressure of a barrage of criticism directed
at the kind of position taken by Winch, moved away from the dichotomous

treatment of understanding in terms of reasons and rule- following on
the one hand and causal explanations on the other.
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Although

Hampshire has sometimes been identified with this "new dualism" on the
78

basis of some of his statements in Thought and Action /

his most

recent work clearly indicates that he does not treat causal explan-

ations and explanations in terms of reasons, intentions and so on as

mutually exclusive or reject the use of causal explanations of human
thought and action.

For example, the list of "familiar propositions"

which he accepts as true that is provided in the postscript to the
expanded edition of Freedom of the Individual includes the following:
Not all interesting explanations of mental events, and
of the behaviour of persons, are causal explanations;
other forms of explanation may be satisfactory in their
appropriate contexts. But the availability of these
alternative forms of explanation does not by itself
preclude the possibility of normal causal explanations
of the same phenomena, identified under the same de-

scriptions.

79
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Certainly, Hampshire does maintain that the social and human

sciences face serious

obstacles to carrying through standard types of
.
causal explanation applicable to physical states, when
.

.

desires, beliefs and other thoughts are in question.
As we have seen in his account of a critical theory of knowledge,

Hampshire believes that these obstacles center in the "indefinite

reflexiveness of thought."

8

Yet, as he explicitly points out, his

argument concerning such obstacles is not to be confused with the
thesis that because human action is intentional or rule-governed, we

cannot construct causal explanations of human behavior or social phenomena.

His argument admittedly focuses on the language of intentions,

purposes, etc. which social actors use in characterizing themselves and
others, but he states:
My argument will contain no suggestion that human beings
are as a species unique in the world in not being susceptible to strictly scientific understanding to any

degree or in any way.

Of course, this position must be set out and analyzed in greater
detail, a task which will be undertaken in the next section in relation
to the materialist challenge to Hampshire's account of mind.

But at

this point it is important to note that the objection that an inter-

pretive approach automatically rules out causal explanations of human
behavior and social phenomena is mistaken.

Hampshire's philosophical

and
premises, unlike Winch's, do not bar theoretical generalizations

causal explanations from political inquiry.

Instead, Hampshire's

causal
position is that the social scientist cannot provide an adequate

505

explanation of human actions and social practices
unless he accounts
for the beliefs, intentions and reasons of the
agent's involved.

As

Alasdair Maclntyre concludes in his review of Winch'

3

s

The Idea of

Social Sciftncp,
true causal explanations cannot be formulated
where actions are concerned—unless intentions, motives,
.

.

.

and reasons are taken into account.

Of course, even if this point were granted, it still might seem
that Hampshire's analysis, like Winch's, encounters serious difficulties concerning the relationship between the concepts used by social

agents and the concepts available to the social scientist.

After all,

Hampshire like Winch clearly holds that a society or a set of activities and practices must be understood in its own terms.

However,

there is a significant difference in how far each theorist is willing
to press this claim.

One of the major problems with Winch's conception of social

inquiry is that he treats this attempt to characterize a society in its
own terms as the only legitimate and proper task of a social science.
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In contrast, Hampshire's position suggests that this interpretive

understanding of activities and practices in terms of the participants'
own concepts, classifications and descriptions is the proper starting
point in social inquiry and not the entire enterprise of social inquiry.

His principal contention is that unless the social scientist

immerses himself in the conceptual framework which mediates a particular set of activities and practices, his descriptions and explanations
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of a particular activity or practice in that society may
well distort
or miss its basic point or purpose.

But this thesis is certainly not

identical with either the claim that every reclassification or rede-

scription of social activities and practices introduced by the social
scientist necessarily results in such distortion and error, or the

claim that classifications and descriptions used by social agents must
be accepted by the social scientist.

As Hampshire repeatedly acknowledges, social agents often "mis-

describe and misconceive" their own situations and activities in a

variety of different ways, and the beliefs and intentions which then
guide their actions "incorporate this misapprehension or misdescription."
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Consequently, an observer (whether a social scientist or

another social agent) may rule that an agent's characterization of his
own circumstances or activities is "improper or unacceptable" because
it rests upon basic errors in the agent's explanation of his own scheme

More importantly for social

of identification and classification.

inquiry, Hampshire notes that an agent may be unable to provide an

acceptable and proper characterization of his own activities because
his own conceptual framework and classificatory system completely omit
".

.

.

those features of the actions that seem to the observer the

salient and distinguishing features."

86

In other words, social agents

can and frequently do lack the concepts, distinctions and classifi-

cations which are necessary in order to recognize and identify essential aspects of their own social activities, practices and institutions.
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Yet, while it is possible that agents engaged in a certain type
of

activity lack the concepts which are necessary for identifying and

understanding significant features of their activity, it is impossible
that they lack the concepts which are necessary for carrying on these

activities.

This is why the interpretive model of social inquiry

requires that the social scientist begin his study of a particular
social system with an analysis of the concepts used by members of that

society to classify, characterize and carry on their activities.
an approach does not necessarily rest

,

Such

as Winch' s account of it sug-

gests, on the assumption that the conceptual scheme used by the members
of a particular society is complete, unchallengeable and inherently

superior to any reconceptualization and reclassification of their

activities and practices provided in the explanations of the social
scientist.

It does rest on the proposition that the social scientist

cannot discover or uncover a social reality in a particular society

which is completely independent of the vocabulary of that society.

Misunderstanding of this point has been a contributing factor to a
third general objection which has been raised against the interpretive

model of social inquiry.

This line of criticism charges that the in-

terpretive approach is inherently conservative because it systemati-

cally ignores the pervasiveness of conflict and power in social and
political life.

For example, Giddens argues that the interpretive

model not only takes forms of life, traditions conventions and pracreducing the
tices as being "internally unified and coherent," thereby

communication
problem of order and conflict to essentially problems of
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but also ignores how asymmetries of power infect
the communication

process itself.

87

Linguistic philosophy of action and the interpretive

approach which is built upon it over-extend Wittgenstein's
game analogies, treating all social systems of rules and norms as
if they were

closed and unquestioned in the same way as the rules of games or
ritu-

alistic and ceremonial forms of human behavior.

However, it cannot be

assumed that this is typical of the rule systems which most concern the

political scientist for:

They are less unified; subject to chronic ambiguities of
'interpretation,' so that their application or use is
contested

,

a matter of struggle

88
.

.

.

.

These struggles concerning interpretation of a system of rules, concepts and meanings are, moreover, connected to fundamental divisions of
interest

.^^

Likewise, Fay charges that the interpretive approach, by presupposing that meanings, beliefs, practices and actions are "congruent

with one another," precludes the possibility of even identifying, much
less analyzing, possible conflicts or contradictions "between certain

actions, rules, and common meanings, or between these and their causes
or results."
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In particular, the interpretive model ignores those

cases where social agents cannot adequately characterize or understand

their own social position and activities because their concepts, ideas
and beliefs are part of a mechanism which functions so as to distort or

conceal significant features of social reality.

By rejecting the kinds

of conceptual distortion which are rooted in deep-seated social
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division and conflict of interest, the interpretive
approach to social
inquiry

.

.

leads to reconciling people to their social order

and supports the status quo.^^

..."

Moreover, because it does not come to

terms with the ideological obstacles which social agents confront when

they try to examine and evaluate alternative theories or conceptual

frameworks, the interpretive model spawns a naive political theory

based upon the assumption

"...

that the simple presentation of ideas

will foster a change in social actors' self-conceptions.

."^^
.

.

In large part, this line of criticism is based upon the assertion

that the interpretive model presupposes that the vocabulary used by

social agents always and necessarily captures the most significant

features of their social activities, relationships and practices.

But,

as we have seen, Hampshire neither makes nor implies any such claim.

In addition, Hampshire explicitly acknowledges the point which Giddens

stresses in his critique of the interpretive model:

that within a

shared conceptual framework there are disputes over the application and
use of the central concepts with which agents characterize their poli-

tical activities and practices, and that such disputes are frequently

political contests reflecting conflicting interests and purposes.
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Also, Hampshire's account of thought and action clearly does not pro-

vide the kind of simplisitic and naive view of changes in consciousness
and self-consciousness which Fay attributes to the interpretive model.

Finally, careful examination of Hampshire's analyses of moral

conflict and of the relationship between ethics and politics dispels
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the notion that the philosophical assumptions
underpinning an inter-

pretive approach to social inquiry are inherently conservative.

His

entire approach to the ethical problems confronting agents
when they

must decide about future courses of conduct or when they evaluate
the

decisions and actions of others emphasizes that

"...

morality ori-

ginally appears in our experience as a conflict of claims and a division of purpose."

Also, as he expressly acknowledges, political

and governmental decision-making typically involves similar conflicts

among competing claims, needs and values.
Most importantly, Hampshire rejects the notion, which has been

pervasive in liberal and utilitarian discussions of such conflict, that
all moral and political conflict can be portrayed as always and es-

sentially a matter of calculable trade-offs and compromises within
closed system of universal principles.

a

He recognizes that such con-

flict can involve two different and incompatible ways of life, or that

particular decisions or courses of action sometimes entail commitment
to a certain way of life as opposed to another.

In his analysis of the

relationship between public and private morality, he states:

—

Conflict between competing ways of life religious,
ideological, national, family and class conflict has
been perpetual and conflict is always to be expected;
and the conflicts are not only in the realm of ideas,
but are often also political conflicts, involving force
A way of life is protected and
and the threat of force.
maintained by the exercise of political power, and that
way of life will evolve, and will change with the
changing forms of knowledge, as long as sufficient

political protection of it lasts.

96

—
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While this clearly does not provide answers to all the
questions concerning conflict, politics, morality and ways of life which are
of
interest to the political theorist, it certainly is not the case that

Hampshire's account of knowledge and mind precludes any further
analysis of such questions.

The Displacem ent Hypothesis

There is an even more fundamental objection to the interpretive

approach to political inquiry than those which have been considered
thus far.

This challenge is directed at the notion that explanations

in terms of purposes, meaning,

intentions, goals, etc., are proper or

necessary in the social and human sciences.

As we have seen, such ex-

planations necessarily include the concepts and classifications through
which agents understand themselves and their world and in terms of
which they formulate the intentions and plans that guide their actions.
Of course, this does not mean that the social scientist can utilize

only those concepts which are actually used by social agents in

a par-

ticular social and historical setting in his attempts to explain human

behavior and social phenomena.

However, once the admissibility of

technical, causal concepts is acknowledged, how can defenders of the

interpretive model maintain that the explanatory framework which is
built upon the concepts used in ordinary discourse about thought and
action cannot be eventually replaced with a strictly scientific explanatory framework?

Moon, who expressly confronts this objection to an

.
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interpretive social science, characterizes it as simply an insistence
that we have open the possibility
that we may replace the concepts of ordinary language, of action, purpose, intention, meaning, etc., by
scientifically acceptable terms, thereby obviating the
need for an interpretive understanding of social
.

.

.

life[ J^*^
In other words,

there is nothing immutable and final about a

teleological explanation of human behavior in terms of the concepts and

categories of ordinary discourse.

The social scientist must seek a

conceptual framework that can provide deeper and more basic explanations of human behavior and social phenomena than the typically

incomplete and unsystematic explanations available to ordinary social
agents

According to this line of criticism, even if advocates of an interpretive social science reject Winch's strict limitations on the concepts which are admissible in social inquiry, they are still guilty of

placing artifical and

^

priori limits on what will be or can be

achieved in the social and human sciences.

This closed view of social

inquiry is the inevitable consequence of treating intention, purpose
and other concepts used in ordinary discourse about thought and action
as essential and ineliminable components of any conceptual framework

used in explaining human action and social phenomena.
a

On the basis of

conceptual analysis of past and present vocabularies of thought and

action, advocates of an interpretive approach to social inquiry are
conceptual
making highly questionable claims about possible future
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frameworks which will emerge from psychology and the other
social
sciences.

Taken seriously, the interpretive approach becomes an

obstacle to further progress in our understanding of social
action
because it institutionalizes and insulates from empirical falsification
a conceptual

framework which may eventually prove to be as irrelevant

to social science as the purposive, anthropomorphic, Aristotelian

framework overthrown in the development of the natural sciences.
Moon rejects this objection to an interpretive social science,

treating it as less serious than the criticism that the interpretive
model rests upon the reproductive fallacy.

In replying to this new

line of criticism, he focuses on the familiar contrast between the

subject matter of social inquiry ("social relations and the ideas

consituting these relations
physical sciences.

.

.

.")

and the phenomena studied in the

In short, his argument is that "we cannot conduct

political science, as we understand it today

.

.

.",

if we completely

neglect the meanings, intentions, purposes and so on which are expressed in and are part of social activities and practices.
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Any attempt

to eliminate intentional and purposive concepts from political inquiry
in its present state would automatically discard some of the most

significant features of our existing understanding of political behavior and political phenomena.

Although it is not clear exactly what we

would be studying after such a purge of our conceptual framework, it is
clear that we would no longer be studying political activity in political contexts.

99
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Of course, as Moon admits, such an argument applies
only to the

present stage of political inquiry, and certainly does
not rule out the
logical possibility of generating "some kind of neurophysiological
the-

ories of 'behavior'" or "a 'behavioral' science modeled on a strict

scientific ideal, eschewing the use of intentional concepts.

.

.

But Moon insists,

Discussion of such an ideal seems to be quite pointless,
however, since it is completely programmatic at this
time, and totally foreign to the methodologies and
interests of virtually all contemporary political
scientists.
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As he argues elsewhere in his essay,

the nomological model of scien-

tific explanation, when applied to the explanation of political phenomena, represents

"...

little more than a promissory note."

Since we

lack not only laws of the nomological form, but also the spectators in

terms of which such laws are to be constructed,

"...

the demand that

we cast our explanations in these terms can only express a pious faith
in the future of a naturalistic social science."
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Although Moon's response to this objection is,

I

think, essen-

tially correct, this line of criticism of the interpretive approach to
social inquiry does present a more serious and far-reaching challenge
than he acknowledges.

In the first place,

it is exactly this type of

objection which characterizes the most pervasive and entrenched opposition to the notion of an interpretive understanding of political
phenomena among mainstream political scientists.

For example, re-

searchers examining political behavior typically reject the ordinary
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terminology which political actors use in characterizing and
explaining
their own thought and action as dominated by crude, unsystematic and

pre-scientific theories of human motivation and behavior.

While such a

framework may be adequate for carrying on certain social activities and
practices, it is certainly not the proper starting place for developing
a comprehensive,

empirical theory of political behavior.

Such a view is particularly evident in Wahlke's critique of the

behavioral methodology which is presently utilized by researchers in
political science.

As we have seen, he argues that political research

remains in what is essentially a "pre-behavioral stage."

The basic

problem is that political scientists continue to work with concepts
which are "deficient and inappropriate," chiefly because they are not

really "behavioral" but rather "attitudinal" or "mentalistic" concepts.
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In other words, political science can advance only once it

substitutes genuinely behavioral concepts for the kind of ordinary lan-

guage concepts which the interpretive model retains as essential to the

explanation of political behavior.
Wahkle further indicates his basic differences with the interpretive approach when he states:
The people whom political scientists study are, after
all, no more exempt from the laws of behavioral dynamics
than from the laws of gravity.
The major obstacle to the political scientist's recognition and utili-

zation of such laws or uniformities of human behavior is the over-

rationalized model of the social actor which figures so predominantly

,
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in both the conceptual framework available to ordinary
agents and in

the interpretive approach to social inquiry.

According to Wahkle's

analysis, progress in political science is dependent upon elimination

of this flawed conception of human nature which is linked to the con-

cepts of intention, purpose, meaning and so on.

A genuine political

science will be systematically grounded in the laws of the "biobehavioral sciences" in the same way that astronomy builds upon the laws of

physics and chemistry

Wahkle's article clearly illustrates the pervasive impact of be-

havioralism upon the prevailing conception of what constitutes an
adequate explanation of political attitudes and behavior.

It has long

been a basic tenet of behavioralism that explanation in terms of intentions, reasons, goals, purposes, meanings and so on is inherently non-

scientific.

Moreover, Wahkle's view of conceptual advance in the

social and human sciences as principally a step from mentalistic, pur-

posive concepts to truly behavioral concepts is simply a less radical

statement of

B.

F.

Skinner's vision of a conceptual framework from

which even such basic concepts as freedom and responsibility have been
eliminated through scientific advance.

Finally, Wahkle's use of bio-

politics and "the application of psychophysiological and psychophysical

concepts and methods to the study of political attitudes" at Stony
Brook as examples of how the political scientist is to apply basic

"biobehavioral knowledge" exemplifies another basic assumption of behavioralism:

that we will eventually discover a set of mechanistic

laws operating on the physiological level from which the mechanistic
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laws of human behavior identified in psychology
and the other social

sciences can be derived
In addition, while not all political scientists share
this behav-

ioralist vision of a political science founded on the laws of the

"biobehavioral sciences," similar resistence to explanations of human
behavior in terms of intentions, purposes, and meanings is inherent in

prevailing positivist and empiricist assumptions concerning scientific

method and explanation.

The positivist model of a science of politics

also pictures the eventual disappearance of analyses of political

change and processes which offer explanations involving intentions and

purposes with the discovery of a truly scientific vocabulary which
captures the "deep structure" of political processes.

According to

this conception of scientific advance, political science remains in its
infancy, or perhaps at the stage of alchemy in constrast to chemistry.
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Thus, an interpretive approach to political inquiry, which

holds that certain of the purposive, intentional concepts and explan-

ations used in ordinary discourse about politics must remain essential
to any future analysis of political structure or change, is perceived
as freezing political science in its present state.

In short, the positivist and empiricist accounts of the scientific

method, like behavioralism, treat explanation in terms of intentions,
purposes, goals, reasons and so on as inherently nonempirical

.

Again,

the prevailing assumption is that only mechanistic, causal explanation
is the truly scientific form of explanation,

Behavioralism, positivism

and empiricism present a common view of scientific progress in the

.
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social and human sciences which is modeled on the
defeat of the teleological, purposive mode of description and explanation in the
physical

sciences
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As we have seen, Hampshire's suggestions concerning an alternative,

interpretive approach to political inquiry are founded on

a the-

ory of mind and knowledge that challenges the assumptions regarding

mind and knowledge which underpin this positivist conception of scientific progress in the social and human sciences.

However, in recent

analytic philosophy, the type of philosophy of mind and knowledge which

Hampshire defends, as well as the kind of conceptual analysis which
supports this position, have themselves been challenged by essentially
the same objection posed against the interpretive model.

Hampshire

holds that we cannot provide a coherent or adequate account of mind or

action unless we focus on the concept of intention and related concepts
such as belief, desire, goal and so on.

The standard objection to any

account of mind or action which treated such concepts as essential and

ineliminable has been, of course, that these concepts could be reduced
to or translated into a logically more primitive or purely observa-

tional language.

Since no such reductions or translations have been

successfully completed, the force of this objection to theories of mind
and action which insist upon the nonreducibility of intentional and
J
purposive concepts has dissipated.
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Yet, according to several contemporary analytic philosophers, this

question of reducibility or nonreducibility is actually a side issue
when considering the relationship between ordinary discourse about
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thought and action on the one hand and the scientific
vocabulary used
to explain human motivation and behavior on the other.

The central

issue concerns rather the possibility of providing superior descriptions and explanations of human motivation and behavior which will

replace the central concepts and classifications in our present conceptual system.

These advocates of what Richard Bernstein has labeled

the "displacement hypothesis":

maintain that the conceptual framework in which we
now think of ourselves and others as agents can be
displaced by a radically different scientific frame.

.

.

work.
,
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This challenge to the account of mind and action provided by conceptual

analysts in general and Hampshire in particular is based on the contention that such a displacement is possible and that scientific mate-

rialism is the most promising candidate to replace our present conceptual framework.

Thus, this challenge centers in varieties of

"eliminative materialism," the "displacement view" or the "disappearance form" of the identity thesis advanced by Paul Feyerabend, Richard
Rorty, Wilfrid Sellars and J. J. C. Smart.
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Of course, the central claims of materialism, such as that human
beings are simply complex physical mechanisms or that whatever can be

described or explained in psychological terms can also be described or
explained without loss in purely physical terms, are certainly not new
to philosophy.

In order to understand the recent resurgence of ma-

terialist theories of mind in contemporary analytic philosophy, one
accounts of
would have to examine a series of problems concerning the

4
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consciousness and "inner states" provided by Ryle and
other conceptual
analysts.

In addition, fully sorting out the differences
between

classical materialists and contemporary displacement theorists
as well
as the differences among the various displacement theorists,
would

require careful examination of a complex set of issues regarding
"the
status of persons; the nature of thought and intentionality

;

and the

nature of sensations and feelings."^
However, Bernstein contends that the most basic, common challenge

which the displacement hypothesis presents to the type of account of
mind and action advanced by Hampshire and other linguistic philosophers
is quite clear.

The displacement thesis represents a "radical turn" in

the discussion of the relationship between accounts of action in terms

of intentions, reasons, beliefs, desires, goals and so on and accounts
of action in terms of causes.

Up to this point, it had been a major

tenet of analytic philosophy, both in its earlier reductive form and in

more recent conceptual analysis, that many of the ordinary statements

which human beings make about their own mental states and activities
In contrast, the displacement theorists:

are "meaningful and true."

maintain that despite our strong convictions to
the contrary, the most pervasive and basic types of
assertions we make about our intentions, actions,
.

.

.

,

reasons, motives are (or may be) false

1 1
.

Although conceptual analysis may be useful in setting out the most
basic components of the conceptual framework which agents use in clas-

sifying and characterizing their own thought and actions, it cannot

establish that these basic concepts and categories are essential,

6
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ineliminable and unchallengable features of any adequate
explanation of
human behavior.

In short, the displacement hypothesis challenges the

conclusions which are drawn on the basis of conceptual analysis, particularly the accounts of mind and action constructed upon such an
analysis, and, ultimately, the interpretive conception of social
inquiry.
For example, Feyerabend, who is certainly no defender of posi-

tivist philosophy of science, offers one of the most radical and sweeping statements of this displacement hypothesis.

He acknowledges that

the basic structure of the conceptual framework which materialists

propose for characterizing and explaining sensations, thoughts,
actions, etc., is "incompatible with the structure of the idiom in

which we usually describe pains and thoughts."

1

15

But this incompati-

bility alone certainly does not refute materialism because the fact
that a particular conceptual framework for classifying and charac-

terizing thought and action is in common use is simply "an irrelevant

historical accident."

1 1

In order to refute the materialist thesis,

the defender of the prevailing conceptual framework must demonstrate

its superiority in describing and explaining human motivation and be-

havior.

Moreover, if he is to disprove the materialist philosophy of

mind, the defender of the existing mode of discourse about thought and

action must confront the "fully developed materialistic idiom" (which

Feyerabend predicts will one day replace existing mental and action
concepts), not simply "the bits and pieces of materialese which are

available to the philosophers of today."

1

17
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Feyerabend rejects the claim that "the practical
success" of the
existing classification and characterization of thought
and action

constitutes a legitimate argument supporting this conceptual
framework.
He contends that:

such idioms are adapted not to facts but to
If these beliefs are widely accepted; if they
MiisXs..
are intimately connected with the fears and the hopes of
the community in which they occur; if they are defended,
and reinforced with the help of powerful institutions;
if one's whole life is somehow carried out in accordance
with them then the language representing them will be
regarded as most successful.
At the same time it is
clear that the question of the truth of the beliefs has
.

.

.

,

—

not been touched.
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In his "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," this point is

applied in a detailed analysis of the claim that the materialist thesis
must be false because of the fact of knowledge by acquaintance.

Oppo-

nents of materialism have frequently attempted to counter the materialist suggestion that our present understanding of mental processes and

our use of mental concepts may be inadequate and mistaken by arguing
that persons are directly acquainted with, or possess direct and cer-

tain knowledge of their own sensations, thoughts, intentions, actions
and so on.

However, Feyerabend argues that this "alleged fact of

nature" is not a fact at all, but rather

"...

the result of certain

peculiarities of the language spoken and there fore alterable."
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In

other words, the notion of direct, certain knowledge by acquaintance is
a "philosophical invention" made possible only because of the lack of

content ("No prediction, no retrodiction can be inferred from them

,
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1

.

.

.")

20

of these ordinary language concepts and our everyday state-

ments concerning thoughts, sensations, feelings and so on.

As our

mental concepts are "enriched" by the application of empirical knowledge of

".

.

concommitants

.

.

mental events, their causes, and their physiological
.

.

"

,

the idea that we can directly know mental states

and processes collapses.
In short,
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the conceptual framework used to classify and charac-

terize thought and action in ordinary discourse constitutes a false,

empirically inadequate, and dualistic theory of mind.

This dualistic

theory is not set out openly and systematically and is not presented as
a hypothesis to be tested:

It is rather incorporated into the language spoken in a
fashion which makes it inaccessible to empirical criticism whatever the empirical results, they are not
used for enriching the mental concepts which will therefore forever refer to entities knowable by acquain122

—

tance

This conceptual framework and any philosophy of mind and action based
upon analysis of it are completely circular.

The dualistic theory

embodied in ordinary discourse and conceptual analysis cannot be really
tested by examining "the facts" because the most crucial facts

"...

are formulated in terras of the idiom and therefore already prejudiced
in its favor."^^^

Feyerabend concludes that it essential to develop

alternative theories of mind and action, and that such alternative
theories cannot be judged and evaluated on the basis of established
modes of thinking and talking about mind and action.
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As Bernstein acknowledges, there are weaknesses
in Feyerabend's

position.

Moreover, the stronger and more subtle versions
of the

displacement hypothesis, such as Rorty's, focus on examining
the possibility of the displacement of the existing conceptual framework
rather
than on attacking the legitimacy of ordinary statements about
mental

processes and states.
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Yet, Bernstein contends that Feyerabend's

analysis does provide a useful perspective from which one can assess
the accounts of mind and action that have emerged from conceptual

analysis.

In brief, the displacement hypothesis, even in its crudest

form, poses a powerful and essentially correct challenge to

deep

"

.

.

.

the

priori bias of many ordinary language philosophers."

Bernstein acknowledges that linguistic philosophy has demonstrated
that such concepts as action, intention, goals and responsibility are

central and essential rather than peripheral and incidental to our conceptual framework.

But he argues that no matter how useful and suc-

cessful this conceptual scheme may be for practical human activities
and social life, no matter how inconceivable the kinds of fundamental

conceptual revisions implied by the materialist thesis may seem at the
present

,

the linguistic philosopher cannot legitimately claim that his

analysis of the existing conceptual scheme establishes conceptual or

necessary truths

vrfiich

are immune to refutation or revision on the

basis of empirical evidence.

The a priori bias of contemporary lin-

guistic philosophy is that it dismisses the possibility of providing

mechanistic, causal explanations of human thought and behavior on the

grounds that the notions of intention, purpose, etc., are essential to
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our present ways of thinking and talking about
ourselves and our

activities.

It is this

3.

priQri bias which undercuts the accounts of

mind and action presented by linguistic philosophers and,
in turn, the

interpretive approach to social inquiry which has emerged from linguistic philosophy.

The basic deficiency of linguistic philosophy of mind and action
is that it continues to treat the vocabulary of reasons, intentions and

other concepts used in ordinary language accounts of human behavior as

logically incompatible with the terminology used in mechanical, causal

explanations of behavior.

It is on the basis of this mistaken dicho-

tomy of two mutually exclusive, nonreducible conceptual schemes that

linguistic philosophers have typically drawn a highly contestable

ontological conclusion about human nature and human behavior.

Because

human thought and action cannot be adequately characterized solely in
terms of a completely mechanistic terminology, linguistic philosophy

concludes that the thesis that a human being is nothing but

a

mechanism

subject to the same physical laws as other mechanisms is false.

1

26

Bernstein focuses briefly on the work of Charles Taylor in an
attempt to demonstrate that even those linguistic theorists who recognize that such a conclusion is illegitimate lapse into the same kind of

^

priori philosophical anthropology.

Since they treat teleological and

mechanistic explanations as incompatible rivals, the linguistic theorists inevitably detach their conceptual analyses of mind and action
from empirical psychological investigations.

Even if they do not

our
explicitly reject the materialist thesis because it conflicts with
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present conceptual framework, linguistic philosophers
neglect the

dialectical relationship between conceptual analysis and empirical
analysis, or between philosophy and science.

In short,

the conceptual

analysts, like the practioners of reductive analysis before them, reify

conceptual distinctions into dichotomies and "necessary truths,"
thereby neglecting the manner in which even our most fundamental concepts, distinctions and classifications are modified by the discovery
of new facts or the development of new theories.

1

27

If Bernstein's reading of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind
and action is correct, the displacement hypothesis challenges the

central core of the interpretive approach to social inquiry:

the views

concerning the characterization and explanation of human thought and
action which flow from conceptual analysis.

However, it should be

clear from what has already been said about Hampshire's accounts of

knowledge, mind and action that Bernstein's characterization of conceptual analysis does not accurately or adequately reflect Hampshire's
position.

More generally, Bernstein's account of conceptual analysis,

particularly his sketch of the "new dualism" in linguistic philosophy,

misrepresents or ignores the most important recent analytic treatments
of such issues as reasons and causes, agency and intention, and so
on,^^^

Bernstein's summary of analytic philosophy of mind and action

ignores not only Hampshire's work but also the work of Donald Davidson,

Alasdair Maclntyre and others who have made extensive contributions in
this area.
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Bernstein, like many other critics of recent
linguistic philosophy

of mind and action, seems to take the position
advanced by Norman

Malcolm in "The Conceivability of Mechanism" as representative
of conceptual analysis in general.

""^^

Yet, Hampshire, Davidson, Taylor and

Maclntyre clearly do not take the same stands as Malcolm on such
issues
as the relationship between explanations in terms of reasons, inten-

tions, purposes,

etc, and causal explanations,

the conceivability of

mechanism or the identity theory, whether there are precise psychophysical laws, and whether mental phenomena can be explained in purely
physical terms.

Thus, whereas Bernstein has a case when he maintains

that Malcolm's thesis rests upon certain a priori assumptions chal-

lenged by the displacement theorists, the positions taken by other

linguistic philosophers are not open to the same criticism.

In the

remainder of this chapter, Hampshire's analysis of the problems confronted in the attempt to explain human thought and action will be set

out by contrasting his position with that criticized by Bernstein.
One of Bernstein's principal criticisms of conceptual analysis is
that it treats the explanation of thought and action in terms of

reasons, intentions, purposes and other central concepts in ordinary

language as fundamentally incompatible with causal, mechanistic

explanations of mental processes and human behavior.

In other words,

for the conceptual analyst, explanation in terms of reasons, intentions

and purposes and causal explanations are always and essentially

competing or rival forms of explanation.

Of course, given such a

dichotomy, the materialist claim that one can or will eventually

"
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provide causal, mechanistic explanations of mental
events or human behaviors is automatically a rejection of our everyday
explanations of
thought and action as completely mistaken and false.

Malcolm's argument against the materialist thesis does rest upon
this view of causal and purposive explanations of mental processes or

states and human behavior as logically incompatible rivals.

""^^

How-

ever, as we saw in contrasting Winch's and Hampshire's views on the

reasons-causes distinction, Hampshire's account of the difficulties
faced when providing causal explanations of human thought and action

presupposes no such dichotomy,
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Hampshire expressly rejects the

claim that explanation of human thought and action in terms of reasons,
intentions, etc., constitutes a different kind of explanation than
causal explanation as

undemonstrated

.

"

.

.

.

unclear, and insofar as it is clear,

132

Certainly, this is not to deny that there are significant dif-

ferences or that there is potential conflict between the terminology
used in ordinary discourse to classify and characterize human thought
and action on the one hand and, on the other, a terminology developed
for the scientific explanation of mental processes and human behavior.

For example, in ordinary language, mental states and processes are

identified and distinguished

...

by reference both to their effects in behavior and
to their causes in stimulating conditions, and by reference to typical contemporary thoughts, which the subject may or may not reveal.

133

Since this is, of course, a vocabulary which serves a number of
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different social purposes beyond explanation, it should
come as no
surprise that the criteria of application of these concepts does
not

meet the exacting requirements of a terminology to be used in scientific explanations.
In contrast, a terminology designed for the scientific explanation

of human behavior is limited to "publicly observable and exactly specified features" of behaviors and their "stimulating conditions. "^^^

While such a vocabulary would not adequately serve the more general
social and communicative purposes of ordinary discourse, "it could

reasonably be expected" to generate causal accounts of human behavior

which are properly supported by covering laws or law-like generalizations and to provide explanations of behavior which, unlike ordinary

accounts of human action, are "deterministic in form,"

1

35

Clearly,

Hampshire does hold that there are certain obstacles to the application
of the same types of causal explanation used in the physical sciences
to the explanation of human thought and behavior.

Moreover, he does

argue that such obstacles are presented by special features of the

ordinary vocabulary which social agents use in classifying and characterizing mental states and behavior, particularly when these involve
beliefs and desires.

However, there are fundamental differences

between this argument and Malcolm's claims concerning the inconceivability of a mechanistic account of human thought and action.

Malcolm contends that we can rule out the possibility of a combehavior
pletely mechanistic explanation of mental processes and human
require the
because such a terminology is incompatible with, and would
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total rejection of, the ordinary framework which is used to charac-

terize thought and action.

Hampshire's analysis rejects the two most

essential stages of this argument:

the claim that our ordinary lan-

guage terminology and the causal, mechanistic terminology are always
rivals, and the claim that mechanism is "inconceivable."

In the first

place, Hampshire acknowledges that the same mental event, process or
state, or the same behavior or pattern of behavior, can be explained in

either of these terminologies.

Thus, one might explain a sequence of

thought in terms of the standards of rationality appropriate to ar-

gument

,

in terms of the associative connections which are peculiar to

human thought processes, or in terms of other such explanations which
do not fit the pattern of causal explanation.

As he points out, this

does not mean that this same sequence of thought cannot be explained by

tracing the causal connections between certain "mental states" and
other states, "mental" or "physical."

1

^6

Although such different ex-

planations sometimes prove to be incompatible (this is particularly
evident when either mental processes or behaviors that are characterized in our ordinary terminology as fully under an agent's control are

revealed, under the alternative pattern of explanation, to be influenced by external or unconscious factors over which the agent has no
control)

,

this is not always and necessarily the case.
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Hampshire admits that a number of philosophical problems and
of the
confusions arise when we attempt to reconcile such explanations

different termisame mental state or process, or the same behavior, in
different points of
nologies which express and reflect fundamentally

.
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view.

138

Yet, he has clearly undercut the basic leverage which Malcolm

attempts to apply against the materialist thesis in order to resolve
these difficulties.

In general, Hampshire accepts the proposition

which has been stressed by Malcolm's critics:

"...

that no limits

can be set a priori on the scope of scientific explanation.

More specifically, there is no

a,

"^^^
.

.

.

priori basis for doubting that scien-

tific explanations of mertal events and human actions will actually be
found.

As he states in his essay "Freedom of Mind,"

But I am ready to agree that, given that we have any
true statement of fact about a state of mind, e.g. that
Jones believes that there is a lectern in the next room,
then we can always look for, and may expect ultimately
to find, an explanation of this fact by reference to
some set of initial conditions, which will, in normal
circumstances, constitute sufficient conditions of
Jones' having this belief.
I am also ready to agree
that this request for an explanation of psychological
fact, if pressed far enough, and pressed successfully,
will always include, as one element in the whole explanI am
ation, an experimentally confirming covering law.
ready to agree that there is no ^ priori reason why,
given that a psychological fact is specified by a
description, and given that we hold this description of
the explicandum constant, we should not find an
explanation under a covering law, experimentally

confirmed
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In contrast to Malcolm's inconceivability of mechanism thesis,

Hampshire maintains that there are no
the identity thesis or materialism.

^

priori reasons for ruling out

Much like Feyerabend, he argues

that ordinary language is "so thoroughly dualistic and Cartesian" that

materialist conit is difficult to even make sense of an alternative,

ception of mind.^^^

Moreover, he accuses "Cartesians and common-sense

our present
dualists" of constructing a philosophy of mind based upon

.

,

.
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state of ignorance concerning the "physical mechanisms
of thought. "^^^
In short, he is willing to accept a version of the
materialist

"...

doctrine that the physical states of an organism determine
uniquely

corresponding states of mind," and that

"...

changing states of mind

are instances of lawlike regularities, and are the effects of
assign-

able causes, no less than their physical states.

states in the Preface to his Freedom of Mind

."''^^
.

.

Or, as he

,

Not only the power of thought, but the actual use of
this power by any individual on any particular occasion,
are naturally held to be in principle explicable by
antecedent conditions in the organism, which determine
how this power will be used in any particular

occasion
However, Hampshire contends that few defenders of such a materialist theory have followed Spinoza's lead in setting out comprehen-

sively and consistently the implications of this doctrine, particularly
for a theory of human nature or personality.

With the exploration of

these implications, materialism emerges as a very different kind of

doctrine than that which is championed by either the classical materialists or the contemporary displacement theorists.

In short, because

of the special difficulties in the application of mechanistic, causal

explanations of human thought and action which were identified by

Spinoza
There is ... an unclarity, or even an ambiguity, in
the otherwise acceptable statement that the occurrence
of any state of mind can in principle be explained like
any other natural phenomenon, by reference to an
experimentally confirmed covering law, which correlates
such an occurrence with some set of initial

conditions
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For this reason, the version of materialism which Hampshire
defends is

expressly divorced from several of the major theses or assumptions
which are standardly associated with the identity thesis or

materialism.
First, discussion of the materialist doctrine or, more generally,

of the problems confronted in explaining human thought and action, must
be detached from the general thesis of determinism.

Hampshire states:

A general thesis of determinism, applying to all events
without restriction, is too general to be either falsified, or confirmed, or rendered probable, and is empty
and uninteresting, until it is in some way restricted,
146
or placed in a context within a theory.

This is, of course, not the same as the thesis that there are certain
events, such as those we classify as mental events, which do not have

causes.

Hampshire expressly notes that questions about what caused a

particular event, whether the event is classified as a physical event
or a mental event, are always in order.

Rather, the point is that such

statements as "every event has a cause" or "every event is an instance
of some natural law, which explains its occurrence by reference to some
set of initial conditions" are so general and vague that it is not at

all clear what the thesis of determinism is.
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It is best to begin an

analysis of the materialist theory of mind or the conceivability of

mechanism by setting aside this vacuous thesis of determinism.
Of course, this does not resolve the apparent incompatibility

between the materialist claim that mental states and processes and
freedom of
human behaviors are the effects of assignable causes and the
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thought and action which is attributed to human beings in our daily

discourse and activities.

However, the point is simply that we can

deal with this difficulty by careful analysis of human thought and

action, not by falling back on general ontological statements or ar-

guments about determinism and free will.
Secondly, this alternative materialism breaks completely with
those versions of materialism or the identity thesis which maintain or

suggest that the physical mechanisms associated with all the mental

powers and capacities characteristic of human beings can be explained
in terms of physical structures and processes identified and understood
at the present stage of scientific advance.

Certainly, the kind of

materialism which Hampshire considers tenable does take what can be
termed a "mechanistic" view of man in the sense that it treats human

beings as "complex organisms which function in accordance with the laws
of physics and of chemistry, as do all other biological systems."
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The materialist presumes that there are organic or physical mechanisms

involved in even the most highly advanced mental powers and capacities
of human beings, including various kinds of thought processes and the
use of language.

Thus, it is in principle possible to discover speci-

fic organic or physical states which are associated with particular

mental states or powers.
However, this brand of materialism is "open-ended" because it

acknowledges that the physical mechanisms associated with the most
to be
sophisticated types of human thought and activity are too complex

.
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adequately dealt with given our present knowledge of
biology, physiology and so on.

It anticipates that the organic or physical mecha-

nisms which are involved with the more advanced mental
states and
processes embody physical structures and processes "which are not
yet
recognized, or even envisaged in contemporary physics.
have no

a

Although we

priprj reasons for doubting that various mental states and

processes are determined by certain sets of antecedent condtions, we

definitely possess no exact and detailed knowledge of these postulated

determinants of mental events.

Despite the continuing growth of our

scientific knowledge, the modern materialist, like Spinoza, must confront the fact that:

The relation between specific organic states and specific processes of thought is still a dark area of ig-

norance
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In short, on the basis of the materialist thesis that mental

states and processes involve some kind of organic and, ultimately,

physical mechanism, we cannot draw any conclusions about the nature of
this mechanism.

The mechanisms involved in the higher functions of the

human organism may prove to be radically different from any account of

mechanism which can presently be given or imagined, and they may prove
to be too complex to be adequately explained even if much more sophis-

ticated physiological and biological theories are developed.
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Any

materialist who maintains or assumes that the mechanisms discovered by
future developments in physics, physiology, biology and so on will fit
some pattern presently understood or anticipated at the existing state
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of the physical sciences is guilty of the same kind of
illegitimate,

^

priori theorizing as Malcolm.
Finally, and most importantly, this alternative version of materi-

alism follows Spinoza in attempting to come to terms with the tension

between the materialist belief that all mental states involve or are
dependent upon physical states, and therefore must be the effects of

assignable causes and conform to law-like regularities, and the common
sense belief that there is an essential indeterminacy in human thought
and action because human beings possess the unique power of reflection.
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In other words, this materialism does differ from the stan-

dard doctrine advanced by classical materialists as well as the dis-

placement theorists in insisting that there are features of the

ordinary vocabulary used to identify, classify and characterize mental
states and processes which present very real obstacles to the explan-

ation of human thought and behavior in terms of the same causal model

applicable to physical states and processes.

This view further

detaches the materialist theory considered by Hampshire

f-^om

major

components of the standardly-accepted version of a materialist con-

ception of mind or the identity thesis.
In the first place, this alternative kind of materialism calls for
a radical reformulation of the displacement hypothesis or the thesis

that it is likely or possible that our present psychological vocabulary

will be replaced by a deterministic scientific framework.

Clearly,

and
Hampshire does not ignore the possibility of change in the meaning

thought and
use of the concepts used to characterize and explain human
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behavior in ordinary discourse as a result of empirical and
theoretical
advances in the sciences.

In fact, he acknowledges that

.

.a

terminology adapted to precise causal judgements can be expected sometimes, and for some purposes, to replace the common place terminol-

ogy."
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At the same time, there are certain discernable limits which

any such future scientific terminology, even a materialist one, must

encounter.

In brief, these limits are presented by the use of inten-

tional knowledge as well as empirical knowledge by ordinary social

agents and by the pervasiveness of prepositional attitudes, expressed
by such concepts as believing, intending, planning, knowing, perceiving

,

remembering and desiring, in our psychological vocabulary. 155
Although Hampshire's analyses of these limits invariably cut

across several different issues and are, at least in certain parts,
fragmentary, the major points he makes are clear.

In part, he simply

argues that any such displacement of our ordinary vocabulary by a

strictly scientific vocabulary is highly unlikely.

The kind of termi-

nology envisaged by the displacement hypothesis does provide the basis
for deterministic explanations, and is therefore necessary in order to

develop a technology, "a reliable method of control and manipulation
.

."^^^

.

In contrast, our existing psychological terminology serves a

number of other interests and social purposes besides the collection,

communication and application of empirical knowledge.

Moreover, as we

have seen, the concepts which constitute the basic core of our present

conceptual scheme are themselves essential constituents of existing
social practices, social relationships and a form of life.

While such
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a displacement of our present concept scheme by a causal, deterministic

framework is logically possible, it posits an unlikely future where
fundamental human interests and purposes as well as basic social activities, practices and relationships are discarded, presumably because
"an interest in scientific accuracy and in social engineering" becomes

totally pervasive and predominant in human life.

1

S7

This general line of argument is, in turn, supported by a more

detailed analysis of our psychological terminology and psychological

explanations which indicates additional difficulties in the standard

versions of materialism and the displacement hypothesis.

As we have

seen, the alternative materialism drawn from Spinoza accepts the thesis

that mental states involve, are associated with, or are dependent upon

physical states as well as the thesis that no

^

priori limits can be

set on the possibilities of the scientific explanation of physical

states.

However, Hampshire holds that it does not follow from these

claims that thoughts, beliefs, sentiments and so on can be explained by

reference to physical states and processes alone.
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Thus, he rejects

one of the central claims traditionally associated with materialism:
the claim that purely physical explanations can be provided for mental

phenomena.

This means, of course, that Hampshire repudiates any kind of
can
reductive materialism which asserts that psychological explanations

physical vocabe reduced to explanations in terms of a deterministic

bulary.

Moreover, his analysis challenges one of the central under-

pinnings of modern statements of the displacement hypothesis.

.
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Defenders of the displacement or identity theory have standardly
argued
that support for their theory will be provided by the eventual

discovery of deterministic psychophysical laws which link mental and
physical states.

Yet, if Hampshire's analysis of psychological con-

cepts and psychological explanation is correct, the discovery of such

nomological psychophysical laws is not to be expected.

Although he

admits that "it is entirely natural that psychological explanation
should be modelled to some degree on physical explanation," Hampshire

maintains that:
There are too many independent reasons for insisting
upon the indeterminacy of psychological explanations
when compared with explanations of physical states and
processes
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More specifically, beliefs, desires and other prepositional
attitudes, which are essential to explanations of human behavior, have
three features that set them fundamentally apart from physical phenomena.

First, as we have already seen.
In every case the subject's belief about the nature of
his attitude or sentiment, and also his belief about its
cause, in part determines what his attitude or sentiment
actually is. A man's attitudes and sentiments are modified by his beliefs and doubts about their causes.
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In other words, while we certainly can provide causal explanations of

beliefs, desires and other prepositional attitudes, such causes have a

unique and ineliminable feature.

A

person's own belief about the

causes of his desires, sentiments, beliefs and so on is itself a causal
factor affecting these prepositional attitudes.

This absence of a

on the
"clear independence of cause and effect" imposes a complexity

^

,
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cause-effect relationship in the realm of human thought and behavior
which is not present in the cause-effect relationship in the sphere of
physical states and processes

.

Secondly, human beings constantly evaluate and assess their own
beliefs, attitudes and other states of mind, including analysis of

their origins or causes, and this process of reflection and criticism

frequently changes their mental states.

Since such reflection on the

causes and effects of particular mental states is "indefinitely openended," the attempt to explain mental states in terms of the covering

law model of causation collapses completely.

Again as we have already

seen, Hampshire considers this ref lexiveness of thought as marking the

single most important difference between the explanation of human

thought and behavior and the explanation of physical phenomena.

He

states
The really distinguishing feature of the causes of
belief, and of mental causes generally, is the incalculable regress of reflection by the subject who in-

vestigates his own state of mind.
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Moreover, such reflection and reflexivity is so central to the iden-

tification and classification of mental states that there is

a further

"indeterminacy" inherent in human thought which has no parallel in the
physical world.

In short, the explanation of human thought and behav-

ior is complicated by the ever-present possibility that a person's

state of mind:

may at some specific time be indeterminate, in the
sense that no clear and definite account of it is true.
.

.
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and that the only true account is one that shows con
tradiction and confusion, because the subject's mind is
not made up.
A third barrier to deterministic explanations of human thought
and

behavior is that the causal determinants of beliefs and other prepositional attitudes and desires include a complex network of other
thoughts, beliefs, attitudes and desires, most of which lie below the
level of consciousness.

Psychological explanations must take into

account not only those thoughts, beliefs and attitudes of which
subject is aware but also the vast store

"...

a

of collateral know-

ledge, beliefs, suppositions and assumptions which are all the time

having their effects on behavior."
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The identification and analysis

of such connections between thought and behavior is an extremely complex and difficult enterprise, and this constitutes yet another major

difference between the explanation of human thought and action and the
explanation of physical events.
In short, Hampshire's argument is that these three features common
to all beliefs,

prepositional attitudes and sentiments, and belief-

dependent or thought-dependent desires impose an indeterminacy or
"looseness" on explanations of human thought and behavior that stands
in sharp contrast with "the strictness and reliability of counterfac-

tual judgments which an applied science requires."
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The terminology,

particularly such concepts as belief and desire, which is absolutely
essential to the explanation of human behavior is simply incompatible
to the
with the standard type of deterministic explanation appropriate

542

physical sciences.

Thus, we have solid reasons for rejecting that

picture of a future science of human behavior resting on deterministic

psychophysical laws which is expressly championed or implicitly assumed
by behaviorists, positivists and displacement theorists.

Neither the psychologist nor the political scientist can explain
the more sophisticated forms of human behavior unless he attributes

beliefs, desires, intentions, goals and so on to social agents.

But in

order to do this, the social scientist must work within a conceptual

framework which includes the agent's own concepts, ideas and beliefs
and which is fundamentally different from the conceptual scheme used in

the physical sciences.

The attempt to substitute another terminology

which meets the requirements of deterministic explanation can be
achieved only at the cost of changing the scope of inquiry from the
study of human behavior to the study of something else entirely.

Moreover, it is completely unrealistic to expect that the social

sciences will follow the same stages and direction of development

marked by the advance of the physical sciences.
Of course, it is possible to accept the basic thrust of

Hampshire's analysis of psychological concepts and psychological explanation and, at the same time, insist that the displacement hypothesis still has a legitimate point.

For example, Donald Davidson

accepts a similar notion of "the nomological irreducibility of the

psychological" and also concludes that we cannot attain, in the study
and
of human behavior, the same degree of precision of explanation
sciences.
prediction which is in principle possible in the physical
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However, he states,
This does not mean there are any events that are in
themselves undetermined or unpredictable; it is only
events as described in the vocabulary of thought and
action that resist incorporation into a closed deterministic system. These same events, described in appropriate physical terms, may be as amenable to pre-

diction and explanation as any.^^^
In other words, the displacement hypothesis, properly restated, still

places restrictions of the kind of conclusions about the human and
social sciences drawn from an analysis like Hampshire's.

Davidson's work can thus be read as one of the most sophisticated
and powerful challenges to the philosophy of mind which Hampshire

advances and, in turn, of an interpretive model of political inquiry.
But before we turn to the specific objection touched upon above, it is

important to note the various ways in which Davidson'

s

analysis moves

away from the kind of displacement thesis championed by Feyerabend and
toward Hampshire's own position.

In the first place, Davidson main-

tains that there are no strict psychophysical laws or, more specifically, that "there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of

which mental events can be predicted and explained.

..."

1
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Rejecting the notion that support for the identity theory must come
from the discovery of such laws, he advances a position called

"anomalous monism."

Anomalous monism, much like the kind of materi-

or
alism Hampshire discusses, holds that mental states are dependent

subservient to physical states, but rejects the claim that mental
explanations.
states and processes can be given strictly physical
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In addition, this thesis concerning the nomological
irreducibility

of our psychological terminology is supported by an
analysis of psycho-

logical concepts, particularly intentions, beliefs, desires
and other

prepositional attitudes, which parallels Hampshire's work at several
points.

For example, Davidson like Hampshire emphasizes "the holistic

character of the cognitive field":
Beliefs and desires issue in behavior only as modified
and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes
and attendings, without limit.
Clearly this holism of
the mental realm is a clue both to the autonomy and to
the anomalous character of the mental.

1

6Q

Thus, in order to increase the explanatory power of our theories of

human behavior, we must provide increasingly comprehensive accounts of
this "whole system of the agent's beliefs and motives.
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As

Davidson expressly acknowledges, such a pattern of explanation necessarily relies on standards of coherence, consistency and rationality

which are absent in standard deterministic explanations of physical
phenomena.
Finally, on the basis of this analysis of psychological concepts
and psychological explanation, Davidson draws conclusions about the

nature of the human and social sciences which are again similar to
His own summary of the position which he sets out in his

Hampshire's.

article "Psychology as Philosophy" states:
the study of human action, motives, desires,
beliefs, memory and learning, at least so far as these
are tied to the so called prepositional attitudes',
cannot employ the same methods as, or be reduced to, the
.

.

.

'

more precise physical sciences.

.

:
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More generally, Davidson is critical of attempts to model the
study of

human behavior and social phenomena on the same type of methodology

which is appropriate in the physical sciences.

He explicitly notes

that the thesis of the nomological irreducibility of the psychological

means
that the social sciences cannot be expected to
develop in ways exactly parallel to the physical
sciences, nor can we expect ever to be able to explain
and predict human behavior with the kind of precision
.

.

.

that is possible in principle for physical phenomena. 172

But it is, of course, precisely at this point that Davidson ap-

pears to have serious reservations about the kind of analysis of mind
and politics presented by Hampshire.

For Hampshire seems to suggest

that there is something inherent in the nature of human behavior or

social phenomena which imposes these limits on the social and human

sciences.

In contrast, Davidson maintains that;

The limit thus placed on the social sciences is set not
by nature, but by us when we decide to view men as
rational agents with goals and purposes, and as subject
to moral evaluation.
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Certainly, Davidson is willing to admit that the conceptual framework
or common idiom with which we classify and characterize human thought

and behavior is "removed from the direct reach of physical law" because
deterministic
it is composed of different constituent elements than a

conceptual scheme used to explain the physical world.
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However,

derives
The constitutive force of the realm of behavior
like
from the need to view others, nearly enough, as

ourselves

175
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In other words, the anomalism of the mental follows not from some

intrinsic features of human beings, human thought, or human behavior,
but rather as a corollary of a conceptual scheme which portarys human

beings as autonomous, rational agents.
Clearly, Davidson's position represents a significant break with
those versions of materialism, the displacement hypothesis or identity

theory which envision the eventual discovery of deterministic psychophysical laws.
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Moreover, his analysis documents how radical and

sweeping a displacement of our ordinary conceptual framework would be
and identifies the major reasons why such a displacement is not to be

expected.

However, from Hampshire's perspective, Davidson still fails

to acknowledge fully the interdependence of the conceptual scheme which

we use to characterize thought and action on the one hand and funda-

mental human interests, purposes and goals as well as essential features of human life on the other.

This failure is especially evident

in his claim that the limits of the human and social sciences are not

established "by nature," but rather reflect some kind of decision or
choice to view human beings as rational, autonomous agents.
More specifically, Davidson fails to recognize the full impli-

cations of the fact that:
the
The defects of the psychological vocabulary, from
to
not
point of view of deterministic explanation, are
the
that
be eliminated without frustrating the purposes

vocabulary serves.
suited to the task of
Of course, our psychological terminology is
as well as reporting
explaining the motivation and behavior of others
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or communicating information about our own thoughts, beliefs,

intentions and activities.

At the same time,

this vocabulary is also

designed to serve the purposes of human beings as agents rather than as
passive observers of themselves and others.

In other words, this same

conceptual framework is essential to and linked to the basic interests
and purposes of beings who must confront situations where one is

uncertain or unclear about what he believes or desires and must make up
his mind about what he actually believes or wants to do, where one is

reflecting on his own beliefs or desires (including their origins or
causes) as part of a conscious process of criticism and correction, or

where one must formulate intentions or decide what he will try to do on
some future occasion.
It is this latter set of interests and purposes which are incom-

patible with and would be frustrated by a deterministic conceptual
framework.

The classical materialists and the displacement theorists

posit the possibility or liklihood not simply of a changed psychological vocabulary but also of a changed world in which these basic

interests and purposes, as well as the forms of life they relect, disappear.

of
It is not simply a world in which people no longer speak

are never
freedom and responsibility, but a world in which human beings
find themselves
faced with conflicting beliefs and desires and never

confused or uncertain about what they believe or want.

Moreover, it is

the sources and nature of their
a world in which human beings find that

are no longer open to criticism
own thought processes and mental states
in which human beings are no
and correction through reflection, and
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longer capable of formulating intentions to intervene in the
causal

pattern that has determined their thinking and behavior in the past.

Hampshire maintains that any such materialist vision of

a

future

where deterministic laws have displaced our psychological vocabulary is

fundamentally flawed because

"...

these are intrinsic features of

thought and mental processes generally," which are not to be eliminated
by any sort of refinements in our psychological vocabulary

^"^^
.

Davidson's reservation about such an argument seems to be that one can
legitimately claim only that these are features of mental states and
processes as characterized within our psychological vocabulary.

In

other words, the principle of the anomalism of the mental concerns only

events described as mental events within a vocabulary which has different conditions and commitments than that part of our conceptual

framework which is used to explain physical phenomena.

Thus, Hampshire

cannot legitimately make such claims about "intrinsic features" or the
true nature of thought processes, mental states, human behavior or

anything else on the basis of an analysis of the psychological

vocabulary commonly used to describe and explain mental events.
However, this objection presupposes a dichotomy between our psy-

chological vocabulary and the actual nature of the beliefs, attitudes,
sentiments and other mental states of those who use this terminology
mind,
which is, according to Hampshire's account of knowledge and

untenable.

Davidson suggests that we must treat the psychological

vocabulary as simply part of
describe and explain

a

a

conceptual scheme which is used to

reality that is always and essentially given am

1
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independent of the describer, observer or knower.

Yet,

if Hampshire is

correct, the principal difference between the
psychological vocabulary
and the physical vocabulary is that the former
encompasses a wide

spectrum of cases ranging from pain sensations, impulses and
other
mental states which an individual passsively experiences to the kind
of

reflective desires, interests and so on which are formed as the outcome
of a process of thought.

1

A

The central failing of crude materialism, in both its classical
and modern versions, is its neglect of this latter category of mental

states.

Materialists focus exclusively on examining mental states from

the standpoint of the scientific observer and ignore the significant

question of what it would be like to be

a

materialist

"...

living and

acting with some of the specific knowledge that a materialist claims
must be obtainable,"

1
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Davidson's analysis shares these failings

because he uncritically accepts contestable empiricist assumptions

concerning thought and the role of our psychological vocabulary in
reflexive thought processes.
Clearly, there are some significant differences between the ac-

count of mind and action offered by Hampshire and the alternative

analysis of mind and action presented by Davidson.

Moreover, the

proceeding summary discussion only begins to get at these differences
and treats only a very small part of the extensive set of problems and

issues, centering in philosophy of mind but reaching into epistemology
and metaphysics, that surround the claims of materialism, the identity

thesis and the displacement hypothesis.

In short, Davidson's work
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illustrates that Hampshire's account of mind remains open to challenge
and that it certainly does not resolve or dissolve all the problems

addressed in traditional and contemporary philosophy of mind.
At the same time, despite these differences, both Hampshire's work

and Davidson's analysis of mind and action pose similar challenges to

central empiricist, positivist and behavioralist assumptions underpinning the dominant view of the present state and future direction of

political inquiry, or of the social and human sciences in general.

In

this, they are representative examples of one of the strongest currents
in recent linguistic philosophy.

While there is clearly no consensus

among contemporary philosophers concerning the basic elements of a

viable philosophy of mind and action, there is wide-spread dissatisfaction with the principal assumptions concerning mind and action which
are unref lectively incorporated in contemporary political theory and

research.

Thus, the work of Davidson as well as that of Hampshire

illustrates the kind of reexamination and assessment of long accepted

philosophical premises which has nutured the interpretive model of
political inquiry.

Moreover, careful analysis of this work indicates

the extent to which it has been mischaracterized and misunderstood by

both defenders of the positivist model as well as theorists who express
some sympathy with the linguistic turn and the interpretive model of

social inquiry.
both
First, in regard to the present stage of political inquiry,
are no basic
theorists raise strong objections to the notion that there

sciences, or
methodological differences between the social and physical
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the notion that the social scientist can construct empirical social
and

political theories in the same way as in the physical sciences.

Davidson holds that the psychologist, like the ordinary agent, cannot
explain complex human behavior without attributing beliefs, desires,
goals, intentions and meanings to agents.

But beliefs, desires and

other parts of what Davidson calls the cognitive field cannot be dis-

tinguished and classified in the same way as physical events because
they form a complex, holistic system.

An adequate explanation of human

behavior must provide some account of the overall pattern of this
system or field, and this requires the application of standards of

rationality, coherence and consistency.

Moreover, the attribution of

beliefs and other prepositional attitudes is necessarily linked to the
concepts, distinctions and classifications which are available in our
language.

Thus, in order to provide a coherent account of beliefs

and other components of the cognitive field, the psychologist presup-

poses some theory of meaning and language, however crude or unreflective it might be.
In short, the psychologist cannot escape the task of interpre-

tation and the philosophical issues and problems which are inherent in
this task.

Psychologists, to the extent that they use concepts of

conbelief, desire and other prepositional attitudes, as well as the

learncepts which are logically connected to these (e.g. perception,
ing,

the
action), cannot employ the same methods which are used in

physical sciences

""^^
.

There is no way for the psychologist concerned

human behavior to
with the explanation of the more advanced forms of
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escape the "necessarily holistic character of interpretations of prepo-

sitional attitudes" or the "normative element" which is always present

m

the attribution of such attitudes.

1
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Davidson's analysis thus challenges the notion of psychology as a
science of human behavior modeled on the physical sciences and traces
the linkages between psychology and philosophy.

Hampshire's suggestion

that the explanatory frameworks and theories used throughout the social

sciences, including political inquiry, necessarily include some account
of human nature or theory of human motivation and behavior extends this

analysis.

For if this is correct, the same interpretive task and the

same philosophcial issues and problems raised by this task, which

Davidson discusses in relation to psychology, are involved in all explanations and theories of social and political phenomena.

Both

Davidson and Hampshire demonstrate that there is a much closer relationship between philosophy and the social and human sciences than the

positivist conception of a science of politics or society acknowledges.
One of the major strengths of Hampshire's work is that he, much more
than Davidson in particular or analytic philosophy in general, explores

these connections between philosophy and social inquiry, or between

mind and politics.
Both Davidson and Hampshire emphasize that the kind of interprebetween
tive task which emerges from their analysis of the connections
to the
philosophy and the social and human sciences is not a return

kind of

A

anthropriori philosophical psychology and philosophical

philosophy.
pology characteristic of traditional political

Hampshire
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in particular notes that the generation of such grandiose, broadscale

hypotheses or theories of human nature is not a promising path for
future advance in the social sciences.

sciences will advance

,

He suggests that the social

.by subdividing

into the more specialized

sciences of human behavior and reaction, and by showing the complexity
of human, as of animal organization," and that such advance can be

expected to replace completely

^

priori anthropology.

1 ftft

At the same time, Hampshire and, to a lesser extent, Davidson,

express real reservations about the conception of such advance in the

human and social sciences which is tied to empiricism, positivism and

behavioralism.

As we have seen, both Davidson and Hampshire reject as

fundamentally mistaken the vision of

a future science of

human behavior

or politics as grounded in a set of deterministic psychophysical laws

that is advanced by Wahlke and the behavioralists as well as many of
the materialists.

But, at this point, Davidson seems to hold that to

say anything more about the probable limits of scientific advance in

the social sciences would be to impose

on empirical fields of inquiry.

^

priori conceptual restraints

Moreover, he has nothing more to offer

about what the psychologist or social scientist can do or should do
about the difficulties concerning the explanation of human behavior

which he has identified.
to know
In contrast, while Hampshire argues that we cannot claim

^

holds, we can
priori what the future of the social and human sciences

problems which social
certainly identify and analyze the most important

behavior and social phescientists face in attempting to explain human
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nomena.

In particular, we know that in the case of mental states,

unlike physical states, there is no clear independence of cause and
effect because mental states are modified by beliefs about their
causes.
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In other words, it is clear that it is the problem of re-

flexivity, or to use a more traditional terminology, self-consciousness, which is the principal source of our present uncertainty about

the future of psychology in particular and the social sciences in

general. Certainly, it remains unclear:

whether allowance can be made within a psychological or social theory for the effect upon the individual or the society of a belief that the theory is true:
whether therefore laws of nature, of a precise and
applicable kind, can or cannot be formulated in psychology and sociology in spite of the complexities of
,

.

.

self-consciousness.
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But the dominant model of scientific explanation and theory, with its

empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, does not even
provide a base for raising these issues and problems which center in
the reflexive relation between theory and fact in the social and human

sciences.

.
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